





'V 



^^ « 







,v- 







M 






*"* *■ 



"^y^^ 



%>^ * o « o ^ ^^^ 



>.... .^ 



1'^ 



o > 




-*U.o< 







^oV" 


























CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 



(5o6 



A Contribution to a Philosophy of Theisivi 



BY 



REV. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S. T. L. 
Author of Christian Philosophy : A Treatise on the Human Soul 



BENZIGER BROTHERS 

Printers to the Holy Apostolic See, 

NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO : 
I goo. 

L 



3^^/ 



Office of t^Q t^ I 

Heglst«r of Copyrights* 



Nihil obstat. 

Rev. F. X. McGOWAN, O. S. A., 

Censor Deputatus, 

6002S 

Imprimatur 

^ MICHAEL AUGUSTINE. 

Archbishop of New York. 
New York, February loth, 1900. 



Copyright, 1900, 
By John T. Driscoll. 



SfcCJJ>iD GOPY, 



S"^ 



o o , 



TO MY 

fB^otbet 

who first spoke to me of God and urged me ever 
to be faithful and true in His service 

THIS VOLUME 

is 

DEVOTEDLY INSCRIBED 



PREFACE, 



In 1890 a translation of Father Hettinger's Apology by 
Father Bowden of the Oratory appeared under the title of 
Natural Religion. The great reputation of the writer drew 
attention to the work. Many criticisms appeared and of espe- 
cial interest was an article on '* Reason Alone " — "A Reply 
to Father Sebastian Bowden," in the Fortnightly Review, Nov. 
1890, by W. H. Mallock. The importance of the problem was 
brought clearly to mind. Convinced that the existence of God 
was a certainty — how present this truth to the mind of the 
present day? This volume is the fruit of the thought and study. 

The success attending the publication of the work on the 
Human Soul constrained the writer to adopt the comparative 
method with this treatise also. The subject is heavy and 
abstruse in parts. An effort has been made to render the 
reading as easy as possible. Hence the illustrations, and 
references to modern literature, and relegation of doubts and 
controversies to the notes at the foot of the page. 

The line of thought worked out in this volume is a depart- 
ure from that followed in many treatises on the subject. The 
writer takes the idea of God as a fact of consciousness. The 
question is not how the idea came to the individual mind. 
But are we justified in holding the idea, and what is its con- 
tent? Hence an investigation into the grounds of the idea. 
Viewed in this aspect, it becomes a study in Psychology. 
Now, as the idea of God is not an individual but a universal 
fact, the course of investigation is of more than a personal 
value. It is a study of the human mind. 

Some particular questions, e. g.^ capability of the mind to 
conceive the Infinite, the problem of Personality are not dis- 

[v] 



VI PREFACE. 

cussed at length. The latter notion has been examined in the 
volume on the Human Soul. The former pertains to a treatise 
on the Theory of Knowledge, whose proper place is in the 
Philosophy of Mind. This treatise is published in the hopes 
that it will bring light and comfort to those who believe, and 
help dispel the clouds of error and misunderstanding under 
which so many are struggling. 

The writer acknowledges the debt of gratitude to the kind 
friends who have in word and deed encouraged the progress 
of the writing, and so carefully examined the proof-sheets of 
the work. 

Dec. 8th, 1899. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



Agnosticism. 

I. Modern Philosophy compared to: page. 

(i) Greek Philosophy, V cent. , B. C. 6 

(2) Scholasticism of 13th cent. 6 

II. Agnosticism: 
(i) Origin: 

(a) the term : Mr. Huxley 7 

(b) the doctrine: fundamentally the same as Greek Scepti- 

cism, but circumstances are different 7 

(2) Development: 

(a) philosophical: Real Phenomenalism, e. g., Locke; 

Ideal Phenomenalism, e. g., Kant; both combine in 
Huxley, Spencer, etc S 

(b) scientific: decline of Hegel; rise and spread of phys- 

ical science 12 

(c) false representations of religious truth 15 

III. Doctrine: 

(i) with Tyndall, Huxley: fragmentary 16 

(2) with Spencer: systematic 17 

(a) phenomenon and noumenon. 

(b) Relativity of Knowledge, e.g., Hamilton, Mill, Grote, 

Spencer. 

IV. Criticism: 

(i) true method 19 

(2) True and false Agnosticism 21 

(3) contradictions of Mr. Spencer 22 

(4) Philosophy of Religion 23 

V. Influence: in Science, Biblical Studies, Theology, Literature ... 23 

CHAPTER II. 
The Fact. 

Belief in God a psychological fact 26 

I. U niversal in place, , , , , 27 

[vii] 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

II. Universal in time: primitive monotheism. 29 

(i) in general 29 

(2) speciatim: 

(a) Indo-EuropSLns: 

(i) Hindus 30 

(2) Persians 33 

(3) Greece and Rome 35 

(4) conclusion 35 

(b) Egyptians 36 

(c) China 37 

(dj Semites 38 

(e) Savages: 

(i) Individual testimony 39 

(2) Traditions , 41 

(3) theory of evolution disproved 41 

(3) Conclusion: primitive purity, degeneracy, primitive revela- 

tion, monotheism = 42 

III. Expression of the Fact: 

(i) by moral and metaphysical relations 43 

(2) by phenomena of the external world 44 



CHAPTER III. 

Origin of the Belief. 

I. Theory of Innate Ideas. . 45 

1. Defenders 46 

2. Criticism: 

(a) False Assumption 47 

(b) False basis. 

(c) Idea of God. 

II. Theory of Evolution , 49 

1. Defenders: Spencer 50 

2. Criticism 53 

(a) Assumptions. 

(b) False. 

(c) Fallacious. 

III. Theory of Theosophy 55 

1. Teaching. 

2. Forms: 

(a) Ontologism: 

(i) De Bonald, Bonnetti 56 



CONTENTS. IX 

III. Theory of Theosophy — Continued. page. 

(2) Neo-Hegelians 57 

(3) Criticism. , 58 

(b) Special faculty: 

(i) Forms 58 

(2) Muller 58 

(3) Criticism 59 

(c) Theory of feeling: 

(i) Defenders 59 

(2) Doctrine. 

(3) Criticism. 

IV. Theory of Christian Philosophy , 60 

1. Sources. 

2. Teaching. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Mental Life. 

I. Grounds for idea of God in consciousness 63 

II. Errors: 

(i) The ^/!'rzWz proof: Anselm, Scotus, DesCartes, Leibnitz... 64 

(2) The Neo-Hegelian: Fichte, Hegel, The Neo-Hegelians .... 67 

III. Theory of Christian Philosophy 70 

(i) Method a posteriori 71 

(2) Argument. 

(a) The universal idea viewed as to its content 72 

(b) The judgment: first principles > 75 

(c) Reasoning: error, mathematics, reign of truth 76 

(d) St. Augustine, Bossuet, Fenelon — the facts of ignor- 

ance, of discovery 78 

teaching 79 

IV. Criticism of Prof. Royce: criticism . 80 

CHAPTER V. 

Moral Life, 

Argument is two-fold: law of conscience and aspirations of the 

soul 83 

I. Argument from conscience 84 

1°. The Moral Order: 

(i) right and wrong 84 

(2) obligation, moral necessity and moral order 85 

(3) sanction in the individual and in history 86 



X ' CONTENTS. 

I. Argument from conscience — Continued. page. 

2°. Conscience. 87 

(i) the voice of the moral law. 
(2) its nature and office. 
3°. Argument 88 

(i) how formulated. 

(2) its conclusion: a just and good God. 

4". Errors, ^. ^., Kant 89 

(i) his notion of morality. 

(2) Independent morality, e.g., Neo-Kantians, disciples 

of culture, ethical societies, etc. 
(3") criticism. 

II. Argument from fundamental desires. 91 

i^. aspiration for truth. 
2° . love of the good. 
3°. desire of life. 
4°. longing for happiness. 
5°. man's religious nature. 
Conclusion ; force of the argument 93 

CHAPTER VI. 

Contingency. 

I. Basis of the argument: the fact of change 96 

II. The argument 97 

(i) chemistry 97 

(2) Physics: 

(a) mechanical physics 99 

(b) Thermo-Dynamics 100 

(3) Astronomy 103 

(4) Geology 105 

(5) Biology 106 

(6) Anthropology no 

(7) Mathematics in 

Conclusion. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Causality. 
I. The principle: 

(i) cause „ 117 

(2) efficient cause: its nature 118 

(3) how expressed: 

(a) every effect has a cause 119 



CONTENTS. XI 

I. The principle — Continued. page. 

(b) the dependent demands the independent. 120 

(c) a thing beginning to be demands a reason for the 

beginning 120 

(4) how proved , 121 

II. Errors 121 

(i) Hume: 

(a) genesis of cause: its value 122 

(b) criticism: experience — value of Hume's position. . . 122 
(2) Mill: 

(a) nature of cause 125 

(b) criticism 125 

III. Argument 126 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Motion. 

I. The Principle 129 

(i) motion: potential and kinetic energy 130 

(2) definition of Aristotle 131 

II. Errors: Hegel . 131 

(i) The TO fieri. „ 132 

(2) criticism: 

(a) false philosophically 132 

(b) false scientifically « 133 

(c) falsity of Neo-Hegelianism 133 

III. The Argument 133 

IV. The Argument from Local Motion , 133 

(i) nature of local motion 134 

(2) nature of attraction: 

(a) theory of Mechanists 135 

(b) theory of Dynamists 137 

(3) objections: 

(a) eternal motion 138 

(b) Kant's theory 139 

V. Argument from Mutation 140 

(i) question stated 140 

(2) basis: 

(a) everything in motion is moved by something else . . . 140 

(b) infinite series impossible 143 

(3) reducible to local motion .- 144 

VI. Conclusion 145 



xii CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I 

Order. page. 

History — importance I47 

I. Basis 148 

final cause: question stated 149 

n. The Fact 151 

(i) efficient and final cause 151 

(2) final cause necessary: 

(a) Physiology 152 

(b) Psychology , 153 

(c) Ethics 154 

HI. The Principle 156 

(i) nature « -. 156 

(2) Proof 157 

(a) facts: hypothesis of chance. 

(b) conscious experience. 

(c) animal life. 

(d) external nature: nature and art 

(e) material universe. 

IV. Theories 161 

i". Mechanical: 

(a) doctrine ........ 161 

(b) criticism 162 

2°. Evolution: 

(a) forms: Monism, Agnosticism, Darwinism 165 

(b) criticism 165 

3°. Pantheism: Schoppenhauer, Hartman 172 

V. Theory of Christian Philosophy 174 

1°. Doctrine. 
2°. Proof: 

(i) by exclusion. 

(2) by reasoning from facts. 

(3) method and conclusion. 

CHAPTER X. 

Creation. 

I. Theory of Pantheism 179 

i'^. Theory of Emanation l8o 

(i) doctrine. 



CONTENTS. Xlll 

I. Theory of Pantheism — Continued. page. 

(2) forms: 

(a) India 181 

(b) Gnostics 182 

(c) Neo-Platonism 183 

(d) Erigena 183 

(e) Cousin 184 

(3) criticism 185 

2°. Theory of Manifestation 185 

(i) doctrine. 

(2) forms: 

(a) India 186 

(b) Stoic 187 

(c) Spinoza 188 

(3) Influence 189 

3°. Transcendental Theory. > 190 

(i) doctrine. 
(2) forms: 

(a) Vedanta 191 

(b) German Transcendentalism 198 

II. Dualistic Theory 200 

(i) history and forms 200 

(2) Ethical dualism 201 

III. Theory of Creation 202 

(i) notion 202 

(2) proof 204 

CHAPTER XI. 

Unity. 

I. Unity . . 209 

II. Simple Unity 211 

(1) not collective unity 211 

(2) not potential unity 213 

(3) not abstract unity 217 

III. Theory of Christian Philosophy 223 

(i) simple unity , 223 

(2) not a physical composite, e. g., body. 223 

(3) not a metaphysical composite, e. g., soul 224 

(4) not a logical composite 227 

(5) God a pure act, a pure spirit 228 

Immanence and Transcendence of God 229 



XIV CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XII. 



Providence. page. 

Question stated , 231 

I. Notion of Providence : law, government, order, meaning of law, 233 

II. The Material World 235 

reign of law: Astronomy, Chemistry, Physics: 

III. Organic World 240 

reign of law: Biology, Anatomy, Physiology. 

IV. Difficulties: 

(i) perturbations in stellar universe, e. g.. Astronomy, Mete- 
orology 246 

(2) prodigality in organic kingdom 248 

(3) useless organs 250 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Prayer. 

The question 253 

I. The Fact ., 254 

II. Theory of Modern Science 255 

(i) prayer opposed to physical laws: its true value 256 

(2) criticism 258 

III. Miracles . 260 

(i) nature 260 

(2) Errors: 

(a) Pantheists: Spinoza, Spencer, Hegel , 265 

(b) Physical Scientists 266 

(c) facts denied, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley 268 

IV. Special Providences 270 

(i) nature 270 

(2) how illustrated 271 

V. Conclusion ^ 273 

CHAPTER XIV. 

Pessimism. 

I. Buddhism.. 276 

(i) origin , . . 276 

(2) doctrine: 

(i) Buddhism of Gotama 278 

(2) Four Noble Truths 279 



CONTENTS. XV 

PAGE. 

II. Schoppenhauer 283 

(i) doctrine: 

(a) sources, basis 283 

(b) will the only reality 284 

(c) value of life: 

(a) a priori 285 

(b) a posteriori 286 

(2) criticism: 

(a) theory of knowledge false 287 

(b) principle is false 287 

III. Hartman 289 

(i) doctrine: 

(a) genesis, the unconscious, matter and mind 289 

(b) Hedonism, value and goal of life, 290 

(2) criticism 291 

IV. Influence 292 

V. Causes 294 

(i) Philosophical. 

(2) Ethical. 

(3) Religious. 

CHAPTER XV. 

Evil. 
I. The Problem 297 

(i) nature of evil. 

(2) nature and kinds of good. 

II. In the Material World 300 

(i) Principle of finality 300 

(2) ends, tendencies, final cause , 303 

(3) mutual fitnesses, existence of goodness fundamental and 

universal 305 

III. In Human Life 307 

(i) Theory of Hedonism: 

(a) exposition , 308 

(b) criticism 308 

(2) Theory of Utilitariarism: 

(a) exposition. 310 

(b) Empirical, Intuitional and Evolutionary Ethics 311 

(c) criticism 312 

(3) Theory of Christian Philosophy 314 

(a) in Animal Life: tendencies; pleasure and pain; animal 

and human pain 314 



xvi CONTENTS. 

III. In Human Life — Continued. page. 

(b) in Human Life: 

(i) good, and moral order 316 

(2) nature of evil 317 

(3) physical pain and moral evil . . . , 319 

(4) pain in Human Life 319 

IV. Conclusion 320 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Natural and Supernatural. 

The Problem 322 

I. Theory of Positivism 322 

(a) teaching. 

(b) supernatural. 

(c) idea of humanity. 

(d) criticism. 

II. Theory of Pantheism , 326 

(a) teaching. 

(b) defenders. 

III. Theory of Dr. Bushnell 329 

(a) teaching. 

(b) criticism. 

IV. Theory of Christian Philosophy 332 

(a) natural. 

(b) supernatural. 



Conclusion. 



335 



INTRODUCTION. 



§ I. God is the greatest word ia language, the most 
profound and far-reaching problem in philosophy.^ 
Found on the lips of every rational creature, it yet un- 
folds a depth of meaning which the greatest intelligence 
has never exhausted. It enters into the lowliest lives 
to restrain, uplift and sanctify. In times of sore trial 
the thought of God is like a beacon in the gloom, 
breaking through the darkest cloud with a ray of hope, 
and brings the message of light and peace, and hap- 
piness beyond. Speak of God to the sorrow-laden and 
depressed; their burden becomes Hghter and their 
heart more strong. The great astronomer, after untold 
labor spent in investigating the laws of the heavenly 
bodies, lifts his soul in humble thanksgiving to God 
for the unutterable joys experienced in the contempla- 
tion of His works.'* To bring a message about God to 
our fellow-men is the highest duty and privilege. The 
message is a glad tidings to the human soul which 
ever yearns for more knowledge concerning its 
origin and destiny. " Thou hast made us for Thy- 
self, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rest in 
Thee.'" 

§ 2. A message, to be of value, must appeal to living 
men. Special questionings and difficulties are a part 
of every individual mind. A wise physician examines 
the nature of the disease before prescribing a remedy. 

* Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 400. 
^ E. g. Kepler, cf. Order in the Physical World, tr. from the 
French, by T. J. Slavin, p. 9. 
^St. Aug. Confess. 1. i, c. i. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

History is a reflex of the individual. Its periods are 
characterized by a predominance given to certain 
problems or to varied aspects of life. Hence special 
difficulties arise which mast be answered. The knowl- 
edge of God's truth is ever increasing, an abundance 
of material is at hand. The need is to gather this and 
give to it a shape and form best fitted to break the 
advance of error. 

§ 3. Our age is an age of scepticism. The storm of 
doubt, bitter and relentless, has swept over our lives. 
Beliefs and truths, dear to the soul and sanctioned by 
time-honored tradition, have been ruthlessly assailed. 
Timid minds have seen the dark hosts rapidly forming, 
have beheld positions believed impregnable success- 
fully assailed and viewed in anticipation the ruin and 
desolation of what made life precious. The funda- 
mental truths of religion are the object of attack. The 
existence of God, the nature of the soul, the fact of 
revelation are questioned. At such a time it is not 
wise to fly to the refuge of faith. The most decisive 
battles of to-day are fought beyond the breastworks of 
revealed truth. * The arms we use are those of reason, 
the missiles are the most certain facts of conscious- 
ness and of physical science. In employing these we 
claim the right to use any legitimate m.ethod. We 
deny the claim of adversaries to limit us to any one 
method or any one class of facts, and then cry out 
that the reasoning is not conclusive. Methods vary, 
even though legitimate. In time of war the wise leader 
disposes his array with a view to capture the position 
of the enemy. In like manner we claim the right to 
employ the method best suited to the present exigen- 
cies of the subject. 

,^ Balfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 2; Wordsworth, The One 
Religion, p. 6. 



INTRODUCTION. 

§ 4. The considerations adduced are the heritage of 
Christian Philosophy handed down by the pens of St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas. The marvellous advance 
in the sciences furnish mcreased data for argument 
and illustration. The question is considered under all 
aspects. All sources of knowledge are investigated. 
History, Language, Psychology, Ethics, the Physical 
Sciences, each comes with its special testimony. The 
aim is simply to collect the data and show their bear- 
ing on the Idea of God; to answer the question: What 
is meant by God and has the idea of God an objective 
vaUdity? 

§ 5. This is a problem of modern thought. Is the 
mind constrained to admit that the Theistic interpre- 
tation of the universe is the true one? All that is true 
and noble in human life depends on the answer. The 
trend of philosophic speculation renders the discussion 
imperative. The wide interest and large circulation 
of treatises on the Idea of God is a sign of the times. 
In our own country the recent contributions of Prof. 
Royce and of Prof. Fiske hold the attention of readers. 
In chapter IV the views of the former are critically 
examined. Under a thoughtful and attractive style he 
proposes an ethical and idealistic Pantheism. The 
Idea of God by Prof. Fiske is a popular work, and 
appeals strongly to the undisciplined mind. In the 
present treatise however the reader will clearly see: 
(i) That his theory of the origin of the idea of God is 
flatly contradicted by facts. ^ (2) That his presentation 
of the Christian idea of God as set forth by St. 
Augustine is absolutely false.® (3) That he con- 
founds the teaching of St. Athanasius and of Clement 
of Alexandria with the doctrine of Spinosa, Lessing, 

' Idea of God, ch. III., pp. 154, 163; infra, ch. III., s. II. 
« Idea of God. ch. V., VI. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and Schleiermacher/ (4) That far from present- 
ing a Theistic doctrine, his is rather a Cosmic 
Pantheism.* 

' Idea of God, pp. 94, 103, 109, 112. 
8 Idea of God, ch. XIII., p. 166. 



CHAPTER I. 

AGNOSTICISM. 

§ I. History is the record of the human race. It 
sets forth what man has achieved in the various spheres 
of human activity. We there behold the many phases 
of a nation's life from its early rise through all its 
progress in government, in science, in letters, in con- 
quest on to its decline and fall. Thus nation comes 
after nation and government gives way to government. 
The map of the world is ever changing and each change 
appeals to us with keen interest as involving the 
hopes, resolves and fortunes of human beings like 
ourselves. 

§ 2. The mere narration of facts may please the Philosophy 
young; it is not sufficient for the more mature mind. ° ^^°^^- 
He seeks to get behind the facts, to grasp the causes, 
to know why and how a people rose from amidst their 
neighbors and exercised an influence upon con- 
temporaneous and subsequent periods. Thus we are 
led to the most attractive study of the Philosophy of 
History. 

§ 3. Our interest is now centered upon the history 
of thought. The world has seen epochs characterized 
by the activity and splendor of literary work. They 
have been called the intellectual ages of mankind. In 
spite of many differences we may still detect some 
striking resemblances which form a basis for compari- 
son and contrast. Thus the thoughtful student sees 
reasons to compare the present period of philosophic 
thought to the period of Greek Philosophy at the birth 
of Socrates and to the Middle Ages at the time of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 

[5] 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Agnosticism. 
Present § 4. In the fifth centurv, B. C, Athens was the center 

time can be ^ ^ j ■> ^ 

compared of intellectual life in Greece. There from all parts 

to Greece 

at the birth 2:athered teachers and those anxious still to learn. To 

of Socrates. ^ . . . , 

the Athenian success meant position in the state and 
an influence in public affairs. For this the knowledge 
of Rhetoric or of public debate was a necessity. 
Hence the multitude of individual teachers who claimed 
to propose what all so eagerly sought. They became 
known as Sophists, /. e., wise men — an appellation of 
honor at first, but with Socrates and Plato indicating 
boastful, fallacious and venal men. 
work of 8 r. The Hfework of Socrates was to expose the pre- 

Socrates. ^ i ^ , , , ^. . ^ . . ^ 

tensions of these men, to show the distinction between 
true and false knowledge. This is done by a process 
of intellectual analysis. At times he leaves the 
adversary in doubt as in the Dialogues of Search; again 
he proposes positive and definite truths. In both the 
aim is apparent, viz., the necessity of forming clear 
conceptions. The principal elements of Logic are 
found in the dialogues; afterwards they were thrown 
into scientific form by Aristotle. Thus was given a 
deathly blow to the universal scepticism of the time.' 

^o^ern g 6_ Modcm thought is running in a parallel course. 

cism. The current tone is Agnostic, which is as Prof. Schur- 

man says, the " Apotheosis of Scepticism." ' The 
passing generation has been deeply imbued with its 
spirit. In Philosophy, Mr. Spencer is its acknowledged 
leader; in Science, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Tyndall 
champion its teaching; in Literature, George Eliot, 

^ Cf. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools. 
' Cf. Belief in God, by Pres. Schurman. 



AGNOSTICISM. 

Mrs. Humphrey Ward are its open defenders. Not con- 
fined within the walls of the university or lecture hall, 
it has become a topic of conversation in the parlor, the 
dining-room and on the railway carriage. The college- 
graduate and the daily laborer are heard to voice its 
sentiments. The tendency is to question everything; 
and philosophy, science, as well as common sense 
assure us that the only state of mind on the important 
problems of life and of being is one of doubt.' 

11. 

Origin. 
87. The term "Agnosticism" is of very recent origin of 

^ ' . . ,:. , the term. 

origin. Mr Huxley is very mgenuous m telling how 
it was coined. When a young man, he became a mem- 
ber of the Metaphysical society of London, he found 
himself out of place in the company of men each of 
whom had a reputation as the parent of an I'sm of some 
kind. He felt constrained to be like his associates 
and broached the doctrine of Agnosticism. In a 
spirit of humility he openly confessed that he was an 
Agnostic because he did not know nor could he ever 
hope to know a solution for the fundamental truths of 
religion."* 

8 8. The doctrine, however, signified by the term the 

" . . ' . doctrine. 

Agnosticism is not new.^ It is of the same nature as 
that proposed by the Sceptics in the time of Socrates. 
Nevertheless in its modern form it cannot claim to be 

^Theological Essays, R. H. Hutton, p. 22; Is Life Worth 
Living, W. H. Mallock, ch. VIII; The Great Enigma, W. S. 
Lilly, ch. III., IV. 

^ Essays on Some Controverted Questions, IX., Prof. Huxley; 
his article in XlXth Century, Feb., 1895, in criticism of Mr. Bal- 
four's " Foundations of Belief." 

'The Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth in the New- 
World, Sept., 1894. 



8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

a direct offspring. It is a truth of history that like 
effects may be traced to the working of independent 
causes. The cause at the base of the Greek Scepticism 
as well as of modern Agnosticism is the failure on the 
part of the human mind to acquire definite and true 
knowledge of things. Thus we find Socrates ever 
occupied in an analysis of the definition. The Dia- 
logues are discussions concerning the meaning of 
words. In our own day the fundamental problem of 
Philosophy is in like manner the theory of the notion. 
The circumstances, however, which brought the cause 
into play are not the same in both periods. We shall 
briefly indicate the sources and development of 
modern Agnosticism. They can be summed up under 
three heads: Philosophical, scientific and religious. 

^° Its 

causes Phil- I . Philosophical. 

osophical. 

§ 9. (a) Locke is called the parent of English Psy- 
telSXng^^ chology. A disciple of Descartes, he yet shows inde- 
Agnost?? pendence of mind in differing from his master, e. g., 
^'^™' rejecting innate ideas, and in working out his own 

peculiar theory of knowledge. He teaches that sensa- 
tion and reflection are thie two sources of knowledge. 
The former embraces the knowledge of external 
objects. The latter is so much like this that it might 
be properly called the internal sense.® 

§ 10. Thus is found an explanation for Locke's 
empiricism. To him reflection is a more refined form 
of sensation. The radical difference between sense 
and thought is obliterated; the one runs into the other, 
of which it is a more shadowy form. The higher 
powers of mind are ignored. As a consequence we 
only know the qualities or sensitive appearances of 

* Human Understanding, b. II., ch. i, sec. IV. 



AGNOSTICISM. 9 

thinefs: the real substance or essence is beyond reach/ Substance 

^ ' •' unknown. 

Therefore in the founder of English philosophy we find 
traces of the modern school of Agnosticism. 

§ II. Starting from Locke's principle that the mind developed 
knows external objects only through mental representa- and Hume?' 
tions,^ Berkeley quickly developed into Idealism. 
Ideas, /. ^., mental representations are the direct and 
proper objects of cognition; the esse of things is their 
pei'cipi.^ Hume combined the Agnosticism of Locke 
and the Idealism of Berkeley and taught an open and 
radical scepticism.^" 

§ 12. The destructive character of Hume's writings 
aroused Kant. For upwards of twenty years he labored 
on his great work A Critic of Pure Reason. He was 
confident that he had given a death blow to scepticism 
and placed human knowledge on a firm lasting basis. 

8 13. (b) Kant tausfht that the mind independent of (b) Kant 

,1- ^ . . ,, . , another 

all experience, creates in itself certain pure forms of source of 
knowledge. Into these forms and clothed by themcism. 
are fitted the materials of knowledge, /, ^., the phe- 
nomena furnished by the senses. The forms of Intui- 
tion are Space and Time; the forms of thought are 
the twelve Categories." The categories are purely 
ideal; they have no objective validity. Yet they are 
the direct object of the perceiving mind. For the 
mind in the act of apprehending an object clothes the 
object with its own ideal vesture. The forms or 
vesture constitute with Kant the phenomena. The 

' " Indeed as to the real essence of substances we only sup- 
pose their being without precisely knowing what they are." 
lb. B. III., ch. IV., sec. VI. 
Hb. B. IV., ch. I, sec. I. 

^^ Berkeley's Works V. i, sec. 3, The Theistic Argument, J. 
Dimon, p. 42. 

'^Treatise on Human Nature; The Theistic Argument, J. 
Dimon, DD., pp. 6, 7. 
" Critic of Pure Reason. 



lO 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Influence 
of Locke 
and Kant 
upon 
modern 
thought. 



Philosophy 
of Associa- 
tion is 
Agnostic. 



real objects, as they are in their own concrete exist- 
ence independent of the mind, are never known. ^' 
"We know nothing but oar manner of perceiving 
them." ^^ The objects in their own objective nature 
are called by Kant nou}ne7ia. Hence the famous dis- 
tinction which obtains even to our day between the 
phenome7ia and the noumena. The ideal appearances 
make up our knowledge; the real things are unknown 
and unknowable. The speculative reason cannot 
know God; He becomes the postulate of practical 
reason. Thus in attempting to refute Hume, Kant 
becomes the parent of modern Agnosticism.^* 

§ 14. The direct influence of the real phenomenalism 
of Locke, and the ideal phenomenalism of Kant upon 
the formation of modern thought can be easily traced. 
The two currents worked their own way along until in 
our own day the waters intermingle and their separate 
identity is merged into a wider and more powerful 
stream. 

§ 15. Locke's theory of knowledge developed by 
Hume influenced Hartley, Priestley, Bentham and 
James Mill. Drawing the inspiration and teaching 
from his father, J. S. Mill proposes it with a wealth of 
detail and analysis in his Logic, a work which exer- 
cised a profound influence on the English mind of the 
past generation. He thus became the logician, while 
Mr. Spencer is termed the metaphysician, and Mr. 
Bain the psychologist of the Association School. 

§ 16. Hence the only system of philosophy which 
can be considered as the product of the English mind 
is the direct offspring of Locke and Hume. It teaches 
with them that we can only know the external appear- 



'' Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 321, 360. 

^^ Critic, Transc. ^sthet., p. 37. 

'^ A. K, Rogers, Modern Philosophy, p. 225. 



AGNOSTICISM. 1 1 

ances of things, that what we term substance is only a 
bundle of qualities united by the laws of association, 
that the real essence is unknown and unknowable." 
The bounds of human knowledge are confined within 
the domains of sense. The notions of cause, of sub- 
stance, of essence are explained in a new meaning. 
God, soul, etc., may exist; the human mind is unable 
to say so; therefore to us they are as good as not 
existing. But this is the distinctive character of 
Agnosticism. 

§ 17. The influence of Kant comes through another Kant 
course. During the eighteenth century the Scotch Hamilton a 

source of 

school of philosophy alone withstood the power of Agnosti- 
English scepticism and materialism. With Reid it 
became a strong citadel of Theistic argument. Sir W. 
Hamilton, however, recognized the weakness in the 
position of his predecessor. At the time Kant was in 
the zenith of power and his teaching was considered 
impregnable. To him, therefore, Hamilton went for 
the material to supply what was lacking in Reid. His 
work was an attempt at a reconstruction. It was 
eagerly welcomed by Christian writers and for upwards 
of fifty years was the recognized manual of Theistic 
philosophy outside of the Catholic church. 

§ 18. The real effect of Hamilton was contrary to^js^hemy 
what he and his disciples expected. His theory of the edge. 
notion was riddled by J. S. Mill.^^ His philosophy of 
the conditioned is nothing more than an exposition in 
English form of the categories of Kant. The mind in 
the act of knowing fixes limits on the object known." 
Thus we can only know the limited, /. ^., the finite. 

*^ Essays on Religion, J. S. Mill, p. 263. 
'* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton. 

"'* To define a thing is to give it limits." Knight, Aspects 
of Theism, p. 157. 



12 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Mausel a 
disciple of 
Hamilton. 



2° Scien- 
tific. 

position 
and influ- 
ence of 
physical 
science. 



The infinite is a mere negation, /. <?., of the finite. 
God becomes not an object of knowledge but of faith. ^^ 
§ 19, Dean Mansel in his Bampton Lectures ^^ pub- 
licly and expressly attempted to harmonize this doc- 
trine with the tenets of Christian teaching. The result 
was disastrous. The fallacy of the reasoning, the 
weakness of his position were too patent to be passed 
by in silence. Christianity suffered by being allied to 
a false philosophy. And the effort to follow the lead 
of Hamilton and Mansel has brought English non- 
Catholic Apologetics to its present low position and 
made it so easy a mark for trenchant writers like Hux- 
ley and Spencer." 

2°. Scientific. 

§ 20. A second factor in the development of modern 
Agnosticism is found in the rise and progress of phy- 
sical science. Our century is truly an epoch of scien- 
tific discovery. By observation and experimentation 
every department of nature has been compelled to dis- 
close its treasures and to reveal its laws. The old 
classic curriculum in the most conservative universities 
has been shattered and scientific departments formed 
with special academic degrees. The importance of a 
scientific education is loudly proclaimed, the methods 
of scientific mvestigation are praised to the exclusion 
of any other." 



^^ Lectures, V. 11, p. 374; Theological Essay, R. H. Hutton, 
pp. 6, 86. 

^^ The Limits of Religious Thought. 

'^^ The Theistic Argument, by J. Dimon, p. 22. Thus Prof. 
Fraser holds that the alternative lies between either " a scepti- 
cal alienation from an uninterpretable universe " or " reconcili- 
ation vrith the universe in hopeful moral faith." Phil, of 
Theism, 2d series, p. 3, This is the position of Kant. Cf. also 
The Christian Doctrine of God in Lux Mundi, p. 88; Royce, 
The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. H., ch, IX.; Pres. 
Schurman in the Philosophical Review, vol. IV., May, 1895. 

2^ The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 201. 



AGNOSTICISM. 1 3 

§ 21. The Physical sciences are of great value. No their value. 
one will deny that a larger knowledge of nature ennobles 
man and contributes to the material comfort of life. 
Nevertheless the physical sciences investigate only one 
department of nature. Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics 
cannot be classed as physical sciences. 

§ 22. The exclusive attention paid to physical science the source 
is due to the rise of Positivism and the decline of power. 
Hegelianism. The metaphysics of Hegel, the culmin- 
ating point in the development of Kant, was considered Metaphy- 
to be the last and final effort of the human mind in 
solving the mystery of the universe. Its merits were 
instantly recognized, but its critics were not silent. 
They succeeded in exposing the assumptions on which 
it was based and the contradictions it involved. The 
result was a division of Hegel's disciples into three 
warring camps. The controversy was bitterly carried 
on by the small parties of followers. Many minds, 
however, paused in dismay. To them metaphysics 
was a synonym for whatever is extravagant, unintelli- 
gible and absurd." 

§ 23. At this crisis Comte broached the system off^^^J^°,^ 
Positive philosophy. His aim was to constitute a ^^^^°^°p^5^- 
hierarchy of the physical sciences and set forth sure 
and true methods to be followed in the pursuit of 
knowledge. His success was very great. The system 
was propagated in England, America, Germany, Italy^ 
as well as in France. He taught that observation and 
experimentation were the only channels of knowledge, 
that what was beyond the limits and scope of the 
senses did not exist, that the only knowledge deserving 
the name was physical knowledge. In England J. S. 

" Hence Prof. Pfleiderer writes that we find ourselves in a 
sort of interregnum in Philosophy. Phil, of Religion, vol. II., 
p. 115. 



14 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Mill, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Harrison, George Eliot, and 
Mr. Lewes championed the new philosophy. In the 
hands of Mr. Huxley, Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Youmans, 
however, it appears under its true nature, /. ^., a 
scientific Agnosticism. 
Mr. Huxley 8 24. While Mr. Huxley acknowledges his indebted- 

an apostle ^ ./ o 

of scientmc ness to Hamilton" and to Hume,'^'' and repudiates 

Agnosti- ^ , . . . . 

cism. Comte, his principles are nevertheless the principles of 

Positivism." He tells us that Agnosticism is a method, 
the essence of which lies in the vigorous application 
of a single principle, viz., in matters of knowledge 
follow reason as far as it will guide you and not pre- 
tend that conclusions are certain which are not demon- 
strated or demonstrable. ^° This principle, innocent 
in itself, becomes vicious when interpreted after Mr. 
Huxley's own mind. To him it means that any reality 
beyond phenomena and their laws is unknowable. 

Tyndall § ^5' ^^- Tyndall attempts to explain life by 

mechanical processes; he discerns in matter " the 
promise and potency of life; " ^^ he affirms the phe- 
nomenal nature of knowledge, and holds out the teach- 
ing of Democritus as the final word of modern science." 
With him the only means to arrive at truth are those 
employed by physical science, viz., exact observation 
and experiment. He appeals to these as to a final 
tribunal in his celebrated strictures on prayer and 
special providences. Material agencies alone exist, and 
what lies beyond is in the region of the unknowable. 

'^ Essay in XlXth Century, Feb. 1895, on Mr. Balfour's 
Foundations of Belief. 

2-* Life (if Hume, by T. Huxley. 

^^ The Physical Basis of Life, p. 123; Scientific Aspects of 
Positivism; Essays upon some Controverted Questions, Essay 
IX.; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 8, 9, 10. 

2" lb., Essay IX., Agnosticism. 

^^ Belfast Address in Fragments of Science. 

^* Modern Theorie^^ in Philosophy and Religion, by Prin. Tul- 
loch, art. Scientific Materialism. 



AGNOSTICISM. 1 5 

Notwithstanding many contradictions and veiled 
attempts to conceal the meaning of words and phrases 
he persists in advocating this doctrine. What is the 
Unknowable with Mr. Spencer, becomes to him the 
Inscrutable.^^ 

§26. The same tone of thought was persistently in America. 
advocated in America by the writers of the Scientific 
Monthly. With a show of knowledge put forth in an 
attractive style they tried to convince readers that 
religious truth was beyond the sphere of exact thought, 
that science alone could verify its assertions; that 
what was not within the limits of scientific methods 
could not be known. Thus science became the ally of 
unbelief and no man of disciplined mind was presumed 
to know anything whatsoever about the great truths 
pertaining to God or to the soul.^° 



°. Relmous. L^'"'^- 



lOUS. 



8 27. A final element in forming the tone of modern „ , 

" ' *^ False pre- 

scientific thought must be sought for in religion. False sentations 

® * =" of religious 

presentations of a truth are the most insidious errors truth a 

'■ source of 

and lead to the most disastrous consequences. Scepticism. 

§ 28. With the rise of Protestantism the great prob- 
lems of discussion were the freedom of the will, the 
doctrine of grace, /. e., of divine supernatural help, 
and of predestination. They assumed a most malig- 
nant and repulsive form in the Creed of Calvinism. 
The history of religious thought shows how bitter was 
the strife. God was described as a being of infinite 
power who created and destined men to eternal dar^- 
nation without giving any means to enable them to 

^^ Pop. Scien. Monthly, Dec. 1876. 

^° Against this form of Phenomenalism Mr. Balfour directed 
his Essay, The Foundations of Belief, lb., p. 6. As a work of 
philosophical criticism the reasoning is very strong. 



l6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

reach eternal blessedness. The human soul revolted 
from a religion so terrible. ^^ Hence we can understand 
the indignant protest of J. S. Mill although we can 
hardly reconcile it with his gospel of Utilitarianism,^' 
In America Jonathan Edwards upheld the rigid Cal- 
vinistic creed with voice and pen.^^ The result was a 
reaction to an opposite extreme. While some religious 
minds as, e. g., Emerson, Carlyle, etc., sought relief 
in a vague Pantheism;^" others, e. g.^ Froude, Th. 
Parker, drifted away to Scepticism or a pure natural 
religion. In New England the effect is seen in the 
Unitarian revival of some thirty years ago. The 
movement spent itself with the death of its leaders and 
was merged into the swelling tide of scientific Agnosti- 
cism.^^ 

III. 

Doctrine. 

Mr. 8 29. Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Huxley left fragments of 

spencer the , . . . . 1 1 ' t 

real Phil- the Agnostic teacning scattered through various essays 

osopher of - , , t-, ^ . , . 

Agnosti- and addresses, ror a systematic and minute expo- 
sition we must go to Mr. Spencer. Ks the exponent 
of the Synthetic Philosophy he is styled the Apostle of 
Modern Agnosticism. A brief examination of his 
teaching is not therefore out of place. ^^ 

^^ John Fiske, Idea of God, pp. xxx., 41, 42. 

^^ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton, vol. i, p. 131. 

^^ J. Edwards, by F. B. Sanborn, in Jour, of Specul. Philoso- 
phy, Oct., 1883 

^^ Recollectionb and Impressions, O. B, Frothingham, ch. 
XV., XVI. 

^^ " The Unitarians set forth a religion of ethics instead of a 
Gospel of faith; their word is practically not regeneration, but 
self-culture; Christ is an interpreter of nature and only so a 
redeemer * * * the literature of the day religious only in 
form; a substitute for Christianity; praises Christ as the great- 
est of heroes; finds God in all; speaks of culture, refinement 
and philanthropy; a captivating and plausible religion." Cf. 
Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 24, 28. 

36 The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, ch. IV. 



cism. 



AGNOSTICISM. 1/ 

§ 30. In the very begianing of his volume First ^js^^^^^ 
Principles, Mr. Spencer defines the limits of knowledge. 
He draws a distinction between phenomenon and 
noumenon. In this he is a disciple of Kant. The 
former, he tells us, the mind can grasp; the latter can 
never become the object of knowledge. This opens 
the way for a sharp distinction between science and on science 

•^ . , and relig- 

religion. Science investigates phenomena; its conciu- ion. 
sions can therefore be known and verified. Religion 
is concerned only with the noumenon; its teachings 
become objects of faith, not of ascertained fact." We 
may believe that there is a soul or a God; we cannot 
prove the assertions. ^^ 

§ 31. In the light of this distinction we can under- of^Knowi 
stand what Mr. Spencer means by the phrase "the'^^^^" 
Relativity of Knowledge." The words are simple, 
but the meaning is very uncertain and vague. Found ^ith^^™^^ 
in every treatise on Modern philosophy, they are rarely 
employed in the same sense. It is necessary, therefore, 
to examine them carefully. 

§ 32. (a) By Relativity of Knowledge Mr. Hamilton g) Mn 
means that we can never know reality except under 
modifications imposed by the perceiving mind, after 
the same manner that objects appear blue when viewed 
through blue glasses. ^^ This is the teaching of Kant, 
and leads to Idealism and Scepticism. We do know 
existing things. The knowledge is a postulate of 
modern science and is confirmed by sound reasoning."" 

2'' The same disdnction is drawn by the Neo-Kantians. 
Ernest Laas attempts to bridge the chasm between science and 
religion by appealing to the esthetic sense. His teaching is 
termed an esthetic religious Neo-Kantianism. Cf. Pfieiderer, 
Phil, of Relig., vol. II., p. 178. 

^^ Lux Mundi, p. 49. 

^^Metaphysics, I., p. 148. 

^^ The Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth, in the New 
World, Sept., 1894. 



i8 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(b) Mr. 
Mill. 



(c> Mr. 
Grote. 



(d) Mr. 
Spencer. 



§ 33- (t>) ^^r. Mill proposes another explanation. 
He holds that we know a thing only as distinguished 
from something else. Thus our consciousness is of 



difference, 



an object is known to be what it is by 



contrast with what it is not. Hence knowledge is 
based on the perception of relations.*^ Bat this is not 
true. Our knowledge is primarily of things. As a 
consequence we can compare things. We never con- 
trasts objects not known." Some of our concepts, 
e. g., short and tall, are essentially relative, but not 
all are so. 

§ 34. (c) Mr. Grote's version brings us back to the 
days of the Greek Sophists." Things are as they 
appear to be. As they appear to me so they are to 
me; as they appear to you, so they are to you. Thus 
what is true to one, may be falsehood to another. 
Truth, therefore, varies with the individual.*^ The 
error lies in making the individual mind the measure 
of things. Truth consists in the conformity of the 
mind with objects. There are certain tests or criteria 
laid down in Logic which assure us when this con- 
formity is had. We hold the truth if the evidence is in 
the mind's possession.*' 

§ 35- (<i) By the phrase '* Relativity of Knowledge" 
Mr. Spencer is more closely allied to Hamilton than 
to the others. His teaching is the logical sequence of 
the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. 
The phenomenon only is in relation to the mind know- 
ing; the noumenon is outside all relation to the 



^^ The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 40; Cosmic Philoso- 
phy, J. Fiske, vol. I., p. 14; Significance of T. H. Green's teach^ 
ing in Jour, of Spec. Phil., Oct,, 1883. 

^'^ The Great Enigma, W. S, Lilly, p. 222. 

^2 Plato, Protagoras. 

^^ Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 373. 

^^ McCosh, Fundamental Truth. 



AGNOSTICISM. I9 

knower."^ What is behind and beneath phenomena is 
unknown/* We know the impressions produced on 
us; we are compelled to think of these in relation to a 
positive cause. *^ This cause is termed the Absolute, his doctrine 

^ , . of the 

The Absolute linked as it is with the concepts of Absolute. 
external creation and of self-existence is inconceivable 
as Mansel teaches.*^ Yet he tells us that this Unknow- 
able, inasmuch as it is the highest abstract truth in 
science, philosophy and religion, presents the safest 
ground for a reconciliation between them.^" 

§ 36. The Agnosticism of Mr. Spencer, therefore, 
comes in direct descent from Kant through Hamilton 
and Mansel. Its initial point is the distinction between 
the phenomenon and the noumenon, and its funda- 
mental principle is the Relativity of Knowledge, under- 
stood in the sense that phenomena alone can be known. 
In explaining the origin of knowledge we discover 
traces of the phenomenal idealism which characterizes 
the English school of Association philosophy. It can 
with difficulty be distinguished from Positivism." 



IV. 

Criticism. 

§ 37' (i) J^st as the present epoch bears comparison d) Funda- 
with Greek thousfht at the time of Socrates by reason error is in 

.,. . . , . , the theory 

of a prevailmg scepticism, so the corrective employed of the 

concept. 

■^^ The Thei=;dc Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 11, 13, 14, 37. 

^^ Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, ist series, p 397. 

^^ First Principles, pp 93, 96, 108; Principles of Psychology, 
vol. I., p. 2og; XlXth Cent., Jan., 1884. 

*Mb., ss. II, 13; XlXth Cent., Feb., 1889; Mansel, Limits of 
Religious Thought, L. 11., III. 

^°Ib., ss. 8, 191; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 17; 
Prof. Knight wisely writes that Mr. Spencer's aim is " to recon- 
cile science and religion in the recognition of mystery." 
Aspects of Theism, p. 134. 

"Chrisdan Philosophy — The Soul, ch. IV. 



20 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

SO effectually in the one may be adopted with equal 
success in the other. The life-work of Socrates was 
to place knowledge on a firm basis. The method he 
used was one of cross-examination. In pursuance of 
v/hat he felt to be a divine mission he questioned 
everyone."'' Especially he sought the rhetoricians. 
Professing a desire to be instructed, he listened to the 
discourse and proposed difficulties. Apparently on the 
defensive, he was ever the aggressor. In dialectic he 
had no superior. His penetration, humility and irony 
left him the victor. He occupied himself almost 
exclusively in determining conceptions logically. 
His teaching v/as mainly moral, viz., inquiry into the 
meaning of virtue, courage, wisdom, etc. In this 
method are found the elementary processes of true 
Logic, e.g., analysis, division, definition, classification, 
etc. His work, however, was not complete. He 
pointed out the true method to be followed in dealing 
with the problem of doubt. It was reserved for the 
master-mind of St. Thomas to solve the true nature of 
the notion, and to employ with precision the logical 
processes of Aristotle in the problem of the universal 
which deeply agitated the schools of the Middle Ages. 
Method of §38. To-dav the Same situation confronts US. Kant 

Socrates 

and teach- taught a thcory of the concept which leads to Agnosti- 
Thomasto cism. Hamilton vainly tried to reconcile Kant with 

be fol- 
lowed, the traditional Scotch philosophy. J. S. Mill proposes 

the old doctrine of the Nominalists, viz., that ideas 
are only nam_es. They overlook the distinction between 
intellect and sense. ^* Hence the current errors in phil- 
osophy. The problem of the notion is the source of 
all the confusion; its true solution the only real remedy. 



1895 



^^"^ Cf. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic schools. 

5^ Agnosticism, Pres. Schurman, in Phil. Rev., vol. IV., May, 



AGNOSTICISM. 21 

In setting it forth we must adopt the method of 
Socrates and the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
This is done in a treatise on Philosophy of Mind.^' 

8 ^Q. C2) The position of the Agnostic in the Theistic (2) a true 

^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ . L, r 1 rr., • and a false 

controversy contains a semblance of truth. Ihere isAgnosti- 
a true and a false Agnosticism, The distinction is 
based on the difference which should be made between 
simple and comprehensive knowledge. We may have 
a clear and distinct knowledge of a thing without being 
able to grasp it in its entirety.*" Thus our knowledge 
is certain, but limited." Much more so it is true of 
God. We speak of God's infinite power, goodness 
and truth. The words have a definite meaning, and 
express definite concepts, but cannot tell the whole 
truth. '^ 

§ 40. We thus express our knowledge of God — a knovdedg-e 
knowledge partial, it is true, but sufficient to dis- partial but 
tinguish God from any other being. Our minds are ''^^^' 
too limited in range and power to penetrate the inmost 
recesses of the divinity, to comprehend His judgments, 
or to trace out His ways. Nevertheless we know that 
God is and in part we know what He is. The Holy 
Bible in many passages shows that the human mind 
can know God but not comprehend Him. The Fathers 
of the church again and again insist upon the dis- 
tinction." 

"The Theistic Argument, J, Dimon, pp. 5, 37, 39, sq. ; 
G. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, ist series, vol. L, p. 16. 

5* "Alind est enim videre, alind est totum videndo compre- 
hendere," Aug., Epis. 147, n. 21. 

=^ "A man may infer " writes Prof. Dimon, " that the author 
of Hamlet was intelligent without professing to sound all the 
depths of Shakespere's mind." The Theistic Argument, p. 117. 

^^ " Deus Ineffabilis est; facilius dicimus quid non sit quam 
quid sit," Aug. Enar. in Ps. 85, n, 12. 

''''' A very good criticism of Kant's antinomies carried out on 
this line is found in Found, of Relig. Belief, by Prof. Wilson, p. 
197. 



22 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



Spencer's 
Contradic- 
tion. 



Agnosti- 
cism con- 
founds 
these 



§ 41. Mr. Spencer even is forced unconsciously to 
make a distinction. In the first part of First Princi- 
ples he tries to prove that God is unknowable. In 
the second part he admits His existence. Thus the 
Unknowable can be known/® And Mr. John Fiske,'" 
in criticising Frederick Harrison, cites St. Athanasius 
as teaching that God is revealed to mankind only 
through incarnation in Christ — a doctrine held to-day 
by the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel, whereas the holy 
Doctor in the same treatise expressly declares that 
God is known from the order and harmony of creation."" 
In explaining the meaning of Unknowable the same 
writer forgets to make a distinction between simple 
and comprehensive knowledge," and tells us that 
we know not the infinite but only its phenomenal 
manifestations" — an error due to the radical mis- 
take of confounding intellectual with sense-knowl- 
edge." 

§ 42. Thus modern Agnosticism rests on a confusion 
of concepts. It is clothed in a garb of false humility. 
It extols the greatness of the infinite or absolute and 
belittles the strength of the human intelligence. It 
thus tends to separate the soul from God by an impas- 
sible barrier.^* Of its nature it is destructive of religion 
whose office is the union of man and his maker. Hence 
it comes that from one point of view Mr. Spencer is 
considered by many thinkers to be a continuator of 
the Deism of the last century; whereas from another 
he is held to represent what is best in Spinoza's teach- 



5» Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., voL II., p. 157. 

^^ Idea of God, p. xxvii. 

^'^ St. Athanasius, C. Gentes. 

®^ lb., pp. xxviii, 36. 

^' lb., p. xxviii. 

*^ pp. T36, 140. 

*^ The Great Enigma W. S. Lilly, p. 214, sq. 



AGNOSTICISM. 2$ 

ing, and thus to stand as the ablest defender of Cosmic 
Theism or rather Cosmic Pantheism/^ 

§43- (3) Against Agnosticism we teach that there (3) There is 
is a Philosophy as well as a History of Religion. It is of Religion, 
a science which deals with the fundamental questions 
of the soul. It infers conclusions from physical, moral, 
and intellectual data. From a study of the world and 
of man it rises to the conception of an infinite mind 
which has fashioned and guides all. The inference is 
sound and certain. The course of reasoning by which 
it was reached can be throv/n into a system and we 
have the science of Theodicy. The light which guides 
us is the light of reason. Philosophy teaches the pos- 
sibility, and History the fact of divine revelation. God 
has taught us more about Himself. The only-begotten 
of the Father hath revealed the treasures of grace and 
of oflorv hidden from the human mind. The revealed 
truths form the science of Theology. In the begin- 
ning of the Summa of Theology, St, Thomas discusses 
the problem whether Theology may be termed a 
science, and answers in the af6rmative. The reasons 
he adduces are vaUd to-day. 

V. 

Influence. 

§ 44. The influence of Agnosticism upon the English influence of 
and American mind during the past fifty years has been cifmTn'" 
very great. It has been hailed as a new Gospel. ''^^^^"^^' 
Consisting, in its essence, of a few main principles, it 
has, like Positivism, generated a tone of thought and 
a certain manner of viewing things. Here is found the 

*^ Fiske Cosmic Philosophy; Jacobi, Jewish Ideals, p. 58; 
XlXth Cent., Oct., 1877; Fortnightly Rev., May, 1873; J. Fiske, 
Idea of God, ch. VIII., XIII. 

®® An Agnostic's Apology, by Leslie Stephen. 



24 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

real secret of its power. Every department of knowl- 
edge has been infected by its virus. In Biology it has 
become identified with the theory of Evolution; in 
Biblical Studies with the so-called Higher Criticism; 
in Theology with Ritschl and the Neo-Kantians." 
Wherever a destructive tendency appears, there is 
found a congenial atmosphere. The physcial sciences, 
however, are its stronghold. Disclaiming any knowl- 
edge whatsoever of metaphysical principles, it scatters 
broadcast false metaphysics. Its garb of false humility 
serves to conceal its venom and to attract the unwary. 
Its defenders are praised as men of honest and strong 
minds. In public lecture halls its doctrines are pro- 
claimed by elegant and attractive speakers. 
Serature. § 45- Literature has been deeply imbued with its 
spirit. Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, Mrs. Hum- 
phrey Ward and Hall Caine propagate it in their 
writings; Swinburne, La Conte De Lisle, in their poetry. 
Tennyson tells us 

" I have but faith, I cannot see," 
" There is more faith in honest doubt 
Believe me, than in half the creeds." 

And proclaims the Gospel of modern thought in the 
touching and beautiful lines: 

" O yet we trust thai somehow good 
Will be the final goal of ill. 
That nothing walks with aimless feet; 
That no one life shall be destro5^ed 
Or cast as rubbish to the void 
When God hath made the pile complete. 
Behold, we know not anything; 
I can but trust that good shall fall 
At last — far off — at last, to all, 
And every Winter change to Spring. 

^''Gerhart, Institutes of the Christian Religion; Stuckenberg, 
German Thought, p. 169. 



AGNOSTICISM. 2$ 

So runs my dream: but what am I? 

An infant crying in the night: 

An infant crying for the light: 

And with no language but a cry. 

I falter where I firmly trod, 

And falling with my weight of cares 

Upon the great world's altar-stairs 

That slope through darkness up to God, 

I stretch lame hands of faith and grope 

And gather dust and chaff, and call 

To what I feel is Lord of all, 

And faintly trust the larger hope. 

O life as futile, then, as frail! 

O for thy voice to soothe and bless! 

What hope of answer or redress ? 

Behind the veil, behind the veil." 

— In Memorlani, LIV^-LVI. 

§ 46. Signs of a reaction are, however, now apparent. Reaction. 
The fact that so many men, eminent in the scientific 
world, are also devout Christians, has an influence 
upon the minds of the younger generation. Time has 
permitted a sober judgment to view with impartiality 
the works of the leading agnostics, to ask what they 
have really done and to separate the chaff from the 
wheat. Agnosticism is viewed as the natural and 
logical result of a wrong theory of knowledge. Now, 
as with Socrates and St. Thomas, the all-important 
problem is to form fixed and definite concepts. ^^'^roXA&m 
discuss the problem here would be to extend the "^^^''^^y- 
present treatise beyond just limits. A full historical 
and critical treatise pertains to Philosophy of Mind. 



CHAPTER II. 

FACT. 

§ I. Contact with other minds is invested with a 
peculiar charm. The thoughts, the hopes, the fears 
of those we meet in the varied relations of daily life, 
are a subject of surpassing interest. The}?" appeal to 
us as sharers in a common humanity. Great is the 
delight felt in the study of physical nature and in the 
knowledge of her secret treasures. Greater still is 
that • derived from a study of man, whether in the 
development of the individual, or in the course of his- 
tory, or in the products of genius, e. g.^ Literature 
and the Fine Arts. 
God^a^" § 2. In the present essay we are concerned not with 

TaTFac?^^' ^^ individual and isolated example. The bounds of 
the inquiry are much wider; they extend to and 
embrace the whole human race. The purpose is to 
discuss the validity of the belief in God. This is a 
primary conviction and possession of humanity. We 
deal, therefore, with a psychological fact. Its con- 
crete expression is found in the various forms of religi- 
ous worship which have held so prominent a place in 
human history. The inquiry is not concerning the 
proximate sources whence man derived the belief. In 
this authority and custom play an important part.^ We 
are occupied with the ultimate grounds and justifica- 
tion of the idea. Thus the discussion is more philo- 
sophical and of more permanent value. ^ 

^ Foundations of Belief, by A. Balfour. 

- Bovvne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 7; Mill, Essays on 
Religion, p. 128. 

[26] 



FACT. 27 

§ 3. The initial point of our inquiry is not an assump- ^^^J^^^^jJ"^ 
tion^^ We do not reason from an hypotliesis but from th^s fact has 
a fact. The fact is taken as it is presented in conscious basis, 
experience." The train of our reasoning will show at 
every step that this fact has a sound basis and can be 
verified to a certainty. Thus it is not an ideal product 
of subjective affections, e. g., of imagination, of hope, 
or of fear; it has an objective content which is grounded 
in the very nature of things. 

I. 

The Fact is Universal. Fact is uni- 

versal. 

§ 4. Now it is a fact that all men believe in God. 

This belief is the possession of civilized as well as of 

savage nations.^ No tribe has been found without a 

religion, and no religion without some conception of 

God.^ /The assertion that tribes exist who have no 

notion of a higher being has been refuted by facts/^ 

The Benedictine monks of Australia say that the natives Australia. 

believe in an Omnipotent Being, the creator of heaven 

and earth, whom the}^ call Motogon/ /The Australian 

will say " No, not seen him, /. e., Baiame, but I have 

felt him."/ Waitz tells us that the religious ideas of 

the African tribes are so high that if we do not like to^" Africa. 

call them monotheistic, we may say at least that they 

^Supernatural Religion, vol. I., pp. 64-67. 

* This method is pursued by Prof. Bowne in Philosophy of 
Theism, p. 8. He, however, shows the influence of Kant in 
resting belief in God not on demonstration but on the practical 
reason, and in renouncing demonstration, p. 32. 

^Cicero, de Leg. I., 8; Disp. Tusc, I.; Plutarch, adv. Col- 
otem, ch. 31; Tyler, Primitive Culture, vol. I., p. 425; vol. II., 
p. 18; Spencer, First Principles, pp 4, 13. 

* Religion of Primitive Peoples, D. G. Brinton, p. 30. 
■'Origin and Growth of Religion, by M. Miiller, p. 78; Nat- 
ural Religion, p. 85 

nh., p. 17. 

'Jour. Anthrop. Instit. vol. II., p. 269. 



28 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

have come very near the boundaries of true monothe- 
ism." '' However degraded these people may be," 
writes Mr. Livingstone, "there is no need telling 
them of the existence of God or of a future life. These 
two truths are universally admitted in Africa. If we 
speak to them of a dead man, they reply: " He is 
gone to God." " This testimony is confirmed by 
Qua tref ages, '^ Miiller,'^ Wilkes,'^ Wilson,^' Lang.'^ 
in America, g ^j Careful research into the customs and language 
of the aborigines of America reveal the same truth. 
To the Indians God is the Great Spirit." With some 
the idea of God is very lofty. ^^ Again we find it exist- 
ing in cruder and lower expression." Darwin's descrip- 
tion of the natives of Patagonia as very low is refuted 
by Giacomio Bove,^° Nevertheless, however imperfect 
and childish the expression may seem, it represents 
the highest and most perfect idea v/hich the mind for 
the time and circumstances can grasp." If we, with 
the great advantages of civilization, with the wealth of 
knowledge in Religion, Philosophy, History and 
Science handed down from the past and pouring in 

^° Waitz, Anthrop., vol. II., p. 167; Miiller, Origin and 
Growth of Religion, p. 107. 

'^ Missionary Travels, p. 158. 

^^ The Human Species, Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sau- 
vages; The Pigmies, ch. VII. 

^3 L. c. ; Chips, vol. I., p. 45; Science of Religion, p. 39. 

'•* Exploring Expedition. 

^^ North and South Guinea, p. 209. 

^^ The Making of Religion. 

^■^ Ethnography and Philology of the Hidsata Indians. W 
Mathews. 

^* Prescott, Conquest of Mexico; Schoolcraft, Oneota, p. 342. 

^^Thus Payne, in his History of the New World, vol. I., p. 
389, says that the lowest savages have no God. The difficulty 
is found in his meaning of God. Cf. " The Making of a 
Religion," A. Lang. 

20 Miiller, Natural Religion, p. 83. 

" Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 116; Pfleiderer, The Philos- 
ophy of Religion, vol. III., p. 15. 



FACT. 29 

from all sides, still find a difficulty and a fruitful source 
of error in the effort to express abstract and imma- 
terial concepts by way of metaphor or analogy, why 
should we be supercritical in dealing with the savage 
mind? We must for the moment forget our advantages, 
put ourselves in sympathy with them and judge them 
on their own ground. Their environment is narrow, 
the data of their experience are limited. The diffi- 
culty in expressing immaterial ideas is therefore much 
greater than ours. 

§ 6. Hence religion, in its most general sense, is a conclusion, 
universal phenomenon of humanity. ^^ Patient research 
day by day brings into stronger light the great truth 

That in all the ages 
Every human heart is human, 
That in even savage bosoms 
There are longings, yearnings, strivings 
For the good they comprehend not.'^ 

II. 

Primitive Monotheism. F/i'"i*ij^ 

Monothe- 

§ 7. Religion is a phenomenon universal not only in 
place but in time also. The records of all nations Belief in 
from the very dawn of history show that the human ve°rsai?n 
race has at all times sought for God,^* Abundant '^™^' 
proofs are furnished by the new department of science, 
The History of Religions, which has sprung up in our 
own generation. It investigates the religious beliefs 
of past nations as they are revealed in the written gP^^^y^^^ 
records, in the customs, laws and life, in the language, Religions. 
and from these data presents some information of 

'" Tiele, Outlines, p. 6, 

'^^ Miiller, chips, vol I., p, 30. 

'* Cicero, de Leg. i, 24; Aristotle, de Coelo, i, 3; Seneca, ep. 
117. The fact is taken as a proof by Cicero de Nat. Deor. i, 
17; Aristotle, Rhetor. 1, 13; St. Thomas, C. Gent. II., 34. 



30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



by com- 



what our remote ancestors have thought and felt con- 
cerning their origin and destiny. In the discussion of 
parative the primitive beliefs of mankind lanafuapre is by far the 

Philology. ^ o <=> J 

most important source. True index of thought and 
feeling it goes far beyond written records. The 
materials so far collected are imperfect. Yet they all 
converge to the important truth that the farther back 
we go in the history of religious thought, the more 
certain it appears that the earliest belief of mankind 
was monotheistic.^" 
Themethod § 8. In treating this subject we shall be candid and 

followed. , - , ^^ , . . . ^ , 

loyal to truth. Nothing is gained by a travesty of 
facts. The only method to be followed is a deeper 
and more exhaustive study of the very branch of 
knowledge which at first sight is supposed to present 
unsurmountable difficulties to the Christian believer. ^^ 
In thus proceeding the inference shall be safe and 
sound. 
In India. § 9. The sacred Books of the Hindus are made up 
of various writings covering the space of a, thousand 
years. The most ancient is the collection called the 
Vedas. It embraces the Rig-Veda, the Sama-Veda, 
the Yagar-Veda, and the Atharva-Veda. Of these the 
Rig- Veda is the oldest and the most valuable for our 
present study." Its age has been variously estimated 
from 1500 to 2000 B. C.^^ A careful examination of 
these records shows traces of a primitive monotheism. 

'^ Apologie du Christ™% Hettinger-Jannin, vol. I., ch. VIII. 

^^ Wiseman Lectures on Science and Religion, Lect. III.; 
'• True reverence is shown in treating every subject however 
sacred, however dear to us, with perfect confidence; without 
fear and without favor; with tenderness and love by all means, 
but, before all, with an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty 
to truth." MuUer, Science of Religion, p. 6. 

" Physical Religion, Miiller, pp. 58, 74, 

^^ Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 5; Muir's Sanscrit Texts, 
vol. I., p. 4; vol. IL, p. 206; vol. III., p. 116. 



FACT. 31 

Thus we read " 

In the beginning there was neither aught nor naught. 

There was neither sky nor atmosphere above. 

There was neither death nor immortality. 

There was neither day nor night, neither light nor darkness. 

Only the Existing One breathed calmly self-contained. 

God is called Ekam Sat, i. e.^ the only existing being. 
True it is that traces of a nature-religion can be found 
in the Vedas.^" But to say that the Vedic gods are 
nothing more than natural phenomena personified and 
worshipped, or that nature-worship is the primitive 
type of Indian Religion is to betray the superficial 
observer. ^^ The moral and spiritual basis is older, and 
more in accord with the fundamental principles recog- 
nized by the primitive x\ryans.^^ " That which is and 
is one," says the Rig-Veda, ^^ " the poets call in various 
ways." Or it puts the question " He who established 
the six -worlds, is he that one which exists in the form 
of the unborn Being? " ^* 

S 10. That this one is not a barren unity of philo- notaphii- 

«-> J r osopmcal 

sophic speculation, such as is found later in the panthe- "^lity. 
istic teaching of the Upanishads, is evident from 
parallel passages.^-' 

" He who is our Father that begot us, he who is our creator, 
He who knows all places and all creatures, 
He who gav^e names to the gods, being one only. 
To him all other creatures go, to ask Him." 

'^ Rig- Veda, x, mant, 129. 

^^ Tiele, Elements of The Science of Religion, ist series; 
Outlines of Primitive Belief, C. H. Keary, pref., p. xi.; History 
of Religion, by A. Menzies, p. 324. 

^' God in Nature, by Baron Bunson; The Teaching of the 
Vedas, M. Phillips, p. 83. 

^^ lb., p. 35, 40, 45, 103, 104, no; Origins of Religions and 
Language, F. C. Cook, pref., pp. 5, 6; d'Harlez, Avesta and 
articles in Jour. Asiatique. 

33R.-Veda, I., 164, 46. 

^* Rig- Veda, I., 164, 6; x, 121, 8; Miiller, Physical Religion, 
p. 366. 

2^ Rig- Veda, I., 164, 46; x, 82, 3. 



32 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus Father Calmette does not hesitate to say that 
the true God is taught in the Vedas.^^ And scholars 
of great name, e.g., Adoiphe Pictet," Miiller,'^ Dr. 
A. B, Smith,^^ Prof. Banergea," Card. Gibbons," F. 
E. Ellmgwood," Prof. Wilson," M. Phillips,''* Muir," 
J. M. Mitchell/" do not hesitate to declare that the 
loftier conceptions of the Vedic religion are unques- 
tionably the earlier, and that they show clear traces of 
a primitive monotheism. 
The more 8 n. The farther back, therefore, we go in the his- 

primitive is " , 70 

the belief, torv of the Indian peoples, the purer becomes the form 

the purer •' ,.-%.,,., 

it is. of religious belief. Idolatry is shown to be a degenera- 

tion.*^ In the Vedas different gods are worshipped. 
Some writers maintain that this is due to a personifica- 
tion of natural forces, that primitive man reads behind 
the powers of nature agencies separate and distinct 
after an analogy of his ov/n volitional power, that thus 
the conception of one God is only a later growth.*^ 
Others, e. g.^ Miiller, hold that the different names in 
the Vedas express different deities. Reasoning on 
this basis, we can conclude with Tiele that the Jews at 
different times worshipped three different Gods, e. g., 
Elohim, Jahweh, Adonai. Others that the different 

^^ Miiller, Physical Religion, p. 44. 

^^ Les Origines Indo-Europiennes. 

^^ History of Ancient Sanscrit Literature; Chips, vol. L, pp 
23, 349; Science of Religion, pp. 37, 57, 86, 88, 99. 

^^ Introd. to Christian Theology, p. 166. 

■^° Aryan Witness, 

^^ Our Christian Heritage, ch. II. 

^^ Oriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII. . 

*^ Essays, vol. II,, p. 51. 

-* The Teaching of the Vedas. 

^* Sanscrit Texts, vol. III., p. 245; vol. V., p. 412. 

''^ Present Day Tracts, vol. VI, n. 33. The Hindu Religion. 

^^ Oriental Religions and Christianity, by F. E. Ellingwood. 
ch, VII.; Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, 

p; lo- 

^^ Destiny of Man, J. Fiske, p. 78. 



FACT. 33 

names for God only represent different manifestations 
or attributes of the one God."' 

S 12. A better explanation can be sousrlit in langfuasfe. explanation 

"^ ^ ^ ^ ^ of the de- 

It is a historical fact that the early form of religious gradation. 

belief was monotheistic. Now the names employed 
by the mind to designate spiritual facts are all drawn 
from conscious individual experience. In the begin- 
ning, man naturally expressed the power and attributes 
of the infinite in different words drawn from nature 
and from life. The tendency of language is to become 
crystallized. Words gradually lose their etymological 
force. The}'' stand out as distinct and independent 
facts in our mental life. What first was a sign, becomes 
itself an object. Thus a language monotheistic in its 
primitive signification gradually becomes polytheistic 
in fact.'° 

§ 13. The oldest and most trustworthy records of(b)irania. 
the Iranian worship are contained in the Gathas.^^The 
The sacred chants are attributed to Zoroaster." His 
life was an attempt to restore the primitive belief. 
Hence the doctrine of the Gathas is viewed as pure 
Iranian."^ Written in a different dialect from the rest 
of the Avesta, they form the kernel about which the 
sacred literature of the Persians clustered in an after- 
growth." 

§ 14. Now the Gathas inculcate belief in AhuraAhura 
Mazda the self-existing, omniscient being." He is the 

^^ Physical Religion, Miiller, p. 44; Oriental Religions and 
Christianity, F. E. EUingwood, ch. VIT. 

^® Miiller, Science of Language, vol. I. 

^^ Science of Religion, Miiller, p. 18. 

" Origines du Zoroast"®, by Jas. Darmesteter, in Annales du 
Musee Gaimet, t. 24, p. 5; Origins of Religion and of Language, 
F. C. Cook, p. 203. 

" Ebrard, Apologetics, vol. IL, p. 217. 

*^ Present day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25; The Zend-Avesta and The 
Religions of the Parsees, J. M. Mitchell. ^ 

" Muller translates Akura by "living," Mazda by "am who 



34 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

all powerful Lord who made heaven and earth and all 
that is therein, and governs everything with wisdom.." 
The sole really personal being is Mazda Ahura." The 
two spirits in antagonism are below him.^® Thus the 
opposition of Ahriman is of a later date.^^ Originally 
he was a good spirit created by Ahura/" The Amesha- 
Speutas in the Gatha have the nature of abstract ideas 
or qualities, /. ^., attributes of Ahura. Afterwards 
they formed a kind of celestial council." The spiritual 
unique nature of Ahura is attested beyond question." 
He is identified with Varuna, the god of light, of justice 
and of the moral order, whose worship antedates Indra 
and who is conceived as the most spiritual of the Vedic 
gods." 
conclusion. g i^. We can therefore with perfect safety accept 
the conclusions of d'Harlez,®* of Darmesteter/" of 
Tiele,®^ that the primitive form of Iranian belief was 
monotheistic." 

am." hence the self-existing living one; Hibbeit Lectures, p. 
igi; so also Pfieiderer in Phil, of Religion, vol, IIL, p. 86, 
Chips, vol. L, p. 124. According to Mr. Cook, Asura or A Intra 
means Lord, and is derived from aszt, i. e., life, and ultimately 
from the verb as in zend, ah i. e., to be, and cites the St. Peters- 
burg dictionary and Grassman. It thus has an affinity to the 
Hebrew verb to be, the root of Jahweh, Origins of Religion and 
of Language, p. 51, note, p. 71; while Mazda is derived from 
Maz i. e., great and da i. e.^ knowledge, ib., p. 141. 

*^ Gathas, I., chant i. 

"Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, ist series, p. 47. 

58 Ib. 

^3 Cook, 1. c. p. 141, Present Day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25, by J. M. 
Mitchell. 

60 Pfieiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 84. 

^' Present Day Tracts ib., p. 16. 

62 The God of Zoroaster, by L. H. Mills, in New World, 
March, 1895. 

63 Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, pp. 65, 141. 
6* Avesta and articles in Jour. Asiatique. 

6^ The Zend Avesta, in Annales du Musee Guimet, tom. 21; 
Origines da Zoroast.™* ib. tom. 24; Contem. Review, Oct., 1879! 
66 Elements of the Science of Religion, ist series. 
6'' Study of Five Zoroastrian Gathas, L. H. Mills, DD. 



FACT. 35 

8 i6. The same truth comes out from a critical study (c) Greece 

" •' and Rome. 

of the religions of Greece and Rome/^ When we 
ascend to the very dawn of Grecian history we are met 
with the fact that the idea of God, as the supreme 
being, was firmly implanted in the minds of this branch 
of the Aryan race.°^ The worship of the powers of 
nature came afterwards, and gave rise to the family 
of gods which in Greece and in Rome surrounds the 
person of Zeus. 

§17. A critical study of the Aryan religions con- Hence 

• , I 1-1 ^1 Ml • primitive 

vmces the student that m them we nnd no illustration belief of the 

- • . , ^ T ^ 1 • 1 Aryans was 

of an evolution and progress from a low to a higher monotheis- 
form/*^ Everywhere we find signs of degeneracy from 
higher and purer forms. ^' The fact is forced upon the 
mind that idolatry is explained by a tendency every- 
where evident, to sink from a purer knowledge of God 
to what is lower and corrupt. '^^ 

§ i8. Under the strong light thrown by contemporary 1° Egypt 
scholarship upon the ancient religions of Egypt and of ^^ 
China, the same truth is brought into clear view. 

*** ElHng worth, Oriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.; 
Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 82. 

^^ Muller, Chips, vol. II., p. 146, who cites Welchers' Mythol- 

og:y- 

" Present Day Tracts, vol. VI, n. 33; The Hindu Religion, J. 
M. Mitchell; F. C. Cook, 1. c, p. 70. 

"As Mr. Darmesteter so well writes " The religion of the 
Indo-European race, while still united, recognized a supreme 
God, an organizing God, almighty, omniscient, moral. The 
conception was a heritage of the past." ContPm. Review, Oct., 

1879. 

■'2 S. H. Kellogg, Genesis and Growth of Religion, p. 271; 
Miiller, Chips, vol. I. pp. 37, 48. " Is it not something worth 
knowing that before the separation of the Aryan race, before the 
existence of Sanscrit, Greek or Latin, before the God of the 
Vedas had been worshipped, and before there was a sanctuary 
of Zeus among the sacred oaks of Dodona one Supreme Deity 
had been found, had been named, had been invoked by the 
ancestors of our race." Science of Religion, Miiller, pp. 27, 
82; also The Religion and Thought of the Aryans of Northern 
Europe, R. Brown, F. S. A. 



36 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Polytheism is shown to be an aftergrowth and 
corruption." 
(a) Egypt. § 19. In the most ancient monuments of Egypt the 
simplest and most precise conception of one God is 
expressed. He is one and alone; no others are with 
Him. He is the only Being, living in truth, i. e., 
Maat, which signifies a straight and inflexible rule.'* 
"Thou are one," we read, "and millions of beings 
proceed from thee." '^ He has made everything and 
he alone has not been made. The hidden god from 
whom in the beginning all things came into existence 
is represented as declaring '"^ 

I am Turn, a being who is one alone 
I am the great God, the self-existing. 



existin 

spirit 

unity 



God a self- God, therefore, is not only a unity, he is a self-existent 

existing . ^^ . ^ , . . . , , ,, . . 

spiritual Unity. He is the spirit more spiritual than all spirits, 
the self-existent one, unbegotten, eternal." More 
than 5000 years ago in the valley of the Nile the hymn 
of praise arose to the one God. He is termed nutar^ 
i. e.^ the iinperishable o?ie, according to Tiele, who cites 
de Rouge, and Brugsch,'^ or the strong one, according 
to Renouf, who traces a striking resemblance of the 
word to the Hebrew El ShaddaiJ^ 



'^ Religions of Ancient Egypt, Le Page Renoaf, p. 262. 

'^ In the Egyptian as in the Aryan and Semitic languages, the 
notion of stretching out is connected with the notions of straight, 
right, righteous, trtie^ rule, row, order. Oar word rule, Latin 
regula, comes from the Aryan Arg, which means to stretch out. 
In Gothic rak-j'a, rach^ts, means right, straight. Hence the 
Egyptian 77iaat signifies not only truth and justice but order and 
law in the physical and in the m.oral world. Renouf, 1 c, p. 
123. 

" M. de Rouge, in Annal de la Phil. Cret., t. XX., p. 327. 

'^ Book of the Dead, ch. 17. 

'"'Tiele, Egyptian Religion, p. 218; Historj'- of Religion, A. 
Menzies. p. 142. 

"^^ Tiele, 1. c, p. 225. 

"'^ Renouf, Religions of Ancient Egypt, pp. 102, 254. 



FACT. 37 

8 20. Monotheism, therefore, is a fact clearly hence mon- 

o ' ■' otneistic. 

expressed in ancient Egyptian records. ^"^ It is no less 
true that the sublimer portions of the Egyptian religion 
are not the comparatively late result of a process of 
purification from earlier and grosser forms. ^' That 
the worship of the Egyptians was polytheistic from the 
beginning was taught by Tiele in Outlines of History 
of Religion," in a later work he expresses the contrary 
opinion. ^^ The heritage of that ancient civilization is 
the belief in one supreme God, the creator and lawgiver 
of men whom He has endowed with an immortal soul." 
These primitive truths now shine forth from the rank 
growth of mythology and superstition in which they 
had been well-nigh buried. ^^ 

§ 21. In China the powers of nature, the spirits of (^)^^*"*- 
ancestors are invoked and worshipped. But behind 
all there is found the conviction in the existence of 
some higher power, who is the creator and preserver 
of the world. ®^ This monotheistic belief is a tradition 
handed down from the earliest period of their history." 
The primitive Chinese worshipped Chang-Ti, /. ^., 
supreme Lord. Together with him lower spirits were 
associated.^® Chang-Ti was the supreme ruler, one, 

^"^ Tiele, 1. c, p. 222; Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III., 
p. 267. 

*' Renouf, 1. c, p. 95; Wordsworth, The One Religion, p. 32; 
Rawlinson, Religions of the Ancient World, p. 29. 

«^ P. 45. 

*^ Cf. supra. 

"Prof. Rawlinson History of Ancient Egypt, vol. I., p. 314; 
Records of the Past, vol. 11., p. 129; IV., p. 99; VI., p, 100. 

'* De Rouge, 1. c. ; Renouf, 1. c, p. 262; Ellingwood, Oriental 
Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.; Wilkinson, Ancient Egyp- 
tians, vol. IV., p. 178; Lenormant, Manual d'Histoire Ancienne, 
vol. I., p. 522. 

8* Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 88. 

^' Edkins, Religions in China, p. 95. 

®^D'Harlez, in New World, Dec, 1893; F. M. James, in New 
World, June, 1897. 



38 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

invisible, spiritual, the only true God.^^ According to 
Mr. Legge, Ti was the one supreme object of homage 
as far back as we can go.^" Tien, /. e.^ heaven," is a 
naturalistic and polytheistic word, used at first meta- 
phorically, e. g.j " may heaven grant," afterwards obs- 
cured and corrupted the primitive faith. ^^ Hence Mr. 
Legge, and Mgr. d'Harlez. unhesitatingly declare that 
5000 years ago the Chinese were monotheists.^^ 
3« Semitic g 22. When we turn to the Semitic races we have in 
the Holy Bible a record of Jewish belief, which is 
beyond question. Their early government was 
a theocracy. They stand forth a clear example of a 
nation monotheistic throughout the course of its 
history. Renan attempts to explain this by a mono- 
theistic instinct in the Semitic race.^" The explana- 
tion is rejected, but it is a striking testimony of a fact.'^ 
Fallen into idolatry again and again, the Jews are 

^^ La Relig. Chinoise, d'Harlez. 

^° Legge, Religion of China, p. 18. 

^^Mijlier, Science of Religion, p. 86. 

92 D'Harlez, La Relig. Chinoise; New World, Dec, 1893; The 
Chinese, Dr. W. Martin, p. 163; Shoo-King, by Dr. Legge, ch. 27. 

92 D'Harlez in Dublin Review, vol. 43, p. 109. 

The Tao-Te-King, i. e.. The Book of Tao and of Virtue, is the 
basis of Taoism. Scholars do net agree in its interpretation. 
After an exhaustive analysis Mr. d'Harlez reaches the conclu- 
sion: " L'orlgine de tous les etres et leur lois sont dans un 
etre premier, infini, eternal, spirituel, et personnel, infiniment 
bon et perfait, que I'esprit de I'homme ne peut comprendre in 
nommer. Cet etre infini a produit tous les etres particuliers en 
les faisant sortir de sa substance. II les formes distincts de liu- 
meme, mais ii continue a les regir, a leur fournir tout ce que 
est necessaire a leur existence. Les etres doivent s'appuyer 
sur lib, se servir de liu comme d'un point d'appui et d'une 
source de dons necessaire a leur perfection morale. lis doivent 
imitef ses vertus et retournir a liu a la fin de leur existence." 
Le Tao-Te-King, par. M. d'Harlez, Annales du Musee Guimet, 
t, 20, p. 23. 

9-* Pfleiderer speaks of " a natural predisposition," Philos. of 
Religion, vol. III., p. 117. 

9* Mliller, Chips, vol. L, p. 340, who explains the fact by prim- 
itive revelation, p. 348. 



FACT. 39 

recalled to the service of the one true God by a series 
of punishments, inflicted by the voice of the Prophets. 
Rising up one after the other these great and holy 
men, filled with the divine spirit, strove in word and 
in deed to uplift the people from the depths to which 
they had sunk. Thus the primitive belief remained 
untarnished and was preserved to the coming of Christ. 
The nations among whom the Jews lived were idola- 
trous. Scholars, however, assure us that this idolatry 
was a degeneracy, that traces of the primitive faith 
show a monotheistic conception. ^^ 

§ 23. Even among the lowest and most barbarous 4° with 
tribes, traces of the same belief are found. The 
natives of Africa have sunk to the lowest grade of Africa, 
humanity. Covered over, as their belief is, with the 
crudest forms of superstition and fetichism, passing 
away also before the advance of Christian civilization, 
we yet find reminiscences of a supreme God." In 
their conceptions the ethical element predominates.^^ 
As Dr. Robertson Smith truly observes, '* even in its 
rudest forms Religion was a moral force." ^^ The 
Bushmen, Fuegians, Australians have moral and 
omniscient gods, /. ^., makers of things, fathers in 
heaven, friends, guardians of morality, seeing what is 

^®Renan; Miiller; Ebrard; Ellingwood The Oriental 
Religions and Christianity, p, 225; Montifiore in Hibbert Lec- 
tures, 1892, writes: " The worship of a chief divinity is 
undoubtedly a characteristic feature of the Semitic religion," 
yet adds " analogy does not lead us to believe that if we were 
to go farther and farther back into prehistoric times we should 
find a higher and purer religion, but rather one vaguer, meaner, 
and more trivial." P. 25. The conception of primitive belief 
with Hume and Pfleiderer as " an irrational and pathological 
phenomenon " (Phil, and Devel. of Religion, vol. I., pp. 13, 28), 
is contradicted by historical facts. 

'■' Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 39. 

*^ Lang, The Making of Religion, pp. 194, 280. 

" Religion of the Semites, p. 53. 



40 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Australia, good or bad in the hearts of men.^°° The aborigines 
of Australia are probably the lowest extant in the scale 
of civilization. Yet their religious conceptions are so 
lofty that we naturally seek an explanation in European 
influence or in a higher civilization.'" An all-knowing 
being observes and rewards the conduct of men; he is 
named with reverence, if named at all; his abode is in 
the heavens; he is maker and Lord of all things; his 
lessons soften the heart; he is called Fapang^ z. <?., 
Father, Mujigiin-uguar^ i. <?., our Father."'^ This 
supreme being is not the product of ancestor worship; 
for it is held v/here the latter is not found. "^ 

In Guinea. g 24. In Guinea the natives worship ''The Ancient 
One, The Ancient 0?ze in the Sky land, Our Maker ^ Our 
Father, Our Great Father.'' ^""^ Waitz teaches that if 
the African negroes are not called monotheists, they 
are still on the borders of monotheism.'"^ The belief 
in one supreme Being who made and upholds all things 
is universal. '°^ 

In America. § 25. In America the Pawnees worship Ti-ra-wa. 
i. e., the Spirit Father, or A-ti-us ta-kaw-a, i. e., our 
Father in all places.'" The Zunis speak of God as 
Awonawilona, i. e., the all-Father."^ The Indians of 
Missouri worship "' The Old Man I^nmortal,"' The Great 
Spirit, The Great Mystery.^'' The Tinne of British 
America have the word Nayeweri, i. e., he who creates 

i°o Lang, 1. c, p. 176. 

'^Mb., p. T91. 

^°2Btough Smith, The Aborigines, I., 428; Taphin, The 
Native Races of Australia. 

^o^Lang, 1. c. ch. XIII., XIV. 

^oMb., p. 222. 

^o^b., p. 229. 

'^^ Wilson. North and South Guinea, p. 209. 

i°'Lang, 1. c, p. 255, 257. 

^«Mb., p. 271. 

^^'^ Ethnography and Philology of the Hidsata Indians cit. by 
Miiller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 17. 



FACT. 41 

by thought. The Algonquin speaks of Kitche Maneto, 
who created the world, "by an act of his will." "" 
The Aztecs of Mexico pray to Tota^ i. e.^ our Father; 
the tribes of North America to "grandfather" or 
great " grandfather." 

S 26. If to this we add the tradition universal both universal 

" _ tradition 

amoner civilized and savage nations that formerly that form- 

*^ ° _ ^ •' erly heaven 

heaven was nearer to men than it is now, that the ^as nearer 

' earth. 

creator himself gave lessons of wisdom to human 
beings, but afterwards withdrew from them to heaven 
where He now dwells, the reasoning will be made much 
more cogent. We find this tradition v/ith the ancient 
Hindus,"^ with Greek and Romans, ^^'^ as also with 
African and Mexican tribes."^ 

§27. The anthropological theory that God was^^5cf°^°- 
evolved out of ghosts or ancestor-spirits can in no way J-efuted.*^'^"^ 
explain the savage concepts of God. On the contrary, 
the facts show a corruption of a purer and older form. 
The fact is universal that mankind shows an inclination 
to fall away from a primitive monotheism.'" This 
tendency, so universal in history, can only be explained 
by admitting that monotheism was the original belief 
of mankind."^ Mr. Tylor himself admits that "The 
degeneration theory, no doubt in some instances with 

"^ Schoolcraft, Oneota. p. 342. 

'" Rig- Veda, I., 179, 2; VII., 76,4; Muir's Sanscrit Texts, 
vol. III., p. 245; The Teachingof the Vedas, M. Phillips, p. 175. 

"2 Miiller. Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 170. 

"3 Duke of Argyle, Conternp Review, June, 1881; Prescott's 
Mexico; Lang. The Making of Religion, passim. 

"■* Abbe de Broglie, Problemes et Conclusions de L'Histoire 
des Religions, ch. II., III. 

"5 Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III., p. 317; The Mak- 
ing of Religion, A. Lang, p. 328, 334; Genesis and Growth of 
Religion, S. H. Kellogg, p. 271; Origins of Religion and 
Language, F. C. Cook, p. 70; Oriental Religions and Chris- 
tianity, by F. Ellingwood, ch. VII.; Rawlinson, The Religions 
of the Ancient World, p. 242. 



42 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fairness, may claim such beliefs as mutilated and per- 
verted remains of higher religion."^ 
conclusion. g 28. From this testimony we may with perfect safety 
consider the conclusions as well established : (i) That 
the farther back we go in the history of any religion, 
the purer become the religious concepts, hence the 
fact oi primitive purity for which we have the testimony 
of Renouf, deRouge, MuUer, Rawlinson, Tiele. (2) That 
everywhere evident traces are found of the corruption 
of primitive belief, hence the fact of degeneracy for 
which we appeal to the labors of Dr. Robertson Smith, 
Miiller, Kellogg, Ebrard, Phillips, etc. (3) That all 
nations point in tradition to the time when heaven was 
closer to earth, hence the traces oi primitive revelatio7t, 
<f. ^., MuUer, Phillips. (4) That the ascertained results 
of historic criticism show the earliest known belief of 
the Persians, the Hindus, the Egyptians, the Chinese, 
to be a pure and spiritual mojiotheism^ for which fact we 
have the researches of d'Harlez, Darmesteter, Tiele, 
Legge, de Rouge, Renouf."^ 

III. 

The Expression of the Fact. 
Compara- 8 20. The coursc of our investigation is not yet over. 

tive Phil- ^^ ^ . , , , , , ^ , ^ 

oiogyre- The materials at hand enable us to advance a step 

veals the . . 11,., 

thoughts of farther. A new science yet remains untouched which 

primitive , . , - _ . . , .,, , , 

man. opcus the way into a land flowing with milk and honey, 

filled with objects of delight and of food for the mind. 
Within our memory the Department of Linguistics was 
placed upon a scientific basis. It opens up a new 

"^ Prim. Culture, vol. II., p. 336; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, 
vol. III., p. 42. 

1^'' Reasoning from the data of language Miiller infers a primi- 
tive Aryan, Semitic and Turanian religion. Science of Religion, 
pp. 82, 93. 



FACT. 43 

country for exploration and conquest, where every 
word is a sculptured monument revealing the highest 
and deepest thoughts, feelings, aspirations of mankind. 
By the study of language we can enter into the thoughts 
of past ages, and become cognizant of their inmost 
consciousness. Especially is this true with the problem 
of God.^^« 

§ 30. It has been shown that belief in God is a phe- (a) God ex- 
nomenon universal both in place and in time. The mora? and 
fact, however, does not satisfy us. We seek the S^ con-^^^" 
causes of the fact. What were the sources whence ^^^ ^' 
man derived the belief. The science of language gives 
the answer and bids us seek in the phenomena of the 
moral relations: Thus, e. g., Jahweh^ i. e., the one 
who is; Ahura, i. e., the living one; El^ the powerful 
shown in Elohim, Ilah, Allah, Babylonia, /. ^., bab, gate 
and el; Elyon\ Shaddai^ i, ^., the Mighty; Bel^ i. e.^ 
Lord; Molech, i. e.^ King; Adonai^ i. e., Lord; Wodin^ 
i. e.^ the all-Father. In the lower tribes cited above 
we have the Zulu, Unkululii^ i. e., Father, ^^^ the 
Australian Fapang, i. e.^ Father. ^^° In Chinese Ti 
means sovereign.^" 

S XI. Another source by which primitive man (b) by 

^ . . ^ words 

expressed his concept of God is in the Physical world, drawn from 
Thus we have Dyaus Pitar of the Aryans, Tien of the nature. 
Chinese, Deva from the root Div, i. e., to shine. From 
the Sanscrit root we have the Greek Zeus^ the Latin 
Deus,^ the Persian Daeva, the German This, Tiu, the 
Celtic £>ia, the races of Central Asia Teo.^'^'^ The Vedic 

^'^Miiller, Chips, vol. IV., p. 221, 

''» Pfleiderer, Philos. of Religion, vol. IIL, p. 42. 

^^•^ A. Lang, op. cit. 

'■-' Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 75, sq. Thus Pfleiderer has 
no grounds for asserdng that " the names of gods of different 
religions all alike refer to natural phenomena." Philosophy of 
Religion, vol. IIL, p. 13, 237. 

^^^ Ebrard, Apologetics, vol. II.. p. 145; The Idea of God and 



44 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Aqui is formed from the root ag^ /. ^., to move 
quickly;"^ and Varuna from var^ i. <f., to cover, and 
signifies the wide-spreading sky."* Num or Junta of 
the Samoyedes, Jumula of the Finlanders, is ixovixjum^ 
i. e.^ thunder, and la^ i. e.^ place, hence the place of 
thunder, or the sky. The same word, modified by 
phoenetic rules, is found among the Lapps, the Etho- 
nians, the Syrjanes, the Tcherejuissians, the Voty- 
akes.'" The Mongolian Te?ig-ri, i. e.^ Lord of the 
sky, the Hunnish, ta7ig-li^ the modern Yakute word 
tangara are the same as the Chinese Tien}'^^ 

§ 32. Thus for the first time the deepest germs of 
the consciousness of God among the different nations 
of the world have been laid open."' As yet the 
material is not complete. Nevertheless we are war- 
ranted to find, in our own being and in the world with- 
out, the ground on which rests our concept of the 
supreme being. ^" 

the Moral Sense, W. R. Baines; Miiller, Chips, vol. I; Science 
. of Religion, pp. 63 sq. ; Physical Religion, p. 136; Origins of 
Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, p. 59, who cites Grimm, 
History of the German Language, 2d ed., p. 282, and German 
Mythology, ch. IX. 

^22 Miiller, Physical Religion, o. 122. 

"* Chips, vol. II, p. 65. 

12^ Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 89. 

"Mb., p. 92. 

"' Miiller, Chips, vol. IV, p. 221. 

"* Idea of God and the Moral Sense, by H. R. Baines. 



CHAPTER III. 

ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 

§ I. A distinction should be drawn between the ^^jgJJ^^^"^^ 
origin of our belief in God's existence and the ^r^z^^^j- our^beiief 
whereby we strive to justify this belief. One logically 
and naturally leads to the other; yet they are distinct, 
and capable of separate treatment. They give rise to 
different trains of thought and are centers around 
which cluster different groups of erroneous notions. 
We shall now set forth the various theories which 
attempt to explain the origin of the idea of God. 



Theory of Innate Ideas. 

§ 2. In the effort to combat a philosophy of sense, innate 
and render the spiritual nature of man secure from all 
attacks, some thinkers of great name have contended 
that our ideas do not all come through the channels of 
the senses, but some at least have their source in the 
mind alone. These are the natural endowments of the 
soul. Hence God in creating man not only bestowed 
a mind with its activities, but also implanted in the 
mmd one or more ideas already formed. They are 
due then not to the suggestion of sense, nor to the 
activity of mind, but whole and entire were our pos- 
session from the first dawn of consciousness. This is 
called the theory of Innate Ideas. 

§ 3. This theory was proposed in different forms by proposed in 
its defenders. From the dawn of philosophic specula- forms" 
tion even to our own day, men of great power and 

[45] 



46 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

elevatioQ of mind have set it forth with skill and force/ 
Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and Rosmini are its 
apologists. Kant taught that the subjective forms of 
sensation and of intellect were innate. Rosmini holds 
that the idea of indeterminate being, /. <?., of being in 
general, alone was innate. The former led the way to 
scepticism and agnosticism; the latter inclines to Pan- 
theism. A criticism of their position will be presented 
elsewhere. 

(a) Plato. I 4, (a) Plato held that the souls of men were 
created in the beginning, and for some fault com- 
mitted were sentenced to be inclosed in the body as in 
a prison. The ideas, v/hich we have, do not come 
from experience; they were implanted in the mind at 
the moment of its creation. The body acts upon the 
soul in a depressing manner, and causes these ideas to 
become obscure and fade away. The objects v/e meet 
in experience recalls the ideas once had and brings 
them fresh to mind. The mind learns nothing new 
about things; they are only the occasion whence it 
recalls long-forgotten knowledge. The theory of Plato 
thus becomes a theory of reminiscence. 

a))Des g ^_ (b) The strange teaching propounded by Plato 

was not followed by his disciples, was bitterly attacked 
by the Christian Fathers, and fell into oblivion. Des 
Cartes took it up, corrected it in parts, e. g., the pre- 
existence of souls, and proposed it in a new form.^ 
Ideas are of three kinds, he tells us. If, e. g., I 
examine my own consciousness I find some ideas are 
adve7ititioiLs^ i. e., the ideas of external objects which I 
experience in the varied life of the day, which come 
and go, and have no permanent influence upon my 
mental life; others are i?inate, i. e., they do not come 

^ F. Bowen, in Modern Philosophy, ch. II 
^Medit. Ill Cousin's edition, vol. I, p. 268. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 47 

through the senses, but whole and entire are the very 
endowment of my rational nature, e. g,, transcendental 
notions, axioms and first principles speculative and 
moral, mathematical figures, and especially the idea of 
God; finally others are factitious^ i. e.^ they are the 
product of discursive thought and are formed by the 
mind reasoning from the data it possesses in the innate 
and the adventitious. 

§ 6. (c) Leibnitz taught that the mind has confused (c) Leibnitz, 
notions of mundane objects. These he calls innate 
ideas. At the same time 2, power or inclination or dis- 
position is inherent in the mind by virtue of which these 
confused notions on the occasions of sensation are 
elaborated and rendered more distinct. Thus sensa- 
tion arouses the mind and makes it aware of the treas- 
ures stored within. Under the action of the mind the 
notions take form and shape, and become the primary 
truths and axioms of reasoning and of science.^ 

§ 7. (i) The theory of Innate Ideas is of value on Cj-itjcism 
the suDposition that our ideas can be explained in theory rests 

'■ ^ , ^ on assump- 

no Other way. This is the criterion of every hy-tion. 
pothesis. If, therefore, it can be shown that ideas 
can be readily explained without resorting to this 
assumption, the theory is deprived of its founda- 
tion. Now all our ideas can be explained by the 
activity of the mind and the data of sense. The ex- 
planation is much simpler and more in conformity 
with mental operations. 

8 8. (2) It is false to maintain that we have ideas (:2) no ideas 

'J ^ ' _ antecedent 

antecedent to sensation. Consciousness testifies that to sensa- 
tion. 
the mind forms ideas from the contents of sensation. 

This is done by its power of abstraction. Hence the 

idea of being, of unity, of moral duty, etc. The faculty 

is innate because it is the mind itself in action. The 

5 Nev/ Essays. 



48 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas, however, are not. The first principles are 
intuitions, /. ^., truths which the mind perceives to be 
immediately evident. They may be called spontaneous 
judgments, /. ^., the spontaneous assent of the mind 
to the truth presented. Even these suppose data 
which comes not from the inner constitution of the 
thinking faculty, but point to some external source. 
Idea of God 8 q_ (^) The defenders of this theory held that at 

not mnate. c y \^/ _ J 

least the idea of God is innate. Their motive was 
good. In this way they strove to stem the tide of 
atheism and irreligion. Their zeal, however, was not 
according to knowledge. It is not at ail necessary to 
hold that the idea of God is innate. The foundation 
stone of our faith rests secure and impregnable. The 
vast concourse of Christian apologists have never pro- 
posed this hypothesis. On the contrary, they have 
combatted it strenuously. In fact if the idea of God 
were innate how can we explain the different modes 
men have adopted to express it ? The names of God 
are by no means identical, they do not spring from the 
same root. Some, e. g., in the Indo-European family 
of languages, have their source in the phenomena of 
the external world. If the idea were innate, it would 
be as definite and as exacting as a first principle. Now 
words give expression to our ideas. It would follow, 
therefore, that the word for God would be as exact and 
as forceful as the idea. Experience shows that this is 
not so. The mind of man has expressed the idea of 
God in various ways.* 
It is derived § lo. The phenomena of the external world, the 

from CD- '■-' -^ 

jective truths of the moral order, the voice of consciousness, 

sources. 

the power and reign of truth have placed their stamp 

^" Equidem unum esse Deum summum quis tarn demens 
• * • neget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mun- 
danum opus diffusas, multis vocabulis, invocamus quoniam 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 49 

Upon the expression of the idea. To say that external 
objects awaken or render clear the idea already 
imbedded in the recesses of the mind is a pure assump- 
tion and is in opposition to conscious experience. For 
if the idea were implanted in any form, the act of 
awakening or of rendering it clear would not change 
its nature. It should appear the same.^ 

II. 

Theory of Evolution. 

§ II. The principal adherents of this school of^°^^"°* 
thought are Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, Tyler," Reville.' teachers. 
They concur in teaching that the idea of God is a mere 
product of the imagination. Its universal and deep 
hold upon the mind demanded an explanation. Vari- 
ous causes have been proposed. This difference is, 
however, accidental. The source and process of 
formation is the same. The primitive condition of 
man is supposed to be that of the babarian and savage.' 
His thoughts and feelings were just a shade higher 
than those of the brute. Brought in contact with the 
raging elements and the mysteries of nature, his child- 
like mind was prone to think mighty and hidden per- 
sons to be the cause. ^ Hence the fields, the woods, 

nomen ejus cuncd proprium videlicit ignoramus." Aug. Epis. 
16; Aristotle, de Mundo, c. VII; Miiller, Science of Religion, 
p. 124. 

* Locke bitterly assailed the innate ideas of Descartes. His 
position is sound; but the reasons he alleges are without basis, 
viz. (a) there are natives to whom the notion of God is strange, 
(b) The greatest variety of opinion exists among the various 
nations as to the nature of God. 

® Primitive Culture, ch. II. 

' Histoire des religions des peuples non-civilizes, vol. II. 

® Pfieiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 4, writes 
** how could primitive man with his quite undeveloped mental 
powers be able to grasp the difficult thought of one infinite God, 
who is pure spirit." 

^ Sir J. Lubbock, Origin of Civilizat., p. 119. 

4 



50 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the mountains and heavens were peopled with divini- 
ties." Fear and wonder made him in ignorance create 
gods. Thus Lucretius wrote, '^ and in our own day Mr. 
Tyndall proposes the same doctrine as the explanation 
most natural to ignorant minds to account for the phe- 
nomena of nature. ^^ To Hobbes' ignorance and fear 
were the causes; ^^ so also Hume in his Natural History 
of Religion;^* J. S. Mill, however, rejects this 
explanation.^^ Mr. Flammarion, the illustrious savant, 
sees the theologians driven from stronghold to strong- 
hold before the irresistible march of scientific knowl- 
edge.^^ To him ignorance and fear are the very reason 
of their existence. 

§ 12. It is sufficient to indicate these views. To the 
thoughtful student no refutation is needed. They are 
as shallow as they are blatant. Popular with a certain 
few, their strength lies only in negation. They are 
based on wrong and degraded notions of human 
nature, they are accepted only as a protest against an 
exaggerated or a fancied form of religious teaching. 
Spencer. g 13. A powerful writer and laborious student of our 

time has attempted to apply with a scientific parade of 
learning and of logic the theory of evolution to our 
idea of God." The author of Synthetic Philosophy 

f° Fiske, Idea of God, p. 65; to him Theism is a much later 
development partly due to political circumstances. lb., p. 72. 

^^ De Rer. Nat. V, 1161; " Primus in or be deosfecit timer." 
Statius, Theb. Ill, 661; Epicurus, cf. Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i, 20. 

^■•^ Fragments of Science, Prayer. 

^^ Cf. his Leviathan, Pfleiderer Philosophy of Religion, vol. I, 
p. 112. 

'^Sections 1-8. 

^^ Utility of Religion, p. 100. 

^^ Cf. also J. Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 107, 108. 

^■^ J. Fiske, The Idea of God; J. Cotter Morison in the Service 
of Man accepts the evolutionary theory of God and advocates 
the religion of humanity; Evolution of the Idea of God, by- 
Grant Allen; Darwin in Descent of Man, vol. L pp. 63, 65; My 
Creed, by M. Savage; d'Aviella, Gifford Lectures, 1899; 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 5 1 

has been before the public too long and has obtained 
the reputation of too much learning, to be passed over 
in silence. He is the foremost representative of a 
school which a few years ago exercised a wide and deep 
influence on the English and American mind,'^ but 
which is now on the decline. In his Principles of 
Sociology, Mr. Spencer gives a long and elaborate 
treatise on the origin and growth of the idea of God. 
As the exponent of modern Positivism, his words 
deserve more than a passing notice." 

S 14. Mr. Spencer bases his reasoning on the facts his 

o ^ t- o argument. 

of dream-life. Death takes away our dear and loved 
ones. The separation is not final. They come back basis. 
to as in the shadowy dreamland. We see the well- 
known countenances, hold converse with them, and 
live in the trust that they are not far distant. Thus 
arose the belief in ghosts with a semi-substantial, /. e., 

Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, pp. 3, 22, 32; Prof. 
Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 19; History of Religion, A Men- 
zies, p. 28, sq. 

^^ " If it should be found, as I am persuaded is the fact, that 
the human mind begins with a vague naturalistic-humanistic 
conception of the gods — a conception whose elements are not 
yet differentiated, much less opposed — and that reflection after 
developing this latest contrast in the opposite directions of nat- 
uralism and animism, rises ever}; where with the progress of 
civilization to a synthesis of both nature and man in one eternal 
and infinite ground, the history of the development of the 
religious consciousness would be itself an argument in favor of 
that hypothesis." Belief in God, by J. G. Schurman, pp. 72, 
78. An attempt, however, of a reconciliation with Hegel is evi- 
dent — e. ^., " The method is«based on the fact that all exist- 
ences, all objects of thought or inquiry are in a state of 
becoming," p. 74; or when he speaks of " man's consciousness 
of God," p. 134. Again he writes " God did not first exist and 
then as though in need of something else, create a world. It is 
of the essence of spirit to manifest or reveal itself. And just 
because God is a spirit, the world is his constant expression. 
Creation is the external self-revelation of God." Pp. 139, 208, 
217, 227. 

^^ Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 13; Christian 
Philosophy, ch. IV. 



52 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

semi-corporeal, form.^° This implied the conviction 
that in some way the dead were re-animated. The 
after-life, which thence grew upon the imagination, was 
at first temporary. Under the influence of fancied 
hopes and fears it became more and more enduring, ^^ 
This leads to the notion of another world, ^'^ peopled 
with supernatural agents. ^^ The unscientific and 
ignorant mind looked upon these beings as real. Their 
power was greater than any other being and they were 
supposed in some mysterious way to exercise an influ- 
ence over our health and good-fortune. Hence arose 
the conviction that they must be propitiated, — a con- 
viction which obtained a deep and permanent hold 
upon the mind and resulted in a permanent worship.'^* 
§ 15. According to Mr. Spencer, propitiation was 
first offered to our near relatives. Hence the primitive 
the human ^^^^ ^^ religion was ancestor worship." Not those 
man'and ^^^^^^ who recently departed and were closely joined 
divine. by bonds of kinship became the objects of our prayers 
and sacrifices; our forefathers who died long ago and 
who left behind a memory of power and position, 
received likewise a share of our worship." By reason 

''^ Prin. of Sociology, vol. I, ch. XIII; The Supernatural, Its 
Origin, Nature and Evolution, by John G. King. 2 vol.; A Mod- 
ern Zoroastrian, by S. Lang, p. 149, 156; J. Fiske, Idea of God, 
pp. 69, 75, 106. 

2^ lb., ch. XIV. 

"lb., ch. XV. 

23 lb., ch. XVI. 

"^ Christian View of God and the World, Dr. Orr, p. 466. 

^^ P. 147. With Pfleiderer primitive religion was a worship of 
house-gods. Phil, and Development of Religion, vol. i, p, 38. 
Belief in God, he writes, was formed out of the prehistorical 
belief in spirits, which in turn points back to two sources; 
ancestral and nature spirits, p. 103. The former are found in 
dream-life, the latter shown in the personification of nature, p. 
104. He does not agree with Spencer in explaining nature 
deities by ancestral spirits, but admits two distinct sources, p. 
106, sq. 

^^ P. 149. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 53 

of the remoteness a distinction began to dawn upon the 
mind between the huinan^ the semi-divine and the divined 
Remoteness magnified their deeds and made them 
appear more than mere mortals. Hence mankind grew 
to look upon and act to them as gods. To Mr. Spencer 
idolatry and fetich-worship are only aberrant forms of 
ancestor worship.^® The animal worship, as practiced 
by the Egyptians, he explains by pronouncing it a 
special form of ghost-belief.^^ Thus Mr. Spencer 
believes that he has solved in the most natural and 
convincing manner the origin of our idea of God.^° 

§ i6. (i) What strikes the reader in this explanation Criticism 
is the extreme candor of the writer. He sees things sumptfon. 
which no one else ever saw before, and tells them so 
openly that he seems to be convinced of their truth." 
To do so, however, he assumes from the very begin- 
ning all that he strives to prove; taking for granted 
that this process is the most natural one, he accumu- 
lates facts and arranges them in a most plausible 
manner. Yet the process of reasoning is throughout 
filled with gratuitous assumptions, and untrustworthy 
evidence." 

S 17. (2) The theory of Evolution is not in accord- (2) Theory 

^ * ^ ' -^ of evolution 

ance with facts and scientific reasoning. Mr. Spencer as proposed 

° ^ by him is 

is its authoritative and most learned exponent. Day erroneous. 
by day his standing and strength is weakening. The 

" P. 150. 

98 lb., ch. XXI. 

»9Ib., ch. XXII. 

^° The Making of Religion, Andrew Lang, p. i. 

2^ The theory that religion is the outgrowth of soulvvorship is 
very old. Enhemerus said the gods were deified men, e. g., 
Zeus, King of Crete, cf. D. G, Brinton, Religion of Primitive 
Peoples, p. 42. Resuscitated by the mythologists of the XVIIth 
and XVIIIth centuries, it is brought before the minds of to-day 
by the labors of Spencer and Lippert. Pfleiderer, The Philoso- 
phy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 12. 

2* The Making of Religion, by A. Lang, p. 46. 



54 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

elaborate system propounded by him after years of 
labor will not be lasting." Too many defects have 
been pointed out, too many assumptions and weak 
arguments have been unmasked not to create in the 
mind of the student a well-founded belief that the 
reasoning is faulty throughout. Elsewhere radical 
defects have been indicated. Now such a theory can 
offer poor support for an explanation of the idea of 
God. The more so that the explanation to be valid 
supposes the theory to be sound. ^^ 

§ i8. (3) To study the existing beliefs of uncivilized 
races in the hope that thus is obtained the surest index 
of their primitive condition is a false principle, utterly 
disregarded by contemporary historical science. Waitz 
and Gerland have shown that the religion, language and 
politics of the savages in Africa and Australia bear 
unmistakable traces of a higher and earlier stage." 
How explain the fact that in Polynesia the worship of 
the high gods has been expelled by that of ancestors? ^^ 
(3) a petitio 8 ig. (4) Finallv our idea of ghosts does not create, 

principii. . , ''.. ^ . . .. ^ -^ 

It supposes a belief m a future life. Dreams are 
abnormal states of the mind. To take such a founda- 
tion for an elaborate theory concerning the origin of a 
belief which exercises a universal and deep influence 
on men, betrays poor logical acumen and shows the 
inherent weakness of the argument. The conviction 
of a future life is part and parcel of our waking 
thoughts; it springs from the highest promptings of 
our nature; it is imbedded deep in the soul. Yet Mr. 
Spencer can tell us that the *' idea of ghost is the 
primitive type of the supernatural." On the contrary 
the dead seem to come back in dreams and hold con- 

^^Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 15. 
^S. H. Kellogg, Genesis and Growth of Religion, ch. HI. 
35 Pfieiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 15. 
3^ lb., p. 16; Lang, The Making of Religion, passim. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 55 

verse with us, only because there is imbedded in our 
souls a conviction of an. after life. Ghosts are a par- 
ticular result, not the cause of the belief." They are 
the projection of the mind's hopes and fears, of its 
affections and longings. These take shape in the 
imagination and stand before us in the well-known 
lineaments of our near and dear departed. Dreams 
are accidental occurrences in our daily lives. Some 
people rarely, if ever, dream. The belief in God and 
in a future life are universal and form part of our wak- 
ing conscious lives. ^^ So close to us and so imperative 
are these beliefs that do what we may we cannot shake 
them off. To propose an accidental cause for a wide- 
spread and permanent effect is a futile attempt, or it 
supposes a silent "begging the question" in the 
course of the reasoning. 

III. 

Theory of Theosophy. 

§ 20. The word Theosophy has a wide meaning. In Meaning of 
its etymology it means " those who are wise in the ^°^°^ ^' 
things of God." This wisdom is supposed in different 
persons to be acquired in different ways. Thus the 
word Theosophy has been applied to various physical 
processes practiced in the far East; and the Gym- 
nosophists and Yogis have been called Theosophists. 
Here by Theosophy is understood a special knowledge 
of God by virtue of a direct contemplation or insight 
into the divine essence. 

§21. This theory appears in a special form with (i) the 
those who claim a direct insight into the divine essence. Pantheism. 

2^ Miiller, Science of Religion, Lect. III. 

^^ The Idea of God found in lowest known grades of savagery; 
The Making of Religion, by A. Lang, p. 175. 



56 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

In the early ages of Christianity the Gnostics professed 
to have this knowledge, whence their name. To the 
Neo-Platonists the contemplation of the divine essence 
was the noblest exercise of man. This was accom- 
plished by a divine illumination, an inner light," Pan- 
theists at all times have professed the same teaching. 
Thus Fichte writes " Man reaches the knowledge of 
God in pure thought, which is the eye of the soul. By 
this he perceives God, for what is pure thought but 
the divine existence." " 
(2) Onto- § 22. That man by the exercise ^f natural reason 
^^™" alone has an intuition of the infinite, was broached by 

(a) Catholic Catholic writers in France about fifty years ago. The 
^°^^' leaders were de Bonald, Bonnetti and Ventura. The 

aim was to stem the tide of a materialistic and atheistic 
philosophy. In this way the existence of God was not 
only placed beyond question, but was even rendered 
incapable of proof, for we do not prove what we see. 
The movement spread and acquired adherents of great 
name. At the same time it was subjected to most 
rigorous criticism. Its philosophical basis was shown 
to be most untrustvv'orthy. In the Vatican Council 
human reason was vindicated by the teaching that the 
existence of God can be demonstrated to a certainty.''^ 
To-day Ontologism counts no defenders among Catholic 
writers. Looking back to the time of the conflict we 
can clearly see that the doctrine had its rise in a mis- 
taken zeal, which was not in accord w4th truth. 

(b) modern S 23. Ontologism, no longer proposed as Catholic 

non-Catho- o ^ 07 o r x 

lie writers, teaching, is, nevertheless, most strenuously advocated 
by many non-Catholic writers of the present day. 
Thus Dr. Harris writes: " The belief in God is a 

2^ Hoars with the Mystics, R. A. Vaughn. 

^Hunt, Pantheism, p. 264. 

^^ Denziger. Euchiridion, p. 387. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 5/ 

rational intuition necessarily arising in its own self-evi- 
dence in contemplating the process of thought in any 
line of inquiry."'*'' Prof. Knight proposes an intu- 
itional argument for the belief in God,*' Dr. Luthardt 
speaks of an intuitional idea of God,"" MuUer holds 
that an intuition of God is a radical element of all 
religions; "^ and adds to make clear his meaning " We 
pity a man born blind, we cannot be angry with him." "^ 
Prof. Fisher speaks of an intuition of the Infinite.'*^ 
So also Dr. Harris/' Prof. Wilson/^ Prof. Fraser,''' C. 
M. Tyler,'' Princ. Caird,'=' T. H. Green,'' Edward 
Caird.'" On the other hand, we find Prof. Flint reject- 
ing the doctrine.'' 

§ 24. This recent form of Ontologism is due to the its source is 
influence of Hegel. With the destructive criticism 
passed by Mr. Mill on the pKilosophy of Sir Wm. 
Hamilton, English Theistic writers were left without 
a philosophical basis. The Association school could 
never be brought into harmony with Christian thought. 
Hence they turned to Hegel. Now the fundamental 
principle of Hegel is the unity of the divine and the 
human consciousness. This unity gave rise to the 

^2 Self-Revelation of God, p. 154. 

^2 Aspects of Theism, pp. 11, 131, 119, 120, 143; Lindsay in 
Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 89. 

^ Fundamental Truths of Christianity, p. 57. 

*5 Chips, vol. I, pp. X, 235. 

''lb., p. 53. 

^^ Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 40. 

*^ Philosophical Foundations of Theism. 

^^Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 8. 

^° Philosophy of Theism, 2d series. 

^^ Bases of Religious Relief, p. 120. 

^^ Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 131, 249. 

" Prolegom to Ethics, p. 72. 

^* Evolution of Religion, vol. 1, p. 164. 

^^ Theism, p. 80, sq. Dr. McCosh must not be classed with 
these writers. He holds " that there are certain intuitive prin- 
ciples which proceeding upon external facts lead to a conviction 
of the existence of God." Method of Divine Government, p. 
520. 



58 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Criticism. 



(3) Theory 
of special 
faculty. 



Coleridg-e. 



Miiller. 



concept of the divine intuition/^ Some writers, how- 
ever, hesitate to use the word i}ituitio7i. To them God 
is a necessary postulate of thought." In this form the 
theory will be examined elsev/here. 

§ 25. To hold that we have an intuition of the 
Infinite is to advance a pure assumption. Conscious- 
ness gives no warrant for the assertion. In this ex- 
plnation how can we admit that men deny or doubt 
the existence of God ? Agnosticism is another name 
for atheism and scepticism, and is the great philo- 
sophical error of the present day. The theory falls in 
face of facts. 

§ 26. A second form of Theosophy is found in the 
doctrine of those who hold that man has a special 
faculty by which he perceives God.^® It is very much 
akin to the Ontological phase. Thus we speak of the 
intuition of Plotinus, the intellectuelle Auschauung of 
Schelling, the intuitive reason of Coleridge.'"'* Through 
Schelling and Coleridge it influenced the Transcend- 
entalists of New England. ^° Recently this theory has 
been broached by a writer whose world-wide reputation 
gives to his opinion a great weight. Mr. Miiller 
teaches that besides sense and reason there is in man 
a third faculty by which he apprehends the infinite." 
This faculty is a power independent of sense and rea- 
son, a power in a certain sense contradictory to sense 
and reason, a very real power which alone cannot be 



5^ With Baader " the eye through which God sees me is the 
same as that in which I see God." Cf. Pfieiderer, Phil, of 
Religion, vol. II, p. 32. 

" Lindsay, Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of 
Religion, p. 8q. 

'"^ Hunt, Pantheism, p. 181. 

^^ Hours with the Mystics, R. O. Vaughn; Aids to Reflection, 
Coleridge, pp. 225, 249. 

^° Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 64. 

^^ Science of Religion, pp. 12, 14. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 59 

overcome by them. This faculty is at the root of all 
religions. Yet he denies that a mysterious element is 
thus introduced into Psychology. ^^ 

§ 27. By this teaching Mr. Muller aimed at crushing criticism, 
the school which denies the possibility of conceiving 
the infinite." But this teaching is not at all necessary 
to attain the desired result. His error is based on a 
false theory of knowledge. He is a disciple of Kant. 
Now Kant denied that the intellect could transcend 
the finite and reach the divine.^* To Mr. Muller it is 
evident that sense cannot do so. Nevertheless, he was 
conscious of such a conception, and to account for the 
fact he postulated another faculty. A true exposition 
of the power of mind, of the distinction between intel- 
lect and sense, of the sphere and limits of both shows 
that the mind has a knowledge of the infinite without 
the need of resorting to a third and special faculty. 

§ 28. Finally Theosophy appears in the religious feel- ^f p^^?[^ 
ing of Jacobi and Schleiermacher.^^ They maintained 
that the divine is immediately revealed through /<^/V/^, 
/. €., religious feeling."^ The sense of absolute depend- 
ence is the religious feeling in its simplest form.*'^ This 
teaching is the legitimate consequence of Kant's theory 
of knowledge, and of Spinoza's Pantheism.*'^ If the 
mind cannot reach objective truth, how shall we obtain 
it? Kant held the existence of God was a postulate of 

6' Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 26; The Philosophy of Right, D. 
Lioy, p. 135- 

63 lb., Lect. I. 

6* Muller, Science of Religion, p, 13. 

6^" Thus the pious soul has an immediate knowledge of the 
Infinite in the Finite." The infinite to him, however, was 
impersonal, hence Pantheistic. Cf. Hunt, Pantheism, p. 312, 

6* Burt, History of Modern Philosophy, vol. II, p. 13; Lotze, 
Phil, of Religion, pp. 1-8. 

"The Religious Feeling, by Newman Smyth, p. 35; L. B. 
Hickok in Creator and Creature combines Kant and Jacobi. 

68 Cf. Hunt, 1. c. 



6o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Criticism. 



the practical reason. Under the fire of criticism, what 
becomes of the practical reason? There is no warrant 
for the distinction between theoretical and practical. 
To stem a rising rationalism Jacobi appealed to feel- 
ing. God exists because he feels that it is so. To 
give objective validity to the feeUng, he made it the 
channel of divine revelation, or rather found in this 
feeling an intuition of a divine reality.^' 

§ 29. The same criticism can be passed on all three 
forms. They spring from a false theory of knowledge; 
they have no basis in consciousness; they are gratu- 
itous assumptions to supply an imaginary need. The 
facts are answered with more ease and truth in the fol- 
lowing theory. 

IV. 



The Theory of Christian Philosophy. 



The 

Christian 
Fathers. 



§ 30. The task of the early Apologists and Fathers 
of the Church was to show forth the truth of the 
Christian religion against the false philosophy and 
religions of the time. Their writings are the store- 
house whence the schoolmen drew the materials for 
the magnificent structure of reasoned faith, the pride 
and glory of the human intellect. Under the guidance 
of divine faith they have sounded the depths of man's 
nature and of his relation to God. To explain the 
origin of the idea of God in the human mind is not an 
isolated problem, occupying the attention of one only.'^° 



®^ " The method of all the higher truths of religion is differ- 
ent, i. <?., from the scientific method, being the method of faith, 
a verification by the heart and not by the notions of the head." 
H. Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, p. 20. This ten- 
dency predominant with Fred. Robertson, Theod. Parker. 

■"^ The problem of primitive revelation whether in its nature 
or extent is not here discussed. That pertains to a treatise on 
Religion. The argument is an induction from facts and the 
purpose is to state the facts. 



ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 6l 

It is a question which agitated the very greatest among 
them. Their teaching has been carefully collected," 
and presents the following facts: 

§ 31. (i) The Fathers set forth a two-fold knowledge g^^J^Jf^^^ ^ 
of God. The one is a vague and obscure knowledge °^ ^°'^- 
which is common to all men. The other is a more 
elaborate and complete knowledge and comes from 
instruction and divine revelation. 

§32. (2) The former knowledge is not learned by o^scureand 
teaching; it arises spontaneously from our rational their 
nature; the rational man has it by himself; it is a 
natural anticipation of the mind; what man obtains 
from his own nature and without instruction; what 
man learns from himself and not from another; the 
knowledge which nature herself suggests. ''^ 

§ 33' (3) This is explained by saying that the human the expia- 
soul is made to the image and likeness of God; that 
it is made to know God; that from the indeliberate 
exercise of its own faculties by a kind of natural move- 
ment, it comes to the knowledge of God. " Insita et 
cum -natura conserta notitia." This knowledge is 
therefore vague and confused. Revelation and 
instruction purifies and makes it more scientific. 

§ 34. (4) This spontaneous knowledge of God is d is- the sources, 
tinguished by two important characteristics: (a) It 
arises from rational nature by the use of faculties con- 
natural to all. Hence it is not an intuition, nor is it 
the result of a special faculty. On the contrary, it can 
be compared to a spontaneous inference, (b) It is 
universal with human nature. The considerations, 
whence its source, are obvious and common to all who 

'^ Petavius, de Deo, 1. I; Franzelin de Deo, p. 94, sq. 

'2 Clemens Alex. Strom. V. p. 612; Gregorius Nazianz. or. 28, 
al. 34, n. 5, 6; Aug. in Joan. tr. 106, n. 4; Chrysostomus, ad 
Pop. Antioch, h. 9, n. 2. 



62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

have the free use of reason. These obvious sources, 
indicated again and again by them, are the world of 
nature and of man." 

This teaching thus harmonizes with the results of 
comparative Philology. Historical science brings its 
testimony in favor of Christian Philosophy. In the 
following pages we shall investigate these two sources 
and strive to find a detailed and philosophical justifica- 
tion for our natural possession, /. ^., the idea of God.^* 

''^ St. Aug. Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8. " Praecipuum et prin- 
cipale speculum ad videndum Deum est animus rationalis 
inveniens seipsum. Si enim invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta 
sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, ubi quaeso. quam in ejus imag- 
ine, cognitionis ejus vestigia expressius impressa inveniuntur ? " 
St. Bernard, De Domo Inter., c. 12. 

''^ Hartman therefore errs in holding that religion is not an 
original and inseparable element, but was acquired by man on 
his way upwards. To him the motive element was egoistic 
endaemonism, the creative factor was poetic fancy. History 
of Religion, A Menzies, p. 43. These elements may enter as 
factors in the historic deterioration of religious belief, they are 
not primitive causes of the belief itself. Prof. Gruppe holds 
that religion is an acquired social habit. Miiller, Physical 
Religion, p. 87. 



CHAPTER IV. 

MENTAL LIFE. 

§ I. The consciousness of the human race bears 
testimony to the idea of God. It is the common prop- 
erty of humanity. Shared alike by barbarian and civil- 
ized, by unlettered and learned, it finds varied 
expression in language and exerts a profound influence 
on thought and action. We shall not here discuss the 
historic development of the idea or pass in critical 
review the various phases in which it has been realized. 
That pertains to the History of Religion. The aim of 
the present treatise is to investigate its philosophic 
basis, to seek the sources whence it has its origin, to 
analyze the grounds which gives to the idea an objec- 
tive validity and prove that a being really exists whom 
we call God. 

8 2. The testimony for the idea was sougfht and Conscious- 

o J & nessfurmsh 

found in human consciousness.^ In like manner we l^°¥?^s^9'" 

the idea of 

shall seek in consciousness first of all for the grounds ^°^° 
which give to the idea an objective value. The method 
to be pursued is psychological. The basis for the idea 
must be very near and close to us. Its universality 
and deep influence on our lives can only thus be 
explained.^ In truth, as shall be shown, our whole 
nature stretches up and cries aloud to God. Religion 
and worship are only the various expressions for the 

^ Tertullian, De Testimonio Animae. Sero te amavi, pul- 
chritude tarn antiqua tarn nova! Sero te amavi! Et ecce intus 
eras, et ego foras, et ibi te quarebam. Aug. Confess. 1. X, ch. 
27; XII, 25; De Vera Relig., XXXIX, The Great Enigma, W. 
S. Lilly, p. 266. 

'Janet, Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 843 

[63] 



64 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



cry, only means whereby the human soul tries to find 
its Maker and show to Him the homage of adoration, 
of love and of praise. Then we can turn to the world 
without, which proclaims alike to the popular mind, to 
the scientist and to the philosopher, that it did not 
create itself, that its existence and activity are due to 
a higher and greater being, whose " everlasting divinity 
and power " is shown throughout.^ 

I. 

First § 3. In setting forth the sources whence arose the 

source to be " '^ ° 

investi- idea of God, philosophers at all times have delighted 

gated in . 

mental life, m making an appeal to our conscious mental life. 
From Plato and St. Augustine down to contemporary 
writers this line of thought has been presented in vari- 
ous ways. The intellect itself, or the idea, or the 
force and reality of truth have suggested to the most 
profound and subtle minds the world has seen, reasons 
for the faith that is in them. Its fortunes have been 
varied and with a great many it has fallen into disre- 
pute. The fact, however, that so many acute and 
brilliant minds have been impressed with one or more 
of its forms leads the thoughtful student to suspect 
that it is not altogether lacking in force, and gives the 
hope that if presented in the proper manner, it may 
have a well-grounded basis, though not so readily 
grasped by the ordinary mind. 



The a 
priori 
argTiment. 



II. 

Errors. 

§ 4. (i) The fam.ous a priori argument for the exist- 
ence of God is based on the consideration of the idea. 
For upwards of one thousand years it has been eagerly 

^St. Augustine, Enar. in Ps. 41, n. 8; 73, n. 25; 134, n. 10. 



MENTAL LIFE. 65 

and fiercely discussed in the schools and has been pro- 
posed in slightly different ways in the hope that each 
succeeding presentation would stand firm against 
future criticism. By Kant and recent writers it is 
called the ontological argument. 

8 7„ (a) St, Anselm, the father of the school-men, (a) St. 

\. 1 . . . . ^ Anselm. 

was the first to present this argument m scientific 
form. He reasons thus: I have an idea of a being 
infinite in all perfections. The mind cannot conceive 
a being greater than this. Hence, he infers that such 
a being ought to exist. For if it did not exist, then it 
would not be the greatest being which the mind could 
conceive. Therefore it has both an ideal and a real 
existence* 

§ 8. (b) Scotus, the doctor subtilis^ proposes the argu- (b) Scotus. 
ment in different words. The most perfect being, he 
writes, can exist; the possibility of the existence is 
implied in the idea. Therefore, he concludes, it must 
exist. For if such a being did not really exist, it would 
be not possible to exist. For, in order to be possible 
it must be real. Hence the notion of its possibility 
implies its reality. 

§9. (c) Descartes recognized the fallacy in the(c)Des 
wording of the argument and attempted to place it 
upon a sound basis. He employs as a criterion the 
principle that whatever we conceive clearly and dis- 
tinctly must be true. When I examine the idea, which 
I have, of the most perfect being, he reasons, I find 
that the note of existence is therein contained, just as 
in the notion of a triangle the truth is contained that 

* Proslogium, ch. 2, 3; St. Bona venture, Itinerarium; Shadd, 
History of Doctrine, vol. I, p. 238; Flint, Theism, p. 279; Dr. 
Sterling says that " the very thought of God is that which is, 
and cannot be." Gifford Lectures, 1890, ist series, Lect. X; 
The Being of God, P. H. Steenstra, p. 80; Shedd Dog. TheoL, 
p. 222. 

5 



66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the three angles are equal to two right angles, or in 
the idea of a circle that the points on a circumference 
are equally distant from the center. Therefore, if not 
more evident, it is at least as certain that God, who is 
a being of such infinite perfection, exists, as any 
demonstration of Geometry could make/ 

(d)Leib- g lo. (d) The reasoning of Descartes did not seem 
conclusive to Leibnitz/ He found in this presenta- 
tion, as in the others, the same logical fallacy, viz., 
concluding directly from the ideal to the real. He 
tried, unsuccessfully, however, to avoid the rock; 
nevertheless his reasoning is very captious. The divine 
being is a being which is determined to existence by 
its own essence, /. ^., a being whose existence is 
explained not as the effect of another being, but as 
due to its own infinite essence. Now, he adds, such a 
being, is evidently possible. Therefore it must really 
exist. For if it did not really exist, it would not be 
possible.^ 

Criticism. § II. In form and process the argument follows that 
of Scotus. Its weakness at first sight is more difficult 
to detect than with the arguments of Anselm and Des- 
cartes. Nevertheless the same criticism can be made 
of all. In every form so far presented the argument 
concludes from, the ideal to the order of real existence. 
The ideal, as such, has only an ideal content. The 
element of reality must come from another source than 
from the creative fancy of the mind. An inference 

^ Prin. Phil., I, 14; Discours de la Methode, pt. IV. med. 3d. 

^ New Essays, B, IV, ch. 10. 

' " In order to prove that God exists it is sufficient to prove 
that He is possible. Now we have proved that God is possible. 
Therefore He exists." The Monadology of Leibnitz, by R. 
Latta, p. 274. " What is possible and what a general principle 
compels us to say must be, that certainly is," Bradley, Appear- 
ance and Reality, pp. 149, 395; to him the absolute is shorn of 
personality and moral attributes, hence not God. 



MENTAL LIFE. 67 

from the pure ideal to the real exists. When, there- 
fore, we reason that the element of existence must be 
contained in the idea of the most perfect being, we 
conceive such a being is or is possible, the ready 
answer is: Granted if ideal existence is understood, 
if, however, there is question of real objective existence, 
then we do not know; or granted, if it can be other- 
wise shown, that such a being has real objective 
existence.^ 

§ 12. (2) These forms of the ontological argument ^HJ^tie^^^ 
have little influence on present philosophical thought, ^^y- 
They are of value only as historical vestiges of the 
working of the human mind in the effort to draw from 
inner consciousness some assurance for the exist- 
ence of God. The effort is worthy of praise; it 
has undoubtedly a real basis; the criticism made is 
that the method is faulty or that the principle is 
erroneous. 

§ 13= With the German disciples of Kant, the argu- teaching, 
ment assumes a new form.^ Presented in an attractive 
style and with a certain pretense to deep reasoning, it 
is fitted to appeal to the philosophical mind. Its influ- 
ence upon the present state of the Theistic argument 
is very great. The right wing of Hegel's followers, 
e.g.^ Goeschel, Gabler, Daub and Erdmann, as opposed 
to the left, /. ^., Strauss, and the extreme left, e. g., 
Feuerbach, have made this argument in a special man- 
ner their own possession.^" It appears in the writings 
of Prof. Caird, Dr. Schurman, Dr. Sterrett, Prof. 
Pfieiderer, Prof. Green, and the followers of the Neo- 
Hegelian school. 

^St. Thomas, 1. q. 2, i ad. 2. 

^ Kant himself rejects the argument, Critic, ch. 3, § 4. 
^'^ Belford Bax, Handbook to History of Modern Philosophy, 
P- 390- 



68 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

FicMe^" § 14. The adumbrations of the present form of the 

so-called Ontological argument appear in Fichte. To 
him God and the world are two mutually involving 
spheres of consciousness." They can be viewed as 
thought-relations involving each other.*"' God as 
cause is postulated to explain the effect in so far 
as there is an effect to explain; and the effect is 
effect of its cause only in so far as it displays its 
causalty.^^ 
morescien- g i^. With Hegel, howcver, this reasoning assumes 
Hegel. a more consistent form.*'' He held that thought and 
being were identical.*^ The world of thought, of 
nature, and of man was an evolution of the idea. The 
spirit exists by a necessity of thought. The concrete 
existence of the categories, nature and spirit, is 
deduced from their essence, which is thought." He 
holds that we cannot by argument reason from the 
sensible world to God. The argument to be employed 
is only an expression of thought itself, for thought is 
the elevation of the spirit above the limits of the finite 
to those of the invisible and infinite.*^ Therefore the 
real character of the proof is the assertion by the 
spirit of the actuality of the infinite ideal. The assump- 
tion on which it rests is that primal being is self-exist- 
ent. We can deny God only by denying self-existence; 

^^ Fichte, by A. B. Thompson, p. 134. 

^2 This argument is presented with some modifications by Prof. 
Bascom, Natural Theology, ch. Ill, § 7. Cf. Foundations of 
Religious Belief, by Prof. Wilson. With Cousin " the finite 
and infinite are logical correlatives." Elem. of Psych., p. 375. 
So also Prof. Schurman, in Philos. Review, vol. IV, May, 1895. 

^3 lb., p. 142. 

^4 Logic, Introd., § 51. 

^^ Phil, and Devel. of Religion, by Prof. Pfleiderer, vol. I, p. 
148; H. Haider, Some Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy, in Phil. 
Rev., vol. V, p. 263. 

^^ Hegelianism and Personality by Prof. Seth, p. no. 

*' Histoire de la Philosophic, par P. Janet et G. Seailles, 
p. 851. 



MENTAL LIFE. 69 

but this is equivalent to the spirit denying itself — a 
patent contradiction.'" 

8 16. This fundamental concept of Hesfel that the Hegel's 

" f o teaching 

idea is the source and essence of all thing:s, which in presented 

" in various 

themselves are only the forms of its evolution, is pre- ways. 
sented in various ways by his followers. Thus, (a) 
some tell us that the aim of the Ontological proof is to 
identify the idea of God with that of self-existence 
which must be assumed.'^ (b) Or that the belief in 
God is constitutive of intelligence itself.^" (c) Or with 
Prof. Caird that the belief in God is a psychological 
necessity, (d) Or, finally, with Prof. Pfleiderer, teach 
that while thinking and being are different, contrary to 
Hegel's dictum, yet they are constituted for each other 
by the conformity of the laws on both sides and in this 
agreement of the two sides the unity of the ordering 
principle, /. e.^ of the effectuating thinking or the 
omnipotent reason of God reveals itself." 

§ 17. The Ontological proof in the hands of its ^^^^^"s"*- 
most recent defenders is pure Pantheism. Thus the 
unity of the divine and human consciousness is the 
reason given why the mind is assured of the existence 

^^ Basal Concepts in Philosophy, by A. D. Ormond, p. 271. 

^® " God is the absolute and transcendant ground of the world. 
The world is the product of an imminent spiritual potence which 
has as its immediate presupposition spiritual self-activity." 
"This self-activity as the self-existent /rz'z/j- of all being we have 
found to be God. His self-activity is a presupposition of im- 
manent potence. The immanent ground of the world-process 
is a spiritual potence which leads it in its evolution through 
stages of mechanism and life up to the soul of man in which 
spirit becomes self-conscious. Thus man is a potence whose 
infinite and perfect actuality is God." Basal Concepts in Phi- 
losophy by A. D. Ormond, pp. 280-2S1. 

'•^ " That God is the ultimate ground and source of all things 
whether they be living or in earth, thinking or unthinking, 
seems to me not merely a conclusion reached by reflection and 
inference, but an intuitive belief constitutive of intelligence 
itself." J. G. Schurman. Agnosticism and Religion, p. 26. 

^^ Philosophy and Development of Religion, vol. I, p. 148. 



70 ciirasTiAN philosophy. 

of God. The objections to the pantheistic teaching 
are also valid in the present case, God and the human 
soul are not identical. Memory and consciousness 
make us aware of our personal identity and assure us 
that we are individuals distinct both from God and 
created things." 

III. 

Theory of Christian Philosophy. 



A true 
argument 



§ i8. Our inner life contains true sources for our 
Emulated. ^*^^^ of God. The human mind again and again, in 
spite of failure, seeks there a justification of its belief. 
An instinctive conviction, as it were, tells that the 
idea is more than a passing fiction. It has an abiding 
presence, and a silent overshadowing power. A diffi- 
culty is found in tracing it to the proper source. The 
hope is nevertheless held that in some way its true 
ground can be discovered. Erroneous notions as to 
our mental nature and activity, a false analysis of our 
mental content may obscure the truth. It cannot 
entirely rob us of the heritage which is a part of our 
being and of our life. 

^-" The intuition of an Absolute Reason is (i) ihe necessary 
pre-supposition of all other knowledge so that we cannot know 
anything else to exist except hy assuming first of all that God 
exists; (2) the necessary basis of all logical thought so that we 
cannot put confidence in any of our reasoning processes except 
by taking for granted that a thinking Deity has constructed our 
minds with reference to the universe and to truth; (3) the 
necessary implication of our primitive belief in design so that 
we can assume all things to exist for a purpose only by making 
the prior assumption that a purposing God exists — can regard 
the universe as a thought only by postulating the existence of 
an Absolute Thinker. We cannot prove that God is, we can 
show that in order to the existence of any knowledge, thought, 
reason in man, man must assume that God is." Dr. Strong in 
Systematic Theology, pp. 33, 34. The writer tries to com- 
bine Anselm, Descartes and Hegel. The argument labors with 
the defects of all. 



MENTAL LIFE. 7I 

§ 19. We do not reason from the idea to the actual "^^^^^^^ 
existence of the object therein represented. That lias 
been shown to be a false process. We take the idea, 
investigate it as it is given in consciousness, and seek 
a basis or foundation for its content. This Una of 
reasoning is legitimate and opens up the wide range 
and infinite possibility of our mental life. The idea is 
received as a product or an effect. The activity of the 
mind may explain its form. The content or compre- 
hension of the idea, however, is not the result of the 
mind's activity, but has an external or independent 
basis. The reasoning, therefore, is not a priori^ but 
proceeds from the effect to the cause. 

8 20. At the initial point of the investio^ation a vital Theories of 

^ ^ *=> the Uni- 

problem comes to view. The real value of the uni- versai idea, 
versal idea has been discussed in the schools for 
centuries. The Nominalist holds that the idea is a 
name only. This view exercises wide and deep influ- 
ence on modern thought. ^^ The Realist teaches that 
the ideas as such have an objective reality. This is 
the opinion of Plato and is now obsolete. Scholastic 
philosophy draws a distinction. It teaches that the 
idea is formed by the mind and is therefore a mental 
product; nevertheless, its content or comprehension is 
based in objective reality. 

§ 21. A criticism of these opinions shall not be pre- its present 
sented here. The discussion would entail too much 
space and more properly pertains to Philosophy of 
Mind. The view of Scholastic philosophy is there 
shown to be in accord with the known processes of 
mental life and is implied in ordinary and scientific 
language. Its exposition naturally leads up to our 
argument for the existence of God. 

"^^ Scientific Theism by F. Abbott. 



72 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(a) The 8 22. Consciousness reveals our inner life; it tells 

idea. o ' 

the thoughts, desires, feeling which we experience 
through the swiftly running moments of the day. By 
its testimony we know that our ideas are singular, par- 
ticular or universal. Thus the idea of one person or 
object really existing, e. g., Peter, a stone, is called a 
singular idea; the idea of several objects, e. g., a group 
of men, a few stones, is called a particular idea; the 
idea of a whole class of persons or objects, e. g.^ 
Scholastic humanity, stone, is called a universal idea. The uni- 

teaching-. 

versal idea is the idea so properly called. It is the 
direct and proper effect of the mind brought into con- 
tact with external objects. The universal idea is 
defined as an idea which contains one quality or 
attribute which is common to many individuals. Thus, 
e. g., humanity is a universal idea inasmuch as it 
expresses the one quality, e. g., human nature, which 
Is possessed by all mankind. So also whiteness is a 
universal idea because its content is a quality which is 
found in many objects, 
proved by % 2T,. That such ideas exist in the mind is abund- 
*^ss, antly proved by an examination of our mental life. 

They do not exist in a limited number. The mind is 
busy in their constant formation. It is not confined 
within the bounds of things actually existing. Not all 
the objects exist to which the idea may extend, e. g., 
the idea of humanity extends to all men: past, present 
and future. Or again, the idea may express an essence 
which as such does not actually exist, but which is con- 
ceived as possible. The mind, therefore, draws a clear 
distinction between existing and possible things, 
possible g 24. Let us examine the possible essences. What 

essences. . ^ 

IS their nature? They are not absolutely nothing. 
They stand midway between a contradiction and an 



MENTAL LIFE. 73 

actual fact. The mind can have no positive concep- 
tion of a contradiction. It does not actually exist, nor 
can it ever exist. It has no reality of existence nor of 
essence. It is an absolute nothing. An actual fact has 
a reality both of essence and of existence. Now a pos- 
sible thing does not actually exist, but it can exist. It is 
not something absurd and contradictory. We cannot 
say that it has a reality of existence, because as yet it 
does not actually exist; but we can say that it has a 
reality of essence, inasmuch as the mind conceives it 
as a thing which may exist in the concrete. The fact 
that a thing is possible does not depend on the mind. 
The distinction of the possible and the impossible 
stands out clearly in our mental life. The mind can- 
not make or change the one or the other. A round 
square, or, two plus two equals five, can never be 
other than impossible. The intellect discovers the 
truth and in its presence stand in silent and helpless 
acquiescence.^* Nor can we say that the possible or 
the impossible depends on existing things. If so, then 
all possible things would exist; but this we know to be 
false. Therefore a possible thing which is the object 
of the mind is of its own intrinsic nature independent 
both of the mind and of existing things. 

8 26. Some reason, however, must be given for its^^^?",?/ 

« » J & possibility. 

possibility. The human mind seeks to know why one 
thing is possible and another is not. A closer analysis 
of the nature of the possible alone can give a reason 
which will be well-grounded and strong against adverse 
critcism. 

§27. The elements v/hich go to make up the con-its inteiiigi- 

r ., , , . . , - . . ble charac- 

ception of a possible thing are perceived to combine inter. 

'*Aug. de lib. Arbit. i, 2, ch. 12. To him truth is our highest 
good." Quid petis amplius quam ut beatus sis ? Et quid 
beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabli et excel- 
e ntissima veritate." lb., ch. 13. 



74 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

harmonious accord. But there is more than a mere 
mechanical combination. The elements are intelligible 
not only as units, but also as a combined whole. The 
mind conceives them forming a harmonious unity. 
The character of intelligibility is stamped upon them. 
The mechanical combination takes place because the 
mind conceives it as something intelligible. It has a 
positive reality inasmuch as it is the direct object of 
thought. What is impossible is unintelligible. If the 
mind could conceive it, it would be possible, 
its expiana- 8 28. The intelligibility of the idea is what must be 

tion. 

explained. The mind does not make it so; it simply 
finds that such and such an object can be conceived. 
The intelligibility is not purely ideal. It is only the 
content of the idea brought into the range of the mind's 
action. Now the content of the universal idea has a 
basis in objective reality. In the case of actually 
existing things this cannot be doubted or gainsaid. 
The same is also true of possible essences. The simple 
fact of existence makes no change or difference in 
their relation to the mind. The actual and impossible 
are equally intelligible. The content of the one, as of 
the other, is also based in an objective reality." 
found in § 29. The Consideration of possible things, therefore, 

objective •■ , , ■ ^ 1 • ^ . . . . 

truth. leads the mind to the existence of objective truth. 
It conceives this truth as the basis of and the reason 
why some things appear intelligible and others do not. 
This basis is real, just as the content of the idea is 
real. It is necessary because the mind is powerless to 
change its conceptions at will; it finds that the idea is 
such and such and takes it as it is found. What it is 

'^ The reasoning from possibility is to be viewed in connection 
with what follows. Thus in scope as in the manner of drawing 
the inference this argument must be distinguished from that of 
Kant. Cf. Janet, Traite Elementaire, p. 852. 



MENTAL LIFE. 75 

now, it always was and always will be. The essence of 
a horse could never be other than it is; if so, the 
horse itself would be something else. Hence, we are 
constrained to admit an external, necessary basis to 
explain the content of a possible concept. We are led 
to the objective reality of an external and necessary 
truth. This truth pervades the universe in some 
wonderful manner. The mind is under its silent, 
potent sway. 

§ 30. What is true of the idea can be affirmed in like (b) also 

<• 1 -1 TTT- 11-1 1 -i ■ shown by 

manner of the judgment. With the latter the truth is an analysis 
much more apparent and can be more readily grasped, judgment. 
We do not base our reasoning on the ordinary judg- 
ments employed in daily life. They depend upon a 
variety of circumstances and are conditioned by chang- 
ing things. Instead we take the first principles of 
thought, e. g.j the principles of contradiction, of 
excluded middle, of identity. These principles are 
said to be immediately evident. The connection 
between subject and predicate is so intimate and 
necessary that the mind cannot help perceiving and 
affirming it. They are called metaphysical principles; 
without them discursive thought would be impossible; 
they impose upon the mind a law which it is powerless 
to resist. It is natural to seek the true value of these 
principles. Their control of the mind is supreme and 
inexorable. Are they, then, merely subjective and 
the consequences of the mind's own nature? 

8 31. First of all we observe that the name applied first 

1 • 1 . 1 • • 1 TVT principles 

to them IS that of metaphvsical principles. Nowiniogicai 

11 «■ 1 • ^ t • ', • r 1 1 • ^^^ onto- 

Metaphysics or Ontology is the science of real being, logical 
Its principles and fundamental notions are drawn from 
the consideration of the essence of things. They are, 
therefore, objectively real. Logic, on the contrary, is 
the science of mental operations and deals with ideal 



76 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

being. Again, the first principles of Logic and the 
first principles of Metaphysics are closely akin. They 
are called by the same name, e. g., the principles of 
contradiction, of excluded middle, etc. They are only 
different expressions of great truths which pervade the 
universe. The logical principle of contradiction, 
"the mind cannot affirm or deny the same thing of 
another at the same time and under the same circum- 
stances," has an objective validity when worded in 
Metaphysics as " the same thing cannot be and not be 
at the same time." So also for the principles of 
identity and of excluded middle. The former expres- 
sion is the logical, the latter is the ontoiogicai principle. 
§ 32. Hence, the first and fundamental principles of 
the mind are valid in the world of external reality, just 
as the fundamental principles of the physical world 
pervade and dominate our mental life. The logical 
principles do not depend upon existing things. They 
apply to the past and future, as to the present. If 
they were purely mental, their existence could be 
explained by the constitution of the mind. But they 
are objectively real and point to a real and objective 
basis.''' 
(c) reason- § SS- Finally, the same line of thought is verified in 
^"^' reasoning. The mental operation of reasoning consists 

of the comparisons of ideas and of judgments with the 
view to draw a conclusion. Ideas and judgments, there- 
fore, form the material of our reasoning. Now if the 
idea and the judgment are objectively real in the sense 
explained, and if they can only be explained by postu- 
lating a basis which is objectively real, it follows that 
the process of reasoning is not the product of idle 
fancy, but to be of value, it must be carried on in con- 

^^The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, pp. 205, 228. 



MENTAL LIFE. *J7 

formity to objective thing^s." The world of external o"*" ^"°w^- 
■' -' ^ must con- 

reality then enters into the world of thougfht. The (oi"? to ob- 

•^ * jective 

mind may turn or twist the mass to its own special truth, 
ends or purposes. Nevertheless, the content is objec- 
tively real, the content comes from without, the pecu- 
liar form and shape only can be ascribed to mental 
activity. An apt illustration is drawn from Mathe- 
matics. 

§ 34. Mathematics is distinguished from the other Mathe- 
sciences because of its abstract character. It deals Astronomy, 
with abstract properties of numbers. It is distinc- 
tively a work of the intelligence. I, e. g., could shut 
m)^self in a room and for twenty years or more give 
myself up to the study of Geometry without once seek- 
ing verification for my conclusions in the world without. 
The result would be a complete science well-connected 
and exact. It would not be the result of experience; 
it is purely and solely a mental work. Yet scientists 
assure us that the solar system is ruled by the truths 
and principles which make up the science of Geometry 
and to confirm the statement they point to the phys- 
ical and experimental science of Astronomy. 

8 ^c;. How explain this marvellous accord? A world Hence the 

^ ■^'^ ^ reign of 

of truth lies around. We see only in part and we truth, 
know only in part. The mind finds traces and indica- 
tions of wonderful harmony between mental and phys- 
ical worlds; ^® a harmony which can only be explained 
by a basil unity. Not that one is the reflection of the 
other, nor are they two aspects of the same thing. 
Such views contradict known truths and cannot be sus- 
tained. But both suggest a unity which is above or 

'■^ " Hoc ita esse debet, illud non ita; hoc ergo quaerens unde 
judicarem, cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et 
veram veritatis aeternitatem, supra mentem meam commuta- 
bilem." Aug. Conf., 1. VII, c. 17. 

28 Chadbourne. Natural Theology, Lect. VIII, IX, X. 



78 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

beneath, according as we view it, superior to or more 
fundamental than either. This unity we cannot see 
for our eyes are holden, but we do see the traces of 
its light in the world of sense and of thought, and from 
the participation, which we share in common with all 
thinking beings and forming their constitution and 
written law, we reason to its real existence. Else all 
thinking things, all objects of our thought would be 
shrouded in darkness and mystery and our minds 
would be put to inevitable confusion. ^^ 
St. Augus- g 36. This train of thought enables the reader to 
reasoning, grasp the force of St. Augustine's famous argument 
drawn from the power and reign of truth. ^° The mind 
does not make, it finds the truth. In ordinary and 
scientific language v/e speak of new discoveries made, 
of the bounds of knowledge enlarged from day to day. 
The ingenuity of man may make instruments and 
appliances to reach out or to apply the truth; but the 
truth itself is beyond his control." In its presence he 
stands powerless. Its sv/ay is absolute and universal. ^^ 
It knows no limitation of time, of space, or of any 
created intelligence. This absolute dominion of truth 
can only be explained in God. Its basis is not the 
human mind, or existing things. Unchangeable and 
eternal it rises above the changing fortunes of con- 
tingent things, and points to a mind unchangeable and 
eternal, whence its source and only sufficient expla- 
nation. 

^^ S. Th. 1. q. 16, a. 5, ad. 2; 1, q, 12, a. 2; 1. q, 88, a. 3; 1. 2. q. 
Q3, a. 2; 3. q. 5, a. 4. ad. 2; 1. q. 84 a. 5; C, Gent. 1. 3. e. 47; 
Card. Zigliara, 1, 4, c. 12, 13. 

30 De Lib. Arbit. 1. 2, ch. 8-12-14 — where he also reasons that 
the highest truth is the greatest good; De Vera Relig., ch. 30, 
31; Soliloq. 1. I, n. 3; Confess. XII, 25; Bossuet, Connaissance 
de Dieu et soi meme, ch. IV-VII. 

^^ Dr. William Ward, Philosophy of Theism, vol. I. 

22 Fenelon, Demonstration de I'existence de Dieu, p. i, ch. 
IV. § I. 



MENTAL LIFE. 79 

§37. The conclusion, therefore, is evident. ^^Jn"i^sisof 
analysis of our mental life leads us to the existence of cental life 

-' leads to 

God." The reasoning is from the effect. At first g^^jence of 
sight, obscure and subtile, its power grows upon reflec- 
tion. Our minds are subject to the laws and reign of 
truth. The truth is not purely subjective, not the 
fanciful creation of the imagination. It has objective 
elements and an objective basis. It is necessary and 
eternal, pervading alike the world of matter and of 
mind. It constrains us to admit an external and neces- 
sary mind. Therefore, God exists, the foundation and 
source of truth." 

IV. 

Dr. Royce's Argument. 

§ 38. The course of reasoning set forth at first sight Prof- 
bears a resemblance to that of Prof. Royce and found 
in his works " The Religious Aspect of Philosophy," 
"Spirit of Modern Philosophy," "The Conception 
of God." Upon closer examination a wide and funda- 
mental difference is seen. 

8 ^g. Prof. Royce admits his indebtedness to Kant, his 

^ "^^ ^ . teaching. 

Schelling and Hegel. He candidly ranks himself among 
the post-Kantian philosophers. Yet he is unlike them 
all. With Kant he admits that theoretical reason can 
never give us external reality, that only a moral faith or 
insight can give certainty to what is beyond conscious- 
ness. Hence, the chapter on the Postulates. The ex- 
ternal world, the existence of God are postulate of 

33 St. Aug. in Joan. tr. 23, n. 9, 10, 11. 

^Cf. Hontheim, Theodicea, p. 128; Boedder, Theologia 
Naturalis, p. 48; Balmes sees in the reasoning mind an argu- 
ment from intellectual order, Fundamental Philosophy, p. II, 
B. IV. ch. 23. As such it bears contrast with the proofs from 
the moral and the physical order. The force of the argument, 
however, rests in showing that truth is objective. 



80 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

moral insight. Unlike Prof. Fraser he does not rest 
here.^* He attempts to justify the postulate and show 
in what way the moral faith is rational. He does not 
seek the reason for it in the faith or religious feeling 
of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, nor in the asthetic sense 
of the Neo-Kantians, nor in the religion of humanity. 
He turns abruptly and tries to justify his position from 
intimate analysis of the theoretical reason. Hence, 
his candid and beautiful chapters on scepticism and 
pessimism. In developing the argument he appeals 
(i) to the very act of thinking, /. e.^ thought itself; " 
(2) to the fact of error; " (3) to the fact of ignorance. ^^ 
These are phases of the one and same argument and 
show a growing development in the writer.^' 

facts true. § 40. (i) The facts adduced by Prof. Royce can- 
not be questioned. They are a part of the con- 
scious experience of every mind. Young and old, 
uneducated and learned, are forced to admit that they 
are in ignorance of many things, that day by day the 
knowledge of truth is increased, that they have been 
frequently in error, and that the possibilities of error 
are great. On these facts our argument was raised, 
and we are happy to know that Prof. Royce has grasped 
their significance and set them forth with a grace of 
expression and a wealth of detail. 

false as S 41, (2\ If, howcvcr, wc vicw thcse data, not abso- 

Prof. Royce, 7 t • -r^ -- ^ , • j 

words lutely, but m Prof. Royce s environment, we do not 

^^' see what their real value in the present case can be. 

He sets forth with Kant's famous distinction, and 

develops it and makes it his own. He is thus in an 

^^ Phil, of Theism, 2d series, p. 4. 
2^ Spirit of Modern Philosophy, part II, ch. XL 
2'' Religious Aspect of Philosophy, ch. XL 
3^ Conception of God, p. 15. 

39 New World, June, 1898; A New Form of Theism, by J. E. 
Russell. 



MENTAL LIFE. 8l 

idealistic atmosphere. His Supreme Reality is " An 
ultimate aspect of things." " His initial point is abso- 
lute scepticism. The very effort to rid himself of this 
shows the fundamental principle to be false. Never- 
theless, he retains it in spite of the open contradiction 
and makes no effort to question its truth." 

§42. What is the test for subjective truth? Not test for 
conformity with external reality. This he expressly 
rejects. But conformity with a higher intelligence." 
Hence, he is a disciple of Berkeley. Here he falls into 
2i petitio principii. He sets forth with the data of con- 
sciousness to reason God's existence, as absolute 
Truth. Yet he postulates the existence of the All- 
Knower or All-Enfolder to justify the veracity of the 
data. This was the mistake of Descartes. 

§ 43. Again, his exposition of thought and of judg- thought 
ment is incorrect. The idea is the apprehension of anient." ^' 
reality, the judgment is a perception of the agreement 
or disagreement of two ideas. Hence, an objective ele- 
ment is found in both. Yet Prof. Royce explains them 
as wholly and entirely subjective. In setting forth the 
nature of error, he confounds intention with attention^ 
and in passages almost following each other expresses 
most contradictory statements."^ If judgment and idea 
not only as acts, but viewed in their contents, are 
purely subjective, we reach only a subjective inference. 
The All-Knower is a creation of the mind; it is not 
objectively real. To postulate it as a reality shows 
that the demonstration, as such, has failed absolutely 
to give a reasoned truth. We admire much in Prof. 
Royce; his beautiful and thoughtful style, his candor 

^"^ Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 222, 

^'Spirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI; Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy, ch. VI, VII. 

^'^ Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 342, 378. 
■^^ Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 398, 399. 
6 



82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and truthful spirit, his penetrating criticisms of Scepti- 
cism, of the Dieu-Proges, of the Relativity of Knowl- 
edge. He has grasped the issue fairly; has seen many 
truths. His prepossessions and his assumptions taken 
from others we object to. They are all centered in a 
false epistemology. He has shown an honest develop- 
ment in philosophy, has rejected opinions once enter- 
tained which gives the hope of further development 
still. There is a true Idealism, and Christian philoso- 
phy gladly welcomes truth in any form. 
Pantheistic, g 44. Finally, this truth must not be identified with 
God.'^ This is the Pantheism of Fichte." From the 
intellectual, moral and physical order we reason to 
God's existence; but God is not the order itself." 
With as much truth I could, on seeing a beautiful 
mansion, maintain that the symmetry and truth re- 
vealed in the building is its maker. No, these point 
to an Architect, just as the reign of truth points to a 
Mind. 

** Spirit of Modern Phil., ch. XI; Religious Aspect of Philoso- 
phy, p. 194. 

■^^Hunt, Pantheism, p. 264. 

■** Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 195. 



CHAPTER V. 

MORAL LIFE. 
The analysis of mental life does not exhaust the con- moral 

• • Ti/r . , nature. 

tent of conscious experience. Man is not only an 
intellectual, he is a moral being also. Endowed with 
a mind capable of acquiring a knowledge of himself 
and of external things, he likewise possesses a heart 
filled Vv^ith longings for what is true, and beautiful and 
good. A consideration of mental data shows the exist- 
ence and power of a mind transcendent and immanent, 
the source and basis of objective truth. Our moral 
nature in stronger and clearer voice calls us to look 
beyond ourselves to one who prescribes the funda- 
mental laws and principles of human conduct, and 
alone is able to satisfy the desires of the soul. 

8 2, The moral argument embraces the lines of rea-t^^argu. 

" _ *=^ ment. 

soning based upon the existence and power of a moral 
law over human life and upon the longings of the 
human soul. It naturally separates into two parts. 
The former is better known as the argument from con- 
science; the latter as the argument from fundamental 
desires. 

§ 3. The argument from conscience has always been its force. 
a favorite with Theistic writers. Much simpler in form 
than that from ideas, it appeals to data more obvious. 
Its force is apprehended not only by those whose minds 
have been disciplined to metaphysical reasoning. The 
uneducated are conscious of the still small voice which 
speaks silently from the depths of the soul. Much, 
however, depends upon the manner in which the argu- 
ment is proposed. 

[83] 



84 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



1°. The Moral Order. 



right and 
wrong. 



man acts 
for a 
purpose. 



unity of 
physical 
nature. 



§ 4. The distinction between right and wrong is a 
primary conviction of the human soul. Go where you 
will the wide world over, speak to persons in every 
rank of society from the years of budding reasoning 
even to decrepit old age, you will find that this truth is 
an inalienable possession of mankind.' An obligation 
presses upon us to do what is right. We may do 
wrong, but we are conscious of violating a law. The 
obligation, therefore, is not of physical necessity. It 
does not take away the exercise of free-will. The 
necessity is a moral one. It is that which has a basis 
in the relation of means to an end. A rational creature 
must employ certain means to obtain a definite end. 
True, he need not use these means; but the end can- 
not be secured without them.- 

§ 5. Now it is a fact of consciousness that, when we 
act in the full possession of our faculties, we act for a 
purpose or an end. The reason is found in our nature 
as intelligent beings. Our waking lives are made up 
of efforts to reach determined objects. Thus the mind 
is led to grasp the notion of a moral order. 

§ 6. We look out into the world around us and see 
creatures differing in nature, but devoid of intelligence, 
putting forth activities of various kinds. An order 
and harmony prevails throughout. Every object pos- 
sesses activities and exerts these not by virtue of free- 
determination but through a physical necessity. It 
cannot act otherwise than it does. Nevertheless, a 
unity of action obtains and the world is viewed as a 



^ Date of Modern Ethics, by Rev. J. Ming, S J,, p. 175. 
^ Mgr. d'Hulst, Confer, de Notre Dame, 1892. 



MORAL LIFE. 85 

system. The relation of means to ends is everywhere 
visible and furnishes the basis on which the argument 
from design rests. 

§ 7. The same truth reigns in human life. With this o^ moral 
distinction, however, that lower creation by a physical 
necessity, in virtue of their nature, act in a determined 
way for definite ends. Human action, on the contrary, 
is free. The individual sees the end and bends the 
energies of mind and of body to its possession. A unity 
and harmony should also prevail in our moral life.^ 
This only is had by an ultimate unity of tendency. 
The conscious apprehension of this exercises a direct- 
ing and controlling influence over individual acts. 
Thus, human acts can be viewed as constituting 
a system. On this fact is based the science of 
Ethics.* 

8 8. The reason for the unity and harmony which reason of 

^ . ■' -^ this moral 

should reign m moral life is found not alone in unity, 
the subjective consciousness of the individual, but in 
an objective moral order. All men seek happiness. 
Happiness is the ultimate purpose of activity. Men 
have sought happiness in riches, in honor, or in 
sensual pleasure. The result is bitter disappointment. 
In so acting men do not live up to the standard which 
should guide their lives. Here is seen the sphere and 
power of the moral law. It is the guide and sanction 
for what conduces to our true last end. The sanction 
is needed because of the free-will in the human 
agent. By following its guidance we shall surely 
obtain true happiness. The obligation to obey it is 

2 Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 140, 141, 
* The objection that the moral law is only the expression of 
man's constitution is not of great weight, How in this hypoth- 
esis can we explain its binding force in spite of free will and 
the fact of disobedience? Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. Ill,- 
p. 264. 



86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

g^^ncdon in therefore based in the very nature of things.* Only 
viduai. thus is Unity and harmony obtained in our moral life. 
By acting contrary to the moral law we bring unhap- 
piness to ourselves and destroy the harmony which 
should otherwise exist." Order is preserved by obedi- 
ence to its dictates; if disorder is found it is due to 
the exercise of free-will.^ 
in history. § 9. This truth is not limited to individual conscious- 
ness. The distinction between good and bad is found 
in the laws, literature and religious beliefs of all peo- 
ples. If nations differ as to the morality of individual 
acts, the difference is due to varying circumstances or 
to an error of judgment. The great fundamental dis- 
tinction is never obliterated.^ 

§ 10. We cast a hasty glance over the history of the 
past. The records of nations and of men rise before 
us. The sanction of the moral order is not confined 
to the individual. Not only does happiness follow the 
performance of a good act, and remorse attend an evil 
action. Virtue and truth triumph sooner or later. 
A man sacrifices honor, wealth, position, in obedience 
to the moral law; his portion is contempt, calumny, 
may be death. The years roll on and time rights 

^" Lex aeterna moderatrix humanarum." St. Aug. De Lib. 
Arb., L I, c. 6. 

^ Martineau, A Stud)^ of Religion, voL I, p. 21. 

' In a suggestive chapter on Moral Insight Prof. Royce 
reasons that ethical doubt leads to the apprehension of " the abso- 
lute and the universal will," (p. 172). It is true that doubt as to 
what vve ought to do " towards the attainment of universal har- 
mony," (p. 141) may arouse in the mind the conviction of a 
moral order. Nevertheless it is not true to say that the stand- 
ard of action is " the universal will " which results from the 
effort to become " one with all the conflicting wulls," (pp. 172, 
173). Such a standard is neither absolute nor universal; it is 
merely the subjective product of the mind, and as such ideal. 
CL The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. i, ch. VI, VII. 

^ S. Th. r, 2, q. 93, a. 4; q. 94, a. 5; Meyer, Inst. Jur. Nat., 
p. 232; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 18. 



MORAL LIFE. 8/ 

everything. The true condition shines forth like the 
sun. A moral action is justified by the progress of 
events, and men look back in praise to what so many 
saw only to condemn. The record of Christian virtue 
is a striking illustration. Dragged before public tribu- 
nals, tortured, robbed of wealth and position, the scorn 
of men, the sport of wild beasts, the early martyrs 
went to an ignominious death. But might does not 
constitute right. The day surely comes when the 
position shall be reversed, when the last shall be first 
and the first shall be last. Thus morality triumphs, as 
history abundantly proves. Victory ultimately crowns 
the efforts of those who strive to obey 

The written and unchanging laws of heaven 

They are not of to-day or yesterday, 

But ever live and no one knows their birthtide.' 

2°. Conscience. 

§ II. The moral law so universal in time and place, conscience, 
so exacting in its behests is made known through the 
voice of conscience. Conscience is thus the judgment 
of the individual as to the morality of his own con- 
duct; it is the application of the moral law to the 
particular events and circumstances of life." 

§ 12. This hidden monitor proclaims the ineradicable its office, 
distinction between good and evil. It awakens in the 
soul the consciousness of obligation and of duty. It 
is the ultimate basis and guide of human action. Its 
voice is ever heard urging, restraining, praising or 
condemning." I carry with me in the lonely silence of 

® Antigone, 454-456. 

'° Card. Newman, Grammar of Assent; Data of Modern Ethics, 
J. Ming, S. J. p. 186; Flint, Theism, p. 402; Cicero de Repub., 
I, II, ch. 22. 

" Miiller's definition of conscience is therefore partial and 
erroneous. Natural Religion, p. 181. 



88 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

my room a judge and witness of my most secret 
thoughts. From its decisions there is no appeal. For 
they are the promulgations and applications of an 
eternal law which rules the course of history and of 
man. The commands of duty, the consciousness of 
obligation, the "ought" or "ought not," are the 
inseparable witnesses of every thought, word, or deed.^* 

3°. Argument. 

foSuiated § ^3' ^^^ argument from conscience can now be 
formulated. It rests upon the moral order of the uni- 
verse as an ultimate basis. Everywhere are found 
indelible marks of a morally constituted world. ^^ What 
is held so firmly in the consciousness of the individual, 
pervades the laws, customs, and religious beliefs of 
mankind, and is verified by the course of history. 
Conscience, therefore, only promulgates a law eternal 
and necessary. Now a moral law imposing upon a 
free agent the obligation of right and of duty, con- 
straining him to obedience even at the loss of wealth 
and position, entailing self-sacrifice and sufi'ering, 
contravening at times our individual hopes and desires, 
furnishing an unfailing source of strength in trial, 
rewarding the good with peace and buoyancy of mind, 
punishing the evildoer with the agony of remorse and 
the foretaste of utter failure, must have a moral source 
and basis abDve and beyond the will of the individual. 
Conscience thus reveals a Lawgiver, who is the source 
of the moral order, the supreme judge of human 
action. The same Being who formed the human mind 

12 Moral Philosophy, W. Hill, S. J., ch. VIII; Goethe, Tasso, 
III., 2; Tacitus, Annals, VI, 6; Cicero, de Leg., I, 14; Balfour, 
Foundations of Belief, p. 79; The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, 
P- 305 

1^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. II, p. 370; Dimon, The 
Theistic Argument, Lect. VIIl. 



MORAL LIFE. 89 

and is the basis of the truth which reigns supreme 
throughout the universe, giving the explanation of its 
constitution and harmony, also formed the moral order, 
the source and explanation of the harmony which 
should prevail in the world of man. 

§ 14. This argument has been a favorite with its history. 
Christian writers. TertuUian appeals to it in his 
defense of Christianity.^" St. Augustine presents it in 
most beautiful passages of his confessions. Pascal, 
Fenelon, Bossuet, Butler, and Card. Newman word it 
in language penetrating and sublime. It awakens in 
the mind the consciousness of dependence on one who 
is far above and yet deep down in the recesses of the 
soul. It assures us that God is not only intelligent 
and great, but also just and good. It has made heroes 
throughout the ages, and when enlightened by Chris- 
tian faith is the unfailing source of Christian sanctity. 

4°. Errors. 

§ 15. To Kant the moral argument appealed with Kant, 
great force. '^ It presented a barrier against the 
destructive tendencies of his intellectual philosophy. 
He called the idea of duty and of moral obligation a 
postulate of the practical reason. On this he raises 
the argument for the existence of God. The peculiar 
position occupied by Kant in the philosophic world 
gave great weight to this line of reasoning. Theistic 
writers again and again have cited it with approval. 
A brief examination of its worth will not, therefore, 
be out of place. 

§ 16. Kant taught that personality constituted man his notion 
an absolutely independent being. Hence man has in ° ^°^^^^' 

'*De Anima, c. 7. 

** Critic of Judgment, § 86; Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 175. 



90 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



its effects. 



Criticism. 



a new 

teaching. 



not justi- 
fied. 



himself his own end. This independence is what gives 
value to a morally good act." Then man acts as a 
person. A law imposed from without is not law, but 
power. Autonomy is of the essence of morality. An 
autonomous law alone can be moral. It is then actu- 
ated by a motive purely moral, /. ^., for itself. 

§ 17. Hence the rise of independent morality. 
Fichte propagates the new doctrine. It is found in 
Grotius," and in Rousseau. ^^ Through them it has 
influenced modern thought. We find it openly taught 
by the most recent German disciples of Kant, by the 
apostles of Culture under the leadership of Matthew 
Arnold and Emerson, by the Ethical societies in our 
own country," and finds a congenial expression in the 
Religion of Humanity. 

§ 18. The moral teaching of Kant is something new 
in history. It differs both from Stoicism and from 
Christianity. To him duty is not a manifestation of 
nature, as with the Stoics, nor does it come from God 
alone. It is an absolute, an independent law. We 
obey it not through the hope of earthly happiness or 
future reward.^" 

§ 19. A morality which is not from divine origin, 
nor can be considered as the expression of nature, can- 
not be justified. It is nothing more than an individual 
or hereditary habit. It cannot be reconciled with the 
explicit testimony of consciousness, with the impera- 
tive demands of duty, nor can it furnish the data for 
any sound system or science of Ethics." According 



'^ T. Pesch, Kant et la Science Moderne, p. 170. 
'' de Jure Belli, Proleg. n. 11. 
'^ Social Contract. 
^^ Pesch., 1. c, p. 1S9. 

20 Cf. Hutton, Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters 
of Faith, p. 271. 

^^ La Morale de Kant, par A. Cresson, ch. IV. 



MORAL LIFE. 9I 

to Kant morality rests on the individual judgment. 
Now experience shows that judgments vary. In the 
conflict who is right? The inevitable result is moral 
scepticism and pessimism." 



II. 

Fundamental Desires. 

§ 20. The force of this train of reasoning consists in uneof 
showing that our nature reaches out to and cries aloud ^'■^™^'^^- 
for God. The cry comes from the depths of our being. 
It is not a passing phase of human emotion. It is per- 
sistent and as universal as mankind. The longings of 
our nature in various ways give expression to the cry 
for light and life. Only He who made the human soul 
can appease its cravings." 

S 21. Ci) The mind is made to know truth. This is aspiration 

. , . ^ , . . r , . for truth. 

Its object and m possession of truth it rests content. 
Now the capacity of the mind for truth is infinite. It 
penetrates the heavens above and the earth beneath. 
In restless activity it ever seeks new fields for investi- 
gation. Created nature does not satisfy the desire of 
knowledge. From the contemplation of the universe 
the mind rises to the Creator. With reverence and 
wonder it strives to penetrate the Divine essence and 
tell of the infinite perfections contained therein. True 
to this rational tendency Plato placed the happiness of 
the philosopher in the contemplation of truth. And 
Christian Theology teaches that man's ultimate end 
and highest good is had in the vision of the God-head." 

" Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. i, ch. V, VL 
'2 Prof. Porter, Science and Sentiment; Dr. Davidson, Burnett 

Lectures, 1892-93. 

'4 St. Aug. Confess. 1. VII, ch. 10; de Doctrina Christ, 1. i, ch, 

S. 9. 



92 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

love of the g 22. (2) The wili of man naturally seeks the good. 
The apprehension of good not attained is the source 
and explanation of rational activity. Its possession 
brings rest and happiness. Now the capacity of the 
will for good is infinite. The passing objects of this 
world do not bring a lasting satiety. The heart is too 
deep and great to be appeased with anything less than 
the eternal and uncreated good. Hence the will in its 
longings passes beyond the present and seeks a future 
existence. The apprehension of a future life includes 
the possession of God, the highest good to the human 
souL^^ 

desire of g 23. (3) The desire of life is fundamental. It 

springs from the depths of our being. Man longs to 
live. For life he willingly surrenders wealth and posi- 
tion. The conviction that the visible world does not 
include the sum-total of life is an inalienable possession 
of the human race. Man bridges the dark chasm of 
death and reaches out to a future existence v/ith its 
untold possibilities, its larger scope and fulness of life. 
In prayer v>^e cry aloud to the living God, in whose life 
we shall have life. The expression of this desire is a 
fact of individual consciousness and finds abundant 
illustration in the religious records of mankind. Belief 
in immortalit}^ is inseparably connected with belief in 
God. 

ha"^\nlss°'^ § 24. (4) The desirc of happiness is a common prop- 
erty of hum^anity. Everywhere man seeks to be happy.^' 
Now this desire cannot be satisfied perfectly by the 
goods of this world. Our happiness here is only 

^^ St. Aug. Enar. in Ps. 26; de Civ. Dei, 1. II, ch. 10, 
^^"Atsi dixisset; omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non 
vultis; dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret 
voluntate, quidquidenim quisquam latenter velit, ab hac volun- 
tate quae omnibus hominibus satis nota sit non recederit,'* 
Aug. De Trin. 1. VIII, ch. 3. 



MORAL LIFE. 93 

transitory. The human soul seeks for something more 
lasting than temporal pleasures, I do not deny that 
men are happy in this life." Pessimism is not a fact 
or a true scheme of philosophy. Only this, that there 
is a void in the human soul which earthly pleasures 
cannot reach or satisfy. The avocations of a busy life 
may still the want for a time. But in the lonely 
silence of night, with the passing away of friends and 
old companions, in the growing consciousness of life 
fast ebbing, this desire becomes strong and unmistak- 
able. We cannot quiet its voice. The pleasures of life 
are weighed in the balance and found wanting. We 
reach out in thought and desire beyond the limits of 
present existence. We seek a lasting happiness in the 
presence and possession of a Being whose infinite per- 
fections satisfy every craving of the soul, and in v/hose 
fruition is found eternal blessedness.^® 

82 c;. (c) That man is a relierious beino: is a truth of man's 

^ ^ ^-J^ ^ ^ religious 

consciousness and a fact of histor}". Just as mankmd nature, 
shows its social nature in the existence of communi- 
ties, in the laws and customs which govern the domestic 
and civic relations, so in like manner history furnishes 
proof of his religious nature. Everywhere are found 
temples, religious rites, and a priesthood of some kind. 
It seems as natural for men to express after this fashion 
their belief in God, who is the Author and Father of 
their being, as it is to gather into communities, to 
exercise the various acts of a community life. 

8 26. The argument from our desires has been strength of 

" _ ^ _ the argu- 

severely criticised." That v/e desire an object, it is "^ent. 

^■^ W. H. Mallock, Is Life Worth Living, p. 3. 

^^ " Cognoscere Deum in aliquo communi sub quadam con- 
fusione est nobis naturaliter insertum in quantum Deus est 
hominis habitudo." St. Thomas, i. q. 2, a. i. 

^^ J. S, Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 139; Prof. Fraser, in Phil- 
osophy of Theism, p. 201. 



94 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

said, is no valid proof that the object exists. The best 
reply is to remove obscurity and exaggeration. We 
appeal not to every desire, but only to those which are 
fundamental, common to all men, and thus viewed as 
the voice of our human nature. Again, the argument 
must not be considered independent and alone. True, 
it has not the force of other lines of reasoning. Never- 
theless, in connection with them it has force, subsidiary 
maybe, yet very great. It shows that man's nature in 
its entirety looks up to God. 



CHAPTER VI. 

CONTINGENCY. 

§ I. Man is the highest and noblest being in the 
visible universe. He stands at the head of the scale 
of beings which vary in perfection down to the lowest 
forms of organic life. His nature is not satisfied with 
what is below; it craves something higher; in many- 
ways it reaches out and cries to God. 

S 2. The data on which is based the proof of the So^^^^^s ^f 

" ^ idea of God 

existence of God are not confined to our own nature, in the world 

without. 

Through the senses the mind is brought in contact with 
the world about us. External things become the 
objects of thought. To the eager student the various 
aspects of nature appeal with an absorbing interest. 
Each discovery, like a rift in the clouds, enlarges the 
vision and enables the mind to catch a glimpse of that 
marvellous background of law and order which obtains 
throughout. Thus we have the various departments 
of physical science which are only various aspects of 
the one great world around us. Each in its proper 
sphere presents the relations of the phenomena and 
the laws which govern their movement. Nevertheless, 
they are not isolated; they bear relations one to 
another, and when viewed as a co-ordinated whole 
they give the best accredited and scientific knowledge 
of the visible universe.^ 

' Dr. Stirling says the three proofs: Cosmological, Teleologi- 
cal and Ontological " constitute together but the three undula- 
tions of a single wave, which wave is a natural rise and ascent 
to God." Gilford Lectures of i8qo; Dimon, The Theistic Argu- 
ment, p. 77. 

[95j 



96 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The fact of § 2. As wc look out into the world the mind is 

movement. ^ '-' 

impressed with the great fact that all things change.^ 
Spring follows Winter, and Summer follows Spring in 
orderly succession. Night gives place to day, and day 
to night in unvarying round. The seed is planted in 
the ground, rises in a stalk, flowers and produces seed 
again. We too change from youth to manhood, to 
old age. The disposition to change is inherent in 
everything, and the fact obtains with the necessity of 
a physical law. 
Its aspects. § 4. In this fact we can distinguish (a) the thing 
which changes, (b) the change itself, (c) the cause of 
the change, (d) the marvellous order in the changes- 
The first is the basis on which rests the argument 
from contingency; the second leads to the argument 
from motion; the third gives the argument from 
causality; the last is the argument from order and 
contrivance. 

I. 

Basis. 

argument | 5. The argument of contingency arises from a con- 
tingency, sideration of the beings which make up the world. By 
observation and experiment we investigate their nature 
and constitution. The one dominant factor, which 
prevails throughout, is dependence.^ No existing thing 
is isolated; a constant action and interaction takes 
place. As a result particular beings undergo various 
modifications. These changes clearly show that the 

^ Aug. de Lib. Arblt., 1. 2, ch. 17. 

3 Pfleiderer agrees with Kant and Hume and Strauss in main- 
taining that in proving the individuals contingent we cannot 
infer that the whole is so. Cf Phil, and Devel. of Religion, p. 
148; The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 256. The argu- 
ment in its present form is valid for the whole as well as for the 
parts. Ronayne, God Knowable and Known, p. 19. 



CONTINGENCY. 9/ 

beings themselves are dependent. As such they are not 
sufficient for themselves but need support one from 
another. The character of dependence is, therefore, 
marked indelibly upon the visible universe. It is the 
finger of God. The knowledge of this fact constrains 
the mind to admit the existence of a being distinct from 
the world, yet over all, who alone can give a sufficient 
reason for its dependence. We must, therefore, prove, 
I, that the world is contingent ; 2, that this fact demands \ 
an explanation in the necessary being, which is God.* J 

II. 

Argument. 

§ 6. To obtain a knowledge of the world we go to Knowledge 
the physical sciences. They set forth the properties, bie worw^^' 
relations and laws of external nature. There are found tiiephysicS 
facts and principles which furnish the materials for our^"^"^^^' 
argument. 

§ 7. (i) Chemistry treats of the composition of(i)chem- 
substances and the changes which they undergo. It^^"^^' 
tells us that substances are made up of small particles 
of matter called atoms. As to the quality or essence 
of these atoms scientists at present are divided. The 
great majority maintain that there are seventy-six ele- 
ments essentially different one from the other. Some 
contend that further analysis will disclose some com- 
mon basis underlying these elements which accounts 
for the fact of their manifold, combinations.^ 

*" The phenomena or changes in the universe have indeed 
each of them a beginning and a cause, but their cause is always 
a prior change; nor do the analogies of experience give us any 
reason to expect, from the mere occurrence of changes, that if 
we could trace back the series far enough we should arrive at a 
Primeval volition." Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 153. The 
objection is answered in the following pages. 

^ Cooke, New Chemistry, pp. 117, 118; Harper, S J., Meta- 
physics of the School, vol. I; The Unseen Universe, p. 160. 

7 



98 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Shows that 
elements 
are limited 
(a) from 
their num- 
ber. 



(b) from 
their de- 
termined 
mode of 
existence. 



(c) from 
their defi- 
nite com- 
bination. 



§ 8. Now if the elements be different, e. g., seventy- 
six, the question naturally arises why are there so 
many and not more or less. Their existence is limited. 
The mind can easily conceive more or less existing. 
The fact that constant experimentation discloses an 
element hitherto unknown, or proves an element to be 
compound which before was considered simple, or 
reduces so-called simple elements to a simpler one, is 
proof for the contention. The elements themselves 
are silent ; they contain no sufficient reason for their 
present existence; they are limited and dependent. If 
there be essentially only one element, two suppositions 
can be made. Either the atoms are limited in number 
or they are infinite. In the former hypothesis they are 
limited and dependent. The latter hypothesis cannot 
be held, for it demands that an infinite number of 
atoms actually exist. But this is not only without 
foundation in fact, but is opposed to the principles of 
sound reasoning, as will be shown further on. 

§ 9. Furthermore these atoms have a physical con- 
crete existence. They therefore exist in a determined 
concrete mode and shape. To affirm that a physical 
reality has not special modes and form is equivalent to 
assert that it does not exist. It cannot be maintained 
that a material atom has infinite modes of existence at 
one and the same instant of time. Some determined 
mode and figure is of the essence of matter. True, a 
material atom may undergo successive changes and 
assume various shapes as a result of the interaction of 
other elements and in obedience to mechanical or 
chemical laws. But these modifications are a striking 
proof of its intrinsic dependence. 

§ 10. Finally, atoms combine in definite proportion 
and their action follows on certain definite lines. 
Hence the laws of chemical equivalents and multiple 



CONTINGENCY. 99 

proportions. The nature of the elements, therefore, 
requires that they combine in such and such a manner. 
Now the determined mode of action reveals their limited 
and determined nature. We therefore conclude that 
their nature is dependent and limited; that they 
present no sufficient explanation for this limitation. 

§ II. (2) Physics is that department of natural (2) Physics. 
science which treats of the general properties of bodies 
and the causes that modify those properties. From it 
are drawn strong and irrefutable proofs of our thesis. 

812. (a) The great law of Physics is the law of inertia, (a) mechan- 

* ,• . . , . . ,.^, ical Physics 

Accordmg to this law, matter is indifferent to rest or the law of 

_. . , . . . .,, . inertia. 

motion. If it be m a state of rest, it will remain so 
unless an impulse to motion is imparted from an exter- 
nal cause. If it be in a state of motion, it will con- 
tinue to move until an external impediment causes the 
motion to retard or to cease. ^ 

§ 13. Now in its physical existence matter must be 
either in a state of rest or of motion. If the former, 
it would exist in a solid or liquid or a gaseous state. 
If the latter, the motion would be of a certain velocity 
and in a definite direction. Ordinary observation 
shows that matter exists in all these conditions. In 
the hypothesis that matter is absolute and not depend- 
ent on any other being whatsoever, how can we account 
for its indifference to rest or motion? If it were abso- 
lutely independent then rest or motion would be of its 
essence. In the former case no motion would be 
possible; in the latter there would be no rest. Ordi- 
nary experience shows that these suppositions are con- 
trary to fact, and the law of inertia proves that they 
are repugnant. Hence we have the remarkable, yet 

^ Hence in explaining the law of inertia writers distinguish 
the inertia of movement and the inertia of repose. Cf. Pere 
Villard, Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison, ch. III. 



100 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fundamental, fact that matter must exist either in a 
state of rest or of motion; nevertheless, it is absolutely 
powerless to determine itself to one state or the other. 
The determination exists as a physical fact, and the 
law of inertia which reigns supreme proves to convic- 
tion that the determination cannot come from matter 
itself. The conclusion, therefore, is obvious that it 
comes from some external source. Hence the depend- 
ence of matter is an evident inference from the science 
of Physics. 
(b)Thermo- 8 14, (b) Thcrmo-Dynamics is the name given to 

Dynamics. ,^7^^ , , . , . ,., r, 

that oepartment of physical science which treats of the 
mechanical action or relations of heat. Its origin is 
very recent, but so important have been the discoveries 
in this field and so deep an insight has it presented to 
a fuller comprehension of the mysteries which envelop 
the interaction of nature's forces that it holds a pro- 
minent place in the interest of scientific men. The 
labors of Helmholtz, of Tyndall, and of Thompson 
have been zealously taken up by the younger genera- 
tion and the records of scientific meetings present the 
marvellous successes which have attended investiga- 
tions in this special field. 
shows a § 18. The knowledge of a physical law is a solution 

conver- " . 

gence to many facts shrouded in obscurity. It opens a vista 

of laws '' J f 

working to along which the mmd can travel. Not only present 

a definite ^ , • , , 1 • ^u 

end. occurrences become simple and easy to explain. 1 he 

future also is brought within the sphere of study and 
we are enabled to predict what will happen for the 
coming years. Oar inferences will become certainties 
if the mind be enabled to detect a convergence of laws 
working steadily and irresistibly to a definite end. 
This is the nature of the present proof. The science 
of Thermo-Dynamics sets forth laws or principles 
which show to conviction that the time will come when 



CONTINGENCY. lOI 

the universe will have an end. If it had an end we can 
infer that it had a beginning. At any rate it is not 
eternal, but is limited and dependent. 

8 i6. (i) A fundamental law of Physics is the con- d) law of 

" ^ ^ '' conserva- 

servation of matter. Formerly it was thought possible tion of 
that matter could be destroyed. In proof of this, 
appeal was made to ordinary facts which fell under the 
observation of the senses, e. g., combustion. It was 
reserved to modern science to prove how false and 
superficial was this belief. Lavoisier, the founder of 
Chemistry, proposed a series of experiments which 
proved that matter is subject to constant change, but 
is never destroyed. Thus by a balance it can be 
shown that the weight of a piece of wood before com- 
bustion is equivalent to the ashes, smoke and gases, 
e. g., oxygen and carbonic acid, set free by the process. 
On this fact Chemistry as a science is based, and this 
principle gives validity to the formulas which express 
ascertained and possible Chemical combinations. 

§ 17 (2) The discovery of this law led scientists to(2)iawof 
suspect that what was true of matter could be verified tkm of 
of the forces which enter into play in the physical uni- 
verse. Almost simultaneously Dr. Meyer in Germany 
(1842), and Dr. Jules in England (1843), propounded 
the great law of the conservation of energy. By 
repeated and scientific experimentation, they showed 
that mechanical work could be converted into heat and 
m'ce versa. Hence the formula to express the 
mechanical equivalent of heat (772 foot-pounds). 
Scientists began to experiment on the other forms of 
energy. Helmholtz, Thomson, and Rankin found that 
this principle was true of chemical affinity, light, 
gravity and electricity. The unity of the physical 
forces was proclaimed as a fact."' The mind was 

' L'Unite des forces physiques, par. P. Secchi, S. J. 



conserva- 
tion o: 
force. 



102 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

enabled to thoroughly understand the process of the 
steam-engine, and the way was opened to the intro- 
duction of the various mechanical contrivances, e. g., 
electro-motors, which hold so important a place in 
modern life. 
tiSn'^oTphy- § ^^' ■'■'^ ^^^ interaction of physical forces, there is 
sicai force, no such thing as destruction. The loss or gain is only 
apparent. Constant transformations and conversions 
have place, nothing more. The law of the conserva- 
tion of energy is considered an established fact. 
Unremitting study and experimentation have resulted 
in its repeated verification. Day by day the known 
range of its application is extending. Up to the present 
not one exception has been discovered. 
thV^dTss^pa- § 19- (3) Nevertheless, in the working of this law, 
energy. ^^ ^^^ transformations which constantly take place, a 
remarkable phenomenon has been noted. It has been 
called by Thomson the law of the dissipation of energy. 
By this is meant that in the transformation of forces 
one form of energy gradually absorbs the others. Thus 
mechanical work or electricity can be converted into 
heat, yet experiment has shown that it is impossible 
to convert the whole amount of heat into another form 
of energy. A residuum always remains after conversion 
which cannot be reached. There is no actual loss of 
energy; only a gradual increase in the amount of heat 
and a corresponding decrease in the amount of the 
energies.® 
tendency of § 20. Heucc a study of the laws of Physics clearly 
forces to shows that natural forces have a tendency to be 

heat. -^ 

reduced to heat. The inference is clear. If the 
amount of heat in the universe is gradually increasing 
at the expense of other forms of energy, the time will 
come when all these energies will be no more and heat 

^ Faye, L'Origine du Monde, p. 310. 



CONTINGENCY. IO3 

alone exist. Now the natural tendency of heat is to 
a uniform temperature. 

§ 21. Thus the world is slowly and surely moving on The infer- 
to the time when there shall be a perfect equilibrium, 
when all motion shall cease, when life shall be impossi- 
ble, when one mean temperature shall pervade through- 
out. There would be no day or night, no change of 
seasons, no heat or cold; the grass would not grow, no 
trees or flowers would cheer the eye, no storm-cloud, 
no light or shadow, no gentle breeze or chill blast, no 
moving thing around. Only a deep and dull silence 
reigns; it is the death of the universe. No earthly 
mortal shall live to see its solemn and awful end. That 
the end will come is as certain as the certainty of a 
physical law. It is true in the mind of a devout 
believer there is a possibility that God may avert the 
calamity. Our argument is based only on the con- 
sideration of the world, such as it is.^ 

S 22. (3) Astronomy is the science which treats of 3° Astro- 

^ ^ ^ , nomy. 

the heavenly bodies, their properties and the causes of 
their various phenomena. From earliest times men 
have been led to study the phenomena of the heavens, 
to trace out the course of the stars and to discover the 
laws which regulate their movements. A strange 
charm clings to the astrologers of old, and the rem- 
nants of their theories which have survived the lapse 
of time appeal to the mind like tales of imaginative 
fiction. With the labors of Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho 
Brahe, Kepler and Newton, astronomy was divested of 
its atmosphere of the marvelous, was placed upon a 
solid basis and took the position and rank of a 
science. 

^Conservation of Energy, by Balfour Stewart, p. 164, 188; 
The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 131; The Unseen Uni- 
verse, p. 126. 



I04 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



nebula- 
Theory 



its explana 
tion. 



formation g 23. At present Astronomy in its total extent does 
world, not claim our consideration. Attention is drawn to 
that portion of the science which treats of the forma- 
tion of the stellar universe. In the preceding proof 
the laws of Physics clearly shov/ed that the universe 
would have an end. The laws of Astronomy, on the 
contrary, constrain the mind to admit that the world, 
had a beginning. 

§ 24. The science of Astronomy maintains that the 
solar system was gradually evolved from a primordial 
gaseous mass called nebula. The theory which obtains 
with scientists of to-day is that proposed by Kant and 
La Place. It is the famous nebula theory and aims 
at explaining the gradual formation of the stellar 
universe. 

§ 25. Suppose a planetary nebula, like, e. g.^ the one 
at present existing in the constellation of Andromeda, 
diffused in the space now occupied by our solar system. 
The power of attraction, with which it was endowed, 
caused the particles to gradually condense. In course 
of time a body was formed at its center. This body 
in some manner acquired a rotary motion. In the pro- 
cess of rotation it gradually threw off one ring after 
another. These in turn condensed and assumed a 
spherical shape. Hence the solar system in its present 
state. 

§ 26. This hypothesis is proposed in the name of 
be admitted science. It cannot be rejected, else the charge might 
be made that we are dogmatic and unscientific. In 
admitting it we show that we are in full accord with 
the principles and spirit of modern science. Astronomy 
thus confesses that the universe had a beginning. In 
did not always exist as it does now. By successive 
stages of development it reached its present condition. 
The whole process of development was directed and 



an initial 
point must 



CONTINGENCY, IO5 

sustained by definite laws.'" Further on we shall see 
that law is the indication and expression of mind. 
Insistence upon this train of thought would carry us 
beyond the sphere of our argument. What we contend 
for is that an initial point in the development must at 
least be admitted." It does not concern us at present the devei- 

^ ^ opment 

whether or not the nebulous mass exists from eternity, eternal or 

not. 

Elsewhere it is shown that this cannot be maintained. 
If we grant that the nebula is eternal, then it may have 
possessed from eternity the forces of attraction and of 
repulsion. The acquisition of these forces at some 
later period necessarily points to an extrinsic cause. 
Now let us admit that these forces are eternal, the 
question naturally arises in the mind, why then did the 
development begin so recently? Physical forces act in 
an invariable manner. An invariable process from 
eternity would have exhausted the development in thccas^etife 
eternal past. Yet astronomers busy themselves in fs°JtroSg!'^ 
computing the age of the earth and of the stellar 
bodies in space. A suspension of action on the part 
of the forces cannot be explained by the forces them- 
selves. It must be due to an extrinsic cause. Here 
again we are brought to a standstill. ^^ 

§ 27. (4) Geology is the science which treats of (4) Geology 
the structure of the globe, the causes of its physical 
features and its history. As a science its origin 
dates only from the past generation. In this short 
period it has deciphered on the rocks the history of 
the earth's formation. It tells us that fire and water 
were the great agencies which had play in the consoli- 
dation of the earth's crust from its primitive nebulous 
condition. The various stages in the process of 

^^ Science and Revelation, F. Peek. 

1^ De Pressense, A Study of Origins, p. 146. 

1' Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I, § II. 



I06 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

dm?wh°en development are clearly marked, e.g.^ the present age, 
no life ex- the Cenozoic, Mesozoic, Paleozoic and Azoic ages. 

isted, e. ^,, ' ^ 

the Azoic The characteristics of each asfe are clearly indicated 

age. ^ ^ 

and the various forms of life peculiar to each are noted. 
One fact, however, is clearly shown, viz., that there 
was a time when no life in any form whatsoever existed. 
Therefore, Geology teaches that the period of life on 
this globe is limited, that life had a beginning, that 
at a period in the remote past, which science has 
approximately determined, no living being, not even a 
blade of grass could be found upon the surface of the 
globe. Geology, therefore, forces the conclusion upon 
us that terrestrial life is not eternal, that it is limited 
and as a consequence dependent. ^^ 
(5) Biology, g 28. (5) It is certain that terrestrial life had a 
beginning. Geology points out the strata of the 
earth and shows that in the Azoic age no living thing 
existed. Paleontology traces back the scale of living 
things, and points to the earliest trace of life.^^ Now a 
^ ^ fundamental and well-established law of Biology is 

teaches that ^-' 

life can only that life Can Only come from life. Therefore, living 

come from '' ^ 

life. beings on earth are dependent and point to some 

^^ Mr. Schurman passes over the argument, in the following 
manner: " Natural history assures us there was a time when 
the earth held no living or thinking beings. But since they 
have actually appeared, it is certain there never was a time when 
nature had not the capacity of producing them. And instead 
of regarding nature before their emergence as a chaos, we are 
bound to interpret it as a developing cosmos which contains in 
itself the promise and potency of all terrestrial life and intelli- 
gence." The reason is that " atoms are merely the hypotheti- 
cal elements of that material vesture in which spirit has 
eternally expressed itself. Spirit is the eternal realitj' and 
nature its eternal manifestations . . . Nature is the exter- 
nalisation of spirit and no more separable from it than the 
spoken word from the thought it symbolizes." Cf. Belief in 
God, p. 156. It is to be wondered whether Hegel would recog- 
nize himself in this " hypothetical vesture." 

'^^ Tait, Recent Advances in Physical Science, Lect. VII; Prof. 
Young, The Sun, p. 1276. 



CONTINGENCY. lO/ 

external cause as the sufficient reason for their exist- 
ence. For the past two hundred years the problem of 
the origin of life has been most eagerly studied. Two 
main solutions have been proposed. 

8 2Q. (a) Materialists contend that the universe Theory of 

o y "< y Abio- 

ought to be explained by its own inherent forces alone, genesis. 
Hence they proclaim the theory of spontaneous genera- 
tion, I. e., the spontaneous production of life as result- 
ing from the action of physical or chemical energies. 
This is the law of Abiogenesis. 

§ 30. (b) Others hold that in the animal or vegetable B?Jf°JJeg4 
kingdom life can only come from life. To explain the 
beginning of life they contend for the intervention of 
a force distinct from the material universe. This is 
the law of Biogenesis. The real question at issue is the 
existence of a living Creator. The former wish to 
explain the phenomena of the universe without having 
recourse to God. The latter find a necessity for action 
on the part of God, and the strongest proof that He 
has acted. 

8 31. To the minds of the ancients there was nospontane- 

. ous Genera- 

doubt that life was spontaneously generated. Aristotle tion. 

believed that many living beings, e. g., insects, worms, 

etc., were generated by the forces of matter alone; 

hence the formula: corruptio unius. geiieratio alterius. . ,. 

^ ' ^ Its history. 

Lucretius says that for this reason men speak of 
Mother Earth. ^^ Virgil describes the spontaneous gen- 
eration of bees,^^ Origen cites the production of worms 
as a fact admitted without question, ^^ and St. Augustine indent. 
holds this to be the only opinion of antiquity.^® Dur- 
ing the Middle Ages the spontaneous generation of 
certain beings was held as a fact simply. Avicenna ™^'^*^^^^' 

^^ De Nat. Rerum, V. 793. 
i«Georg. IV. 

" Contra Celsum, IV, 57. 
^^DeCi^. Dei, XVI, 7. 



io8 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



modern. 



labors of 
Redi. 



In early- 
part of 
present 
century. 



attributed this to the power of matter alone. St. 
Thomas, on the contrary, advanced the opinion that if 
matter produced living things it was in virtue of a 
special power from God." This interpretation of 
spontaneous generation by Christian Philosophers was 
widely different from Materialists. 

§ 32. In 1644 Van Helmont and Kircher gave receipts 
for the production of mice and of snakes. Towards 
the close of this century the first blow was aimed at 
the theory. Dr. Francisco Redi of Tuscany (1668) 
showed that worms in meat were the maggots of flies' 
eggs. This was done by placing meat in jars so sealed 
that the flies could not touch it. The invention of the 
microscope, however, in revealing a new world of living 
beings, brought the old doctrine into favor. Needham 
and Buffon were the leaders in the revival. They 
found a strong adversary in Abbe Spallanzani (d. 1799), 
who tried to show, inconclusively, however, through 
lack of means, that the latent life so generated was 
due to atmospheric germs. The problem was reopened 
and earnestly debated up to the middle of the present 
century. 

§ ^;^. The discovery of oxygen and its presence as a 
necessary condition to existing life marked an epoch 
in the controversy. In 1836 Schultz and Swann made 
notable experiments in sterilizing air which pointed to 
the impossibility of spontaneous generation. By caus- 
ing air to pass through hot glass tubes or sulphuric 
acid they showed that the quantity of oxygen was pre- 
served while the organic matter was destroyed. The 
experiments were not conclusive because the nature 
of what was destroyed could not be known. Twenty 
years later Mr. Ponchet declared that he saw infusoria 
spontaneously generated in a sterilized liquid which 

'' St. Thorn. I, q. 71, a. i. 



CONTINGENCY. IO9 

had been put in contact with the air despoiled of germs. 
Claude Bernard, Quatrefages and Payen in vain pointed 
out to him the causes of the mistake. 

§34. In i860 the French Academy proposed the Pasteur, 
problem as a prize-subject with a view to have the 
question thoroughly discussed. Mr. Pasteur now 
began the experiments which have given him lasting 
fame. He proved that our atmosphere is swarming 
with germs of life which are the real cause of putre- 
faction. He showed that pure air deprived of germs 
does not produce putrefaction in a fermentible liquid, 
because the germs are not always so abundant. Hence 
the phrase " 07nne vnmfn e cellula " was verified for the 
world of infinitely small beings as well as for those 
visible to the naked eye. 

§ 35. In 1872 Dr. Bastian claimed that he found the 
physico-chemical conditions apt to produce life with- 
out germs. Pasteur in reply pointed out three causes 
of error against which he had not guarded himself.^" 
About the sam.e time Fremy and Frecul held that a 
living being could not be born from brute matter, but 
it could be produced by organized matter, e. g., the 
ferment of wine is caused by the cells of parenchyme 
which make up the grape-juice. This is spontaneous 
generation under another form. Pasteur made still 
more decisive experiments. He discovered that fer- 
mentation v/as a function of life, that the phenomenon 
is produced in fermentible liquids by atmospheric 
yeast-germs, that grape-wine is unable to ferment of 
itself, that the organic yeast which causes the fermenta- 
tion comes from without the grain, that the air-germs 
in summer are deposited on the grapes, and in autumn, 
when the grapes are crushed, the germs mingle with 
the juice and cause fermentation. 

'° Popular Science Monthly, Dec, i88i, p. 248. 



no 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Tyndall. 



Virchow. 



(6) Anthro- 
pology. 



§ ^6. In England Mr. Tyndall bestowed upon the 
problem most extended and minute study. He showed 
why the brewer put yeast in barley-juice to make beer. 
For over a year he conducted most careful experiments 
and conclusively proved that fermentation, or putre- 
faction, is the result of pre-existing germs. " There 
is in experimental science," he writes, " no conclu- 
sion more certain." In presence of such facts it will 
be absolutely monstrous to say that swarms of bacteria 
have been spontaneously generated. ^^ 

§ 37. Air. Virchow says ' ' There is not a single known 
positive fact that spontaneous generation ever took 
place; those who hold the contrary are contradicted 
by scientists, not by theologians/' The conclusion, 
therefore, is a fact which cannot be questioned; living 
substances can only come from substances already 
possessing life." Now Geology shows most conclu- 
sively that terrestrial life had a beginning. The infer- 
ence is clear. The existence of living beings on earth 
can ultimately be explained only by recourse to a liv- 
ing cause outside and above the universe, who com- 
municated to this earth the fact and potency of life." 

§ 38. Anthropology is the science which deals 
with the history and races of mankind. It differs 
from Biology in this, that it considers man alone, 
the highest form of terrestrial life. It estimates 
approximately the length of time man has inhabited 
the globe. At present we are not concerned with the 
exactness of its statements. One truth is sufficient, 



^^ Add. in Glasgow, 1876, in Fragments of Science; Huxley, 
Lay Sermons; Quatrefages, Darwin et ses Precurs. Franc, p. 
174; Thein, Anthropology, ch. I; Schanz, A Christian Apology, 
vol. I, ch. Vni; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 488. 

^^ God Knowable and Known, M. Ronayne, S. J., p. 24. 

*^ Traces of this argument are found in Aug. Conf. 1. iii, ch. 
6, n. 10; de Vera Relig., ch. XI; Soliloq. 1. i, n. 3; de Doct. 
Christ, 1. I, ch. 7, 8; in Joan. tr. 19, n. 11. 



CONTINGENCY. Ill 

viz., there was a time when no human being existed on^eachesthat 

' * _ human life 

earth. A study of man's nature shows that in com- had a 

-' _ ^ beginning. 

mon with the brute he is an animal. Yet over and 
above he possesses intelligence and free-will which 
mark him off from all living beings and make him. lord 
of creation. Now Psychology proves that sensation, ^hJ^g°\°if/t 
which is the characteristic of animal nature, cannot sense can- 

' not be de- 

spring from lower forms of life, e. g., life of a plant, ^'^^^^1^°^ 
and that intelligence does not come from sensation, life,. nor 

'^ can intellect 

Wherefore the sense and intellectual life on earth had be the de- 
velopment 
a beginning. But the reason for this cannot be sought of sense. 

in any living earthly thing because all other forms of 

life belong to a lower scale. Hence they are due to an 

external cause. 

^ ^g. Mathematics is the science which treats of(7)Mathe- 

" ^-^ . matics. 

quantity either discrete, e. g.^ numbers, or continuous, 
e. g., magnitudes. Distinguished into several special 
departments, it enunciates laws and principles which 
hold sway throughout the material world. Primarily 
dealing with quantity in the abstract, its data and in- 
ferences find logical and natural application in the 
concrete. Hence we have the distinction between 
pure and applied mathematics. Therefore the princi- 
ples of mathematics can be applied to the universe as 
a whole because of its quantity or magnitude, with the 
same reason that they are applied to Architecture, 
Astronomy and Navigation. 

§40. Now the science of Mathematics sets forth shows uni- 

1 ... , . , 1 , . , verse is not 

certam truths or prmciples which show conclusively infinite, but 
that the material universe is limited in time and in limited and 
space. Therefore it is not eternal or infinite, but ^^^" ^"^' 
dependent and finite." 

§ 41. The question of the infinite in time and in 
space is not two-fold. It can be resolved into that of 

"The suggestive article in cf. Revue des Questions Scientif., 
1878, vol. I, afterwards p.ublished in the volume Les Confins de 
la Science, by Father Carborelle, S. J. 



112 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Problem of 
infinite in 
space and in 
time re- 
solved into 
the infinite 
in number. 



Is infinite 
number a 
contradic- 
tion 



infinite number.''^ The solution of this gives the 
answer to the difficulties involved in the former. For 
the concepts of space and of time, so frequently aris- 
ing in the mind, are in reality more difficult to analyze 
than that of number. The reasoning is not based on 
the abstruse problems of higher mathematics. We 
take the simple integral number found in the ordinary 
school Arithmetic. The problem to be discussed is 
that of the infinite number. It is a problem full of 
difficulties. For centuries it has engaged the thoughts 
of philosophers. Can a consideration of the integral 
numbers used in Arithmetic bring us any nearer a solu- 
tion and give a definite conception free from ambiguity 
and error? 

§ 42. (a) Some maintain that in infinite number is 
a contradiction. But this assertion cannot be held. 
Taken in its widest generality, as the phrase itself 
would justify, it appeals to us without any warrant 
whatsoever, and is known to be false. St. Augustine 
says that there is an infinity in number is a certainty 
beyond dispute. ^^ In setting forth proofs for the 
existence of God, St. Thomas omits the consideration 
of the infinity of number, restricts himself to one aspect 
merely, and proposes an argument based on the truth 
that an infinity of efficient causes succeeding one 
another is false. Pascal candidly admits that there is 
an infinity in number, but in the same breath adds that 
he knows not what it is. The ambiguity of the state- 
ment is clearly shown by Kant, who places it side by 
side with its contradictory as among the antinomies of 
pure reason. 



" Rabier, however, holds that the infinity of number I'i poten- 
tial, of soace is actual. Lecons de Philosophie, p. 465. 
26DeCiv. Dei., 1. XII, ch. 18. 



CONTINGENCY. II3 

§ 43. It is not absurd; else why is recourse had to "^^ ^^s"*"^- 
the infinite number to explain many things which come 
under daily observation. Ask a boy with a hat full of 
marbles if more and more can be had and the answer 
will be there is an infinite number. To his mind there 
is no limit to the number of possible marbles; other 
boys have many more than he, and his store can be 
augmented beyond all possible computation. We 
often find ourselves reasoning after much the same 
manner, and the like answer so naturally arising pre- 
cludes any further doubt or question. The same is 
true of continuous quantity. A line, e. g., is made up 
of geometrical points. If we ask how many points 
make up the line, the answer is an infinite number; but 
this limitation is due to the mind's action ; it is not in- 
herent in the points themselves. So, too, when we try 
to compute the number of integers in algebraic roots. 

§ 44. (b) Others try to clear up the obscurity by '^j^^ij.^^i^^ 
making a distinction between act and possibility, potency. 
Thus they contend that number can be infinite when 
viewed as a potency or possibility, not when it is con- 
sidered as actually existing. The phrase: an infinite 
number actually existing involves a contradiction, is 
a time-honored dogma in philosophy and in theology. 
Thoughtful minds have presented it as an unanswer- 
able argument to prove the existence of God, and as 
a stumbling-block in the path of Materialism. We do 
not deny that it contains truth. Only worded in such 
fashion it is ambiguous and admits of further analysis. 
Take for example the concepts of a line, of time, of 
space. The points in a line, the intervals in time, the 
distances in space actually exist. Yet it can be main- 
tained that they are infinite, and it is impossible with 
the sole aid of this distinction to show that the con- 
tention is false. 



114 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

distinction | 4^, (c) Another distinction, therefore, is necessary. 

termined. It has been shown that an infinite number is not a con- 
tradiction or an absurdity. Nevertheless, so worded, 
it is ambiguous. This can be cleared up by asserting 
that as such it is by its own nature undetermined. 
Hence we maintain that an infinite number is conceiv- 
able, but it is essentially undetermined. The proof of 
this statement is very clear. Of two finite numbers, I 
can say that one is greater than the other. The just- 
ness of the estimate would be questioned by no one. 
If, however, I should say that of two infinite numbers 
one is greater than the other, my words become con- 
tradictory and absurd. 

§ 46. Let us take, e. g., two infinite series, a, b, c, 
and I, 2, 3. Now these series are equal. Yet I can 
suppose I to be lo or 20, or 100 times greater than a. 
A comparison, therefore, of infinite series by reason of 
quantity becomes impossible. The same holds good 
of continuous quantity. Take, e. g., an isosceles 
triangle. Suppose a line EF be drawn parallel to the 
base, AB intersecting the sides x\C and BC. Now it 
is proved by a geometrical process that EF is shorter 
than AB. Admitting that the points of the line be 
infinite, we have one infinite greater than the other. 
At the same time by connecting the points in a special 
manner they could both be made equal. Finally let us 
compare an arithmetical with a geometrical progressive 
series, e. g., 1-2-3 and 2-4-6, etc. Now one series is 
greater than the other, yet both are infinite. Hence 
it is evident that we cannot compare two infinite num- 
bers by reason of quantity. This is due to their nature. 
They cannot receive a quantity which determines them 
and makes them able to be grasped by the mind. They 
constantly elude all efforts to individualize or determine 
them. They are, therefore, essentially undetermined. 



CONTINGENCY. II5 

8 47. The conclusion is clear. An infinite determined conclusion 

. . ... . . . ^°'' infinite 

number is an impossibility. An infinite undetermined i^^°iber. 
number contains nothing absurd. Thus when it is 
said " there is an infinity in number " the undetermined 
number is understood. When, again, others say ** an 
infinite number is a contradiction " they speak of the 
determined number. Having found the proper dis- 
tinction and presented a solution to the question of 
infinite number, we can now apply this principle to 
the infinite in time and in space. 

§48. Now between two determined "^o'lXiX.^ in space infinite in 
there cannot be an infinite interval. This is possible time, 
only when one of the extremes is undetermined. For, 
if we grant that the interval were infinite, it could be 
expressed in numbers which would be at the same time 
determined and infinite. This, as has been shown, is 
impossible. Mathematicians speak of lines meeting in 
infinity, e. g.^ two parallel lines, the asymptote meets 
its curve in infinity. The language can be justified, 
but it should not be forgotten that the meaning is that 
the lines will never meet at all. 

g 49. And hence (i) the material universe had a begin- Hence 
ning.^' A past event, e. g.^ a material phenomenon had^Jb?-''^^ 
of any kind whatsoever, can have actually taken place ^^"^^"^' 
only on the condition that it existed at a determined 
instant of time To maintain that it existed at an 
undetermined epoch is to take away all its reality and 
to render it an impossibility. But two determined 
instants in time cannot be separated by an infinite 
interval. The distance between them is finite. There- 
fore the eternity of matter is an impossibility, and the 
series of phenomena which make up the material 
universe must have had a beginning.^® 

^-^ The Unseen Universe, p. VII, XV, XVIII. 

^^ What basis has Mr. Schurman for the opinion "we do not 
knovv that the world had a beginning in time and see no ei'i- 
dence to suppose it had." Cf. Belief in God, p. 149. 



ii6 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(2) universe 
is limited in 
space. 



objection 
from Geom- 
etry. 



This 

reasoning 
can be ap- 
plied to 
atoms. 



I 50. (2) The material world is limited in space. Are 
the stars which fill the heavens infinite in number? The 
answer is very simple. Each star is determined by its 
own existence. Thus the entire number is determined. 
As such it cannot be infinite. Again, if the material 
world had an infinite extent, real phenomena v/ould 
exist, separated one from another by infinite distances. 
But this, it has been shown, cannot be maintained. 
Therefore the universe is limited in all directions. 

§ 51. It may be said that this reasoning does not 
hold good of abstract geometrical figures. The reason 
is that by their abstract nature, they contain unde- 
termined parts. The mind determines each part in 
the very act of conceiving it. Nevertheless a concep- 
tion of the whole is possible without a determination 
of all the parts. A material phenomenon, on the con- 
trary, is of necessity determined by its own existence. 
The place it occupies in space is necessarily determined. 

§ 52. The same line of reasoning can be applied in 
all its cogency to the atoms which are supposed to 
make up the universe. They exist in the concrete; 
as such they are determined. Therefore they cannot 
be infinite. In face of this what should we say of John 
Stuart Mill's assertion that " the world does not by 
its mere existence bear witness to God?" " 



^^3 Essays on Religion, p. 153; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig, vol. 
Ill, p. 257; St. Thomas, C. Gent., 1. I, ch. 13; II, 15; Sum, TheoL, 
I. q. 44. a I, 2; 1. q. 45, a. 12. "Ex operibus corporis agnosco 
vi ventem ; ex operibus creaturae non potes agnoscere Creatorem !" 
Aug. Enar., in Ps. 73, n. 25. "Interrogavi terram, et dixit, non 
sum (Deus); et quaecumque in eadem sunt, idem confessa sunt. 
Interrogavi mare et abysses, et reptilia animarum vivarum, et 
responderunt; non sumus Deus tuus; quaere super nos. In- 
terrogavi auras flabiles et inquit universus aer cum incolis suis; 
Fallitur Anaximenes; non sum Deus. Interrogavi coelum, 
solem, lunam, Stellas; neque nos sumus Deus, quem quaeris, 
inquiunt. Et dixi omnibus his quae circumstant fores carnis 
meae; Dixistis mihi de Deo meo quod vos non estis, dicite 
mihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna; ipse fecit 
nos," St. Aug. Confess. X. 6. 



CHAPTER VII. 

CAUSALITY. 

§ I. Causality is a primary conviction of the human 
mind. It is at the basis of our mental life.^ Uni- 
versal in application with people of every age, race or 
condition, it enters into every subject of thought, 
every topic of conversation, whether by the laborer in 
the humble service of daily toil, or by the thoughtful 
student in the effort to solve the problems of life and 
of being. To the untutored mind of the child and of 
the savage its working in the physical world presents 
countless sources of wonder. The world is pictured 
as filled with mysterious beings. The mind is naturally 
prone to personify the objects acting around us. The 
error is laid bare by experimental investigation and 
reflection which enables the mind to trace the physical 
laws and to grasp the real nature of the proximate 
causes. The objective truth of causality rer/iains 
intact; its apprehension only becomes more intelligent. 
From a spontaneous judgment it has assumed the form 
and force of a philosophical certainty. 

I. 

The Principle. 

\ §2. The principle of causality enters into every a special 
^argument for the existence of God.^ Around and ^'^ ^"^ 
through it are woven the facts of ordinary and scientific 
investigation. Hence comes the consistency and 

^ " Inest homini natiiraie desiderium cognoscendi causam 
cum inluetuV efiectum." St. Thomas, i. q. 12, a. I. 
' Farges, L'idee de Dieu, p. 59. 

[117] 



Il8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

cogency of the reasoning. In a certain sense, there- 
fore, the other arguments proposed can be called argu- 
ments from causality. Nevertheless a special train of 
thought can be formulated from the consideration of 
causality in existing things. It takes the name and 
rank of a distinct proof. ^ 
(i)distinc- 8 7., (i) Aristotlc in his Metaphysics distinguishes 

tionof C o V / t' J b 

causes. four kinds of causes; material, formal, final and 
efficient. Thus, e. g.^ a sculptor forms a statue of 
Washington out of a piece of marble. The stone out 
of which the statue is made is called the 7naterial 
cause; the form or figure which makes the marble 
appear in the likeness of our country's hero, is 
called the /^r;;z^/ cause; the motive of the worker or 
the purpose of the work, e.g.^ money, reputation, the 
ornamentation of a public building, is considered as 
the final cause; finally the agent who by the exercise 
of his own energy slowly and with labor fashions the 
work is the efficient cause. This division obtains in 
Scholastic Philosophy and has been most fiercely and 
persistently attacked by modern writers. The present 
argument is based on efficient causes; in the following 
chapter the problem of the final cause will be discussed. 

(b) arp- 8 4_ C2) The efficient cause can be either moral, e. g., 

ment based . . > a » 

on efficient when the actioQ is due to a command, entreaty, etc., 

cause. ' J ? 5 

o^c physical, e. g., the agencies of the m.aterial universe 
exercise a real activity to produce a certain result, thus 
heat expands, cold contracts, fire burns, etc. The 

^Modern German Ethnographers, e. g., Peschel, Ratzei, 
Schurtz, have traced the orig-in of religion to one characte'-istic 
of the human intellect, the notion of causality. Cf. Religion of 
Primitive Peoples, D. G. Brinton, p. 44. Pres. Schurman dis- 
missed the argument with the words " The question, Is there a 
first cause? is obsolete for a generation that finds God in the 
world and not outside and apart from it." Belief in God, p. 14. 
The writer evidently does not understand the subject treated. 
Prof. Knight thinks the argument illusory. Aspects of Theism, 
ch. IV. 



CAUSALITY. 119 

distinction should be borne in mind, for it enables the 
reader to guard against confusion, indicates the true 
method to be pursued in proving the principle of caus- 
ality, and reveals the wide extent and true value of the 
principle itself. 

§ 5. (3) The argument is based on facts of experi-(3)and on 
ence Ordiaary experience is reinforced by a wealth expedence. 
of data from the physical sciences. We are conscious 
of a real causality influencing every act throughout our 
daily life. The agencies in nature act upon us. In 
like manner throughout the visible universe, object 
acts upon and modifies object. The various sciences 
set forth the nature of process. The argument, there- 
fore, takes the form of an induction vigorously con- 
cluding from scientific data. 

8 6. (4) The principle of causality can be termed a nature of 
spontaneous judgment.* It is the natural possession cipie. 
and property of the human mind. Nevertheless it is 
not so easy to formulate it in words. At the present 
time scholars are not content in amassing stores of 
facts and in tracing them to proper causes. The very 
foundations of knowledge have been questioned. The 
first principles of thought, the manner and mode of 
thinking have been discussed most eagerly. The ulti- 
mate result is that we have a better knowledge of the 
limits and needs of the mind, a clearer grasp of the 
principles themselves and a more luminous insight into 
current difficulties. 

87. (a) The principle of causa.lity is by some its various 

expressions. 

expressed as every effect has a cause. So taken the 
principle is immediately evident; its truth is forced (a) every 
upon the mind without the slightest hesitation or cause, 
reflection. But it possesses no value when applied to 
objective facts in a proof for the existence of God. 

* Fr. Harper, S. J., Metaphysics of the School, vol. ITI. 



ning. 



120 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The defect is that it is tautological. The whole 
strength of the argument lies in showing to conviction 
that the world is an effect. To employ the principle 
in this form would be to make a gratuitous assumption 
in the most vital part of our reasoning and to render 
the attempt itself invalid and abortive. 

(b) the de- 8 8. (b) Or we may say that what dependently exists 

pendent de- , . j . . 

mandsthe can Only 06 exptaimd by postulating an independent and 
ent being, uecessary cause. In this sense the principle is employed 
in the argument from contingency. So expressed, the 
principle requires some reflection before its strength 
is apparent. We cannot say, therefore, that it is 
immediately evident to the mind. 

(c) what be- § 9. (c) Finally, it maybe stated in a slightly differ- 
musthave ent form, viz., that which begins to exist demands a 

a cause for ^ ^ . . nm 1 • i • 1 

the begin- cause for the beginning .^ Thus a bemg which now^ 
exists, but did not at some time exist, owes it existence 
to the activity of some other being which is termed its 
cause. In this form the principle is employed in the 
argument from causality. So expressed, it is not 
immediately evident.^ As in the former case reflection 
is necessary to grasp its force. 

^ Mr. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 150, says: '' The principle 
of causality is whatever has begun to be, whether a thing or an 
event, must have a cause or antecedent to account for it." So 
also Janet, Final Causes, p. 17. The Theistic Argument, J. 
Dimon, p. 82; J. S, Mill also interprets the principle of causality 
in this sense, yet contends that it is valid only for the change- 
able element in nature, whereas the permanent element, i. <?., 
the specific elementary substances, do not come under its sway. 
Cf. Essays on Religion, p. 142. And in his Logic, vol. I, p. 422, 
says that " ultimate or efficient causes are radically inaccessible 
to the human faculties." This is explained by the Doctrine 
of Phenomenal Idealism which springs from his peculiar 
theory of knowledge. Cf. the Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, 
p. 223. 

^ Dr. Fisher, in Manual of Natural Theology, holds it a 
" self-evident truth," p. 10; Dr. Bowne, in Philosophy of 
Theism, p. 70, writes " we know directly nothing of causes." 
Both err in extremes. 



CAUSALITY. 121 

§ lo. The same line of thought applies to both. ^^ of^^a^St 
make use of the principle of sufficient reason. This verified. 
cannot be doubted or denied; to do so is to suppose a 
sufficient reason for acting. Thus, whenever we act 
intelligently, a sufficient reason is present. If, there- 
fore, the world began to exist, it must have a sufficient ■ 
reason for beginning to be. This can be found (i) 
either in nothing; but this is absurd, for nothing can 
produce nothing; (2) or in the possibility of the world 
beginning to be; but this cannot be maintained, 
else all possible things would exist. Mere objective 
possibility can never be the cause why a being in such 
a state began to exist in concrete reality; (3) or in the 
world beginning to be; but this must be rejected, 
because a thing cannot act before it exists, and the 
question is to account for the initial point of its exist- 
ence; (4) or in some other being which by its activity 
caused, e. g.^ the world, to assume its present exist- 
ence. Now this is what is understood by the efficient 
cause. The principle of causality, therefore, is 
expressed clearly and without ambiguity; its validity 
is shown to be strong and indisputable. '^ We shall now 
consider the principal modern errors which try to 
destroy its real force, and take away a fundamental 
prop to our faith. 

II. 

Errors. 

§ II. The principle of causality has been fiercely 
attacked by two writers who at different times exer- 
cised a strong influence in moulding the English 
philosophic mind.^ 

'' Kant held that the principle of causality is valid only within 
the world of our experience. Cf. Pfleiderer, Hist, of Phil., vol. 
Ill, p. 258; Lewes, Phil, of Aristotle, § 62, shows that it is abso- 
lute. 

^ Their teaching is at the root of the so-called system of 



122 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



his notion 
of cause. 



Hume. i\ Hume is the founder of the Associationist 

school of philosophy. For upwards of one hundred 
years his writings have deeply moved English thought. 
The leading English writers of to-day are his apologists 
or disciples.^ To the foreigner it is the only school of 
philosophy that has a claim to be considered indige- 
nous to English soil. 

§ 12. Hume maintains that all our ideas come from 
experience. Granted that the mind has the idea of 
cause; this idea could have its source in experience 
alone. But, he continues, when we analyze our experi- 
ence, the mind can find no sound basis to justify 
the formation of the concept. Experience shows that 
events succeed one another, not that one has produced 
the other; hence we have succession only, not causa- 
tion. The mind does not know in what consists the 
connection or bond of what is understood by causation. 
Therefore, he concludes that causation is nothing more 
than succession; ^° that causation in the sense of effi- 
ciency has no foundation in experience, but is simply 
a mental fancy or exaggeration and should accordingly 
be rejected by the thoughtful student." 
criticism. § 13. (a) The reasoning of Hume starts from a pat- 
ent fallacy^ The solution is had in the explanation of 
ambtguous experience. Experience can be considered as a prac- 
theword tical acquaintance with anything by personal observa- 
experience. ^.^^ ^^ ^^.^^ ^^ .^^ TMi^ comcs clthcr through the 



Inductive Logic, Hence we find writers confessing that we 
cannot bv induction rise above phenomena. Cf. Knight, 
Aspects of Theism, p. 144. The true answer is to show that 
the method of induction in this question is partial and false, 
that its basis is erroneous. 

^ The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 10, 12. 

^OMill, Logic, b. Ill, ch. 5. 

^^ Natural expectation caused by repetition is the sole basis of 
the idea of causation." Modern Philosophy by A. K. Rogers, 
p. 112. 



CAUSALITY. 123 

external senses which give a knowledge of the out- 
side world, or through the internal faculties which 
reveal the feelings of the body, the thoughts of 
the mind, the movements and emotions of the will. 
Experience, therefore, is two-fold; external and 
internal. Of the two, internal ranks much higher. 
We may be deceived by the senses, by consciousness 
never. 

§ 14. (b) Hume errs in holding that the idea of ^o^j^|^|ro^ 
causality primarily comes from external experience, ^"3™^^^^" 
and that we should first of all seek in external experi- 
ence for its basis and justification. On the contrary, 
the idea of cause comes primarily from internal 
experience. 

(i) Consciousness testifies that we are the causaP^s*^^"^°"y 
V / of con- 

agents of our own thoughts and desires. There is a^^jojj^^^ss 

real causal connection between the mind and its casuaiity of 

will. 

thoughts, between the will and its volitions or resolves. 
This bond or connection is a fundamental fact of inner 
experience. There is nothing closer to us than our 
thoughts and our feelings; they constitute our very 
life. Here only is found the true source and origin of 
the notion of causality. 

§ 15. (2) Consciousness also testifies that the mem-thepower 

1 rill 1 1 1 /• 1 • 1 1 of Wi^l O^ 

bers of the body are under the control of the will, the bodily 
Thus, e. g.^ after careful thought I determine to write; 
the will directs the movement of the hand and my 
thoughts appear on the written page. In like manner 
I move my feet to walk, turn the head in ansv^er to a 
question, move the lips to speak. Often, it is true, my 
acts are indeliberate; but they ever answer an internal 
impulse which is found at its highest and best in the 
deliberate act of the rational will. This control and 
impulse is the connection or bond which is of the 
essence of causality. 



124 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



scfousness § ^^ ^3) ^S^'^^j ^^^^ ^i*^ Certain that other bodies act 
^l^f "j^^^ ^^- upon us. Thus, e. g., a person strikes me a severe 
upon us. blow with the hand; there is more than mere succes- 
sion in the act; there is a real communication of energy 
to produce an effect, viz., discoloration of face or a 
sudden fall. So, too, the energies of nature influence 
us. We are a prey to cold and heat; the sun, rain, 
etc., act upon us in many ways.^^ 
encifo^the § ^7- (4) Finally, we infer that external objects act 
^u^!^*^ '^'^^" one upon another. This is an inference from analogy, 
having its basis in the most certain testimony of con- 
sciousness. It is supposed in the ordinary daily 
confirmed actious ; it is confirmed by scientific investigation; it is 
illustrated in every department of mechanical work, 
e.g., Chemistry, Astronomy. ^^ 
(c) the no- 8 1 8. (c) External observation alone might p:i7e a 

tion of " ^ ^ fc> *3 

cause which Y a CTue notiou of cause and effect. But this would lack 

comes from ^ 

external Ob- the vigor and conviction which the concept possesses. 

servation ^ -^ ^ 

alone much Hen cc it would approximate to Hume's notion of suc- 

different , ^ ^ 

from the ccssion. Consciousness tells us otherwise, and here 

principle. ^ ...,., 

IS found the true origm of the idea. A cause is noth- 
ing more than a substance exercising active power. 
Hence the concept of cause springs from and is based 
in that of substance. Thus every cause is a substance, 
or every substance has the potency to become a cause. 
Hume's error arises from his failure to obtain a true 
concept of substance. To him the mind, e. g., was a 
bundle of qualities. Of itself, therefore, it is nothing. 
Hov/ then could it exercise power and become a 
cause? Internal experience is nothing more than a 
passing series of thoughts and feelings. Hence to 
him succession was the only bond. Causality naturally 
was view^ed as nothing more. Real efficiency gave 

''-^ Ricaby, General Metaphysics, ch. Causation. 
^^ Farges, L'idee de Dieu, p. 29. 



CAUSALITY. 125 

place to association, and instead of a causal connection 
between the mind and its thought, we have the suc- 
cession of idea to idea, the association of feeling to 
feeling in a shadowy uncertain round. 

§ 19. (2) Mr. Mill confounds the principle of cans- To Mm 

, . . 1 1 , - 1 . . . . causality is 

alit}^ With the law of the uniformity 01 nature." uniformity 
Thus he speaks of universal causation, /. <?., a uni- 
formity in the succession of events. This arises from 
the physical truth that the amount of energy in the 
universe, both actual and potential, is ever a constant 
quantity and that it acts in definite ways, according to 
fixed laws. Hence, the principle of causation, he 
maintains, can be formulated as a scientific truth. 

§ 20. (a) The principle of causality is distinct from (a) One 
the law of the uniformity of nature; it is of an alto- not the 

, ^ . . other: caus- 

gether amerent order. The former is a primary con-aiitya 

..,.,,. . . . priori. 

viction which has its source in our inner consciousness. 
It is an obvious truth forced upon the mind and 
holds imperious sway over the thoughts of children 
and savages as well as of the aged and wise. This 
fundamental and necessary character of the causal 
judgment can only be explained by holding it to spring 
from the depths of our rational nature. 

8 21. (b) On the other hand, the law of the uni-(t>)prin- . 

, '^ . ciple of uni- 

form! tv in nature comes from experience. It is an formity not 

2,. prion. 

induction based upon a long and careful observation 
of facts. It is not a self-evident truth; it does not 
rank as a universal and necessary principle. Mr. Mill 
has shown that the conviction or belief in a fixed and 
w^U-ordered system in spite of constant interferences 
and apparent disorders is forced upon the mind after 
long and patient research in the field of nature." 

'* System of Logic, B. Ill, ch. XXI; Martineau, A Study of 
Religion, vol. I, p. 150, 
'5 Logic, B. IV, ch. 21. 



126 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(c)„¥''- § 22. (c) Mr. Mill was led into this error by too 

Mill s error o \ / j 

due to careful adherence to the teaching of Hume. Both 

Hume. '^ 

Started from the same point, viz., that experience is 
the source which can give the true notion of cause. 
Both passed over, as of no worth, the patent and 
fundamental testimony of consciousness. Seeking in 
external experience alone for a solution they separated 
and proposed different but not necessarily contradictory 
doctrines. Hume saw series of phenomena succeeding 
one another; to him, therefore, causality meant suc- 
cession. Mr. Mill was impressed with the marvelous 
order and uniformity which prevailed in the physical 
world. Rising above particular facts, he grasped the 
great law of uniformity of nature, and proclaimed this 
to be the principle of causality. But he took the effect 
for the cause, the result for the principle. Uniformity 
supposes constant succession of fact upon fact. This 
constant succession, however, is due to the causal 
activity of the one upon the other. Physical causality 
is grasped as an analogy from evident facts of con- 
sciousness and is corroborated and supposed by physi- 
cal science." 

ni. 

Argument. 

bafedTif^ § 23- The fact of objective causality, therefore, is 
causality, established beyond question. On this the argument 
is based. We shall now set it forth as briefly and as 
conclusively as possible. From the truth that objects 
in nature exert an influence to produce certain effect's, 
and these in turn produce other effects, we have what 
can be termed successive series of causes and effects. 
Each unit of the series is an effect inasmuch as it was 

'" McCosh, Fandamental Truth; Harper, S. J., Metaphysics 
of the Schools, vol. III. 



CAUSALITY. 127 

produced by the anterior unit; it is a cause inasmuch 
as it produced the following one. Efficient causality, 
therefore, is a link which binds them all together. 

8 24. That such series exist is evident to ordinary successive 

, . rr^, . • , . . series of 

observation. The various sciences, each in its own causes and 

1 • ^1 • effects. 

department, proposes them. Physics and Chemistry 
set forth chemical combinations and mechanical activi- 
ties. Biology deals with birth, death, the various 
modes by which life is communicated. Thus many 
series as a fact exist. For the argument, one such 
series is sufficient. 

^ 2K. Now this series is either finite or infinite. If seriesfinite 

^ , or infinite. 

it be finite, then it has a first member. The existence 
and activity of the first member can only be explained 
by postulating a cause outside the series. ^'^ Else it 
would come from nothing or produce itself, which is 
contradictory. This outside cause must be uncaused; 
else we should go on to infinity. ^^ 

If the series be infinite, ^^ the solution is convincinsf. in either 

' *= case the 

According to the hypothesis, based on facts, each conclusion 
member was produced. But if each member be caused, ing. 
the whole series was caused likewise. The prolonga- 
tion of a series of caused units to infinity by no means 

*'' A view opposed to this and very prevalent to-day as an 
effect of Hegel on modern Theistic discussion is expressed by 
Mr. Schurman, Belief in God, pp. 157, 161, 172. " The truth of 
the argument from causality lies not in an extra-mundane 
Cause or Maker of a created world, but in an intra-mundane 
cause or ground of an uncreated world." This is pure Panthe- 
ism, Cf. Bowne, Intr. to Phil, of Theism." 

'^ J. S. Mill writes that " The First Cause Argument is of no 
value because no cause is needed for that which had no begin- 
ning; and both matter and force have had so far as our experi- 
ence can teach us, no beginning — which cannot be said of 
mind." Essays on Religion p. 53, 143; Exam, of Sir W. 
Hamilton, vol. H, p. 37. In answer we refer to the argu- 
ment from contingency. 

'^ This solution is proposed by Hamilton, Mill and Bascom, 
Prof. Wilson, Found, of Relig. Belief, p. 93. 



IS convinc- 



sion 



128 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

changes the nature of the series itself.^" Hence a 
cause for the infinite series is imperative. Otherwise 
there would be an effect without a cause, — a state- 
ment contrary to the principle of causality. 

§ 26. Again, suppose the series be infinite. In con- 
sequence a present effect would have an infinite number 
of intermediary causes. If this supposition be true, 
then no activity could be had, because an intermediary 
cause is also an effect and is only a cause by reason of 
the activity communicated by its immediate ante- 
cedent. Hence we should have, according to our 
reason, no ultimate effect, a conclusion contradictory 
to the hypothesis. But this is to be rejected as absurd."^ 
Theconciu- g 27. The conclusion is rigorous and certain. By 
the principle of causality the mind is forced to admit 
a first cause to explain the successive series of causes 
and effects in the world about us. This cause must 
be a cause in the sense that it is not an effect of a 
preceding cause. Therefore it is an uncaused cause, 
. /. ^.God." 

2" It is not therefore "A doubtful piece of Logic to argue from 
the absolute necessity of a cause in every case to the existence 
of aa absolute beginning which does not need a cause." Mod- 
ern Philosophy, A. K. Rogers, p. 54. " The real alternative," 
writes Mr. Dimon, " does not lie betv/een an infinite series and 
a first cause, but between accepting a first cause, or rejecting 
the idea of cause altogether." The Theistic Argument, p. 85. 
"An infinite succession of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, 
upon no cause." lb., p. 85. 

'^^ Card. Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, pp. 
197, 198; Clark, Existence of God, p. i, ch. 4, § 3. 

^^ " Hence it is obvious that however remote that point to 
which we trace in thought the history of our universe, we are 
still confronted with the impossibility of accounting by physical 
causation for its commencement; in moral causality we do not 
exclude the subsequent perpetual agency of Creative Will, 
because in scientific reasoning we speak of it in the language 
of physical force." Cf. W. Carpenter, M, D,, Nature and Man, 
p. 396; Prof. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 92. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
MOTION. 

§ I. The considerations drawn from the nature of 
the beings which make up this universe, lead the 
mind to the conclusion that a being exists independent 
and self-sufficient on whom all things depend. This 
is what is meant by a necessary being, /. e.^ God. 

§ 2. In the present chapter we do not dwell upon Fact of 
the nature of the beings around us. We take the great 
and universal fact of movement. All things are in 
constant change. Astronomy sets forth the revolu- 
tions and various motions of stellar bodies. Geology 
explains the development of the earth. Biology is 
busied with the phenomena of growth. Physics and 
Chemistry reveal the molecular movements, caloric 
vibrations and the multiform combinations of inorganic 
elments.^ 

On this fundamental fact of movement and change 
rests the argument which constrains the thoughtful 
reader to admit the existence of God.' 

I. 

The Principle. 
/ 8 3. Motion is a universal and fundamental phe- The nature 

/ rr. , , . , . ^ ^ . of the fact, 

l^nomenon. To take this as a basis of an argument is not the fact 
an appeal to an obvious as well as to a metaphysical tioned. 
truth. ^ There is no question about the fact of move- 

^ The Abbe Dubois attempts to show that all the aiguments 
for the existence of God can be reduced to that of motion, that 
the one only proof is motion inasmuch as all the others are 
only phases of it. Cf. Science Catholique, X*annee, N" 6. 

'Janet, Materialism of the Present Day, ch. IV. 

3 Aristotle, Physics, B. I, IV, VI. 

9 [129] 



I30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

merit, but there is most serious discussion about the 
nature of the fact. On this point Aristotle took issue 
with the leading schools of Greek thought. We do not 
go back to ancient history. The problem is at the 
basis of modern philosophy. The Hegelian system is 
the highest effort of modern metaph5^sic. It has influ- 
enced theistic and atheistic thought. In a treatise on 
the existence and attributes of God we are constantly 
brought in contact with its teaching. At present not 
one or the other aspect of the system is presented for 
consideration. The very concept which lies at the 
basis and gives form and substance to the whole struc- 
ture, comes up for criticism, 
definition of 8 4. In its most i^feneral si2:nification motion can be 

movement. " ^ ° 

defined as a change. Thus objects which change are 
said to be in motion. The change affects quality or 
quantity, or position in place. Ordinary observation 
of the external world reveals the manifold changes 
which make up the content of sense experience. At 
the same time it is an obvious truth that motion is not 
continuous and incessant, /. ^., that all things do not 
always move. There is constant motion going on in 
the world in the sense that some objects are in motion, 
implies the Else wc would have perfect rest and quiet. The 
rest°rnd^of i^otions of rcst and of movement have each a basis in 
motion. experience. Every object is not ever at rest; nor is 
every object ever in motion. Hence we distinguish 
two states; repose and movement. This distinction, 
so true to ordinary observation, is verified in scientific 
and philosophic discussion. 
ill"physk;s § 5" ^^^ scicnce of Physics treats of the properties 
of material bodies. It tells us that inertia and force 
are of the essence of physical things. By reason of 
inertia a body is indifferent to motion or to repose. 
If in motion it continues to move, if at rest it so 



MOTION. 131 

remains. Thus this law supposes that a body can be 
in one or the other state. Again, Physics speaks of 
energy. It distinguishes two kinds: kinetic and 
potential energy. The former is called vis viva and is 
nothing more than active force. Its power is expressed 
in the mathematical formula ^-^. Potential energy 
is so termed because it does not exert its power in 
action, but can do so when the opportunity is presented. 
Thus, e,g.^ a stone suspended in the air exerts no action, 
but possesses the potency to fall as soon as the impedi- 
ment is removed. Potential energy is, therefore, the 
property of an object which is in a state of rest, 

S 6. The same distinction obtains in Metaphysics, i" Meta- 

" ^ •' physics. 

There we discuss the properties of being. Potency 
and act are viewed in their real nature. We learn that 
potency is transformed into act by virtue of an 
extrinsic mover. The mover causes a body in a state 
of rest to exert its activity and to be in motion. The 
potential energy under the impulse becomes kinetic. 
This passage from a state of rest to a state of activity 
is the basis for the Scholastic definition of motion. 
Aristotle words it as " the act of a being in potenc}?- 
inasmuch as it is in potency,"'' and St. Thomas 
explains the definition as above. ^ Thus the funda- 
mental concept of Scholastic Philosophy is found to 
rest upon ordinary and scientific observation. 

II. 

Errors. 

§ 7. In ancient times Parmenides, and in our own 
day Herbart, denied the fact of motion. The answer 
so effectually given to the former is also valid for the 

* Aristotle, Phys., 1. Ill, ch. i. 

'C. Gent., II, 20: III, 82; S. Th. 1. q. 45, a. 5; 1. q. 90, a, 2; 
Fere Villard, Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison, p. 100. 



132 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Heraciitus. latter, /. ^. , solvitur ambulaiido. The error of Heracli- 
tus, however, is much more germane to our thesis. 
He maintained that objects were in a perpetual motion 
and that repose did not exist." This opinion has been 
broached by no less a person than Hegel. Heraciitus 
was content in teaching the motion of material things. 
His doctrine is, therefore, purely materialistic. Hegel, 
on the contrary, took the statement of Heraciitus, 
taught that all things were in a state of becoming, from 
this formed an abstract conception which he called 
TO fieri, and made it the central concept of an Ideal- 
istic system. Nevertheless, the main error is found 
in both. 

Hegel. g 8. With Hegel the ro fieri \s the medium between 

existing being and absolute nothing. All existing 
things are its manifestations. The evolution is seen 
(a) in abstract and metaphysical notions, hence the 
department of Logic ; (b) in real existences and material 
phenomena, hence nature; (c) finally, the idea rises to 
consciousness and manifests itself in the phenomena 
of human thought.^ Hence no rest or repose; only a 
constant movement and evolution. 

Criticism. § 9. (i) The crror of Hegel finds its source with 
Leibnitz. He taught that potency was a third some- 

tophHoso-^ thing between act and pure passivity, hence a sort of 

fcTence^ interm.ediate entity. Hegel formed an abstraction 
from this which he termed the to fieri. Again it is false 
to say that all beings are at all times in act. This 
means the negation of a state of repose. Now physical 
science and sound metaphysics teach the contrary. 

(2) its S 10. (2) The result of this doctrine is the contra- 

results. . "^ ^ -^ 

diction between science and metaphysics. Hence the 

® Farges, L'id6e de Dieu. p. 413. 

■^ Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, by W. Wallace; Hegel's 
Logic, by W. T. Harris. 



MOTION. 133 

disrepute into which the latter branch of knowledge 
has in these times fallen. Science found that it could 
not harmonize with philosophy. Hence it rejected 
philosophy altogether and justly declared that a pos- 
teriori conclusions should be preferred to a priori 
theories. With philosophy religion goes hand in hand. 
Hence the bitter antagonism which arose between 
science and religion. A false system of philosophy is 
the source of all the confusion and strife. Metaphysics 
is built upon Physics, The notions and principles dis- 
cussed in the former find logical application and verifi- 
cation in the latter. 

§ II. (3) It is false to suppose that an improvement (3) cannot 
on the Hegelian philosophy can be made. The Neo- 
Hegelian system is only transitory. A change or 
modification of detail is no remedy to a system radically 
wrong. The fundamental concept of Hegel's philoso- 
phy is a scientific and a metaphysical error. The only 
resource is a radical change and the adoption of a 
system more in accordance with sound reasoning. 

III. 

The Argument. 
8 12. Movement is a fact of daily experience.® It is^^ii^^sof 

o . movement. 

confirmed by exact and profound scientific experi- 
mentation. Nevertheless there are various kinds of 
movements. These must be distinguished one from 
the other, not only for the sake of clearness, but 
especially because they give rise to separate lines of 
reasoning. Thus there is /^<r<2/ movement, /. e.^ move- local, 
ment from place to place, e. g.^ I walk across the room, 
a train of cars moves from Albany to New York, the 
earth moves from place to place in its path around the 

^ St. Thomas, 1. q. 2, a. 3. 



134 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

?ive"^^^^" ^^"- Again, an object may change in quantity, i. e., 
may become greater or smaller in size, e. g., the phe- 
nomena of growth in living things of increase and 

" decrease in inanimate objects through the forces of 

attraction or of friction. Hence we have quantitative 
change or quantitative movement. Finally, an object 
may change in quality, /. e., remaining unchanged in 
size or weight, it may acquire or lose other attributes, 
e. g., the change from heat to cold, from bitter to 
sweet, from white to black, from a pleasant to a nause- 

quaiitative ous odor, etc. This is called a qualitative change. 

motion. ... . , , 

Local motion is movement in the strict sense of the 
word. Quantitative and qualitative motion, however, 
are more properly designated by the common term, 
mutation. Thus we have two lines of reasoning leading 
the mind to admit the existence of God. The former 
is based on local motion and is confined to the field of 
physical science. The latter rests upon the notion of 
mutation and is more metaphysical. 

IV. 

Local Motion. 

history. § 13. The argument drawn from local motion was 

first proposed by Aristotle. St. Thomas develops it 
in the sense and scope of his master.^ Suarez, how- 
ever, rejects the proof as limited in range and lacking in 
strength." Cardinal Satolli, Fr. Pesch, Abb6 Farges " 
have resuscitated the argument from its long oblivion, 

^ Cont. Gent, i, 13. 

'^^ Suarez reasons from a peculiar kind of local motion and 
betrays the undeveloped condition of Physics at the time. He 
concludes: " Igitur ex solo motu coeli nulla est sufficiens via ad 
hujusmodi demonstrationem conficiendam.'' Disput. Meta- 
phys., Disp. XXX, sect. i. 

^^ Satolli, Praelectiones, Quaes. II, art. Ill, Pesch. Instit. 
Phil. Naturalis, L. II, Disp. 3; Farges L'idee de Dieu, p. 61. 



MOTION. 135 

woven it through the facts and laws recently revealed 
by the marvelous progress in the physical sciences, 
and thrown it into a new and conclusive form. 

§ 14. Physical science explains the phenomena ^^ "J^VneYb"^" 
motion by attraction. This is defined as the invisible attraction. 
power in nature which tends to draw bodies together. 
The law which rules the mutual action and reaction 
was formulated by Newton. A body attracts another 
body in the direct ratio of the squares of the masses 
and the inverse square of the distances, e. g., a —~^i. 
This law holds universal sway throughout the material 
universe. Thus Astronomy tells how the stellar bodies 
move through space along their accustomed path in 
obedience to this law. Physics and Chemistry re- 
veal its working in the molecules of a body, and 
enunciate the laws of chemical affinity. 

8 iii. The existence and universal sway of attraction nature of 

. , r 1- 1/- r, • attraction. 

IS, therefore, an undisputed fact of modern science. 
Nevertheless scientists are not in accord as to the 
nature of the law. Two opposing schools exist and 
strong reasons are advanced by earnest and energetic 
adherents. 

§ 16. Some scientists maintain that matter is purely Mechanical 
passive, that of itself it possesses no force, that the^^^"*"^' 
action comes from another source. This is the theory 
of Descartes and its defenders are called Mechanists. 
In support of their position they appeal to the laws 
and principles of Physics. ^^ 

§ 17. (a) The nature of matter is revealed by the (a) appeals 
study of its laws. A primary and fundamental law is inenll.^^ 
the law of inertia. By this is understood the fact that 
matter of itself is indifferent to rest or to motion. If 
it be in a state of rest, it will remain so unless an 

'2 Farges, L'idee de Dieu, p. 65. 



136 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

external impulse be imparted to set it in motion. If 
it be in a state of movement, it will continue in motion 
unless an external force impedes its action and brings 
it to a state of rest.^^ This principle holds universal 
sway throughout the material universe. The countless 
planets, in their swift course through the depths of 
space, move in mute obedience to its power. In 
unmolested round they hold their appointed path, 
because no other body is near enough to cause a 
deflection. If, however, their course is retarded or 
perturbations are discovered, this law bids us seek the 
cause in the presence of a heavenly body hitherto 
unknown. Thus the Mathematician in his study with 
the known perturbations of Uranus as data, could 
direct the telescope of the astronomer to a definite 
point beyond the known limits of the solar system 
where the planet Neptune moved. 

§ 18. The law of inertia is not only true of large 
material masses; it is also verified of the smallest 
particles of matter. On this principle rests the science 
of Mechanics, and it renders possible the multiform 
chemical combinations, 
(b) to law of S 10. (b) A fundamental law of nature which also 

conserva- tj ^ \ / 

tionof holds sway throughout the material universe is the law 

energy. 

of the conservation of energy. That material forces 
enter into play in the world around us is a fact of 
ordinary and of scientific experience. These forces 
are not always in action. Hence in Physics we have 
the distinction between latent and active energy. To 
potential the former the name, potential energy, has been given, 
energy"^ ^'^ iuasmuch as it is not yet active, but is in potence to 
become active, e. g , energy of position; thus a ball 
suspended in air has the latent energy to fall if the 
hand holding it is removed. To the latter the term vis 

*3 Aristotle, by G. H. Lewes, ch. IV, §§ 62, 63. 



MOTION. 137 

viva, i. e., living force, has been applied, inasmuch as 
it is exerting itself in action. 

§ 20. Potential energy is constantly undergoing their trans- 
transformation into actual energy. Actual energy is 
likewise converted from one of its various forms into 
another, e. g., heat into mechanical work or into 
potential energy. The law of the conservation of 
energy asserts that in this perpetual transformation no 
energy is ever lost and that the sum of actual and of 
potential energy is a constant quantity, e. g., P + A = C. 
These energies may vary; at one time actual ma)^ be 
greater or less than at another; yet a corresponding 
variation takes place in potential energy; thus the sum 
is always the same, e. g. (A + I) + (P — I) ~ C; or (A— I) 
+ (P + I)=C. This scientific truth leads the mind to 
admit a vast store of energy in nature, distinct from 
matter as such, in constant transformation from one 
form to another, whereas matter itself passively 
receives and transmits the movements. A contrast of 
this law with the law of the conservation of matter 
brings out more clearly the ground on which the 
hypothesis rests. 

§21. The other theory contends that attraction is Theory of 
an active force inherent in matter. It owes its origin 
to Leibnitz and its defenders are called Dynamists. 
They maintain that matter is not purely passive. Ordi- 
nary observation, they tell us, and scientific experi- 
mentation reveal in matter an active element, which is an active 
the basis and the explanation of the phenomena of matter. * 
universal attraction. The law of inertia is true of 
matter in the sense that matter cannot move itself 
spontaneously. Hence a clear line of demarkation 
exists between the inertia or material sphere and 
bodies endowed with life. Yet matter possesses in 
itself the power to act upon matter — a power, how- 



138 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ever, limited or conditioned upon the quantity of the 
material bodies and the distances intervening. Thus 
the law of universal attraction can be expressed in a 
Snf?om^"^ mathematical formula A =— p. The conclusion is 
theories, therefore drav/n of a universe in which exist action and 
interaction without the necessity of admitting a prim- 
ordial mover or initial cause of movement, 
elusion ?s § 2-- Take either hypothesis; the reasoning is strong 
false. and conclusive. According to the first theory motion 

is not inherent in matter, but springs from another 
source. Now all particles of matter are of the same 
nature. Therefore, if motion were not in some way 
communicated to the material elements, all movement 
would be impossible. The very fact of motion sup- 
poses a mobile and a mover. ^^ This inference leads 
the mind conclusively to admit the existence of a prime 
mover, the source and explanation of all movement, 
/. e.^ God. 
arg-ument R 23. But, wc are told, motion is eternal, Aristotle 

good, It we 0^1 

grant that so taught,^' and St. Thomas does not deny the 

motion is . , . , . ^ , 

eternal. absolutc possibility. Let US grant the contention. 
The force of the reasoning is not at all weakened. The 
eternity of motion does not change its nature. That 
matter is indifferent to rest or motion is a physical law. 
As it is now, so it was in the eternal past. Kxv external 
cause of motion has been shown to be necessary. On 
the supposition that matter be eternal, we should be 
forced to admit an eternal cause. 

law of §24. Again, the law of inertia shows that the motions 

inertia ,'".,.,, , , . , , , , . 

points to a which fall Under our observation had a beginning. 
Thus we have a series of motions communicated. If 
we admit the series to be infinite, we should have an 
infinite series of movements, each one of which had a 

^^ Aristotle, Metaph. IV, 6. 
15 Phys. LVni, ch. I. 



MOTION. 139 

begianing, and at the same time hold that the series 
had no beginning. But this is an open absurdity. 

8 2^. In the second hypothesis matter is considered inference 

^ ^ ^ •' ^ from theory 

as possessing an inherent active force. The inference of Oyna- 

... . . . mists con- 

from this principle is no less conclusive. This inherent elusive also. 
power of matter passes from potency to act, as observa- 
tion shows. Therefore, it is not always in action. We 
see about us bodies at rest, passing from rest to motion, 
or returning again to a state of quiet. Hence we have 
motions constantly beginning. Therefore, we are 
forced to admit a prime beginning and a prime cause 
of the movement. 

§ 26. Kant maintains that the conclusion is not war- objectionof 
ranted by the premises. He holds that universal 
attraction of itself is sufficient to account for motion. 
This opinion is out of date and to-day is rejected by 
scientists of great name." It is the weak point in criticism. 
Kant's nebular hypothesis. Universal attraction is a 
law depending upon the quantity of matter and the 
intervals separating the material bodies. Thus it only 
becomes possible on the convergence of these con- 
ditions. It is difficult to explain its beginning. 
Quantity or space are only conditions. The mutual 
influence is a fact. It will not explain itself. Another 
source is necessary. Faye has shown this conclusively. 
The atoms in the primal nebula were equally distributed 
or not. If the former supposition be true, then the 
atoms would be homogeneous; unequal or different 
forces would be impossible; and a perfect state of 
equilibrium would exist. This is contrary to fact. If, 
however, the atoms be unequally distributed, we are 
face to face with a gratuitous supposition. It can for 
this reason be rejected; or if granted we are warranted 
in seeking a cause for this inequality. 

" Faye, L'Origine du Monde, p. 120, sq. 



I40 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



fi^^^^ . S 2 7. The conclusion is therefore forced upon the 

conclusion. ^ ' ^ 

candid mind. The universe is powerless to explain 
itself. A consideration of the phenomena of movement 

viewed in the light of physical science alone has shown 
this to a certainty. 

V. 

Mutation. 

mutation. g 28. Another line of thought, equally cogent, but 
mox^e far-reaching in application, can be formulated 
from the consideration of movement in the sense of 
mutation. It is not confined to the changes in place 
which physical bodies undergo, but embraces any 
change whatsoever which takes place in nature.^' It 
passes beyond the limits of the external world, enters 
into our inner life, and takes as data, the secret 
thoughts and desires and emotions of the soul. The 
strength of the argument rests upon two fundamental 
principles, 
(i)every g 29. (i) The first principle is that every being 

motion was v/hich is in a state of motion is so because it has been 

put m 

motion by put in motiou by the action of some other being, ^^ 

the activity- , . ..,,.,,, 

of another This IS provcd truc of material bodies by the law of 
inertia. Matter of itself is indifferent to rest or to 
motion. Now it is a fact that all material things are 
not in movement. Else motion would be of the 
essence of matter and no rest would be possible. 
Ordinary and scientific experience shows this to be 
false. The indifference on the part of matter, there- 
fore, can only be explained by affirming that m.aterial 
bodies existing in a state of movement owe the motion 
to the operation of a force external to themselves. 

a being in S ^o. Ao^ain, a beinsf is in motion in order to obtain 

motion is ^ ^ f' . . , ^ 

imperfect, some perfection it does not at present possess. For 

^'f Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. II, ch. 4; VIII, ch. 6. 
^^ C. Gentes, 1. i, ch. 13. 



MOTION. 141 

we must bear in mind that motion here is taken in the 
sense of action or operation. If it already possessed the 
perfection, it would not move to obtain it. Hence 
the acquisition of the perfection is the explanation of 
the movement. To say, therefore, that a being moves 
itself, is to assert that at the same time it has or has 
not the perfection. It has not, inasmuch as it moves 
to acquire the quality; it already possesses the per- 
fection, inasmuch as it contains in itself the sufficient 
cause of the movement. But this must be rejected 
as absurd. 

S ^i. Another reason is proposed bv St. Thomas ini'^^uctive 

<-'"-' r r , argument 

the form of an argument from induction. The Angelic of St. 

*f *^ Thomas. 

Doctor draws a distinction between violent and natural 
movement. It is manifest that an object is violently 
set in motion by the sudden and overpowering influ- 
ence of an external agent. As to natural movement we 
can distinguish between motions in the physical sphere for physical 
and motions of living beings. The law of inertia 
proves to conviction that no material body is capable of 
giving movement to itself. Its indifference to rest or 
to motion absolutely precludes any such possibility/^ 

§32. The organic world is composed of living, of for organic 
sentient and of intelligent beings; it embraces plants, 
animals, man. Growth is movement of a certain kind. 
But growth is not an absolute, it is a relative and 
dependent phenomenon. The plants, e. g., need earth, 
moisture, temperature, rays of the sun for their develop- 
ment. If these be removed, life would be impossible, 

^^"Ecce sunt coeli et terra; clamant quod facta sint; mutan- 
tur enim atque variantur. Quidquid autem factum non est, et 
lamen est, non est in eo quidquam quod ante non erat, quod est 
mutari atque variari. Clamant etiam quod seipsa non fecerint. 
Ideo sumus quia facti sumus; non ergo eramus antequam 
essemus; ut fieri possimus a nobis, Et vox dicentium est ipsa 
evidentia." St. Aug. Confess., 1. XI, ch. 4: de Civ. Dei, 1. II, 
ch. 4. 



142 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the plant would wilt and die, and death would be the 
cessation of all vital action. Furthermore, a funda- 
mental law of Biology is that life can only come from 
antecedent existing life. Hence living motion is not 
spontaneous; it is derivative, and the fact that a living 
thing exists is proof that its vital motion was imparted 
by another being possessing life. 

for animal g 33. The phenomena of sentient and of intellectual 
life are set forth in the science of Psychology. There 
the motions of the soul in all their extent are discussed. 
Our actions are always influenced by some motive. 
External objects come in contact with the senses and 
at times so strong is the power exerted that our action 
is precipitate and indeliberate. 

for man. § 34. Again, wc act judiciously and after mature 

reflection; the motive power resides in the will. But 
the will never acts independently of the intellect. The 
mind seeks motives and presents them to the will. 
Influenced by them we exert action. Now our act is 
cool and dispassionate. We speak or write or move 
about with hardly the show of color in the cheek or an 
untoward glance of the eye. Again, the motives pre- 
sented by the mind may so possess our wills that our 
souls are moved to the very depths, our whole being 
is charged with emotions of divers kinds, e. g., anger, 
desire, pain, etc. ; the perspiration gathers on the 
brow, the cheek burns or is ashy pale, the muscles of 
the face contract in pain or expand in joy, the eye 
reveals the passion burning within and we give vent to 
our feelings in a strong and resolute manner. Even 
here w^e find the influence brought to bear which is the 
impelling cause of action. 

conclusion § 35. Thus 3. Complete induction verifies our princi- 

that motion , ... _,, . /• 1 • • j 

is due to an pie. ^" 1 he motion or action of a bemg is due to aa 

external 

*^"^^- 20 St. Aug. De Quant. An., XXXIV; Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8. 



MOTION. 143 

external source or cause. No one being is sufficient 
of itself. Everywhere within us and without we find 
objects influencing other objects in various ways 
with the result that the things influenced are set in 
motion. 

S 36. (2) The second principle is that an infinite (2) infinite 

. . , ^ ..... . series of 

series of movements and of moving things is impossi- moving 

~ tliin'^s is 

ble. This when added to the former gives to the impossible, 
argument a conclusiveness which cannot be shaken. 
Its truth is apparent w^hen viewed in the light of the 
first principle. In a certain sense it can be considered 
as a corollary. That an object in motion owes the 
movement to an impulse imparted by another being has 
been clearly shown. It is universal and valid as a 
physical law. By reasoning from this as data the 
mind can rise to the higher plane of metaphysics, 
extend its vision backwards beyond an experimental 
research and enunciate a truth far more reaching in 
application. 

§ 37. If a body is set in motion by another, it proQ^.ofthis 
depends upon the other for the movement. Thus, 
e. g., A is moved by B; therefore A is dependent upon 
B, and in B alone is to be found the cause of move- 
ment in A. In like manner it is evident that B is set 
in motion by C, and so on until we come to a first 
mover or to infinity. If the first mover be moved by^oi" motions 

■^ -'ma direct 

another, then ''omnia muta^itur ab alio;'' but this is^i"^- 
a contradiction. If we admit a series of objects 
imparting movement one to another and stretching 
back to infinity, then we are forced to deny the princi- 
ple of causality or admit that no movement is possible, 
as has been shown. 

8 ^8. But it may be said, why suppose movement for circular 

. . , ,. , , . , . , motions. 

in a straight line; could not circular motion evade 




144 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the dilemma? Let us grant that the motion is in a 
-D circle, the molecules of the 

circumference acting on one 
another and form-ing a per- 
fect round. Then A will act 
on B, and B on C, and C 
on D. The activity of B is 
due to the impulse of A, 
that of C to B, that of D to 
C, that of A to D. Now, 
then, A is moved by D and 
and in turn moves B. Two alternatives can only be 
adm.itted. Either the movement had a beginning or it 
had not. If the former, then our argument is granted 
and we have a prime-mover. If the movement had 
not a beginning, then we are constrained to admit that 
A at one and the same instant of time is in a state of 
motion and in a state of repose. It is in motion 
because it moves B. It is not in a state of motion 
because it is moved by D. The principle that move- 
ment of a being is due to an impulse from an external 
object applies to the case with all its rigor. We are, 
therefore, face to face with a manifest contradiction. 
The conclusion, therefore, is forced upon us that a first 
mover exists." 
argument R cjq. This argument can be thrown into a simpler 

in another 8 oy & f 

form. form. Three species of movement have been dis- 

tinguished. The general argument rests upon the 
concepts of local motion and of mutation. But move- 
ment in the strict sense of the word is local motion. 
This is fundamental. Scientific experimentation has 
shown that all other forms of movement can be 

"^^ " Viderunt (Platonici) quidquid mutabile non esse summum 
Deum; et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus 
transcenderunt, quaerentes summum Deum." Aug. de Civ. 
Dei, 1. VIII, ch. 6. 



MOTION. 145 

reduced to it. In the action of one molecule upon 
another, we find that one draws nearer and nearer to 
the other until they meet. The molecular vibrations ^11 ™ove- 

•' ment can 

of a body are only possible, therefore, by local be reduced 
motion. '^^ It is at the basis of all sensible phenomena, motion. 
By it movements of quantity and of quality are 
explained." 

§ 40. If, then, all movement or mutation can be but local 

1 ' r -rii ^notion 

reduced to local motion, and 11 an analysis of local points to a 

— , . 1 . . r 1 • Being: dis- 

motion points to a Being distinct from the universe as tinct^from 
the cause of all movement, it follows that the proof ^"^^^'^^^^ 
drawn from local motion can and should be applied to 
mutation. The conclusion, therefore, is manifest, 
even though somewhat indirect. 

VI. 

Conclusion. 

§41. In drawing a conclusion from this argument, Piato and 
Plato asserts that the first-mover moves himself, not contra- 
Aristotle, on the contrary, infers, a mover who is other. 
immovable.^'' At first sight a patent contradiction is 
evident. Not so, however, when the words and the 
lines of reasoning are closely examined. By saying 
that the first-mover moves himself, Plato wishes to 
guard against the inference that it is inert and passive. 
In like manner Aristotle aims at showing that the first- 
mover does not move in the sense that it changes. 

§ 42. The first-mover is immovable in the sense that 
it is not subject to mutable movement, /. ^., he does 

22 c. Gent. II, 20; III, 82; S. Th., 1. q. 45, a. 5. 

'^^ Farges, de I'acte et de la puissance, ch. IV; The laws of 
physics and chemistry, of gravity, electricity and affinities are 
all, or appear to be, reducible to the laws of motion. Janet, 
Final Causes, p. 187. 

24 Kivovv (XKivTiTov, Physics, B. VII, VIII; Metaphys., B. XII, 
ch, 6, 7. 

10 



146 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

not move himself in such a manner that he changes. 
Thus St. Thomas reconciles the teaching of both." 
There is no contradiction. Different aspects of the 
one great truth are brought out prominently with a 
view to offset special errors. 

25 C. Gent., 1. I, ch. XIII; St. Aug. de Gen. ad Lit. 1. VIII» 
ch. 20-26. 



CHAPER IX. 

ORDER. 

§ I. The oldest and most popular argument for the History, 
existence of God is drawn from the order and harmony 
of the universe. In the remnants of ancient literature 
which exhibit the mind seeking a solution for the 
mysteries of life this argument appears in simple and 
crude form. Language, true index of thought and of 
feeling, goes far beyond the known records of time and 
presents m its vocabulary words which bear the indeli- 
ble marks of order and design.* Thus to the Greeks 
the world was a Koo-jxos, to the Latins a mundus^ to our 
forefathers a universe^ i. e.^ one united and harmonious 
whole. '^ The Christian Fathers and Apologists most 
frequently insist upon this consideration.^ They cite 
the sublime song of the Hebrew Psalmist, " The 
heavens show forth the glory of God and the firma- 
ment declares the works of His hands." " They call 
the mind of the lowest and humblest to the marvelous 
harmony of the heavenly bodies in their course, to the 
regular succession of the seasons. They find con- 
siderations which constrain the ignorant and the 

^ The idea of order is expressed in the Vedic word Rita, which 
means physical or moral order and law (Rig.-Veda, III, 40, 4); 
in Zend Ratu, which means order and orderer (Darmesteter; 
Ormazd and Ahriman, p. 12); in Latin, Rattis, e. g., " motus 
stellarum rati et constantes." Cicero, Dis. Tusc. V, 24, 6g, de 
Nat. Deor, II, 20, 51. Cf. Miiller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 239, 
For the meaning of the Egyptian word Maat, cf. supra, ch. II, 
p. 10. 

^Cicero, de Nat. Deor., 1. II, c. 34. 

'St. Aug. De Ordine; Serm. 141, al. 55, ch. i, 2; Athanasius, 
C. Gentes; Bossuet, Conn, de Dieu et soi-meme, ch. IV; Clem- 
ens Romanus, ep. ad Corinth. 

4Ps. 18. 

[147] 



148 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

learned to admit an intelligence and providence all 

powerful and beneficent, which shapes the course of 

all things and appointeth to each its place and time.' 

Its force S ^ In our own time this argument has been most 

to-day. c •"• ^ , • n r i i 

bitterly assailed.' The rise and influence of the phys- 
ical sciences, especially of Biology and of Physiology 
have, for a time seemed to deprive it of force and 
render it worthless. The very basis on which it rests 
has been turned so that a series of inferences were 
drawn to prove the opposite. Its value, therefore, is 
said to be purely historic, representing only a puerile 
and unscientific state of the human mind. 

§ 3. The attempt; however, has utterly failed. The 
lesson taught is that true philosophy has naught to 
fear from science. For a time, it is true, superficial 
study and hasty generalization may seem to shatter 
the foundation of our highest and noblest beliefs. 
Profound thought and critical analysis win at last, and 
the victory is more lasting and brilliant because of the 
doubt and suspense and bitter conflict which preceded. ' 

I. 

The Basis. 
Basis is the § a The basis of the argument is the existence and 
validity of final causes. Do they really exist and what 

5 " Nam sicut humana consuetudo verbi?, ita divina potentia 
etiam factis loquitur." Aug. ep. 102, n. 33. " ex operibus 
artificem cognosces." Serm. 241, n. i; serm. 197, n. i. " Sun 
and moon move in regular succession that we may have faith, 
O India." Rig-Veda, I, 102, 2, MuUer, op. cit., p. 301- The 
assertion of Mr. Fiske that "all attempts to study God as 
revealed in the workings of the visible universe, and to charac- 
terize the divine activity in terms derived from such study, have 
met with discourageme'nt, if not with obloquy " can come from 
only one who v/rites in utter disregard of the history of the 
past. Cf. Fiske, Idea of God, p. 41, infra, § 4. 

^Farges, L'idee de Dieu, p. 126; Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 126, 
128; Cosmic Philosophy, vol. II, p. 381, sq. 

' Faye, L'Origine du Monde, p. 2. 



Final cause. 



ORDER. 149 

do they prove? Bacon,® Spinosa/ the modern its history. 

mechanical and evolution schools contend that the 

final cause is a pure fiction of the mind. On the other 

hand, Aristotle and the Christian Philosophers " have 

set forth the truth in clear and convincing language. 

In our day the Bridgewater Treatises/^ the writings of 

Dugald Stewart, of Faley, of the Duke of Argyll, of 

Prof. Flint, and of Paul Janet have been to thousands 

an armory for the refutation of error and the defense 

of faith. It must not, however, be taken for granted 

that these various treatises are of the same intrinsic 

value. Bitter discussion has served to bring out into 

clear light the real problem and the difficulties which 

envelop it.^^ Final cause is defined as that on account definition of 

'^ Final cause. 

of which one acts, or the end for which one acts. Hence 

8 De Dignit. et Augm, Scien. 1. 3; New Organ, b. II, appor. 2. 
^Ethics, part i, prop. 56, Appendix; Eraser, Theism, p. 80. 

^^Arist. Phys., 1. 2, c. 8; Metaphys., 1. i, c. 4; Socrates, cf. 
Xenophon, Mem. i, 4, 2; Plato, Apology, Phaed., Laws, b. 12; 
Seneca, de Providentia; Clement of Alex. Strom., 5; Athanasius, 
C. Gent., n. 35; Gregory Nazian, Orat. II; Aug. de Ordine, 
1. I, ch. 2; Chrysostom, de Providentia; Aug. de Vera Relig., 
ch. 29; serm. 141, n. 2. 

" The Hand, by Dr. Charles Bell; The Adaptation of External 
Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, by 
Dr. Chalmers; The Adaptation of External Nature to the 
Physical Constitution of Man, by John Kidd; Astronomy, 
Geology, Physics, treated in reference to Natural Theology, by 
W. Whewell; Animal and Vegetable Physiology considered in 
reference to Natural Theology, by P. M. Roget; Geology and 
Mineralogy, by W. Buckland; Power, Wisdom and Goodness 
of God as Manifested in the Creation of Animals, by W. Kirby; 
Chemistry and Function of Digestion, by C. Babbage; Foot- 
prints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller; Theologie de la Nature, 
par H. Durkheim; Butler's Analogy; Typical Forms, by Mc- 
Cosh; Faith in God and Modern Atheism, by J. Buchanan; 
Theism and Witness of Reason and Nature to the Creator, by 
Prin. Tulloch. 

^-J. S. Mill considers the argument from design to be the 
principal and strongest but inconclusive. Cf. Essays on 
Religion, p. 139, 155, 167. This argument is the mainstay of 
English Apologetical writers. Thus Prof. Fraser says " the 
cardinal fact is that the universe is interpretable and not chaotic, 
not when or whether it began to be." Phil, of Theism, p. 242; 



150 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the teriQ. finals which comes from the Latin ^«/i-, /. e.^ 
an end. The discussion, therefore, is narrowed down 
to the simple fact, are there ends in nature? Do 
natural agents exert activities mechanically or do they 
act with a certain character or predetermination in 
order to obtain definite ends by employing most 
fitting means? In the argument from causality the 
principle was laid down as a necessary law of the mind 
that a phenomenon, which began to be, demands a 
cause to explain its beginning." 
coincidence 8 5. At present wc are not concerned with a single 

of phenom- , , . , - , . 

enaafact phenomenon, but with a group or phenomena; we do 
explained, not scck to explain how a phenomenon began to exist, 
but we are in search of a cause to explain the marvel- 
ous agreement and coincidence of the phenomena." 
This very agreement or coincidence is a phenomenon 
which must be accounted for.^^ Scientific men adm.it 
the fact and, taking it as a principle, push on in their 
investigations to most profitable results. In all depart- 
ments of physical science, especially in Astronomy, 
e. g., law of gravitation, in Physics, e. g., the law of 
inertia, in Chemistry, e. g., chem.ical combinations, it 
ha§ been the source of far-reaching discoveries and the 
basis of fruitful hypothesis. The method, therefore, 
is only an application of the principle of sufficient rea- 
son to the groups of orderly arrayed phenomeaa in the 
world about us. 

Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 59; in Germany, Drobisch and 
Fliigel maintain the same position; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, 
vol. II, p. 221. 

^^ " Ordo est recta rado rerum ad finem." St. Thomas, i. q. 
22, a. i; " omne agens agit propter finem." St. Thomas, C. 
Gentes, II, c. 42; 1, III, ch. 2. 

^■^ Janet, p. 23. 

^^ Adjustment not our inference from facts but a part of 
the facts themselves." Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 82, 84, 
note B. 



ORDER. 151 



II. 

The Fact. 

§ 6. The thoughtful student, brought face to face distinction 
with the various aspects of physical nature, is forced phenomena. 
to admit a distinction between phenomena. Some 
phenomena are sufficiently explained by detecting the 
relation to their efficient cause. They are results or 
effects; nothing more. The mind is then satisfied 
and is not constrained to go farther. They appear to 
have no aim or end. Thus, e. g., the peaks of a 
mountain range, so varied in height and form, are 
simply results of nature's forces in the remote past; 
the masses of lava thrown up by a volcano, the frag- 
ments of rock resulting from an explosion are explained 
by pointing to the cause whence they happened. The so^e ex- 
mind is not forced to seek the w/iy and the wherefores'f^^^nt^^ 
it rests content in knowing the agency which produced ^^"^^" 
them and the manner of their occurrence, /. ^., the 
efficient cause. We do not deny that they have ends 
ox purposes; we only state an obvious fact, viz., that 
the mind is in no wise constrained to look for the 
aim or ends}^ 

87. Other phenomena, however, have a different others only 

. explained 

character stamped upon them. They bear relations by final 

cause. 

not to the past only; they look forward to ^^i^ future. 
The mind is not satisfied in discovering the efficient 
cause; it seeks to know more. It finds a relation exist- 
ing between the grouping of activities and their effects 
which imperiously demands an explanation. The 
effects appear in the light of causes inasmuch as they 
seem to influence the apt arrangement and harmonious 
working of the activities. Hence the mind grasps the 

" Janet, Final Causes, p. 7, sq. 



152 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(a) Psychol- peculiar relation of means to the end.'^'' For illustra- 

ogy, 

tions we go to the physical sciences. 

§ 8. (a) Physiology is the science of the human or- 
ganism. Its closeness to our lives makes it a study of 
surpassing interest. Take up any text-book ; the facts 
recorded give remarkable verification to our line of 
thought. Every organ of the body is specially adapted 
to definite functions. Everywhere we find a coinci- 
dence of innumerable precautions and conditions with 

organs. a view to a determined result. The senses are each 
a marvelous piece of mechanism. The eye, the ear, 
the nose, the mouth, the skin, are formed for special 
offices. ^^ The processes of respiration, of deglutition, 
of digestion, are a constant source of wonder. ^^ 

J^steS!^^^ § 9- Not only are the single organs illustrations of 
purpose. The harmony and co-ordination of the 
human system is more wonderful still. Here wc find 
a subordination, not of single activities, but of groups 
of activities, and tending to the growth and preserva- 
tion of the system. Hence Cuvier's celebrated law 
of correlation of organs: " Every organized being 
forms a v/hole — a peculiar system of its own, the parts 
of which mutually correspond and concur in produc- 
ing the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction." 
Thus from one bone he could construct an entire 
organism." For this reason Claude Bernard identifies 
the governing idea which rules the development of the 
organism with the Final Cause of x\ristotle." 

donoftex § ^°- ^^ ^^y so ^ Step farther in our investigation 
The most remarkable of all the facts of co-ordination 

" De Pressens6, Study of Origins, B. II, ch. i. 
^^ Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, p. 228; 
Martineau, A Study of Religions, vol. I, p. 338. 

19 Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 174. 

20 Ma^fineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 282, 283. 
'1 De Pressense, A Study of Origins, p. 150. 



ORDER. 153 

is the existence of the sexes. Here is found the 
adaptation of organ to organ. One is not the effect of 
the other; they are distinct and independent; yet can 
only be explained the one by the other. Now this is 
what is understood by finality.^^ 

§ II, A thoughtful consideration of these facts forces 
upon the mind the conviction that the relation between 
the structure of these organs and the work they per- 
form could not be in virtue of a physical law merely; 
but there is a relation of means to an end, a marvelous 
adaptation of complex and different elements coales- 
cing into a unity of action to obtain a desired result." 

§ 12. (b) Psychology furnishes another class of facts, Psychoi- 
no less strange and convincing. Reference is made to 
the phenomena of instinct. We deal only with the 
facts. We find in animals innate capacities or tenden- 
cies to perform definite actions which tend to the pre- 
servation of the individual and of the species. This phenomena 

1 . . 1 , . ... of instinct. 

tendency is prior to all experience or imitation, e. g.^ 
the duck, the bee, etc. These tendencies have been 
classified as (a) instincts which tend to the preservation 
of the individual; (b) instincts which tend to the pre- 
servation of the species.^'' 

8 13. In instinct, therefore, we detect a striking in instinct 

r • T i r 1 ^" adapta- 

analogy to function. Just as the organs are conformed tion of 
to exercise special functions, so in animals we find 

'^ Janet, Final Causes, p. 51, sq. ; Order in the Physical World, 
tr. from the French, by T. J. Slevin, John Hodges, London, a 
valuable and exhaustive work. 

^^ J. S. Mill tries to weaken the force of the argument. 
" Creative forethought," he writes, " is not the only link 
between the mechanism of the eye and the fact of sight; 
another is the survival of the fittest." Essays on Religion, p. 
172. Yet he adds, " The adaptations of nature afford a large 
balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence. It 
is equally certain that this is no more than a probability; and 
that the various other arguments add nothing to ils force." P. 

174. 
24 Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. Ill, IV. 



154 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

innate tendencies to perform special acts. Tiie func- 
tion alone can explain the structure of the organ; 
instinct preserves the life of the animal. In both 
cases there is a wonderful adaptation; in the former an 
adaptation of structure^ in the latter an adaptation of 
action. The striking agreement and coincidence are 
phenomena that cannot be explained by seeking the 
efficient cause alone; the relation to the effects must 
be explained also. Now to admit that the effects 
in some way conditioned the combinations of the 
various elements, whether of tissue or of action, 
is to confess that there is an end or aim in the acts 
themselves, 
(c) Ethics. § 14. (c) Ethics is the science which deals with the 
principles and rules of human action. Its basis rests 
human "^ upon Psychology and its principle source is conscious- 
ahva?s^^ ness. It is a principle of Ethics that man acts for 
an end." ^° an end or purpose when he employs reason. ^^ Dis- 
tinction is drav/n between the acts of man and human 
acts. The former do not suppose voluntar}^ reflection, 
e, g., acts in sleep or in delirium, the Tatter always 
suppose reason and consent. Now consciousness 
affirms that w^hen we act v/e not only exert an active 
force, but we so exert it that our thoughts, desires, 
and movements all converge to a definite object. We 
strive to obtain this object and we so conform our acts 
as to secure it. This idea dominates the entire series 
of thoughts and motions. It induces us to seek some 
special means, to neglect or throw aside others. 
Hence, to act for a purpose is the distinctive character 
of voluntary activity. What is true of our own con- 
scious experience we are constrained to admit is true 
of other men also. 

'^^ In mental life causality and finality go together. Cf. Paul- 
sen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 220. 



ORDER. 155 

8 It:. By the same analogy that forces us to believe finality in 

o J J oj other men. 

that Other men have reason and free-will, the mental 
endowment which we possess, we are forced to admit 
that they act after the same manner as ourselves. 
Hence we strive to detect in their actions some special 
purpose; we are constantly attributing motives to 
them. We are convinced that they act for a motive, 
and while we may fail to detect or err in attributing 
false motives, the general fact remains true that their 
acts are regulated by some dominating idea which 
urges them on and gives a special character and con- 
formation to their actions. 

§ 16. Thus Ethics not only reveals the agreement 
and coincidence of phenomena, /. e., of human actions; 
it also gives the explanation. It tells that the coinci- 
dence is explained not by efficient cause, but by the 
result^ that the residt preconceived determines the har- 
mony of the series. Hence it gives a clear and decisive 
illustration of a t^;^^/ cause — an illustration which is 
founded in our own experience. ^^ 

^* The man of science, in his scientific labors, walks by faith, 
by the faith that the universe is constructed on rational prin- 
ciples, on principles the rationality of which the human, or at 
any rate the scientific, mind can comprehend. His faith is that 
the external facts of consciousness do form one consistent, har- 
monious whole, regulated by the laws of nature, and that we 
can more or less comprehend the system which the physical 
universe forms. The moral philosopher holds the same faith 
with regard to the facts of morality, that they too are consistent 
with one another and are all consistent with reason and with 
the moral aspirations of man rightly construed." Introduction 
to History of Religion, by F. B. Jevons, p. 407. It is well to 
note that in this passage the word " faith " is employed in 
different senses. John Fiske writes in a similar strain, Idea 
of God, p. 138; so also Prof. Royce, in the Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy, p. 330. 



156 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



The 

principle. 



III. 

The Principle. 

§ 17. The principle of finality can now be drawn 
from the facts enumerated. When we find manifold 
activities of different kinds combining to produce a 
future effect, so that the effect results not from any- 
one in particular, but from the mutual and harmonious 
activity of ail working as a unit, the mind is con- 
strained to admit that this coincidence of action can 
only be explained by admitting that the effect in some 
manner influenced the arrangement of the activities. 
The necessity and existence of this very influence 
transforms the effect into a cause. ^^ The principle of 
finality is not a priori and universal. In this it differs 
from the prmciple of efficient causality."® True, every 
being has an effect by virtue of the fact that it is a sub- 
stance exercising power. That every being has an aim 
or purpose^ however, is by no means necessary and self- 
evident.^^ Later on in the discussion, when the 
principle, well-established, is applied to the interpreta- 
tion of the universe, the mind may be led in a wider 
hope to grant purposes in creation as yet unknown to 
experience; but at present it would be poor logic 
to pass beyond well-authenticated facts. Again, the 
principle of finality is not universal. Some phenomena, 
on the contrary, cannot be explained without refer- 

2'' By Teleology is understood " the theory which explains the 
prior acts of a series as determined by the preconception of a 
posterior." Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. i, p. XIV. 

''^ The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 106. 

'''^It is not at all necessary to suppose with Hegel and Pres. 
Schurman, Belief in God, p. 180, that the cork-tree exists for 
the sake of the corks which are cut from its bark to serve as 
stoppers for wine bottles. The statement is shallow and flip- 
pant. Cf. also Prof. Royce, in The Religious Aspects of Philos- 
ophy, p. 282. 



ORDER. 157 

ence to the end. The principle, therefore, is limited 
to phenomena of a special kind. 

818. The distinctive character of the latter class of why we 

" demand 

phenomena is the fact that they are not explained to finality. 
satisfaction by pointing out the efficient causes. There 
is a gap between the cause and the effect. The mind 
is forced by the principle of sufficient reason to explain 
the deficiency. This is done by applying the second 
method of induction, /. <?., the method of differences, 
to the problem. The element over and above the 
activity of the efficient cause is found to be the con- 
ditioning and determinating influence of the effect upon 
the group of activities. The effect becomes a cause 
by virtue of its causal influence. Thus only can the 
mind explain the evident adaptation of activities to 
the future. ^^ 

§ 19. It may be objected that chance can explain the Hypothesis 
coincidence of phenomena. This objection is not new; 
it is as old as philosophic speculation.^^ That it 
should be advanced to-day seems strange in view of 
the fact that it has been refuted so often and so 
thoroughly. Chance is a word which cloaks our igno- 
rance. It has no objective value. It is not a cause. 
It is a name given to a group of phenomena, independ- 
ent of one another and without any known connection. 
The known relation between the phenomena is purely 
external. Now that such a grouping may occur, can- 
not be denied. The admission does not touch our 
trend of reasoning. Our basis is the constaiit repetition 
of this group with the same result. A single combina- 

^^ Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 86, writes " we can under- 
stand the q^rouping of efficient causes only by reference to final 
causes, and the final cause is realized only through the efficient 
cause." 

3* Lucretius, de Nat. Rer., 1. V, 420; criticised by Cicero, de 
Nat. Deor. II; Plato, de Leg. XII; Apology. 



158 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tion might be due to chance. The frequent combina- 
tion of the same elements, and their manifold content 
is a phenomenon which demands a cause. Common 
sense assures us of this, and science employs this 
reasoning with profit. It is an application of the 
principle of induction which lies at the foundation of 
scientific progress. 

finan^°^ § 20. The process to be pursued in explaining the 

found in principle of finality is similar to that employed in a 

conscious r L j r j 

experience, preceding chapter when the validity of the principle 
of causality was defended against the attack of Hume. 
Our reasoning does not begin with and is not founded 
on external experience. Its source is within ourselves. 
We start from experience, but from our own conscious 
experience. Consciousness testifies that when we act 
in the full possession of our faculties, we act for an 
aim or purpose. Let us look within ourselves at any 
moment of the day. A thousand thoughts and wishes 
prove the truth of the statement. Or let us examine 
our actions; they are prompted by a motive or aim. 
I sit at the desk to prove to you, kind reader, that the 
existence of God is forced upon the mind by every 
department of human science; or I take a walk for 
exercise or to visit the sick; or I go about the avoca- 
tions of the day with the aim of supporting my family, 
of acquiring fame, or of doing my duty. In each and 
every instance the clear type of final cause is found. 
It is the distinctive mark of my conscious action. The 
why and the wherefore are elements of my conscious- 
daily life. When I turn to examine the acts of my 
fellows, I detect finality there also. As I am convinced 
that they have intelligence and free-will, so I am posi- 
tive that the principle of finality permeates their lives. 
It is a reasoning from analogy, but an analogy which 
is equivalent to the strictest demonstration. In all 



ORDER. 159 

the works of human industry we read the character of 
finality. Men mould and fashion the materials of 
nature with a view to obtain definite results, e. g., 
house, ship, works of mechanics and of art. The sight 
of strange buildings causes us to ask for what purpose 
they were made. Thus in works which come from the 
hands of men we read ends and means. ^^ 

S 21. The same reasoning: can be extended to ani- f^m , ,.^ 

" ^ animal life. 

mals. Animals act from instinct. From the first 
instant of existence they perform without reflection 
and without anterior experience acts which conduce to 
the preservation of themselves and of the species. In 
this, instinctive action differs from human action. 
Nevertheless, we find in both the like combination of 
complicated actions in order to obtain a definite result. 
In animals, therfore, we see traces of unconscious 
finality; nevertheless it is finality. 

§ 22. If we extend the line of reasoning to external in external 
nature, it is because our basis is strong and impregnable. 
We have seen that works of art exhibit the character 
of finality. Now there are differences between works 
of nature and of art; nevertheless they have some com- 
mon characteristics: (a) The relation of parts to the analog of 
whole; (b) the relation of the whole to the objects on ^amreand 
which it acts.^^ The part has value and can be^^^""^* 
explained by showing the relation it bears to the whole. 

2^" Ilia ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent in finem, 
quia habent dominium actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est 
facultas voluntatis et rationis; ilia vero quae ratione carent 
tendunt in finem propter naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio 
mota, non a seipsa . . . Ideo proprium est naturae 
rationalis ut tendat in finem, quasi se agens vel ducens in 
finem." St. Thomas, i, 2, q. i, a. 2. 

22 Janet, Final Causes, pp. 12, 108. Prof Schurman says that 
Dr. Flint virtually abandons the argument from design in miss- 
ing the analogy between works of nature and products of art; 
in the former he recognizes adaptation, not purpose, and there- 
fore argues from order not from purpose. Belief in God, 
p. 185. 



universe. 



l6o CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The whole can only be understood when viewed in rela- 
tion to what it does. Hence Kant admits the identity 
of nature and of art. But this is what is understood 
by finality.^* This is evident in all living beings. The 
unity of parts into a harmonious whole requires a 
cause which proclaims the principle of finality." 
in material § 23. The reasoning can now be extended to the 
material universe. ^^ Wherever we observe various 
activities combining in harmonious unity to produce 
an effect, we are justified in recognizing the effect as a 
final cause. ^' Science is not adverse to this contention. 
It deals mainly with efficient causes. Far from declar- 
ing against final causes it often assum.es their truth as 
a working hypothesis.^® The efficient and the final 
cause are not contradictory. " It must always be 
remembered," writes the Duke of Argyll, " that the 
two ideas — that of physical cause and that of mental 
purpose are not antagonistic; only the one is larger 
and more comprehensive than the other." ^^ The 
series of efficient and of final causes are identical. 
The latter is simply the reversal of the former. In the 
former series we reason from cause to effect; in the 
latter from effect to cause. Mr. Lewes admJts the force 
of this reasoning. " Science," he v/rites, " finds it 
indispensable to co-ordinate all the facts in a general 

^ " In nature there is the most elaborate machinery to accom- 
plish purpose through the instrumentality of means. It seems 
as if all that is done in nature, as well as all that is done in art, 
were done dy knowing how to do it.'" Duke of Argyll, Reign of 
Law, p. 127. 

3= Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 172. 

^® McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 158. 

^' " Necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur 
ad unum est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem." St. 
Thomas, i. q. 103, a. i; Janet, Final Causes, B. I, ch. IV, VI. 

^'^ Bowne, Phil, of Theism, p. 85, ' The postulate of physical 
science is that the world is Kosmos." The Great Enigma, W. 
S. Lilly, p. 153. 

^^ Reign of Law, p. 32; Dr. Bruce in Gifford Lectures, i8g8. 



ORDER. l6l 

concept, such as a plan. " *° And Mr. John Fiske holds 
as an evident truth that " the whole scheme of the 
order of nature is Teleological, and each single act in 
it has a teleological meaning." "^ In the explanation, 
however, Mr. Fiske approximates to the unconscious 
teleology of Hartmann. In face of this Mr. Rogers 
calmly tells us that " teleology appears only where 
mechanism breaks down; " the reason is that there are 
certain facts which can be explained by mechanism 
and natural law. Hence " the string of events is quite 
explainable on natural grounds until we reach the end 
and then a wholly new power is appealed to which 
cannot be stated in scientific terms." " And further- 
more ^' it is a fact of history that the principle of 
teleology has tended more and more to be displaced by 
the principle of mechanism." " 

IV. 

Theories. 

§ 24. Having set forth the basis on which the argu- 
ment for theism rests, we can now examine the different 
theories proposed to account for the facts. It must 
be borne in mind, however, that they rigorously 
exclude the idea of God, and are therefore properly 
termed anti-theistic. 

1°. Mechanical Theory. 
8 25. This theory professes to explain the facts of its 

, . , . 11-1 1 ii T teaching-. 

order m the universe by physical causes alone.''* It 
finds a basis in the physical sciences. There, we are 

40 Hist, of Phil. Prologue, p. XXXVL 

41 Idea of God, p. 161. 

42 Cf. His Modern Philosophy, p. 56. 
^Hb., p. 57. 

44 Descartes taught that we should not examine the ends 
which God has proposed to Himself in creating the world and 
II 



i62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

told, facts are presented as they actually occur.. Effi- 
cient causes only are the objects of scientific investiga- 
tion. The notion of finality is by no means necessary; 
the mind can do without it."^ Science receives no 
detriment thereby. The nebula hypothesis, e. g.^ is a 
simple explanation of the solar system. So, too. 
Chemistry exhibits the phenomena of crystallization. 
A marvelous order is had, but no vestige of final cause. 
Everything is explained by the mechanical working of 
the physical cause.*® They contend that nothing pre- 
vents us extending this view to living beings. Did 
not Des Cartes hold that animals were automata? As 
for organ and function, there is no adaptation; 
the function is only the natural result of the organ 
in act.*^ 

Criticism. § 26. (i) The defenders of this theory must admit 
that the forces of nature are alike.*® This we know 

basis. to be false. *^ An impassable gulf separates viaterial 

from vital^ and vital from mental forces. What might 
be true of material energies cannot be applied to 
mental activities in face of the fact that the final 
cause is given as a certain fact of conscious experience. 
It is just as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is 
no place for a God in nature directing and controlling 

should reject entirely from our philosophy the search for final 
causes; for we ought not to be so presumptuous as to believe 
that God has chosen to take us into His counsel. Cf. Types of 
Ethical Theory, James Martineau, B. I, c, 2, § 8; K study 
of Religion, vol. i, p. 256; Descartes, Med., 4. 

'^^ Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 87. 

"^^ E. Haeckel, Our Monism, in Monist, July, 1892, 

^■^ Herbart; Lucretius, de Nat. Deorum, 1. 4, V. 822; Aristotle, 
Metaph., 1. i, ch. 4, 6. The Neo-Kantians, with Fries and Her- 
bart, exclude finality and explain nature and man by mechan- 
ism, although the explanation is contradictory to their religious- 
aesthetic view. Cf. Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 171, 
218. 

^^ Spencer, First Principles, Principles of Psychology. 

*^ W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 129. 



ORDER. 163 

its forces by His will, as it would be to assert that there 
is no place in man's body for his conscious mind,^° 

8 27. (2) In this theory how can we explain man . (2) it does 

^ ^ ^ . , , . , . , not explain 

Is man the simple result of physical causes? Why man. 
must we admit finality as the distinctive mark of his 
conscious experience? Man foresees, calculates, seeks 
means for ends. Are these acts the pure result of physical 
causes? Is a being, which can shape ends for himself, 
the result of a nature without ends? This is absurd." 

§ 28. (3) The theory is partial and limited. It starts (3) partial 
from physical sciences. Its limit cannot extend to ^"^ ^^"^^^^^* 
living beings, e. g.^ plants and animals, much less man. 
Pure mechanism cannot explain the phenomena of 
life." A directive idea is present in the youth of the 
plant which accounts for the combination of acts tend- 
ing to its own preservation and the multiphcation of its 
kind." Teleology has taken possession of the language 
of Botany and of Biology. Thus Mr. Huxley speaks 
of apparatus^ plan^ fabrics^ in order to ^ for the purpose of ^ 
lay the foundation of ^ foreshadows'^ Mr. Spencer uses 
the words fitness^ manifest relatio?is to future external 
events^ adaptation^ processes^ correspondence^ anticipates^ 
adjustment^ in order that, Psychology recognizes special 
functions as the ends of special organs,'' ''regards teeth as 
having the office of mastication. " " A mechanical theory, 

^° W. Carpenter, M. D., Nature and Man, p. 364. 

" Prof. Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 11. 

^'■^ Schelling, Hegel, Hartman, Teichmuller, Zeller reject the 
pure mechanical explanation. Pfieiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. 
Ill, p. 261. 

^2 Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. V, VII. 

^* Elements of Comparative Anatomy. 

5^ Prin. of Biology; Argyll, Phil, of Belief, pp. 65, 136; Dar- 
win, on Fertilization of Orchards; Mr. Wallace, in Quar. Jour, 
of Science, Oct., 1867; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, 
pp. 259, 261; Prof. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, ch. VII; Dr. 
Paulsen, however, assures us that the prevailing view is that 
there is no finality in physical nature. Cf. Introduction to 
Philosophy, p. 222. 



164 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore, is artificial and is adverse to sound rea- 
soning.^^ 
(4) Science § 29. (4) Finally it rests upon a false assumption, 
discard e. ^.. that science discards final causes. This is 

final causes. ^ ... ^^ . 

erroneous. Science investigates efficient causes, but 
between the efficient and the final cause there is no 
antagonism. The one does not exclude the other." 
The perception of the final cause often leads to the 
discovery of the efficient, e. g., the conformation of the 
valves in the veins led Harvey to discover the circula- 
tion of the blood. ^® The fact, e. g., that man always 
acts for a purpose does not render useless or interfere 
with his efficient causality. Efficient causes are agents 
or means to obtain the desired purpose,.^^ " What is 
contrivance," writes the Duke of Argyll, ** but that 
kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable 
demands of law are met and satisfied." ^^ 

^^ " If you place me face to face, not v/ith an infinite living 
spirit, but only with what is called the great necessity, what 
enthusiasm do you expect the vision to excite? Can there be a 
more paralyzing spectacle? and shall I fling myself with pas- 
sionate devotion into the arms of that ghastly physical giant? 
It is impossible: homage to an automaton-universe is no bet- 
ter than mummy-worship Vi^ould be to one who has known what 
it is to love and trust, to embrace the living friend. In short, 
a human soul so placed \vould itself be higher than aught it 
knows v/ithin the immensity, and could worship nothing there 
without idolatry." Martineau, A Study of Religion, V. i, p. 12. 

^■^ Dr. Gildea, Is there evidence of design in nature, in Pro- 
ceedings of Aristotelian Soc, i88g-go, p. 49. 

^^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 256. 

^^ Lotze, Microcosmus, B. IV, ch. i, No. 2. 

^^ Reign of Law, pp. 90, 127, A false definition explains a 
strange and undefinable position. If we confound teleology 
with miracle, we can understand that " in so far as teleology 
means a breaking into what would otherwise have been the 
natural order of events by a separate and transcendent power, 
whose workings cannot be reduced to strictly scientific formulse, 
it has the whole weight of scientific achievement against it." 
Cf. A. K. Rogers Modern Philosophy, p. 58. But this is 
confusing and fallacious reasoning. No wonder he continues 
** we must either drop the notion of end altogether, or else we 
must adopt some new conception of what end or design means 



ORDER. 165 

2°. Theory of Evolution. 

§30, Evolution is a term possessing a singular forms of 
attraction. A wide generalization, it elevates the mind 
and broadens its view. Eagerly welcomed by men of 
science as a universal solvent of all riddles in life and 
being, the hope was entertained that science and phil- 
osophy would be revolutionized and nature would be 
viewed in a new and truer light. It is not the purpose 
to criticise the theory in its entirety; that pertains 
to another department of Apologetics. We shall 
discuss the principal presentations by its leading 
defenders. 

§ 31. (a) Atheistic evolution appears under the form (a) Monism. 
of Monism. This theory supposes the universal evolu- 
tion of all forms of life; its fundamental principle is 
the unity of force. Its teaching is as old as Empedo- 
cles, Lucretius and Epicurus; but in the hands of its 
modern exponent, Mr. Haeckel, it has acquired a 
certain novelty and popularity. " From the motion of 
heavenly bodies," he writes, " and the fall of a stone, 
even to the growth of plants and to conscience in man, 
all are reducible to the mechanism of atoms," Mr. 
Haeckel's position is set forth in two works, " The 
History of Creation," and " The Descent of Man." 

§ 32, By reducing all things to the mechanical criticism. 
action of atoms, Mr. Haeckel has once and for all 
done away with final causes. But this principle 
is a gratuitous assumption. So, too, the process of 
reasoning, in which he sets forth his theory at length, 
is made up of assumptions and false analogies. There 
is no need at present to enter into a detailed examina- 

and how it works." (lb.) Further on we read the following: 
" Mechanism explains the way in which, not the reason for 
which, a thing is done," and he sees no inherent contradiction 
between mechanism and teleology, p. 306. 



l66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tion of the system. We need only state that in essence 
it is identical with the Mechanical theory. The same 
deficiencies are found in both, and the same criticism 
is true of the one as of the other. 
(b)Agnosti- % SS- (t>) Atheistic evolution appears under the form 
of Agnosticism. It is a recent and powerful phase of 
human thought. Its fundamental principle, according 
to Huxley, who coined the word,®^ \'i positively to follow 
the intellect as far as it will take you, and negatively^ not 
pretend conclusions to be certain which are not demon- 
its principle, strated or demonstrable. Yet there is a reservation 
implied, viz., nothing is to be admitted on any other 
evidence than of the senses. In this philosophy the 
final cause has no place, for the order and finality or 
the phenomena do not appeal to the senses and are 
grasped by the intellect alone, 
s^'^'n r' § 34' Herbert Spencer is the greatest living exponent 

teaching, of Aguosticism. He has done more than any other to 
form a consistent philosophy of evolution on a scientific 
basis. He holds that there is one unknowable reality 
which manifests itself alike in the material and living 
world. He commonly speaks of this reality as force, 
and at times seems to identify it with force. To him 
matter is identical with force, and the evolution of all 
existing things is to be explained by the law of trans- 
formed motion. The process is a mechanical problem. 
A first principle is the persistence of force. This 
principle in its working follows certain laws: (i) Motion 
follows the lines of least resistance, ^^ (2) The homo- 
geneous becomes the heterogeneous. He assumes 
homogeneous matter endowed with forces. This, by 
reason of its instability, passes into the heterogeneous 
under the action of the force. (3) The passage is 

«i XlXth Cent., Feb., 1889. 
^■■^ First Prin., p. 73. 



ORDER. 167 

helped by the law of segregation, which by separation 
or selection enables us to pass from the indefinite to 
the definite. In other words, it is the law of natural 
selection. Hence arise differences in types and species. 
(4) Finally, the law of adaptation, by which the being 
adapts itself to the environments and renders per- 
manent the structural differentiation.^'' 

§ 35. (i) The purpose of Mr. Spencer is to explain criticism, 
the universe by mechanical principles. His system, 
therefore, is the mechanical hypothesis in another mechanical 

• thcorv 

form. To him the lowest forms of life are essentially again, 
the continuation of non-vital processes; while thought 
and consciousness are merely transformations of 
motion. Now this process of reasoning starts with 
and is bolstered up by pure assumptions. 

§36. (2) He is forced to recognize design in the (2) he 

fiA mi 1 r • 1 /• 1 • recognises 

universe.*'* 1 he laws of segregation and of adaptation design in 
are worded in the language of teleology. The very 
process itself by which the homogeneous passes into 
the heterogeneous cannot be fully explained unless we 
admit the final cause as guiding the complicated com- 
bination of varied elements to the gradual formation 
of the specific type. That structure is subservient to 
function, and that structural growth is prior in time to 
the actual or possible discharge of function are domi- 
nant facts in the whole organic world. ^^ 

^37- (i) Finally, Mr. Spencer's theory is the (3) a theory 

o -" vyy jy r ^ j ^ of chance, 

hypothesis of chance dressed in scientific terminology. 
Chance might explain one combination. But here we 
deal with frequent and repeated combinations of most 
complex elements with the constant recurrence of the 
same result. 

*3 De Pressense, A Study of Origins, ch. I. 
^■* Principles of Biology; Dake of Argyll, Phil, of Belief. 
^5 Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief: Schurman, Belief in 
God, p. 174. 



i68 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(c) Darwin- 
ism. 



Darwin's 
writings. 



his 
teaching. 



§ 38. (c) Finally, atheistic evolution appears under 
the form of Darwinism. This theory takes its name 
from Charles Darwin, who, in 1856, published his studies 
on the origin of species. The work aroused profound 
and wide-spread discussion. A laborious life was 
devoted to investigations in this line. His most 
important writings are the Origin of Species, Varia- 
tions of Animals and Plants, and the Descent of Man. 
In his younger days Darwin was a devout believer; but 
as he advanced in years and in the prosecution of these 
studies, his religious convictions became unsettled. 
In a letter written in 1879 he says: " I think that in 
general the most exact description of my state of mind 
is that of Agnosticism." ^^ In his Origin of Species he 
concludes with these words: " There is grandeur in 
this view of life, with its several powers, having been 
signally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or 
into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling 
on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so 
simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and 
most wonderful have been and are being involved." 
In a later volume, " The Descent of Man," he with- 
drew the concession as to the necessity of the creation 
of primitive types. His disciples extended the theory 
to the origin of life, of man and of the universe. 

g 39. In the point of departure the theory of Dar- 
winism differs from that of Spencer. Spencer starts 
from the physical science and attempts to explain the 
process by the law of mechanics. Darwin takes living 
beings and tries, by a large and minute observation of 
facts, to establish a Biology of evolution. Darwin 
differs from other naturalists, e. g., Cope and Mivart, 
by explaining the acquisition of superior qualities, not 
through the development of active powers inherent in 

*^ Life and Letters. 



ORDER. 169 

the individual and brought into exercise at favorable 

opportunities, but through the many exterior circum- 
stances and causes which slowly and gradually impart 
to the individual the qualities it had not before. Thus 
Darwin required one thousand generations for the 
transformation of species; and this result is obtained 
by the exterior influences of fortuitous causes." 

8 40. The basis of Darwinism is the general fact that its main 

^ ^ ^ lines. 

life is a struggle for existence. The result of the struggle 
is the survival of the fittest by a process of natural selec- 
tion or elimination. It is a fact that living things vary, 
e. g.y the distinction of individual, of family, of type. 
Hence he infers the law of variability of organic forms. 
The variation may come from the repetition of the 
same acts or from disuse of the faculties which results 
in atrophy; and he enunciates the law of use and non- 
use. An illustration is drawn from the law of phonetic 
decay in language. Or variations can be explained by 
the action of the environment upon the organism, 
creating new needs and causing the organism to 
respond to the needs so that life may be preserved. 
Hence the law of adaptation. The variations once 
acquired are transmitted from generation to generation 
by the law of heredity, and the transmitted traits abide 
in virtue of the law oi permanent eharacterization. After- 
wards, in the work " The Descent of Man," Darwin 
added the law of sexual selection, which is only a pecu- 
liar form of natural selection. The struggle is not 
only for life and nourishment, but also for sexual 
fitness. 

g 41. It is not the purpose to criticise Mr. Darwin's criticism. 
theory as a whole„ Its defects have been recognized 
by his own disciples, e. g., Wallace and Romanes, who 
have attempted to supply what was wanting by advanc- 

" Origin of Species. 



170 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ing theories of their own. Its relation to the argument 

from design shall only be considered/^ 

W^^ests on g 42. (i) Mr. Darwin reasons by analogy from arti- 

anaiogy. ficial natural selection. But this analogy is a false one. 

In artificial selection there is a reflection, calculation, 

choice, purpose in the agent. In natural selection 

intelligence and design are rigidly excluded. The 

reasoning from a work of intelligent industry to the 

effect of fortuitous circumstances and blind chance is 

faulty throughout. 

(2) supposes S 43. (2) Natural selection can only count as a factor 

choice m u -t^ v y ^ ^ j ^ ^ 

the agent, in Mr. Darwin's theory if we grant to living beings the 
finality. powcr of choice.''^ Mr. Darwin's own language indi- 
cates or supposes this. If this be so, what stronger 
argument for final causes can be had? Finality, then, 
would be inherent in and universal throughout nature. 
In fact, the working of his laws indicate design, e. g,, 
lav/ of use and non-use ^''^ of adaptatio7i, of heredity. 
If we admit natural forces struggling onward to reach 
their highest and noblest expression in man, we can 
understand why Darwin broached a theory so sublime in 
conception. But let us exclude every vestige of finality 
and the theory becomes a play upon words, 
of chance^^ § 44. (3) In reality Darwinism is based on the h5'poth- 
esis of chance. ^^ Hence he appeals to long periods 
of time, to external circumstances, to fortuitous events. 

^- Quatrefages, The Human Species; Darwin et ses precur. 
Francaises. 

^^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, pp. 288. 289; Duke 
of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 17. 

''^Organs develop for, not by, use. Duke of Argyll, Phil, of 
Belief, p. 17. Mr. John Fiske tacitly concedes this point when 
he says that " the action of natural selection upon man is coming 
to an end," and " man's future development will be accom- 
plished through the direct adaptation of his wonderfully plastic 
intelligence to the circumstances in which it is placed." Idea 
of God, p. 163. 

"" Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 262; Wm. Gra- 
ham, Creed of Science, pp. 25-35-47. 



ORDER. 171 

Chance, therefore, is the dominating idea in the pro- 
cess. The various laws he mentions are only special 
names for the great power of chance. This is absurd. 
Common sense will tell us that the marvelous develop- 
ments and the convergence of so many and varied ele- 
ments are not merely fortuitous. This harmonious 
agreement and continuity of growth requires a cause 
over and above the mere chance assemblage of ele- 
ments. In nature all things are done by the use of 
appropriate means and the subordination of material 
structures to future work and function.''^ The conclu- 
sion, therefore, is evident. The theories of Evolu- 
tion cannot answer the problem. They are deficient, 
or if they give a satisfactory answer, it is only 
by "begging the question," In the light of the 
foregoing exposition we are enabled to rightly 
estimate the value of Mr. Sully's words: ** The 
significance which evolution gives to the relation 
between organ and function, e. g.^ the eye and vision, 
renders less necessary, for purposes of immediate 
explanation, the hypothesis of a divine prearrangement 
and preadaptation. Consequently, in these last times 
the teleological view of nature upheld by Christianity 
has had either to take the shape of a faith which seeks 
to disregard fact and reason, or to fall back on the 
more philosophical bnt scarcely optimistic hypothesis 
that the divine purpose is some unknown quantity, or 
at least comprehends interests of which human life 
forms but a very small fraction, and is carried out by 
means of unswerving purposes of natural law." " 

'"Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 11; Huxley, 
Comp. Anat., pp. lo-ii. 

"Pessimism, p. 67. A conclusion altogether different has 
been reached by Mr. E. G„ Robinson, in Principles and Practice 
of Morality. " The evidences of a pre-existent and predisposing 
purpose in nature are too numerous and too distinct to be over- 



1/2 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



German 
Pantheism. 



Schoppen- 
hauer. 



his 
doctrine. 



Hartman. 



3'. Theory of Pantheism, 

§ 45. By Pantheism is here understood not the doc- 
trine of Pantheism as a whole, but only special phases 
which have appeared in recent years and have a direct 
bearing upon the argument from design. Allusion is 
made to the systems of Schoppenhauer and Hartman. 
The common character of their teaching, distinguishing 
them from the other theories discussed, is that both 
admit tendencies and finalities in the universe. The 
work of Hartman, " The Philosophy of the Uncon- 
scious," is a storehouse for those who seek proofs and 
illustrations of purpose and design in nature. 

§ 46. Schoppenhauer contends that an infinite finality 
exists in nature, but is not due to intelligence. He 
denies the right to reason from our own acts to the 
operations of external nature. Nature, he says, is 
prior to the mind, and natural action is absolutely dis- 
tinct from ours. To us nature seems to act for a pur- 
pose; in reality this action is without reflection and 
without conception of end, for in nature there is no in- 
telligence only a will blindly exerting its own activity. 

§ 47. He bases this theory on the phenomena of 
instinct. Here, he says, we find beings who work for 
an end with the greatest surety, yet are absolutely 
unconscious of any purpose in the action. Animals, 
e. g., insects, will the end without knowing it, nor have 
they the choice of means in general; so also nature 
acts when we say it acts according to final cause.''* 

§ 48. Hartman differs from Schoppenhauer in declar- 
ing that not will alone, but intelligence knows every- 
thing, with the single exception of itself; thus it 
knows, but it does not know that it knows. Hence we 

looked. With the progress of natural science these evidences 
are becoming every day increasingly clear." 
" Die Welte als Wille, t. 2, ch. XXVI. 



ORDER. 173 

have the title of his system: The Philosophy of thesis 

■' ^ •' doctrine. 

Unconscious. Hartman bases his theory likewise of 
Psychology. Unconscious processes, he says, lies at 
the basis of our conscious activity. Genius and instinct 
are illustrations of his contention. In all are found tend- 
encies to definite ends. There are revelations of intelli- 
gence, but of unconscious intelligence. Thus we reason 
to a first cause which is absolute and unconscious. 

§49. (i) We deny the right to make instinct the criticism, 
basis of the theory. Man is nobler than the brute, 
and human action is more elevated than instinct. For true basis. 
what reason, therefore, should brute action be taken 
as a type of universal activity? The mechanist who 
reasons upwards from physical forces, the teleologist 
who reasons downwards from conscious action, are 
much more consistent than the half-way theory of 
unconscious reason. 

8 Ko. (2) What is instinct? It is a phenomenon (2) instinct 

^ "^ ^ ^ ^ not a clear 

most obscure and difficult to understand. Mechanical expiana- 

. . . tion. 

activity or intelligence are much simpler than instinct. 
Nevertheless we are asked to take it as their explana- 
tion. Instinct is unable to explain physical activity. 
The impassable gulf between Biology and Physics can- 
not be thus bridged. Again, instinct cannot explain 
intelligence. Psychology proves that reason is an act 
of a kind specifically different. 

§ 51. (3) To admit an unconscious tendency to (3) chance 
certain ends is a reversal to the hypothesis of chance phism. 
or of zoomorphism. But chance cannot explain the 
order and harmony in the tendency, as has been dis- 
tinctively shown. The latter theory is in contradiction 
to facts and must, therefore, be rejected. One 
explanation now remains. It is the theory of Chris- 
tian Philosophy. We shall now attempt to give a brief 
summary of its teaching. 



174 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



V. 



Theory of Christian Philosophy. 



Its 
teaching. 



(i) arg-u- 
ment of 
exclusion. 



(2) possible 
explana- 
tions. 



(a) mechan- 
ics not an 
explana- 
tion. 



(b) nor is 
instinct. 



§ 52. In the first section of the chapter the fact and 
principle of finality were set forth. The attempt was 
then made to criticise the various interpretations 
which modern writers have advanced. A critical analy- 
sis laid bare their defects and sophistries. The way 
is now clear for an answer which is in accord with our 
own experience and scientific investigation. 

§ 53. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that mind 
and mind alone is the cause of the marvelous order in 
the universe. Therefore, mind alone can explain the 
facts and the principles of finality. ^^ 

§54. (i) The first argument is one of exclusion. All 
theories advanced to explain finality have been shown 
to be defective and faulty. Mind alone is the only 
other theory that in fact has possession. The force 
of this reasoning is purely negative. 

§ 55. (2) If we exclude chance, as the trend of the 
chapter constrains us to do, the explanation of finality 
can be reduced to these sources: (a) Mechanical 
action; (b) instinct; (c) mind. Now the theory of 
mechanics cannot explain intelligence; therefore it is 
limited and exclusive. Likewise the theory of the 
Unconscious fails to interpret the facts of conscious 
daily life; therefore it likewise is limited in range and 
exclusive. 



'^ In the Dialogues on Natural Religion, Hume criticises the 
design argument. He denies a valid induction from art to 
nature, holds that chance may explain design inasmuch as the 
design is not at all perfect; that at the most the cause of the 
world-order has a remote similarity with human intelligence is 
only probable, too indefinite to be a principle of practical religion. 
Even if we admit the existence of God, the world is still incon- 
ceivable, and one hypothesis is as good as the other. 



ORDER. 175 

§56. To extend these hypotheses and make their Their^ 
application universal is to commit a logical fallacy, hearing. 
Not so, however, the theory of mind. It harmonizes 
with physical and biological science. The final cause 
does not render null and void the physical efficiency of 
material forces. ** With his, /. ^., the modern man of 
science, belief in Mathematical Physics and familiarity 
with their logical structure, he must know that the 
cosmos, whatever else it may be, is mechanical; and 
that to read back any one of its systems into its ele- 
mentary dynamical equivalents, and from these to 
return forward and predict its still future phases, is 
one of the most admirable exercises of Reason." ^^ 
Thus, there is order, adjustment and harmony in 
the mechanism. In like manner the final cause (c) only 
is the best explanation for instinctive acts. As complete 
for mind, we have a direct example of the final f^^^^^^^' 
cause in our conscious experience. The hypo- 
thesis of intelligence as the sufficient explanation of 
finality has a strong antecedent probability in its 
favor. 

§ 57- (3) Finally, in setting forth the facts and the (3) method 
principle of finality we reasoned from our conscious soun^cfaS 
experience to the facts of external nature. The pro- 
cess was shown to be sound and convincing. The 
analogy is so strong as to equal the most rigid demon- 
stration. By the same right we are justified in seeking 
the interpretation of finality by a like process. Now 
consciousness gives the clear and decisive answer. It 
tells that finality can only be explained by intelligent 
action. Therefore the fact of finality so varied and 
manifold in nature from the activities of the atom to 
the complicated structure of man postulates the exist- 

'^ Marlineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 326. 



strong 



176 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 



The mind 
is God. 



istic and 
(2) Ethical 
Pantlieism. 



ence of a mind that shapes all things in number and 
measure to the proper end.'^ 

§ 58. This mind is identical with God. To the 
Christian Philosopher, God is the creator and governor 
of all things. The argument from final causes proves 
this conclusively. Some writers recognize the exist- 
ence of all pervading order, yet appear to deify this 
and make it God. To them " God is merely a synonym 
(i) material- of nature," and " the laws of nature are the laws of 
God." This language from the pen of one v/ho lays 
claim to scientific habits of thought, is certainly errone- 
ous.^® Others, with Fichte, object to a God different 
from the moral ^orld-order and declare it necessary 
to go no further than that order itself." This teaching 
has given rise to the JDieic-Fr ogres of Taine, Vacherot, 
Renan; ^^ to the " stream of tendency that makes for 
righteousness " of Mr. Arnold.®^ Finally, others with 
Kant held that the teleological argument concludes to 
an Architect, not a Creator .^"^ 

§ 59. The works of art differ from the works of 
nature in this, that the former point to an external, 
the latter to an internal principle. Hence order is 

'■'J. S. Mill holds that " The First Cause can be no other than 
Force: Force is prior to volition, hence volition is not a first 
cause, for Force is eternal and uncreated . . . Nor is 
volition coeternal with force, for it has no exclusive privilege of 
origination." Cf. Essays on Religion, pp. 145, 148. His argu- 
ment rests upon pure assumption. J. Dimon, The Theistic Ar- 
gument, p. 99; W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 231. 

''^ Natural Religion, ch. 2, 3; Martineau, A Study of Religion, 
vol. I, p. 5. 

" Pfleiderer, Philos. of Relig., vol. Ill, p. 269. 

^•^ Farges, L'Idee de Dieu, p 419. 

^' God and the Bible. A good criticism of this phase of mod- 
ern thought is given by Prof. Royce, The Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy, B. II, ch. i, §§ II, III. 

8'^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 306, where this 
interpretation is defended; Prof. E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant, 
p. 635; Pfleiderer, Phil, and Devel. of Religion, vol, I, p. 153. 
Drobish holds the same view. Pfleiderer, Philosophy of 
Religion, vol. II., p. 219, vol. Ill, p. 259. 



(3) Kant's 
objection. 



order is 
intrinsic. 



ORDER. 177 

intrinsic to natural beings. Kant draws the distinction 
between internal and external finality.®^ The former 
is a need in the being, the latter the means nature 
takes to supply the need, e. g., the hunger of a cow 
and the grass of the field. ^* Therefore the tendency 
to order is intrinsic in the natural elements; ^^ it is not 
a geometrical arrangement; it is something essential, 
€. g., take away chemical affinity and the element is 
destroyed. " Plant the shipbuilders' skill within the 
timber itself," writes Aristotle, "and you have the 
mode in which nature produces." ^^ Thus, the mind 
that imposed upon natural things an intrinsic tendency 
to order, must have made the essence of things as they 
are; in other words, must have created them. 

§ 60. Our course of reasoning has reached the 
desired end. The wonderful harmony of creation, the 
marvelous unity of action among elements so different 
in kind, the combination of diverse tendencies to a 
common result, all show with unmistakable emphasis 
that a divine mind guides the universe and gave to 
all its elements their course and being. End is Q^j^^j^jg-^j^ 
not an infringement on God's perfection,®^ nor is 
purpose an evidence of limitation of power. ®^ To 
act for an end is a sign of intelligence. Purpose is 
intrinsic to nature. The tendency to an end is natural 
to every agent. Only thus can the world-order be 
explained.®^ The conclusion, therefore, is imperative. 

^2 Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 13. 

s^Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. II, III, V. 

«5 Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. Ill, p. 261. 

ssphys., B. 2, c. 8. 

^■^ Spinoza, Eth. i, App, 

^^ Fiske, Idea of God, p. 126; Mill, Triree Essays on Religion, 
p. 176; Tyndall, Fragments, pp. 527, 353. " Contrivance is not 
a sign of limited intellect, but is only the rational connection of 
many factors with reference to an ideal end." Bowne, Philos- 
ophy of Theism, p. 137. 

^* Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 324. 
12 



1/8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

We are led by another way to God, and we are con- 
strained to accept the Theistic hypothesis, not as the 
best, but as the only interpretation of facts.^" 

§ 6i. We shall not discuss at length the criticism of 
Kant and of Mill that the argument from design is 
good, but does not prove the existence of God in the 
Christian sense of the word, /. e.^ God as supreme. 
The objection has been answered in showing that the 
same mind which is the Designer is also the Creator. 
Now creation is an act of infinite power." Therefore 
the argument gives the highest and true conception 
of God. 

§ 62. Lotze hesitates at accepting the full force of 
the teleological argument. He admits that it does not 
exclude the activity of physical causes. ^^ Yet he sees 
a difficulty in granting that the Supreme Will or Mind 
in nature should act through means. To him this is an 
imperfection.^^ That there is imperfection we readily 
concede; but the imperfection does not come from the 
part of God; it arises from the imperfections and lim- 
itations of things. The Duke of Argyll considers this 
objection to spring from <2;/r/(?/'/ conceptions. " Our 
notions," he writes, " must be ruled or disciplined by 
observation of that which is, not founded on a priori 
conceptions of what ought to be." ^* And again, " The 
necessity of contrivance for the accomplishment of 
purpose arises out of the immutability of natural 
forces. They must be conformed to and obeyed." '^ 

^° The aim of Prof. Bowne is to prove that " the world is a 
unit and can be explained only by a unitary being," hence he 
postulates " a world-cause in place of a world-substance/' Phil- 
osophy of Theism, pp. 146-59. 

^^ Suarez, Disput, Metaphys, Disp. xx, s. 2. 

®' Microcosmus, B. IV, ch. i, No. 2. 

^^Ib.,No. 5; so also Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 178. 

^^ Reign of Law, ch. III., p. 127. 

s^b., p. 126. 



CHAPTER X. 

CREATION. 

§ I. The human mind instinctively seeks to know 
the causes of things. Illustrations of this are found in 
childhood, as well as m mature years, in the ordinary 
avocations of daily life, as well as in the silent and 
serious meditations of the student. The line of 
thought pursued in this essay has repealed the true 
nature of the material universe. It is conditioned on 
every side and dependent. As such it had a beginning; 
in other words, it was produced. We shall now 
examine the various theories proposed by thoughtful 
minds at different times to account for its origin. 

I. 

Theory of Pantheism. 

§ 2. Pantheism is an error which dates back to the History, 
very dawn of philosophic speculation. In the remnants 
and records of human thought, preserved through the 
ravages of time and the changing fortunes of the human 
race, this theory appears in all its phases. The 
Pantheism of the Hindus is set forth in the Upanishads 
and exerted a deep and lasting influence on subsequent 
Indian thought. The Eleatic school in Greece, e. g., 
Xenophanes, Parmenides, the most powerful philosoph- 
ical school in Rome, e. g., the Stoics, perpetuated the 
teaching for centuries. We find it proposed in the 
crude and bold teachings of Scotus Erigena, in the sub- 
tility of Avincennes, in the mystic dreamings of Master 
Eckart, in the ever-changing and strangely contra- 
dictory S) stems of the German disciples of Kant. In 

[179] 



l8o CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

our own time it is worded in all the charms of prose 
and poetic diction, with a certain elevation of tone and 
a dreamy aspiration after the ideal of all that is, 
and a vague fellowship with nature and with man, that 
appeals to the cultured and meditative mind and seems 
to contain the promise of what the human soul has 
ever longed for: Light, strength, and rest.' But the 
promise is belied, the appearance is deceiving; an 
alluring but dry and empty husk is offered, or a shadow 
which takes form and substance only in the darkening 
mist, but recedes further and further from the eager 
seeker and vanishes into thin air before the growing light, 
itsfunda- ^ ^. The fundamental and characteristic doctrine of 

mental » 'J _ ^ 

doctrine. Pantheism consists in identifying God with all that 
exists. Thus, everything is God and God is every- 
thing, or rather God is the only real substance. In 
setting forth this principle, its defenders separate into 
different schools. Historically and philosophically 
viewed, Pantheism assumes different phases. Created 
things are considered as emanations from, or mani- 
festations of, the one divine substance; or God, the 
universal, indeterminate Being, by a process of self 
determination constitutes the universe of beings dis- 
tinct from one another.^ 

1°. Theory of E7na7iation. 
Theory of g a That existing: things are to be explained by an 

Emanation. o ^ » =» ,. . , . 

emanation out of the original one divme substance is 
mythoiogi- a doctrine found in all ancient mythologists. The 
ancient Vedic bards or risJiis relate in childish and 
fantastic imagery how the different classes of beings 
sprang from the different members of Brahma.^ The 

' E. g., Shelley, Emerson, Thoeodore Parker. 
2 Concilium Vaticanum Sess. Ill, can. 4; of. Denzigers, 
Enchiridion, p. 392. 

^Muir's Sanscrit Texts, vol. i, ch. i. 



CREATION. l8] 

Greek, Norse, and Aztec mythologists only differ in 
the local coloring of racial characteristics and sur- 
roundings which give life and force to the legend. As 
such, this belongs not to philosophy but to the history 
of religion. There it is shown that such accounts are 
only degenerate forms of the doctrine of creation, 
traces of which are everywhere found in the records of 
the early religious life of our race. 

8=;. The earliest forms of philosophical Pantheism Phiiosophi- 

^ ^ . ... cal emana- 

are to be found in India. The primitive Vedic, with its tion. 
traces of monotheism and pure religious conceptions, 
gave way to the later Vedic and Brahmanic ages with 
their plurality of gods, caste distinctions and corrupt 
notions of religious belief and practice. The inevi- 
table reaction set in. Gross superstition is revolting 
to our higher nature and man turns from it in disgust. 

§ 6. The unity of nature and the reign of law so evi- Upani- 
dent and so marvelous, impress the thoughtful mind in 
every age with a conviction of an underlying unity and 
makes Polytheism with its hierarchy of Gods and 
Goddesses to appear as childish fancies without a 
strong foundation or real meaning. Unfortunately 
the reaction turned to a philosophical Monism, not 
to a religious Monotheism. The evidence of this is 
found in the Upanishads, a collection of writings which 
date from the later part of the Brahmanic period. In 
them the Brahma of Indian Polytheism is deprived of 
his ethical character and becomes the neuter Brahman, 
the first principle or the primordial and sole real 
existing being. 

§ 7. To explain the existence of the universe the Two 

. ^ schools of 

Hindoo sages divide into two arreat schools. The one Indian 

. . ^^ thought. 

IS realistic and considers the world about us to be an 
emanation from the one infinite substance. The other 
is idealistic and views the world as an illusion or 



1 82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

mirage, the only existing thing being the all-pervading 
soul or self. 
(a)Materi- 8 8. (a) The whole universe is Brahman, /. e.. 

alistic. o \ / ' » 

absolute being. "In the begmnmg was that only 
which is."'^ It was one only without a second.^ 
Others say that in the beginning there was that which 
was not, that it was alone and without a second; 
and from that v/hich is not, that which -is, was 
born. But this is not true. Only that which is was 
in the beginning. It thought, may I be many, may I 
grow forth. ^ It sent forth fire. In like manner fire 
sent forth water and water earth. That Being thought, 
let me enter into those three beings with this living 
self,' and let me reveal names and forms, /. ^., of 
particular existences. The Self, therefore, entered 
into these three elements: earth, water and fire. In 
so doing, existing things took their variety and shape 
and being. The subtlest portion of earth (food) 
became mind, the subtlest portion of water became 
breath, breath passed into heat (fire), heat into highest 
Beings. Now that which is that subtle essence (the 
root of all) in it all that exists has its being. It is the 
True.' 
(b)Gnos- § 9. (b) In the early ages of Christianity this form 
of Pantheism had wide sway. The Gnostic heretics 

^Chandog. Upan. VI, 2 sq. 

^ Brih. Upan. I, 4, 11; I, 5, 7. 

^Tait. Up. 2, 6. 

' Giva atma, i. e., the living self is not the Highest self, but 
the shadow of the highest self. 

^ That which is i. <?., Sat; sat-ya, i. e., to be endowed with 
being True. In this passage (Chang. Up. VI, 2 sq.) not being 
is derived from being. The contrary is stated (Chang. Ill, 19, 
i) In the Taith, Upan. 11, 7. " In the beginning this was not 
existent i. e., not yet defined by form or name. From it was 
born what exists." In the Brih. Up. V, 5, I, " In the beginning 
was water. Water produced the true and the true is Brahman. 
In the Mundaka Upan., 6. g, Brahma is compared to a spider 
which sends out a web of being. 



tics, 



CREATION. 183 

and the powerful school of Neo-Platonism made the 
doctrine of emanation a cardinal and fundamental 
point. Among the Gnostics some taught two supreme 
principles, the one good and the other bad, influenced 
evidently by contemporaneous Persian cosmogony. 
Others, however, Valentinus held that one supreme 
principle exists, which was called silence^ the depth. 
From this principle other beings or Acones came forth 
in a series of emanations, which are considered to be 
the proximate principles of the universe with its vari- 
ous forms of existence 

§ 10. (c) The Neo-Platonic school was an effort to (c) Neo- 
resuscitate the philosophy of Plato, correcting it in 
certain parts so as to make it more systematic and con- 
formable to the supposed exigencies of the times. Its 
founder is Ammonious Saccas, its leading teacher is 
Plotinus, its doctrine is pure Pantheism. One principle 
exists, from which all things proceed. This principle is 
unformed; it therefore cannot be comprehended under 
any known category of existing being, nor can it be 
the object of thought so that we could contemplate its 
attributes or conceive it as such or such. Beyond the 
reach of any created intelligence it exists alone, vast, 
impenetrable. From this unity proceeds intelligence^ 
i. e. (vovs), and the soul of the worlds i. e.^ \j/vxt) tov iravTos. 

These three principles, according to Plotinus, con- 
stitute a divinity. The universal soul by contemplating 
itself produces all created things, just as it is one and 
the same with the first principles. Thus Plotinus 
endeavored to combine the conception of God with the 
vovs of Anaxagoras and the X070S of Plato, St. John, 
and of Philo. 

§ II. (d) In John Scotus Erigena is found a bold(<i)Erigena. 
and profound exponent of pantheistic emanation. 
Coming forth from the learned and peaceful seclusion 



iS4 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



of the Irish Universities, a master of dialectic, with a 
profound knowledge of Greek philosophy and the rare 
accomplishment of acquaintance with the Greek 
language, he is placed by Charles the Bald over the 
University of Paris. His name held a prominent place 
in the history of the intellectua,! conflicts which dis- 
turbed the times, and the influence of his personality 
and great learning was felt long after his death, for we 
read that the Albigenses of the XIII century claimed 
perfect accord with his teaching, 
kis writings 8 i2. His principle work, in which the traces of 

and 

teaching. Pantheism are found, is entitled ' On the Division of 
Nature." By nature he understands not only all-being 
but also all non-being; the distinction of God and the 
world is only apparent; in reality they are one. Exist- 
ing things emanate from God, and thus only are said 
to be real. By virtue of this emanation God and 
created things are one. The emanation takes place 
through the medium of the Word in whom all God's 
thoughts and attributes have an objective existence. 
The efflux goes on from all eternity; thus the phe- 
nomenal universe, /. ^., as we behold it, is co-eternal 
with the ideal universe, /. e.^ as it exists in the Word, 
and the essence of God is the one substance of all 
things. In this sense Erigena holds that the universe 
is an extension and a manifestation of God's being. 

(e)Cousin. § 13. (e) Victor Cousin, the founder of the Eclectic 
school in France, is not altogether free from the charge 
of Pantheism. Although he expressly condemns such 
teaching, and has found able apologists who endeavor 
to explain his writings in the orthodox sense, neverthe- 
less his words, taken in their evident meaning, show 
that such was his real mind. To him substance, as 
such, is absolutely necessary; therefore there can be 
but one substance and that is God. God is the one 



CREATION. 185 

universal sole being. The universal being embraces 
both the ego and the non-ego^ is one in its own sub- 
stance, but appears manifold in the phenomena. He 
contends that creation is not the production of things 
from nothing, for such a conception is absurd, but the 
necessary production of things by God out of His own 
divine substance. The history of the human race is 
the evolution of God in humanity. This is the doc- 
trine of emanation pure and simple.^ 

§ 14. A word in criticism of the theory will not be criticism, 
out of place. This form of Pantheism recognizes 
the two concepts of God and of the universe with 
their corresponding external realities. It admits 
that the world must have its origin and explanation 
in God, who is the absolute and primal source of 
reality. The fundamental error consists in the wrong 
view taken of how the world originated, in the failure 
to grasp the true notion of creation. This is the root 
and source of all the inconsistencies and contradictions 
which follow the theory, and render its acceptance 
impossible. It therefore exercises very little influence 
upon the trend of contemporary thought. 

II. 

Theory of Manifestation. 



traces. 



§ 15. That God should manifest Himself in divers Early 
forms and ways is a belief which has left traces in the 
early history of all known races. Thus the avartars or 
incarnations of Hinduism rest upon this belief, and the 
Polytheism of the Egyptians to some writers finds in 
this a natural basis. The true explanation is found in 
Christian Theology, which represents the world as the 
work of God and the highest manifestation of His per- 

®Dr. Matheson, in " Can the Old Faith live with the New." 



1 86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fections in the natural order, and by its side sets forth 
the theophanies of the Old Dispensation leading up to 
and finding their perfection in the Incarnation of the 
Eternal Son, the highest manifestation of God in the 
supernatural order. 

Pantheistic g j5^ Pantheism, however, is a corruption of this 

tion. truth. Christian Philosophy teaches that God is 

distinct from the world; Pantheism identifies both. 
The former contends that created things have a true 
substantial subsistence; the latter views existing things 
as modes or accidental modifications of the one eternal 
absolute substance. 

(a)in India, g jy^ (a) The earliest traces of the Manifestation 
Theory, or of Immanent Pantheism, as it is sometimes 
called, are found in India. Brahman is the abstract 
totality of all things. It is analogous to the word 
" existence " in Western Philosophy. At times the uni- 
verse was considered as an emanation from Brahman. 
Again, it was viewed as the modification of Brahman. 
For just as existence has modes, e. g.^ quality, time, 
place, etc., so the supreme principle, the only real sub- 
stance, manifested itself in various modes, /. ^., created 
things. " By means of thoughts, seeing, touching, 
and passions the incarnate self assumes successively in 
various places various forms. That incarnate self, 
according to its own qualities, assumes many shapes, 
coarse or subtle, and having caused his union with 
them he is seen as another and another through the 
qualities of his body. No beginning and no end, having 
many forms alone enveloping everything." " 

Brlhma°n § ^^- ^^^ ^^^^ being, therefore, is Brahman, the 
Self. The Self is all, is absolute. " He became like 
unto every form, and this is meant to reveal the (true) 
form of him (Atman). This is the Brahman without 

^'^ Svetasvata Up, V, 11-13, Miiller's trans. 



CREATION. 187 

cause and without effect, without anything inside or 
outside, this self is Brahman, omnipresent, omniscient. 
This is the teaching," /. e.^ of the Upanishads." 
Created things are viewed as the body of the self.^^ 
They are involucra, webs of finer or of coarser tissue 
woven over the one and only self.^^ 

§ 19. What is true of the visible world is true also of the gods a 

1 „ , r^, . , . <i T-i 1 manifesta- 

the Gods. 1 hey are a part of the universe. bactitionof 
God is but a manifestation of Brahman, for he is all 
Gods." ^* Again, Vayu, Avidya, Time, Breath, Food, 
Brahma, Rudra, Vishnu are but the chief manifesta- 
tions of the highest immortal, the incorporeal Brah- 
man.^"* This all-permeating self is manifested in the 
Gods, in the natural bodies and forces, in the hearts 
of all living things.'*' 

8 20. It is true that in passages of the Upanishads nature of 

, 11- • 1 1 1 ^ , the world. 

the world is considered as phenomenal, not real. 
Examples of the mirage, of the reflection cast by 
flowers on glass, are given to show its illusory nature. 
Nevertheless it seems to have a reality or has a reality 
to the uninstructed.^' 

821. (b) The Stoic philosophy was not merely a(b) in stoic 

rL . - .11 . 1 • X 1 • J Philosophy. 

system of Jb^taics; it has also its metaphysics. It laid 
down rules of conduct, but also grappled with the 
problems of the world's origin and nature. This aspect 
of its teaching at present appeals to our consideration. 

" Brih. Up. II, 5, 19, 

12 Brih. Up. Ill, 7; Chand. Up. IV, 5; IV, 15, i; VIII, 7, 4. 

^^ Katha Up. 11, 5, 12. 

I'^Brih. Upan. I, 4, 6. 

15 Tail. Brah. Up. IV. 

1® Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 132-137. 

^'' In the Vedanta Philosophy Lect. I, Miiller considers the 
Vedanta to be the orthodox philosophy of the Upanishads. Prof. 
Gough tries in his Philosophy of the Upanishads to prove that 
this system is found exclusively in the Upanishads. Prof. Hop- 
kins dissents from this view and holds that it can only be main- 
tained by ignoring strong and plain passages which teach 
■otherwise. E. W. Hopkins, Religions of India, p, 228, note. 



l88 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



its 
teaching. 



The Stoics taught that the world v/as produced and 
therefore was not eternal. To them God was Anima 
mundi, i. e., the soul of the w^orld.^' Holding that all 
ideas came through the senses, they maintained that 
we could have no concept of spiritual beings, God, 
therefore, was the subtlest form of matter, an activity 
after the analogy of ether or physical force. God was 
the active principle, energizing all things, forming and 
producing all things, yet of one and the same essence 
with all. " Quid aliud est natura quam Deus " exclaims 
Seneca. ^^ Such was the conception of Zeno and his 
Greek disciples. Such was the teaching of the school 
which most profoundly influenced Roman thought and 
life. Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius learned 
and transmitted this doctrine in language that for 
elevation and elegance is unsurpassed. The chief 
charm, it is true, is found in its ethical character. 
Thus their writings became the daily companions of 
the great Christian Doctors. In its metaphysics, how- 
ever, it should be classed with realistic Pantheism or 
rather pure Naturalism. ^° 
in Spinoza. g 22. Spinoza is the classic and ablest expounder of 
Immanent Pantheism.^' Born a Jew and skilled in 
Jewish thought and traditions he broke away from the 
early faith to devote himself to the study of Philoso- 
phy. The teaching of Descartes was then in the zenith 
of power and Spinoza was brought under its influence. 
Taking the definition of substance proposed by Des 
Cartes, as that whose concept needs not the concept of 

'8 St. Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. IV, ch. 31. 

19 De Benefic. IV, 7. 

^° " The Stoic doctrine of God was in its essence a somewhat 
rude Pantheism, v;hich went further than the Socratic idealism 
to the pre-Socratic Naturalism." Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of 
Religion, vol. Ill, p. 244. 

21 J. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza; Pfleiderer, The Phil- 
osophy of Religion, vol. I, § i. 



CREATION. 189 

another being for its formation, he inferred that one hisgachm| 
substance alone existed, viz., God. Created things, created 
therefore, are not substances, but only modes of the 
one infinite and necessary substance. The infinite sub- 
stance has many attributes, but two only are clearly 
perceived by the human mind, viz., infinite thought 
and infinite extension. External nature is only the 
image and manifestation of infinite thought. The 
thought is natura jiatiirans^ i. e., nature producing, 
the extended world is natura naturata, i, <?., nature pro- 
duced. To Spinoza the soul is a mode of the divine 
activity, the body is a mode which expresses after a 
certain determinate fashion the essence of God con- 
sidered as something extended. They have, therefore, 
an identity in God, inasmuch as thought and extension 
are his attributes. 

§23. Created things, being modes of God, neces- a fatalism, 
sarily exist. Hence the notion of necessity which 
influences his system throughout, rendering it a modern 
fatalism. Accordingly, he is led to deny free-will, or 
rather to teach a " free necessity," to hold predestina- 
tion or fate in all its rigidity, to do away with final 
causes. 

§ 24. The influence of Spinoza on contemporary's 
English thought has been very great. His Pantheism 
seems to correspond in general trend and in many 
details to the mechanical conception of the universe 
which has so many attractions to modern scientific 
minds. His conception of God with the two attributes 
of thought and of extension reappears in English 
Psychology, where mind and matter are held to be the 
" double-faces," ** two sides " or ** aspects " of some 
fundamental reality, and in Apologetics as a Cosmic 
Theism, proclaimed by many to be the religion of the 



IQO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

future." The English agnostic school teaches that 
God is unknowable and as such does not come \^ithin 
the scope of human thought and action; nevertheless, 
in all other points it is fashioned on the mould of 
Spinoza. Hence comes the charge — so strange at 
first sight — that Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In 
the criticism of his system we meet with the same diffi- 
culties that we find in Spinoza, /. ^., the nature of mind 
and of matter, the character of their interaction and the 
doctrine of determinism. Both Spinoza and Spencer 
teach a pure Naturalism, with this difference only that 
the God of the former becomes to the latter the 
Unknown and Unknowable behind the phenomxcna.^^ 

III. 

Transcendental Theory. 
Idealistic ^ 2K. The two theories set forth are phases of 

Pantheism. o ^ r- 

Realistic or Naturalistic Pantheism. Another, more 
subtle, which has exerted a deep and widespread 
influence on modern theistic and atheistic thought, is 
Ideal, or, as it is more correctly termed. Transcen- 
dental Pantheism. 

^2 Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy; Jacobi, Jewish Ideals, p. 58; 
Fortnightly, May, 1873; XIX Cent., Oct., 1S77. 

2^ To Spencer the forces of nature are interchangeable mani- 
festations of a universal energy which pervades space in every 
part and exerts its influence upon the innumerable bodies that 
compose the universe. Each specific force is but a transforma- 
tion of some other or a modification of that which is the 
common-ground of them all. All are but phases of the one 
great and persistent energy which, as Mr. Spencer declares, is 
the infinite force. His philosophy is thus " the scheme of 
thought which identifies the forces of the w^orld with the activi- 
ties of the First Cause." The inevitable consequences are that 
" theie is one great and universal force, of which these forces 
are manifestations and forms, and that universal force is none 
other than the creative power which has formed the earth and 
stretched out the heavens — the ever present, the unchangeable, 
the unbeginning, the unending one." Cf. Recent Physical 
Theories in their Bearing on the Theistic Argument, by Prof. 
B. N. Martin, in Christian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. I, n. xix. 



CREATION. 191 

(a) The Vedanta. 
8 26. The earliest traces of this form of Pantheism (a) The 

" Vedanta. 

must likewise be sought for in the far East. The 
Upanishads do not contain a complete and systematic 
doctrine. They are rather a collection of medita- 
tions or conferences between the sages of the forest 
and their disciples, and thrown into the form of a 
dialogue.^" 

§ 27. To the Vedantist Brahman was the eternal its 
reality. The universe as we see it by bodily senses is ^^'^ ^"^* 
phenomenal. This is due to Avidya^ i. e., Nescience. 
The aim of the Vedanta philosophy was to dispel this 
and teach the Vidya^ i. e.^ true knowledge or Brahfna- 
Vidya^ i. e.^ knowledge of the self. Thus the eyes of d) The self, 
the seer became opened and he discovered the real 
behind the unreal. The individual self is phenomenal 
also; in its ultimate reality it is one with the Highest 
Self. The Upadhis, /. e.^ the body and its organs, 
condition the Higher Self and make it appear as the 
embodied self. The Upadhis are due to Avidya. We 
cannot rid ourselves of these conditions, but we can 
grasp their true nature, soar above them, and recognize 
our substantial unity with Brahman, /. ^., the Higher 
Self." 

§ 28. The knowledge of the Self as the only reality (2) Knowi- 
is the one thing necessary. This releases man from seiFa?one ^ 
the miseries of life, and the fear of successive transmi- ^^'^^^^^''y- 
grations to a higher or lower sphere of existence after 
death."' 

'^^ Max Miiller, The Vedanta Philosophy, p. 22. 

ssMiiller, The Vedanta Phil., Lee. 2; Chandg. Up. Ill; In 
the Taith Up. I, 9, good words, i. e., sacrifices and austerity are 
essential conditions of this knowledge. 

'^ For the act of transmigration cf. Brih. Up. Ill, 9. 28; VI, 
2, 16; Chang. Up, V, 10, 7; The Laws of Manu; the embodi- 
ments are described with minute and fanciful detail in the 
Manavadharmasastra, XII, 54. sq. 



192 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



The more intense the abstraction becomes, the more 



This ob- 
tained by 

abstraction, the scnses are crashed and the " mind tranquil and 
subdued," " penetrates into the depths of his 



identity of 
individ- 
ual and 
higher self. 



cannot be 
conceived 



expressed. 



being. 

The seeming duality of subject and of object disappears 
before the gaze of the Indian sage and he is conscious 
of one being only. This being is " the great omni- 
present Self" within him apprehended by a perfect 
abstraction.'^^ 

This is the only one thing that perishes not in all 
things that perish, the one thing that gives light in all 
things that have no light. ''^ Beyond this he cannot 
go. In illustration he points to dreamless sleep. ^° To 
the sleeper the external world has no existence. 
The inequalities and miseries of life have passed. The 
duality of subject and object have melted away. His 
own self has been merged into the true impersonal 
self, "the self hidden in all things."" For when 
there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, 
one salutes the other, one perceives the other, one 
knows the other; but when the self only is all this, 
how should he see another? How should he know 
himself the Knower? ^^ 

§ 29. This principle has no visible form, says the 
Katha Upanishad. It is above and beyond the appre- 
hension of the mind. Therefore, " it can only be 
described by No." ^^ It cannot be positively conceived 
or enunciated. "Thou canst not think the thinker of the 
thought, thou canst not know the knower of all knowl- 
edge. This is thy self that is in all things that are." " 

" Katha Up. I, 2,25. 

28 Katha Up. II, 4, 4. 

29 lb. 

20 Chang. Up. VI, 8. i; VIII, 11, I. 

2^ Katha Up. I, 3, 12. 

32 Br. Up. Ill, II, 13. 

33Brih. Up. II, 3, 6; IV, 2, 4; IV, 9, 26. 

34Brih. Up. Ill, 4, 2; Mund. Up. Ill, i, 8. 



CREATION. 193 

The mind is necessitated to think of it. ** It is 
thought by him that thinks it not; he that thinks, 
knows it not; it is unknown to them that know it, 
known to them that know it not." ^^ Nevertheless, 
it cannot be formed by the mind: " that which is not 
uttered by the voice and that by which the voice is 
uttered. That which is not thought by the thought, 
that by which the thought is thought. Know thou 
that only is the Self." ^® Sat or Brahman is to be con- 
ceived as out of space or time, as free from all quali- 
ties.^^ It is other than the known, and above the 
unknown." ^^ It alone abides one in its essence 
** unchanging among changing things." ^^ 

8 ^o. This supreme principle, Sat, " that which is," Brahman 

" ^ 1117 7 7 anuncon- 

is at the root of everything and permeates all things, scious 
It also sees and knows becau3e it is vision and knowl- 
edge itself. It is not a deity in the ordinary sense of 
the word. It is but the expression of the highest 
abstraction of the human mind,"" The Brahman is, in 
our use of the word, unconscious. Consciousness is 
had where subject and object are apprehended as such. 
It IS only by the extinction of consciousness that the 
soul returns into the unity of the self. Brahman is 
called light or intelligence, but not in our use of the 
term. He is abstract knowledge, and knowledge with- 
out an object known. All that moves and breathes 
and stirs is centered in the Self.** This Self is self- 
luminous, dwelling in the heart of every living thing." 
Its light diffuses itself over the modifications of the 

36KenaUp. II, 3. 
3« Kena Up. I, 5, 9. 
3^ Svetas. Up. VI, 6. 

38 Kena Up. I, 4. 

39 Katha Up. I, 2, 22. 
^oChand. Up. VI, 8, 6. 
*iMund. Up. II, 2. 

^2 Katha Up. I, 2, 20. 

13 



194 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



like our 
word "ex- 



True 

nature of 
the soul. 



The phe- 
nomenal 
and the 
real. 



The Self 
and its 
mirrored 
counter- 
feits. 



mind and makes thoughts possible. Without this 
light, darkness and nothingness would envelop all 
things." Brahman is the abstract totality of all things, 
something like our conception of existence. To the 
Vedantist the concrete forms or modifications of exist- 
ing things were appearances. The only reality, the 
external essence is Sat, or Brahman, or the Self. 

§ 31. The true nature of the soui is the one Self. 
Individuality is fictitious. An illusion hides from the 
individual his true nature. Under the illusion it views 
itself as one with the body. In this condition he is 
subject to the rounds of births.** In the knowledge 
that he is no longer a person or self, distinct from the 
characterless plenitude of being, he sees the truth." 

§ 32. The individual and his environment are real 
for the many; they are false for the few. They exist 
in so far as they can account for all that seems to go on 
in daily life. By intuition their existence is seen to 
fade away and disappear into the higher and real exist- 
ence of the only Self. What is real and true in the 
individual is the Self within invisible. What we see in 
the individual is not real, but only involucra or seem- 
ings " woven like warp and woof over the self." " 

§ 33. The individual soul is not another and inde- 
pendent entity. The sun mirrored upon one pool may 
tremble with the rippling of the surface, and the sun 
reflected upon another may be motionless. In like 
manner the real Self is reflected upon its counterfeits, 
the bodies of sentient creatures, and thus fictitiously 



4s Katha Up. II, 5, 15; Mund. Up. II, 2, 10. 

^ Katha Up. II, 4, 10. 

45Chand. Up. VII. 

46Brih. Up. Ill, 6, 8; Kalha Up. I, 3, 10; 11, 6, 7; Chand. 
Up. Ill, 14, 2. Sankara says " the individual soul is only a 
semblance of the one and only self, as the sun imaged upon a 
watery surface is only a semblance of the one and only sun in 
the heavens." 



CREATION. 195 

shares their growth, diminution and other sensible 
modes of life. Apart from its various counterfeits, 
the Self is changeless and unvaried/' The individual, 
therefore, is only an illusion. Maya overspreads the 
self. Thus causes a fictitious limitation. The expla- 
nation or reason for the individual is avidya, /. e.. 

... . "^ ' nature of 

nescience. The individual is such because it does not individu- 
ality. 
know that it is not such.'*® 

§ 34. But Maya is more than the individual illusion. Maya is the 
Through an abstraction or aggregation, Maya came principle, 
to be viewed as the world illusion. Maya is sometimes 
fictitious; it is neither entity nor nonentity. From 
the union, before all time, of Brahman, the ultimate 
principle of reality, the one and only being, with Maya, 
the illusion, the unreal principle, have proceeded all 
things. Things seem to be manifold, but this, too, is 
an illusion."^ Before the subtle and penetrating gaze 
of the sage the veils fade away and disappear, or are 
merged into the totality of Self.^" 

8 x^. Brahman is untouched by the world-fiction. Brahman 

^ ^-^ ■> and Maya. 

In illustration they point to the sun which is unsullied 
though its rays fall on impure earth, or moving waters.'' 
Maya, the world-fiction, overspreads Brahman, as the 
mirage fictitiously overspreads the desert sands. This 
disappears and '* the great unborn consciousless Self 
alone remains." ^^ Brahman alone, the inward light 
is real; it alone abides; it alone is worthy of our 
meditations and affections." It is omnipresent like 

*■' Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, p, 49. 

*^ This is the theory of illusion, the solution of Sankara, 
Ramanuga holds the theory of evolution. Max Miillcr, The- 
osophy, p. 108. 

^^Katha Up. II, 5, 12. 

60 Br. Up. IV. 4, 23. 

" Katha Up, II, 5, H: Chand. Up. VI. 

59 Br. Up. IV, 4, 23. 

«3 Chand. Up. 11,4, 5- 



196 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



The wise 
man. 



the ether. ^'^ This universal spirit is one's own 
spirit," 
True wis- R ^6. The knowledge and vision of the Self, "the 

dom and '--' '^ . , . 

happiness, pure light of lights withm the heart, "^^ by spiritual 
abstraction, purifies the wise man from the world illu- 
sion, and makes him intelligent, /. e., self-luminous, 
frees him from the miseries of transmigration, and 
is the only salvation and bliss." Many means, 
e. g,, renunciation, meditation, bodily postures are 
enjoined. ^^ 

§ 37. The sage of the Upanishads sits rigid, insensi- 
ble to things around, his thoughts and feelings stifled, 
his mind fixed upon a single point, " the light within," 
As the meditation becomes more intense, his body and 
its environment, the vestures of the vital airs, of the 
inward sense, of the mind in turn fade away. The 
mental vesture merges into the vesture of characterless 
bliss, " a bliss a hundred times more than the highest 
human joys." ^^ Then sorrow is no more, nor fear, 
nor pain. He is not troubled at the commission of 
evil deeds nor the omission of good works.®" He is in 
the body, but untouched by actions, whether good or 
bad. " Individuals suffer because one causes belief to 
another. But in the universal soul, where all indi- 
viduals are one, their sufferings are neutralized." ®^ 
With the disappearance of the body he is liberated 
from the illusions of life in various embodiments. He 



54Chand. Up. Ill, 12, 7; HI, 18, i; IV, 10, 5; Tait. Up. i; 
Mund. Up. r. 

"Chand. Up. Ill, 13, 8; 14, 2. 

56 Mund. Up. II, 2. 

s^Katha Up. I, 4, 12; II, 6, 17. 

58Svetsasv. Up.; Tait Up. VI, 18; VI, 24; Mund. Up. Ill, i; 
II, 2, 4; Miiller, S. B. E., vol. i, p. XXIII; Katha Up. 1,2, 
11; Tait. Up. I, 8; Br. Up. IV, 4, 7- 

5»Br. Up. IV, 3, 33. 

«OTait. Up. II, 9; Br. Up. IV, 3; Tait. Up. VI, 18. 
. " Br. Up. I, 5, 20. 



CREATION. 197 

has returned into the Self as water into water, light 
into light, as rivers into the sea/^ There is no longer 
any consciousness. " As the bees make honey by col- 
lecting the juices of distant trees and reduce the juice 
into one form, and as these juices have no discrimina- 
tion so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree 
or that, in the same manner all these creatures, when 
they have become merged into the True, know not 
that they are merged into the True." "^ And again, 
" As those rivers when they are in the sea do not know 
I am this or that river. In the same manner all 
creatures, when they have come back from the Time, 
know not that they have come back from the Time." "* 
The thief, the outcast, the monk are all merged into 
the characterless Brahman. ^^ The father is no longer 
father, the mother no longer mother, the gods no 
longer gods.^^ In its true nature the soul is imper- 
sonal. It has lost or rather regained its identity. It 
did not know that it was the true Self because it had 
identified itself with fictitious vestures and embodi- 
ments. It regains itself, it recovers its true nature by 
seeing and knowing itself as it is free from the 
pleasures and pains of the world-illusion." 

§ 38. The intuition of the unity of souls in the Self 
fulfils all desires. He is motionless like pure water 
poured out upon a level surface. Such a one passes 
into the self never to return, and to use a phrase oft 
repeated in the Upanishads, is lost " like a lump of salt 
in salt water." ®® His mind reflects the pure light of 
undifferenced being; his personality becomes one with 

« Mund. Up. Ill, 2, 8. 

«3Chand. Up. 9, i. 

64 lb., VI, 10, I. 

«5 Brih. Up. IV, 3, 22. 

««Ib. 

«^ Br. Up. IV, 3, 23. 

«« Br. Up. II, 4, 12. 



198 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the Self. No hope of recompense spurs him on. The 
paradise of Brahma and the gods is but transitory and 
empt3\ As the clouds slowly break away and disperse, 
letting the sun shine forth in pure radiance; so the 
fictions of the world-seeming pass away and the self 
alone abides. "It is this undying Self that is out- 
spread before, Self behind, Self to the right. Self to 
the left, above, below; Brahman alone is all this." ^^ 
All works are exhausted; metempsychosis with all its 
miseries has passed; all doubts disappear; all affec- 
tions are crushed; the sage wakes out of this dream- 
world into real being, the soul enters into the All of 
things. 

(b) Ger?7ian Transce7identalis7?i. 

TraScend" § ^9' -^^ ^'^^ ^^^^ ccntury Emmanuel Kant, a pro- 

entaUsm. fessor in Konigsberg, dissatisfied with the condition of 

current philosophical teaching, felt that a remedy 

should be provided. For years in studious retirement 

he turned the problem over and over in his mind and 

The Critic finally published the Critic of Pure Reason. This 

of Kant. , ^ , , , ^ , . . 

work exerted a profound and lasting impression on 
subsequent philosophic and religious thought. In it 
are found the sources of two great tendencies of 
modern thought: Transcendental Pantheism, and 
Modern Scepticism, whose highest and legitimate form 
is reached in Agnosticism, 
^is 3 40. Kant attemoted to effect a revolution in Philoso- 

teacnmg. s ^ >■ 

phy, analogous to that worked by Copernicus in 
Astronomy. '° The radical error in preceding systems 
was to him the fact that they rested upon a wrong 
basis. Instead of teaching that thought should be 
conformed to external things, Kant boldly maintained 

«9Mund. Up. II, 1. II. 

'^Critic of Pure Reason, pref. to 2d ed.; IMiiller's Trans., p. 
693. 



CREATION. 199 

the contrary. He thus reversed the whole fabric of 
Philosophy. To him the mind was the real center, 
and the subjective alone was true. External things as 
they really exist can never be known. The mind per- 
ceives objects only as they are covered over by subjec- 
tive conditions or forms of thought. These forms, /. ^., 
ideal phenomena^ thus become the objects known. 
Hence the ideal only is apprehended, the real, /. <?., 
noumena, forever escape our grasp. 

§ 41. This fundamental principle was seized bypichte. 
Pichte and developed with all the ardor of an enthusi- 
astic disciple. The subject, /. ^., the /or 7ne, to him 
was the fundamental and only reality. The outer 
world was the mirror of the /. The existence of the 
7" is a most certain fact of consciousness; its essence 
is unknown and does not concern us. We know it only 
as an activity, forming internal images and representa- 
tions. The /is thus conceived as possessing a creative 
power, and by the exercise of this power becomes con- 
scious of itself. The / is the subject; the object or 
image is the non-I. The image is the self-determination 
of the / and is viewed as its conscious modification. In 
this consciousness the /and the non-I 2ive again united. 

§ 42. The phenomena of the external world are only The infinite 
the representations of the/. These result from thelSite. ^ 
activity of the / and are its limitations. Freed from 
these, the / becomes the infinite. The original and 
fundamental consciousness is that of the infinite /. This 
/is not conceivable by the mind, is not conscious, 
nor a person, nor a substance, nor a spirit, nor a 
reality. To attribute such qualities to God is to limit 
Him and place Him in the category of the finite. God 
is a pure activity; pure thought is the divine existence; 
human existence is absolutely one with the divine." 

'^ Ficbte, by Robert Adamson, ch. VI, VII. 



200 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Idea of 
creation. 



Schelling. 



Schoppen- 
hauer. 



Hartman. 



history. 



§ 43. Thus to Fichte the / pure and transcendental 
is the only reality; this possesses infinite activity; it 
is thus determined to know the / and the non-Ij to 
know them is to create; before I had the consciousness 
of myself, writes Fichte, I did not exist. 

§44. With Fichte the /was the only reality; the 
non-I was its production. To Schelling they both were 
real, because they were one and the same. His funda- 
mental principle was the identity of the /and the non-I^ 
of the mind thinking and the thing thought. 

§ 45. Schoppenhaur replaces the idea of Hegel by the 
concept of will. To him the will is the only reality; 
everything else in the world are effects, evolutions or 
phenomena of Will. The Will manifests itself in 
different ways; in nature as a physical force, in man 
as consciousness; therefore, only as manifested in man 
does it possess personality, and with the death of 
man loses personality. Of a personal God distinct 
from the world, the mind can know absolutely nothing. 

§ 46. Hartman felt that the will alone was insuffi- 
cient; to it must be added the idea. But the will and 
the idea are to be explained; they cannot exist abso- 
lutely; they point to a further concept, which is funda- 
mental and primal. This principle is the Uncojiscious, 
It is at the same time one and everything. Through 
the idea and the will it evolves and becomes every- 
thing. Existing things are only the appearances of the 
Unconscious 

II. 

DuALiSTic Theory. 

§ 47. The theory of Pantheism resolves all things 
into one absolute principle. Other philosophers, how- 
ever, explain the origin of the universe by postulating 
tw^o principles equally eternal and supreme. This 



CREATION. 201 

theory has attracted men of great gifts but has not 
exerted the influence of the Pantheistic system. It is 
found in the highest stage of Greek philosophy. It 
has been ascribed to Plato." Others hold that Aris- 
totle taught the coexistence of two eternal principles. 
It is certain that he maintained the eternity of matter. 
St. Thomas was influenced by the opinion of Aristotle 
to contend that creation from eternity was possible. 
Thus he attempted to reconcile the philosophers with 
the revealed truth of Catholic faith. 

§48. The Stoics are said to hold the existence of stoics. 
two principles; the one was matter, the other was the 
world-soul. It is easy to conceive that some of them 
should so believe after the analogy of man composed 
of body and soul. Tertullian is the authority for this." 

8 49. The problem of good and evil has engaged the Ethical 

. r 1 t r i • ^^ -TT • 1 dualism. 

attention of thoughtful men in all ages. Various solu- 
tions have been proposed. The solution that has 
interest at present is that drawn from the later Persian 
cosmogony and taught as a cardinal doctrine by the 
Manichean heretics. To explain the simultaneous (a) Mani- 
existence of good and evil they postulated two eternal *^^^^"^' 
principles; the one, the cause of all the good, the 
other, the cause of all the evil that exists. These two 
principles are mutually opposed. The preponderance 
of good or evil is explained by temporary advantage 
gained by the one over the other. This teaching pro- 
foundly influenced early Christianity. St. Augustine (b)St. 
fell under its sway for some years." We find it com-^"^^^"^^ 
ing out afresh in the doctrines of the Albigensians of (^w g. 
the XII century. In our day it has been advanced by^^^- 
John Stuart Mill." 

" Timaeus. 

"Contr. Hermog., c. 1. VIII. 

'* Confessions. 

" Ess. on Rel. on Nature, p. 41. 



202 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

III. 

Theory of Creation. 

emS^of "the § 5°' '^^^^ ^^^ universe is dependent has been proved 

universe, ^o a Certainty. Mathematics shows that it limited in 
time and in space. Physics points out that it had a 
beginning and that it will have an end. We can indicate 
the approximate period when vegetable, animal and 
human life first appeared. That life can come only 
from pre-existing life is an established truth of Biology. 
Hence the source of terrestrial life must be outside and 
beyond the universe. The laws of motion, the proper- 
ties of matter prove that the inorganic world in its 
intimate nature depends on some higher and external 
power. Thus we have been led to the conception of 
God, His principal attributes have been indicated as 
far as human reason from the contemplation of mun- 
dane existences can conceive them. We know that God 
is a spirit; that He is living and intelligent. The 

The nature Problem that now confronts us is how to account for 

pendence' ^^^ beginning of the universe, or what is the nature of 
its dependence. 

Creation. §51- Three thcorics are proposed : (a) Pantheism in 
its various phases; (b) Philosophic Dualism; (c) Crea- 
tion. The first two have been analyzed critically and 

entproba-' found Untenable. This leaves an antecedent proba- 
^^^' bility in favor of the third hypothesis, viz., Creation. 

notion of § 5 2. The classic definition of Creation is: Productio 
rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti^ i. e., the production of a thing 
from nothing in the sense that before its production 
neither the thing itself existed, nor did any subject- 
matter exist from which the thing could be fashioned. 
An illustration may be drawn from ordinary work. 
Thus a carpenter may carve a piece of furniture from 
a block of wood, or a sculptor may chisel a statue from 



CREATION. 203 

a rough piece of marble. Neither the one nor the 
other existed as such before the workman fashioned 
them; hence he is said to have produced them ex ?iihilo 
sid. But the material existed; this the workman did 
not make; he simply took it and made it assume such 
and such a shape; hence he did not produce the statue 
ex nihilo subjecti. Thus the ordinary workman is not a 
creator but only an artificer. In extraordinary works 
of genius as, e. g.^ a wonderful poem, or a great paint- 
ing, the writer or artist is called the creator and his 
work dignified by the title of creation, because the 
extraordinary brilliancy of the work, the extreme rarity 
and difficulty of production, the slender means at his 
disposal arouse in the mind the thought that from 
almost nothing at his disposal this man has produced 
something which for ages will challenge the admiration 
of man. The apparent absence of any material or sub- 
ject-matter out of which the works of genius can be 
formed makes them approximate to the true notion 
of creation and obtains for them the title. 

8 q^. For this reason creation is said to be the pro- meaning of 

^ . . . . the phrase 

duction of a thing out of nothing. The phrase has given "'produced 
rise to much misconception, false imputation and con- nothing." 
fusion. When we say out of nothing, we do not imply 
that nothing was the material or subject-matter after nothing not 
the analogy of the sculptor. Christian Philosophy has cause, 
clearly and repeatedly explained the words. They do 
not imply any notion of material causality whatsoever; 
they refer only to the order of time or of succession. 
Thus, e. g., in explaining creation out of nothing we 
simply mean that before creation there was nothing; 
that by creation things began to exist; that there is no 
question of a causal connection between nothing and 
existence, only a mere succession.''^ The famous 

'^ St. Thomas, Contra Gent. L. II, ch. 16. 



204 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

from noth- dictum handed down by antiquity and employed to-da5% 

ing notning •' t. =/ i > j -> 

comes. that from nothing fwthing co??ies, is thus shorn of mean- 
ing and strength. The phrase is based upon ambiguity 
and misconception. It only has a meaning when we 
admit a causal connection between the two terms. 
This Christian Philosophy has ever emphatically 
denied and it should be heard in its own behalf/'' 

dependence 8 <A.. The dependent nature of the universe has been 

explained. ^ -^^ ^ 

proved beyond question. The arguments set forth 
show that the world, considered as a whole or in its 
several parts, /. e., the particular beings, alike are 
dependent. Now what is dependent had a beginning, 
or in other words, has been produced. It could not 
be produced by an emanation from the divine sub- 
stance, nor is it a manifestation or evolution of a real 
or ideal divine being. These are the various phrases 
of Pantheism." 
(a) not by § 55. (a) It is absurd to suppose that the different 
beings are the emanations of God. God then would be 
divided; His substance would have parts, and every 
thing that is would be a portion of the divinity. Con- 
sciousness presents an inseparable barrier to this 
theory. It tells me that I am a person distinct from 
refuted by God and from every other being. Again, this theory 
and^EtmS saps the foundation of Ethics, If everything were a 
part of God, it would have the nature of God and its 
activities vv^ould be divine. How, then, could we make 
a distinction between good and bad? That there 

'''St. Augustine, Op. Imp. contra Julian, V, 31; Si. Thomas, 
1. q. 45, a. T, ad. 3. As Lucretius expresses it 

" Priacipium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet: 
NuUam rem nihilogigni divinitus unquam." 

De Nat. 1, V. 148. 
■'^ According to J. G. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 140, Mar- 
tineau makes creation an external process like a self-scissure of 
the Deity in whom in some way the world was always con- 
tained; " Dr. Upton teaches a theory of pantheistic mani- 
festation and scission in Hibbert Lectures, 1893. 



CREATION. 205 

IS such a distinction is a fundamental and evident 
truth. 

8 k6. (2) The Pantheism of manifestation, whether (t>) not by 

o s} \ 7 7 manifesta- 

it be viewed as real or as ideal, is no less untenable, tion 

. theory. 

Consciousness bears witness to my own substantial 
reality; it teiis me that /am not a mere mode or 
manifestation of something else. The substantial 
reality of the / is a firm conviction of ordinary daily 
life and an evident and fundamental truth of Psy- refuted by 

•^ Psychol- 

chology. No fallacious reasoning can obliterate this, ogy. 
and the system of Philosophy which neglects the dis- 
tinction is faulty in its very basis and will surely fail to 
give the answer to the deepest questions of being and 
of life which the mind in every age imperatively 
demands." 

§ 57- (3) It is opposed to and contradicted by the bjr Physical 
physical sciences. Everywhere in the broad field of 
science the substantial reality of mundane beings is 
taken for granted; their properties are set forth, their 
laws are formulated. Not only are these beings con- 
ceived and dealt with as substantial realities, but they are 
recognized as substances differing one from another in 
their substantial nature. Reasoning from this evident 
truth, we speak of the classifications and hierarchy of 
real beings. Hence also the basis for the real distinc- 
tion and difference of the various sciences. Through- 
out there is question of substantial realities, not of 
appearances; of beings differing one from another in 
nature. In the supposition of one substance only, or 
of the essential identity of all things, such a process 
would be absurd and open to manifest contradictions. 

§ 58. (4) Again, this form of Pantheism supposes by prin- 
that the perfect and determined have followed and reason, 
proceeded from the imperfect and the undetermined. 

" Christian Philosophy, The Soul. ch. I, VI. 



206 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence the imperfect is prior to the perfect; the former 
produces the latter. But this is contradicted by the 
principle of causality. It is an evident and funda- 
mental truth that the effect cannot be more perfect 
than the cause. In some manner the perfection of 
being which we discover in the effect must be precon- 
tained in the cause. Hence Pantheism is opposed to 
the first principle of sound reasoning. It is also con- 
tradicted by the principle of contradiction. If God 
and the world were one and the same being, then this 
being would at the one and same time be infinite and 
finite, eternal and temporary, necessary and depend- 
ent, immutable and subject to constant change, imper- 
fect and ever becoming perfect. Such a position is 
absurd. Hence we are constrained to reject it 
altogether. 
(2) not by R erg. (b) Another solution is sought in the pre-exist- 

Dualistic ^ Jy \ / _ b •^,.. 

Theory. ence or the eternity of matter. According to this view 
God fashioned the world from pre-existing matter. 
He thus becomes the designer or Artificer, not the 
Creator. This theory cannot stand criticism and for 
two main reasons 
refuted by (i) It is contradictory to the known nature of matter 
o^ mat"en and therefore utterly lacks foundation in fact. The 
properties of matter show that it cannot be eternal. 
Science proves that the world had a beginning as it 
will surely have an end. Even if we grant that matter 
is eternal, the hypothesis will not be one whit 
strengthened. Matter as such is dependent. The 
prolongation of its existence to an eternity will never 
change its nature. External matter can never be other 
than dependent. To maintain that God fashioned the 
world from pre-existing or eternal matter is a mani- 
fest contradiction. In the hypothesis it is conceived 
to be independent; but in its nature it is evidently 



CREATION. 207 

dependent. Therefore, the hypothesis is contrary to 
a known truth and must accordingly be rejected. 

§ 60. (2) The world cannot be the cause of itself. (3) The 

_ . , ., 1-1 • 1 1 . world can- 

It is a philosophical axiom that a being cannot act not be the 

,-.. -ri • • 1 1 • • cause of 

before it exists. It does not exist m hypothesis; it itself. 
does exist on the supposition that it exerts activity. 
Thus it would have existed and not have existed at the 
same time, which is a patent contradiction. 

§ 61. (c) The final theory proposed is that of Cre- (4) Theory 
ation. This is the theory of Christian Philosophy. It 
alone is free from contradiction and appeals to sound 
reasoning.^" 

8 62. (i) The rejection of all other hypothesis is a(a)negative 

o \ y J ^ J i- argument. 

negative argument for creation. It alone now pos- 
sesses the field, and taking the fact that it has been 
taught consistently and constantly for two thousand 
years by the most powerful and soundly reasoned 
school of philosophy that has ever appealed to or influ- 
enced the minds of thinking men, the negative proof 
has a weight and force which cannot be lightly treated. 

§ 62,. (2) Furthermore, no contradiction can be (b) it is not 
pointed out in this theory. It is a fact that the uni- dktor^y"^'^^' 
verse is dependent and limited; it is a fact that it did 
not always exist; it is a fact that this theory alone 
does full and impartial justice to the nature of the 
world and the conception of God. We may not com- 
prehend the manner^ but we can reason to the fact. It 
is true that the act of creation implies infinite power; 
but the conception of God as supreme and infinite is 
deep-seated in the mind; it is what makes God what 
He is. 

§ 64. (3) If it be objected that a difiiculty is found (c) creation 
in understanding how a spirit can bring into existence Svabie?' 

^° The sublime passages in Confessions of St. Augustine, b. 
10, ch. 6; b. II. ch. 4. 



208 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

confusion ^ substancc distinct from itself," we answer that the 

of intellect ' 

and sense, difficulty ariscs f roHi the confusion of intelligence and 
imagination. It is hard to imagine such a process. 
Yet it is not so hard to conceive. ^^ The foregoing dis- 
cussion is a preparation of the mind to receive and 
admit creation as the only possible explanation. 
Furthermore, by way of partial illustration we may 
illustration appeal to the works of the human intellect. The mind 
life. not only builds houses, and fashions mechanical imple- 

ments from materials already existing. It possesses 
what is called a creative power. Literature -and the 
fine arts are its product. The more closely the human 
mind approximates to the concept of divine creation, 
the higher it is conceived to be in the scale of intelli- 
gence and the greater are its works. It clothes its 
concepts in the written and spoken word. How differ- 
ent the sight and sound from the thing signified! 

^^ A. K. Rogers, Modern Philosophy, p. 51. 

^^ J. G. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 148, writes that creation is 
absolutely inconceivable; so also Wm. Graham in Creed of 
Sciences, p. 4. 



CHAPTER XL 

UNITY. 

§ I. The line of thought developed in the preceding , 
chapters brings home to the mind of the thoughtful 
reader the conviction that the visible universe does 
not exhaust all reality, that behind and beyond what 
appears to sense or appeals to thought, there is another 
being on whom the present world rests and in whom 
alone it finds a rational and complete explanation. 

§ 2. Call it what you may, dignify it by the most the fact, 
sublime conceptions of the human soul, represent it as 
the "World Ground,"^ pause before as the great 
" Unknown," ^ its existence cannot be ignored or 
denied. The labored efforts of Philosophical reason- 
ing afford dim glimpses of a far-away truth; their tone 
is wavering and uncertain; they have no power over 
the mind; they seem like half-concessions or studied 
apologies. The term " God " is artfully avoided or 
covered over with learned verbiage. Consecrated by 
long use, bound with the dearest recollections of life, 
— the memories of childhood, appealing to our entire 
being with its varied questionings, needs and aspira- 
tions, no other word in our language brings the truth 
nearer or expresses it with more simple force or reveals 
its living reality and influence upon our daily lives. 

§ 3. The task is by no means complete with the bare the 
proof that an extramundane being exists. A further 
purpose remains. It is necessary to show, as far as 
human reason can, that this being corresponds to the 

' Bowne, Phil, of Theism, 
' Spencer, First Principles. 

14 [209] 



2IO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Christian notion of God. This is an investigation inta 
the nature of the divine attributes. The first and 
fundamental problem is the Unity of God. 

I. 

Unity. 

^tyof g 4, That God is one is a certainty, though not a 

truth evident at first sight. ^ The contrary has been 
held and taught at different times even by entire 
races. Historically viewed, this teaching is justly esti- 
mated as a corruption and an error. The primitive 
belief of the human mind was that God is one. 
Research into the earliest languages reveals the forms 
and convictions which possessed the minds of our 
remote ancestors. Everywhere are found traces of a 
clear and defmite monotheism. The records of the 
past, whether preserved in sacred books or engraved 
on monuments, confirm this conclusion. The History 
of Religions day by day presents arguments in support 
of this position. Idolatry and Polytheism were not 
the primitive forms of human worship. They have 
been given a proper place in the development of 
religious thought and are now viewed as degradations 
or corruptions of a purer belief. 

viewed § 5. Thus the farther back we go in the life of a 

historically. . , , ••,11 

nation, the purer and more spiritual are the conceptions 
of the Supreme Being. Human reason confirms the 
voice of history. Among the most civilized races of 
antiquity we find a protest against Polytheism in the 
form of a philosophic reaction. Hence the rise and 
spread of philosophical systems with the Hindus, the 
Greeks, and the Romans. Differing one from anothef 

2 Inferred from the order and harmony of the universej 
Athanasius, C. Gentes; St. Thomas, C. Gentes, 1. I, ch. 14. 



philosophi 



UNITY. 211 

in the conception of the universe and of its formation, 
they nevertheless owe their origin and existence to the 
conviction of a unity at the base of all things. The 
marvelous order and harmony of the world, the reign 
of law which obtains throughout, the manifest signs of 
a universal system, made up, it is true, of many parts, 
yet welded into a compact whole, the scale of beings caiTy 
from the pure material existences up to the highest 
forms of organic life, their varied and intricate rela- 
tions and experiences reveal a unity of action which 
cannot fail to impress the thoughtful mind. The 
argument from Order not only proves the existence of 
a divine Architect and Creator; it proves also to con- 
viction that the cause of all is one. No simpler or 
stronger expression of this truth can be found than in 
the word " universe," consecrated by long usage of 
English-speaking peoples. The world in all its entirety 
is designated by the term ** universe," /. e.^ one uni- 
versal system made up of many parts. 

II. 

Simple Unity. 

§ 6. It is not sufficient to say that God is a unity, ui^ty^ 
We could not draw any definite conclusion therefrom, 
nor could we from the phrase, as it stands, form a real 
and definite conception. There are various kinds of 
unity. To be exact we must distinguish. For under 
an apparently clear term the strangest aberrations of 
the human mind have been covertly proposed. 

1°, Collective Unity. 

§ 7. y4 collective unity is an aggregate of elements or collective 
of individuals distinct and separable, but formed into""^'^' 
a whole by some common bond. This bond may be 



212 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

physical, i. e., links form one chain, or moral, i. e., law 
unites persons to form a community or government, or 
intellectual, e. g., as in the words or sentences of an 
essay or an argument/ 
this the g 8. That God is a collective unity is the teaching: of 

doctrine of " y o 

Pantheism. Pantheism. Mention is here made of the Pantheism 
of Emanation and of Manifestation. Further on, 
German Pantheism, in which the notion of Evolution 
predominates, will be subjected to criticism. Accord- 
ing to these forms of Pantheism the visible universe is 
an emanation from or a manifestation of the one divine 
substance. Thus existing things are a part of God; 
they partake of the divine nature and, in the highest 
sense of the word, are divine. God is therefore the 
sum of everything; there is nothing distinct from him; 
He is all that is.^ 

criticism. g c). Pantheism is compelled to teach the unity 
of God; but the unity is only a shadow of the real- 
ity. Under the strong light of logical analysis it 
disappears and there is presented to our gaze only a 
strange assemblage of objects differing one from 
another in nature.® Even then there is a unity appar- 
ent, but the unity is that of order and of system, not 

* Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 71. 

^ " The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist 
harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing. 
Hence the Absolute is, so far, an individual and a system." 
Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p, 144= "All differences come 
together in the Absolute . . . The Absolute is the richer for 
every discord and for all diversity which it embraces; and it is 
our ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object." 
P. 204. This teaching is pure Idealism, after the Neo-Kantian 
type, for we read " The Absolute is one system and its contents 
are nothing but sentient experience." P. 146. 

®Thus the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel teach that " God is 
the unity into which we combine the affections of our religious 
sensitivity and to which we refer them as its qualities." Cf. 
L. Stahlin, in Kant, Lotze and Ritschel, p. 200. In this we see 
Kant's apperception, and Jacobi's Sentimentalism combining 
into a form of Pantheism. 



UNITY. 213 

of nature and intimate constitution. Scholastic Phil- 
osophy having a basis on sound reasoning proclaims 
the former and from it infers the unity of the con- 
trolling power which guides and sustains all things. 
Pantheism proclaims the latter in opposition to the 
testimony of consciousness which tells me that I am 
distinct from my fellows and from the world around, 
and gives no intimation whatsoever that my nature is 
a part of God. It is in contradiction to the funda- 
mental principles of right and wrong, to the common 
sense of man, and without the slightest vestige of 
scientific proof."' 

IV. 

2°. Potential Unity. 
8 10. The term Potential is not used in its Scholastic potential 

^ unity. 

meaning. St. Thomas speaks of a potential whole, 
as a unity which by virtue of its nature is capable of 
exerting its activity in various ways. These various 
modes or channel of activity are called potencies, a 
word identical in meaning with our English term 
faculty. Thus, the soul, in its nature a simple unity, 
exerts its activity in various ways, which are called 
potencies or faculties.® 

§ II. Here by potential unity is designated a thing its meaning, 
which, not yet one in its complete essence, is yet in 
potency to become one. The unity, therefore, is the 
result of development; it is a something which has 
grown up; actually it is nothing, potentially it is 
something.^ 

§ 12. That God is a potential unity is the doctrine its teachers, 
advanced in common by the Pantheistic disciples of 

■'Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 166. 
^Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. iii. 
^ Wallace's Hegel, Prolegomena, ch. VII. 



214 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Kant. They may differ one from another in the start- 
ing point or in the form in which the system is pro- 
posed, nevertheless the characteristic notion is that of 
potentiality or evolution. 

Fichte. g i2_ Thus to Fichte, individual consciousness is the 

primary fact and the true basis of philosophy. The 
Consciousness of the absolute Ego alone orginally 
exists. But this Consciousness receives its first form 
in the existence of the individual Ego. We know not 
the nature of that which thinks; we only know it as an 
activity, /. e.^ as forming and representing images. 
Thus by acting the Ego creates itself; it becomes 
actually what it was potentially. The internal image 
is known as something different from the Ego. 

Thus arises self-consciousness and the distinction 
between the Ego and the non-Ego. This duality is not 
real or permanent. In the very act of forming an 
image, the Ego is conscious that the image is only a 
modification of itself. In this consciousness the Ego 
and the non-Ego become a unity. The varied phe- 
nomena of the world, therefore, are only the repre- 
sentation of the individual Ego, and this in turn is lost 
in the inner consciousness or Ego. God, therefore, 
is a pure activity, just as the individual Ego is not a 
being but a pure activity. Pure thought is God, and 
in pure thought man perceives God. 

Scheiiing. § 14. With Fichte the Ego alone was real; the non- 
Ego was its image or representation. Scheiiing, on 
the contrary, held both to be real, but their reality 
consists in their identity. We cannot think without 
thinking of something. Thus the subject thinking and 
the object thought have a fundamental unity. This is 
called the Absolute Ego and is conceived as a mind 
which has in itself the potency to become everything, 
and by its own evolution evolves the potential into the 



UNITY. 215 

actual, first in the world of matter and of animal life, 
finally in the world of man. God thus becomes " the 
living unity of all forces." 

§15. To Hegel thought was existence; what is Hegel, 
rational is real, and the absolute thought or idea is the 
highest reality. God, therefore, is the absolute mind. 
The mind conceives the Absolute as being. This con- 
cept of being is primitive, necessary and indeterminate. 
He calls it a pure being. As such it is distinguished 
from nothing. The bond of their union is a becoming, 
/. e. , TO fieri. 

§ 16. The idea, /. <?., to fieri, by a constant process 
evolves itself into all that is. The evolution is seen 
(i) in Logic which explains the genesis and nature of 
the idea; (2) in the philosophy of nature, which is the 
idea of its otherness. The evolution is marked by 
three stages, viz., the mechanical, the physical, and 
the organic; (3) in the philosophy of spirit, which 
shows how the idea returns from nature. The terminus 
of evolution is reached in self-consciousness.^" The 
idea with Hegel is God, but God viewed as abstract 
and universal. As such He is a pure potency, con- 
taining in Himself the power to become all things. 
What we grasp is the becoming, the to fieri, a divine 
process, God realizing Himself in the world of nature 
and of man." 

§ 17. The potential differs but little from the criticism, 
collective unity. It is a peculiar aspect only of n^t differ- 
the latter. The same criticism applies to both. ThecSnicSve 

unity. 

]0" The strength and merit of the Hegelian philosophj^ lay in 
this that it applied the Idealism of the Kantian subjective 
philosophy to the historical life of humanity and has understood 
that life in the light of a development of the spirit in conformity 
with law." Pfleiderer, Philosophy and Development of 
Religion, vol. i, p. 23. 

^^ Belford Bax, Handbook of History of Mod. Philosophy 
p. 406. ' 



2l6 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



purely 
ideal. 



self con- 
tradictory. 



characteristic of the latter form of Pantheism is the 
element of a perpetual evolution process. ^^ To Schel- 
ling God only becomes personal in self-consciousness. 
With Hegel the highest manifestation or evolution of 
the idea, /. ^., God is found in self-conscious mind. 
Now the conception of a potential God evolving and 
realizing Himself in nature and in man is a travesty of 
the truth. ^^ It is a pure ideal conception, based upon 
unsound metaphysical principles, and v/ithout the 
slightest verification. It represents a conception of 
God at first indeterminate, imperfect, vague, and 
indefinite, who by a perpetual process of evolution 
becomes definite, more perfect and more determined. 
§ i8. The thoughtful reader sees v/hat a strange con- 
tradiction is here presented, /. ^., of an abstract entity, 
determining itself,^^ and becoming more perfect by 
virtue of its very limitation, and realizes how inevitably 
such a teaching has failed to hold the assent of the 
earnest thinkers in our days. Hence the attempt to 
modify these doctrines, to preach a Neo-Hegelianism 
or to pass by Hegel and start once more from Kant.^^ 



^2 The Absolute is " the result together with its becoming." 
This process of evolution is crowned and consummated in 
spirit, is itself the ultimately real. Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism 
and Personality, p. 8i, With Mr. Rogers in Modern Philo- 
sophy, p. 222, "A unity which, as intelligent and active purpose, 
takes up the complexity of means which are needed for its 
accomplishment as an essential part of itself." And Mr. Schur- 
man writes " In the case of the Ego we have not merely a 
mode of the divine activity; we have as it were a part of the 
divine essence." Belief in God, pp. 227, 228, 

^2 To Mr. Bradley everything is the absolute, *' the ideal system 
of metaphysics is to show how the world physical and spiritual 
realizes by various stages and degrees the one absolute prin- 
ciple." P. 359; cf. also Dr. S. Harris, Phil. Basis of Theism, 
p. 410. 

^4 Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. II, p. 79. 

^^ Recent writers recognize this error in Hegel and try to 
explain it away by contending that he is concrete not abstract. 
Cf, A. R. Rogers, Modern Philosophy, ch. on Hegel. " That 
nature should be comprehended as the living tissue which a 



UNITY. 217 

Neither one nor the other can furnish what the mind 
craves. It is in vain that we try to pull and twist their 
teaching. The fundamental principles of both are 
erroneous. The sad consequences they lead to are only 
legitimate products. ^^ Both are in contradiction to 
true science and sound philosophy. Their only real 
value is now historical. Looking back we view them 
as abnormal phases in the history of the human mind, 
and wonder how we could be so deeply influenced by 
them. Constant and earnest thought has shown how 
strange these assumptions, how patent their contra- 
dictions, how distant and speculative they are, how 
hard to realize their teaching, and what little real 
influence they had upon our lives. 

3°. Abst7'act Unity. 

§ 19. By abstract unity is understood a unity which Abstract 
is the creation of the mind and has existence only in 
the mind. God thus becomes an ideal, and religion 
consists in the worship of the ideal, /. ^., in our con- 
scious recognition of and aspiration to it with its 
corresponding influence to uplift and purify the intel- 
lectual and moral life. Not, however, in the sense that 
God or Christ is proposed as an ideal by Christian 
Philosophy. Jesus has a real and objective existence, 
and owing to the divine perfection of His nature 
He is, in the highest meaning of the term, a model An ideal, 
according to which we should fashion and mould our 
lives. The ideal God of modern philosophy is far 

divine spirit is ever weaving " is not a " doctrine dangerous or 
even antipathetic to natural theology." Schurman, Belief in 
God. p. 174. 

*^ Thus Feuerbach inverted Hegel's position and taught that 
the human spirit was God. " He is nothing more than the 
Optative of the human heart converted into the certain and 
blessed Indicative. Pfieiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. II, p. iig. 



2l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

diSerent. It is a simple conception representing the 
highest aspiration of our social, or intellectual, or 
ethical life, vague and shadowy in its nature, having 
no reality, and conveying no meaning any other than 
the projection of the mind upon itself. This idea 
appears in various forms; and its wide prevalence 
to-day calls for a distinct and separate discussion." 
shown in 8 20. The aim of Positivism was the reform of 

(a) Positiv- ^ 

Th Rr society. It is therefore primarily a Sociology. Its 
ion of peculiar metaphysical and religious aspects can thus 

Humanity. ^ ^ -' o r- 

be expla!ned. All departments of learnmg lead up to 
Sociology; it is the culmination and perfection of the 
sciences. To propose a new science of Sociology — 
one free from the imperfections and errors hitherto 
taught and followed, Comte felt that the fundamental 
principles which obtained in the hierarchy cf science 
should be modified or changed. Hence his Metaphy- 
sics, which alone was adopted by some disciples, e. g., 
Littre, and the English writers, e. g., John Stuart 
Mill, Frederick Harrison, George Eliot. To us, at 
first sight, this seems to be Positivism in its purity. 
A critical examination, however, reveals that the meta- 

^■^ Modern Guides of English Thought in Matter of Faith, ch. 
V, George Eliot, R. H. Hutton, p. 275. " You do not so 
much as touch the threshold of religion, so long as j^ou are 
detained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of 
entrance to it, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that 
your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush 
of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and per- 
suasion of the soul of souls; short of this there is 720 object given 
you, and you have not even reached the specified point of 
admiration. Within the limits of pure sincerity, no one can ever 
worship either a nature beneath him or an idea within him; 
however big may be the one, though it comprise all forces and 
all stars, if that be all, it will be venerable to no spirit that can 
comprehend it; and however fine may be the other, if it be but 
a dreamer's image, a phenomenon of perishable consciousness, 
it can never be more than the personality that has it, so as to 
make him suppliant." J. Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. 
I, p. 13. 



UNITY. 219 

physics of Comte contain nothing new, that they can 
be considered as the legitimate consequences of Hume's 
teaching, and that accordingly many English writers 
have proposed the same, and distinctly disclaim any 
dependence upon or indebtedness to Comte. ^® 

§2 1. Comte's theology was the offspring of hisCompte's 

^ * . , ^_ . , , ,,..., teaching. 

Sociology. Humanity to him was the dominating idea. 
To uplift and perfect the human race was his sole aim. 
In his metaphysics he considers that alone to be 
positive which is within the domain of the senses. 
What is' above or beyond the reach of sense does not 
exist. Hence there is no God, no angel, no soul. The 
religious instincts of our nature are a fact, v/hich 
obtrudes upon every conscious mind and cannot be 
ignored in any system of Philosophy. The human soul 
will worship God, even to the extent as to create Gods 
for its worship. Comte felt that the need had to be 
supplied. Having shut off every avenue by which the 
mind might rise to the true concept of God, of neces- 
sity he invented a false one. If nothing exists but 
what sense shows, we must fashion God from the testi- 
mony of sense. As a natural and logical consequence 
of his system, he made man the highest object of 
worship. Not the individual, for our feelings would 
revolt, but humanity as a whole in its highest develop- 
ment. The final end of his Sociology and Philosophy 
thus becomes the highest object of faith and worship. 
The abstract idea of humanity becomes God. This 
idea is made the center of an elaborate ritual, borrowed 
entire from the liturgy of the Catholic Church. He 
marked out a festal year, he prescribed an elaborate 
ceremonial. By unmeaning shadows he attempted to 
give reality and life to what was destitute of either." 

^s Christian Philosopliy — The Soul, ch. IV. 

^ Taine, Vacherot, Renan teach that God is only a human 



220 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(b)in 
Ethical 
Culture 
Religion. 



Its 
teaching. 



§ 22. Another form of abstract Unity in Theism is 
that set forth by the advocates of Ethical Culture. 
The source of this theory may be traced to Kant. The 
principle of his Critical Philosophy is thai the human 
mind can never know things as they really are and can 
thus never attain objective truth. The practical rea- 
son, however, supplies the deficiency. It gives the 
basis for a philosophical system. Hence the important 
place given to his peculiar theory of Ethics. Fichte 
develops the idealism of Kant's theoretical philosophy 
and joins to it the ethics of the practical. '^^ Hence 
the ethical idealism which runs through his writings 
— an idealism which has influenced Goethe, Matthew 
Arnold, Carlyle, Emerson," John Stuart Mill," the 
Neo-Kantian School with Fries and A. Lange," and 
modern writers on Ethical culture. 

§ 23. Ethics is the conception of what ought to be. 
It holds up the picture of our ideal selves. Ethical 
religion turns the thoughts of men to the ideal ends of 
human life. It is practical because ideal. ^* Man 
must act up to the ideal." The noble side of God is 
the ideal conception of the perfect. ^^ The personal 
God taught in Theology is an illusion." All that men 
have gathered into the form of God is but the image 
of our possible selves. When we say that Christian 
love and justice are actually ruling in the world, we 
give expression to a myth. Our ideals do not reveal 



ideal which the world gradually realizes by an indefinite pro- 
gress, hence the term Dieu-Progres. Farges, L'Iclee de Dieu, 
p. 419; cf. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 246. 

"^^ T. Pesch, Kant et la Science Moderne, p. 196. 

^' Sovereignty of Ethics, Divinity School Address, Character. 

2' Utility of Religion, pp. 101-117. 

23pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 173. 

*4W. M. Salter, Ethical Religion, p. 8. 

2Mb., p. 9. 

26 P. II. 

*'P. 12. 



UNITY. 221 

anything outside ourselves, but only indicate what we 
ourselves should be."^® The good and right are simply 
what should be. Of themselves they are nothing. 
Their only meaning or reality is as ideals of action,^® 
Morality is reason uttering itself; an ideal fordoing.^" 
It is the highest thought in man and it is there to 
rule." God is often a name for that supreme sanctity 
which is in every man's breast; the word itself is 
ambiguous; the ethical obligation is in the reason and 
nature of things. ^^ Hence morality is in its essence 
ideal. ^^ All separate moral rules may be resolved into 
the supreme one, /'. ^., to seek the general welfare, the 
universal good,^'' 

§ 24. A new religion therefore rises, whose basis is 
trust in man. And the religious man of the future 
will give himself to dreams of the perfect without ques- 
tioning or concern. ^^ An ideal aim stands out before 
every one.^^ It is not to please some supernatural 
being in the skies, it is not to follow some far-away 
historical figure in the past. It is closer to us than 
this; it is in our own heart; it is given to us in our 
very nature as moral beings." At the same time we 
are told that " morality is the assertion of ourselves; " 
hence we are independent of any law and the doctrine 
of supreme individualism holds sway.^^ 

§ 25. This moral impulse forms the substance of our 
nature. To Fichte religion is the element of duty con- 

28 p. 13. 
59 P. 63. 

30 p. 65. 

31 P. 69. 

32 W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement. 

33 P. 28. 

^' lb., p. 39. 

35 P. 41. 

3s Felix Adler, Creed and Deed. 

3' P. 57- 

38 P. 43; T. Pesch, Kant et la Science moderne, p. 170. 



222 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Criticism. 



(i) result of 
Kant. 



(2) Senti- 
mental 
Idealism. 



(3) inde- 
pendent 
morality. 



(4) not 
satisfying 
or perman- 
ent. 



ceived after this manner. God is nothing more than 
the power that works in all toward the accomplishment 
of the highest demand of duty.^^ He is, as Mr. Arnold 
puts it, " the power that makes for righteousness." *° 

§ 26. (i) This teaching, advocated so boldly in 
choice and elegant diction by modern disciples of 
culture and ethical Associations, shows to conviction 
that Kantian philosophy as a system of truth is a 
failure. Its consequences are illusions and nihilism.'*^ 
In place of God we have a refined form of Senti- 
mental idealism. It is the logical sequence of Kant's 
two great works. In the Critic of Pure Reason 
he teaches that the mind is unable to seize objective 
truth, hence idealism. In the Critic of Practical Rea- 
son he holds that morality is autonomous, that man is 
a law and end to himself." 

§ 27. Hence the modern doctrine of an independent 
morality which forms the fundamental teaching of 
the Neo-Kantian School, e. g., Ritschl, Lange, etc. 
Morality degenerates into an ideal creation which takes 
form and tone from the peculiar temperament or bent 
of mind. Thus we have the aesthetic' ideal of the Neo- 
Kantians, or the practical ideal which verges so closely 
to Positivism and its religion of humanity. 

§ 28. Human nature will reassert itself. As the 
poet so well says 

Truth crushed to earth will rise again 
The eternal years of God are hers. 

The human mind can rise to the proof of God's exist- 
ence; the human heart craves for the great and living 
God. A true theory of knowledge is our only guide. 



39 C. C. Everett, Fichte, p. 257. 

^° Literature and Dogma. 

*' L. Stahnlin, in Kant, Lotze, and Ritsch, p. 

*' A. Cresson, La Morale de Kant, ch. IV. 



69. 



UNITY. 223 

The problem of to-day, both in Philosophy and in 
Apologetics, is the nature of the human mind. In this 
vital question modern philosophy from the time of 
Kant has been drifting helplessly. What wonder is it to 
find men teaching the most patent travesties of truth 
when they perceive objects as through glasses colored 
by prejudice and false theories!" 

III. 

Theory of Christian Philosophy. 

§ 29. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that God 
5s a most simple unity. To understand the meaning 
of this phrase, we must have a clear notion of the 
term, simple. 

(i) The word si7nple is used in contradiction to the meaning of 
word composite. What is simple is not composite; ^'^^ ^' 
what is composite is not simple. The terms are 
antithetical. The analysis of the one throws light 
upon the meaning of the other. 

§ 30. We can distinguish three kinds of composition; 
or rather a composite thing can be so in three different 
ways. Thus we speak of physical., of metaphysical and 
of logical composition. 

(a) A physical composite is a being made up of (a) not a 
physical parts really distinct or distinguishable. It compound. 
is applied to and embraces material objects. Matter is 
composite in whatever way we may view it. Hence 
arises the notion of quantity. If the parts are really 
distinct, we have discreet quantity, which becomes the 
subject-matter of Arithmetical science. If the parts 
are continuous we have continuous quantity, the prop- 
erties of which are explained in Geometry. Moreover 
physical forces which are inseparable from matter are 

^^ T. Pesch, Le Kantianisme et ses erreurs. 



224 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

also quantitative. They can be weighed, measured, 
calculated, as we learn from the science of Physics. 
In analysis and experimentation they are considered as 
quantities. They may therefore be justly termed 
physical composites 
God not § 31. Now the nature of God is not such. The train 

of reasoning, which proves that matter and physical 
forces are dependent and limited, shows conclusively 
that neither matter nor physical forces could ade- 
quately explain this universe. Matter is matter 
wherever it is found. Its nature remains unchanged, 
despite the varying circumstances of place or position; 
it is utterly unable to account for its own existence, 
much less explain the existence of anything else. 
God, therefore, cannot be a composite unity. This 
teaching is Pantheism and differs only in word from 
open Atheism. 

§ 32. But have we in experience any being or class 
of beings which are not material? The answer comes 
without hesitation. Introspection reveals the exist- 
ence and the nature of the soul. We know it to be a 
spiritual substance; in its own essence immaterial, it 
is able to subsist independently of matter. Physical 
composition is utterly foreign to its nature. It is 
therefore called a simple immaterial unity. In its 
nature far above material existences, it approximates 
more closely to the true concept of God. Neverthe- 
less it falls far short of what the human mind holds God 
to be; and this for two main reasons. 
(b)nota § 33. (b) The soul is a metaphysical composite. It 

Sfcom-^^" is simple in essence, inasmuch as it is not made 
up by the coalition of parts really distinct; never- 
theless the imperfection of its nature and of its 
activity is a reason why it is regarded in the light of 
a composite. 



posite. 



UNITY. 225 

§ 34. In a metaphysical composite the parts are not 
separate entities which coalesce into a unity. The 
object is viewed in its own essence. This essence is 
considered distinct from its existence and its acts. 
Essence is a concept which is different from existence. 
Essence is what makes a thing such and not otherwise. 
Existence is what constitutes a thing in the objective 
order of reality and distinguishes it from what is only 
possible. Thus the essence of man is rational animality; 
his existence is the concrete fact that he is an objec- 
tive reality. The concepts are different because they its 
designate different things. The distinction is clearly ™^^"^'^^' 
brought out in possible things. Thus objects which 
are possible are those which can exist but do not yet 
actually exist. Inasmuch as they can exist they have 
an essence. In metaphysics we treat of their essences 
and question the nature and extent of their reality. 
In so far, however, as they do not yet exist, they have 
no existence. The are in the pure state of possibility. 
They began to exist and we conceive it due to the fact 
that existence has been added to essence. Hence 
arises the composition of essence and existence. 

§ 35. This composition is found in every dependent where 
being. Its very dependence shows that at a definite 
time it began to exist,, that before existing it was in a 
state of possibility, and was simply an essence. That 
the visible universe is dependent has been proved to a 
certainty. There was a time accordingly when it did 
not exist. As such it was only possible ; it had essence, 
but not existence. Hence a composition of essence 
and of existence it true of every being in the universe. 
This is due to its dependent nature. Wherever we find 
dependence or an initial beginning, there we can dis- 
tinguish between a state of possibility and the state of 
actual existence. This is true of the human soul. 
15 



226 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

There was a time when we did not exist; our nature is 
therefore dependent; we were possible before we 
began to be. 

§ 36. What is true of essence and of existence can 
also be verified of a continued state of existence. Every 
living being grows. Growth is a law of life. But 
growth means acquisition. In the progress of growth 
a being constantly puts forth activities and acquires 
development in a manner proportionate to its nature. 
We speak here only of intelligent beings. Thus the 
mind of the child grows or develops by the acquisition 
,oi knowledge, by the exercise of thought. The child, 
e. g.y has the capacity to think, to acquire knowledge, 
to become a learned man. This is accomplished by 
laborious study. Thus we can distinguish between the 
mind destitute of knowledge and the thought or learn- 
ing which it obtains. The one added to the other 
makes him learned. Hence we have a composition. 
The learning is viewed as something perfecting the 
mind. If the mind knew everything from the begin- 
ning, it could acquire nothing new. Its thought could 
not then be viewed as perfecting its nature and there 
would be no composition, 
its source § 37. Hencc the composition arises from its imper- 
fection. Now metaphysical composition cannot be 
found in God. He is the first cause, the prime mover, 
the orderer of all things. In nature He is not dependent. 
He therefore never began to be but always was. Thus 
there never was a time when He was merely possible. 
In Him there is no composition of essence or existence. 
The same is true of His acts. If we conceive that the 
acts of God perfect His nature, He becomes imperfect, 
limited, dependent. This is contradictory to the 
notion formed from the conviction that He is inde- 
pendent in His own existence, yet sustains all things 



UNITY. 227 

and from a consideration of the infinite perfection 
which is necessary for the creative act. 

§ 38. (c) Finally there is what is called Logical com- (c) not a 
position. In Logic we distinguish between the genus composite, 
and the specific difference. Individuals are classed 
into groups. There is a common element in all which 
is the basis of the classification. This element is 
called the genus. Thus, e. g., animal is the generic 
element of man and brute. Nevertheless there is 
another element which gives rise to a distinction in the 
generic group. This element is called the specific 
difference and is the reason why we separate a genus 
into many species. Thus, e. g.^ rationality is the 
specific element in man. It marks him out from the 
other species of the genus, animal. 

§ 39. The union of the genus and the specific differ- its 
ence constitutes a logical species. Thus, e.g., man '"^^"^"^" 
can be viewed as a logical composite made up of genus 
and specific difference. This composition obtains in 
Logic. It forms the basis of Logical classification. 
In every individual a generic and a specific element are 
found. By reason of this they are placed in definite 
categories. 

§ 40. Now God is not in any category. He is above 
all categories. He differs in nature from created 
things. When objects are placed in the same category, 
it is by reason of a common element. This element 
is the same in all; each individual agrees with the 
others in this common characteristic. But God is not 
of the same nature as creatures. He is uncreated, 
they are created; He is independent, they are depend- 
ent; He is infinite, they are finite and of limited per- 
fection. Hence we cannot consider God as a genus, 
of which created things are species. God exists, as 
also creatures. But God's existence differs in nature 



228 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

from existence in creatures. Hence existence in one 
has not the same meaning as existence in the other. 
The term existence is applied to both not univocally^ 
i. e.^ in the same meaning, but analogically^ z. e., after 
a certain manner or likeness. The concept of God, 
therefore, affords no reason for distinguishing genus 
and species. There is no basis for a logical com- 
position. 
God a 8 41. ^Ve are thus led to understand how it is that 

pure act. 

Scholastic Philosophy speaks of God diS pure ad.^^ In 
God there is no possibility. No potency to be or to 
become is found. Potency or acquisition is a sign of 
imperfection. It is a mark of limitation and depend- 
ence. It is found in created and dependent beings, 
not in God. Therefore God is conceived as a 7nost 
pure act.^" 
God not § 42. The soul, in its highest activity is independent 

of the bcdily organs. It can subsist after dissolution 
of the body. Its nature is inorganic and spiritual."*® 
Nevertheless it was created to animate a bodily frame; 
this inciiaation is a part of its nature and is retained 
after separation from the body. The dependence 
upon the body is only extrinsic; yet it is natural. 
Because of its spiritual and inorganic nature, the soul 
is termed a spirit; by reason of the dependence upon 
the body, it is termed a soul. Through the bodily 
senses it obtains the materials of thought. In 
co-operation with the body it exercises the acts of 
sensation and of movement. Without this inclination 
to be united to a corporeal organism, the soul would 

'^ Aristotle, Metaphys. XI, ch. 6. 

^= Tu facis nos Domine cui esse et vivere non aliud atque 
aliud est; quia summum esse, atque summum vivere idipsum 
es ? Summus enim es et non mutaris." Aug. Confess., 1. i, 
ch. 6. 

« Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. V-VL 



a soul. 



UNITY. 229 

have a pure spiritual existence. By reason of the^^t^p^^'e 
tendency, its existence is to a certain extent organic. 
Hence we speak of the soul as a spirit^ but not 2i pure 
spirit. Thus the soul is dependent in its nature and is 
not entirely self-sufficient Its natural and perfect state 
is union with body. 

§ 43. Not so with God. Christian Philosophy has 
ever taught that God is a pure spirit. For this reason 
in the early centuries of our era the Fathers of the 
Church took issue with the Stoics. They maintained 
in strong and eloquent argument that God could not 
be the soul of the worlds as Stoicism taught. The notion 
of dependence in any shape whatever is foreign to 
their belief in the divine nature. To them God was 
the first cause, leaning on nothing else, self-sufficient 
and of infinite perfection. This teaching they embraced 
and expressed under the t^vm. pure spirit. To no other 
being was this term applied. As far as imperfect 
human speech could go, this term alone expressed 
simply and clearly the characteristic of the divine 
essence."' 

§44. The mind is now prepared to grasp the true God trans- 
relation of the Creator to the universe. This problem ^nd 

^ Immanent, 

has occupied the attention of philosophers at all times, 
presents various aspects and gives rise to various 
interpretations. Thus some lay exclusive stress on the 
transcendence of God over creatures, and we have the 
school of Deists. Others appeal to the immanence of 
God in creation, and thus formulate the doctrine of 
Pantheism. The truth lies in recognizing the funda- 
mental doctrine of both. God is both transcendent 
and immanent. He is transcendent by virtue of His 

■*Tenelon, Demonstration de I'existence de Dieu, p. II, ch. 
V; Franzelin, De Deo Uno., § III, ch. III. 



230 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nature; He is immanent by His presence and activity/^ 
In illustration we go to the living organism. The soul 
is present everywhere in the living body, but is of far 
higher nature than the material elements. So but in 
an infinitely higher manner God is transcendent to but 
immanent in the world He hath made." 

'^" Quod ubique sis, quem nullus circumscribit locus, et solus 
es praesens eliam iis qui large fiunt a te." Aug. Conf., V. 2; 
ep. 137, n. 4. 

^^ " Deus est ubique per essentiam, praesendam, potendam." 
Card. Satolli, de Deo, q. 8, a. 3. St. August, ep. 118, n. 23; 
137, n. 4; ep. 187, " De Presentia Dei." The contention of 
Mr. Fiske that two separate schools existed in the early church: 
one with the Greek Fathers recognizing the immanence of God, 
the other with the Latins insisting on His transcendence is with- 
out foundation, Cf. Fiske, Idea of God, ch. V, VI. 



CHAPTER XII. 

PROVIDENCE. 

§ I. Our line of thought has led to the conviction Summary 
that behind the visible universe there exists a Supreme prece^ding. 
Principle which is the source and explanation of all 
existing things. The world within our conscious 
breasts and the wide world without, alike unite in 
postulating God. Physical science needs God to 
explain nature; mental and moral science needs God 
to explain man.^ 

§ 2. The problem is about a truth, not concerning a christian 
mere hypothesis.^ The task, however, is not yet com-God,° 
plete. The true conception of God implies more. To 
the soul of man in all ages God is not a mere philo- 
sophical entity, colorless and independent of any 
relation whatsoever to the universe. The proofs pre- 
sented for God's existence contain much more. 
They show not only that God exists but that He 
is in constant touch with the world. Hence the 
further notion of Providence to complete the concept 
of God.^ 

8 3. By providence of God is understood God's gov- Providence 

of God. 

€rnment of the world." Universal and coexistent with 
the limits of creation, God's government holds sway 
over the most insignificant creatures and the most 

* Farges, L'idee de Dieu, p. 20. 

^ Prof. Bovvne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 8. 

2 Dr. Bruce assumes the providential order of the world as a 
hypothesis and then shows that it is justified by facts. Cf. 
Gifford Lectures, 1897. This method is unnecessary and betrays 
confusion or weakness of argument. 

^ Prof. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 339; Aug. 
<ie Ordine, 1. I, ch. I. 

[231J 



232 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

minute particles of matter/ Possessing its sole source 
in the uncreated wisdom of the God-head, it neverthe- 
less presents various and different aspects when viewed 

its phases, in application to existing things. To place the truth 
in strong and clear outline, to avoid confusion and 
error in this most difficult question, it is necessary to 
draw distinctions and to treat the several parts of the 
distinctions in detail. Not that God Himself is varied 
or made up of parts or is changeable; His truth is one 
and His divine providence is a unity. But just as a 
single ray of light thrown upon a prism takes divers 
forms and colors, so, but in an infinitely higher man- 
ner, God's government seems diverse because of the 
diversity in the creatures which are under its sway. 
Thus we have the different departments of the Physical 
Sciences, of Biology, of Physiology, of Psychology, of 
Natural and Christian Ethics. 

method. § 4. The distinction to be made in treating God's 

Providence falls in the same line as that made in set- 
ting forth the arguments to prove God's existence. 
These arguments were divided into two great classes: 
those drawn from a consideration of man's nature and 
those based upon the study of the external world. 
After the sam^e method we shall discuss God's Provi- 
dence as exemplified in the external world and in the 
life of man. In the present chapter the former ques- 
tion shall occupy our thoughts. In the following, the 
Providence of God over the being and life of man shall 
be examined carefully and in detail.® 

^ Janet sees a rational order in the system of laws which per- 
vade the universe, 2. providential order in the system of means 
and ends. Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 845. " Creare 
namque dicitur condere et ordinare." Aug. de Mor. Manich., 
ch. 7. 

^ Notion of Providence not to be confounded with the marvel- 
ous. Fraser, Theism, p. 66. 



PROVIDENCE. 233 



I. 

Notion of Providence. 
8 K. The idea of government is intimately connected govem- 

., ^,r^, . /• ri nient and 

With the idea of law. The one is a correlative of the law. 
other. The relation is not so much of logical neces- 
sity. Its basis is in the concrete facts of the external 
world. It is forced upon the mind by external observa- 
tion and confirmed by profound study. The intimate 
connection between government and law is not limited 
to special spheres of activity or unfolded by special 
departments of human knowledge. It is coextensive 
with existing things and developed by every branch of 
human science. Thus from the prevalence of law we 
can reason to the existence of government; from the 
nature and stability of law we can infer the nature and 
strength of the governing power. 

8 6. The word "law" is employed in various meaning 

.of law. 

meanings. These meanings are not absolutely dif- 
ferent; they represent aspects of the same thing, or 
rather they indicate the different phases in which law 
is realized. Nevertheless the word, as it stands, is 
ambiguous and requires definition. 

§ 7. (a) The word " law " is applied to designate an (a) order 
observed order of things. In this sense the word isofthmgs.^^ 
taken for the effect. The orderly sequence of phe- 
nomena which go to form a system impresses the mind 
with the notion of law and the word is employed to 
signify the system itself. Thus we speak of the reign 
of law and order. The cause of the observed order 
may be unknown. The mind simply grasps and states 
the effect. This is naturally more obvious. To the 
ordinary observer the constant and uniform sequence 
of phenomena is what is meant by the laws of nature. 



(b) proxi- 
mate cause 
of the 
order, i. e., 



234 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Even in the sphere of physical science the term law is 
applied to special groupings of facts. The famous 
three laws of Kepler, which opened up a new vista in 
Astronomy and made Newton's labors of so much 
value, ha-^e no other meaning. They express a scien- 
tific truth beyond which scientists for 5^ears could not 
progress, but the truth was simply a newly observed 
series of facts. In this sense laws form the beginning 
of every inductive science. '^ Only after patient and 
experimental investigation upon an observed order of 
phenomena is the real scientific bond and its nature 
unfolded. Hence the second meaning of the word 
" law." 

§ 8. (b) The term " law " is also employed to desig- 
nate the force or cause of the orderly sequence. An 
force. order of phenomena which is constant and uniform is 
itself a fact which demands an explanation. Such an 
inference is merely a special application of the general 
principle of causality. The mind instinctively rises to 
the conception of some force behind the facts and 
exerting its activity through them so that they combine 
into a uniform arrangement. The force in an opera- 
tion is conceived to be the cause of the orderly 
sequence. The order is the effect. To obtain a 
knowledge of the forces which work in and through 
phenomena is the aim of physical science. Their dis- 
covery is a sign of progress and a mark of perfection. 
Years of patient and unremitting labor are considered 
well-spent if the facts at length are made to tell the 
secret of the marvelous adjustment. We can then 
speak of nature's laws in a higher and truer sense. 
Many things heretofore shrouded in mystery are cleared 
up and their manifold relations can be expressed with 
the precision of a mathematical formula. One such 

' Whevvell, the Inductive Sciences. 



PROVIDENCE. 235 

discovery often revolutionizes a science and brings to 
the name of the scientist a halo of undying fame. The 
discovery of the law of gravitation by Newton marks 
an epoch in history. Linguistics, Sociology, Philoso- 
phy of History, every branch of natural science deals 
with laws in this special meaning of the word.^ 

8 o. (c) Finally, law can be viewed in the law-giver, (c) ordi- 
It there appears as an act of the reason oraina/io r^tionis. 
ra/wm's." ^ The mind perceives the utility or neces- 
sity of a certain line of action, reflects upon the means 
most fitted to accomplish the purpose and then pre- 
scribes the rule with the binding power of the will. In 
its highest analysis, therefore, law is a rule having its 
source in the mind and will of a superior. Laws are 
distinguished according to the nature of the beings 
affected or the means employed, as, e. g.y positive law 
and natural law. The former is a direct and explicit 
enactment; the latter is an inclination implanted in 
the nature of things by which they act in such or such 
a manner. Again, laws are called divine or human, if 
they have source in a divine or human power. 

II. 

The Material World. 
§ 10. The relation between the notion of Providence, Provi- 

_ - ^ . . . _i, dence, Gov- 

Government and Law is very mtimate. 1 he one can emment 
be inferred from the other. Government is possible ^ ^' 
only through law; law implies a guiding and restrain- 
ing power. The inference is not drawn from a priori 
principles, nor is it based on the metaphysical essence 
of things. It is a truth of experience and is based on 
a wide induction from facts. The relation is therefore 

8 Prof. Wilson, Foundadons of ReUgious Belief, p. 339. 
•St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 90, a. 4. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



govern- 
ment. 



Rei^n of 
law is 
shown by 
physical 
sciences. 



a necessary one. At present the nature of that rela- 
tion is of little moment. The reader is now prepared 
to follow the line of thought and to grasp its bearing 
on the problem. 

§ II. The existence of a mind behind phenomena 
has been proved. The characters of intelligence are 
indelibly stamped upon the universe. The reign of 
law which obtains throughout from the smallest atom 
up to the highest forms of organized existence, so 
marvelous in precision and endless contrivance, raises 
the thoughts from the visible to the invisible, from the 
finite objects of sense to the conviction of an infinite 
mind that gives to each its appointed sphere and 
measure of action.^" 

§12. But intelligence is not the only inference. The 
prevalence of law leads to another conviction. It 
reveals the method and mode of divine government." 
The reign of law in the physical world is a uniform and 
patent fact. The constant and regular sequence of 
phenomena is a necessary condition for science. 
Without it science would be impossible. How, for 
example, could I explain a state of things which was 
never the same, but constantly changing, and so that 
no order or sequence could be detected in the change? 
I should give up in despair and say that everything 
was in confusion and that I could not understand. 
Nov/ science does not answer after this fashion. Every 
aspect and department of the material world is brought 
under careful observation. Everywhere order and law 



^0 Aug. de Gen. ad Lit., 1. IV, ch. 32; Serm. 141, 241; Franze- 
lin, de Deo Uno, p. 34. 

^^ " There is nothing in scientific experience inconsistent with 
the belief that those laws and sequences are themselves due to 
a divine will." Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 136, and he adds, 
" there is nothing to disprove the creation and government of 
Nature by a sovereign will; but is there anything to prove it? " 
P. 137. 



PROVIDENCE. 237 

obtains." What at first seemed confusing was made 
clear upon the discovery of a deeper or wider law. 

§ 13. Astronomy more than any other science ^speckiiy 
impresses the truth of law and order. The wide 
expanse of the heavens studded with countless thou- 
sand stars has been for ages a subject of meditation 
with the peasant and the philosopher. To ordinary 
observation these tiny bits of light seem stationary. 
Yet science assures us that some of them are many 
times larger than our own globe; that they move with 
incredible swiftness, faster, e. g., than an express 
train, or a bullet from a rifle; and that they are in a 
constant process of change. The laws which rule their 
movements can all be reduced to the simple law of 
gravitation. This explains the intricate and manifold 
relations of one to another. The combinations and 
adjustments in the heavenly bodies are almost infinite 
in number and of marvelous delicacy. 

§ 14. Not only among the large bodies of the plan- and 
etary system does law hold sway; it obtains also with ^^^^ ''y- 
the smallest particles of matter. ^^ The science of 
Chemistry presents most beautiful and wonderful illus- 
trations of forces in mutual adjustment. The laws 
which govern chemical combinations are very exact 
and intricate. Each elementary substance combines 
with other elements only in definite proportions. The 
new substance formed by the combination possesses 
properties very different from its elementary parts. 

^^ Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 133; Bowne, Philosophy of 
Theism, p. 64. " The heavens are crystallized mathematics; 
crystals are solid geometry; laws of force are numerical; " 
McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 128, sq. ; Thomas 
Hill, Geometry and Faith, A Supplement to the IXth Bridge- 
water Treatise; J. Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 103; 
Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 73; St. Aug. de Lib. Arb., 1. IL 

^^ For invariable laws in the smallest particles of matter. 
Wurtz, The Atomic Theory; McCosh, Method of Divine Gov- 
ernment, p. 117. 



238 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Nevertheless in combination the original elements are 
not destroyed. When the compound is dissolved, they 
reappear with their native properties and activities. 
Thus two parts of Hydrogen combine with one part of 
Oxygen to form water. The compound is a liquid; 
the composing elements are gases, which reappear 
when a voltaic current is passed through water. 

The Science of Acoustics is founded on the perceived 
relation between sound and number. Optics is 
expressed in laws relating to angles and numbers; the 
angles of reflection, of incidence, the powers of refrac- 
tion are set forth in numerical tables. So likewise the 
law of gravitation, the laws of Kepler are those of 
form and number. Thus Astronomy is applied Mathe- 
matics In all physical investigations we find geo- 
metrical symmetry and arithmetical proportions.** 
both or- § 15. Organic Chemistry presents Combinations 

ganic and , • , r 1 mi 

inorganic, which are a constant source of wonder. The same 
elements enter into the formation of substances which 
have different or even contradictory properties; thus^ 
e. g., sugar differs but little from the potato in the 
chemical analysis. The same elements are found in 
both, but the proportion is slightly different. So also 
Tea and Strychnia differ not in the elements, but only 
in the proportion according to which the elements 
combine. The former substance is an article of food, 
a pleasing stimulant, soothes after severe labor and 
helps to sustain life. The latter is a deadly poison, 
paralyzes the nerves and almost instantaneously brings 
the rigor and pallor of death to the animal frame. 
There is no chance in these combinations. If so, 
what confusion would ensue, and how frail would be 

^^ Cf. McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 117; St. Aug. 
in proving the existence of God again and again appeals to 
numbers. De Lib. Arbitrio, 1. II. 



PROVIDENCE. 239 

the tenure of life! The proportions, however, though 
very fine, are stable and constant, as is shown from 
the science and practice of Medicine. Thus diet can 
be regulated or changed as bodily needs require, and 
special compounds can be prescribed as medicines for 
particular ailments. 

§ 16. More marvelous still is the fact that the ele- Physics, 
mentary or simple substances are so few in number 
when compared to the great number of their products. 
Out of this small number the myriad varieties of inor- 
ganic and organic matter are formed. Physics is a 
science which deals with the movements of material 
bodies. It collects data of the various physical 
motions, investigates their modes of action and tries 
to simplify them by a reduction to law. Hence we 
have the laws of motion, of hydraulics, of heat, etc. 
They enter into the course of study in our schools. 
All the mechanical contrivances which make life so 
pleasant are based upon or are applications of these 
truths. The ingenuity of man cannot surpass the 
works of nature in precision, intricacy and detail. The 
steam-engine speeding along the rails at the rate of a 
mile a minute, is yet under the firm control of will that jj^flygnj,gto 
holds the throttle. In like manner behind the forces ^[^J^ ^^^ 
of nature there is a will which guides and controls all.^^ 

§ 17. Thus the existence of law in the physical world God's gov- 

_-.. . „ • ernmentin 

gives some conception of the ways of Divme Provi- the physical 
dence. God governs the material world through the 

'^ Thus Bacon holds " that the inductive inquiry into the nat- 
ural causes that maybe found by our Penses within the material 
part of the universe, and which are the established conditions 
of the changes that go on around us, so far from dissolving 
faith in a dominant providence, should only make those most 
devoted to scientific investigation see more clearly than others 
do, that full intellectual satisfaction even is not to be attained 
without recognition of the invisible providence of God in the 
natural evolution." Eraser, Theism, p. 81. 



240 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Law in or- 
ganic 
world. 



Biology. 



physical law. The marvelous contrivances into which 
these laws enter point to a directing and governing 
mind." 

III. 

The Organic World. 

§ i8. The same uniformity of law which reigns 
supreme in the material universe is also found in the 
world of living beings. ^^ This sphere is not unknown 
to science. At the present time it holds a leading 
place in scientific investigation. Biology is yet in 
comparative infancy and a wide scope is open for 
further research. Nevertheless the data already col- 
lected throv/ much light upon the growth of the organ- 
ism. Biology investigates the conditions and laws of 
organic development. The origin of life is a problem 
which can never be solved by physical science. Not 
so the laws of life. They can come under careful 
observation and be classified. Thus we find that the 
living being does not spring instantly into maturity. 
Its growth is gradual and according to fixed laws. The 
laws of nutrition, of assimilation, the phenomena of 
atavism and of sterility, the influence of environment 
have been studied and their manner of working care- 
fully noted. 

§ 19. These laws may vary in their working by rea- 
son of the different nature of the living being. Thus, 
e. g., nutrition in the plant is not carried on in the 
same way as in the animal. This difference, hov^^ever, 
is one of many and does not destroj^ the essential truth 
which prevails throughout the organic knigdom, viz., 
that growth is attained through nutrition. 

^6 Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. VIII, ch. 6; 1. X, ch. 4: Confess., 1. X, 
ch, 6; de Lib. Arbit., I. II, ch. 17; de Vera Relig., ch. 29; de 
Gen. ad. Lit., 1. 8, ch. 23-26; Cicero, de Nat. Deor,, 1. II; 
Athanasius, C. Gentes; Plato, Laws, B. X. 

^^ Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 68; Aug. ep. 137, n. 8. 



PROVIDENCE. 241 

§ 20. If we seek a knowledge of the human organism ^^^p^^- 
we go to the sciences of Anatomy and Physiology, oiogj. 
The former investigates the structure, the latter the 
functions of human life. The marvelous adaptation 
therein revealed is the result of definite laws combined 
according to some fixed plan. This combination takes 
place with a view to definite needs of life. The 
adaptation of structure to fulfill some special purpose, 
or to discharge some special function is a fact which 
for ages has filled the thoughtful mind with wonder. 
Not only do we find it exemplified in the eye and the 
ear, but also in every part of the human frame. The 
lungs, the throat, the stomach, the phenomena of 
respiration, of deglutition, of digestion, the skin, the 
covering of the teeth, the bones, the very words in 
which we express thought, are all striking illustrations. 
They speak of wisdom adapting and combining means 
for special ends. 

§ 21. Let us turn to the study of animal life. Com- 
parative anatomy gives the data. We find the animal 
fitted by nature with special means to preserve 
life. It has its own weapons of offense and defense. 
Not one is left unprotected. These means are not 
all of the same kind. They have not been manu- 
factured by any human art; they are the en- 
dowment of nature and more wonderful than human 
ingenuity could supply. Let us take an illus- 
tration. 

§ 22. To Solomon, the wisest of men, the flight of spedaiii- 
an eagle through the air was something he could not 
understand. Modern science has been able to explain 
the fact, but the explanation does not in the least 
lessen the wonder; on the contary, our admiration is 
heightened. The laws of gravitation and of atmos- 
pheric resistance, which seem contrary to the possibility 
16 



242 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of flight, are the very ones by which flight is accom- 
plished.^® 
(a) flight of § 23. (a) Birds are heavier than the air; if they were 
lighter, they might float like a balloon, they could not 
fly. By the law of gravitation, therefore, they should 
fall to the earth. But another law is brought into play 
which neutralizes the effects of gravitation. This law 
is the resisting force of the atmosphere. The resisting 
power acts equally in all directions. In order that the 
law of gravitation be counteracted, atmospheric con- 
ditions must be overcome. This is accomplished when 
the body capable of flight presents its maximum 
surface to the resistance of the air in the perpendicular 
direction and its minimum in the horizontal direction. 
The conditions are fulfilled in the anatomy of the bird, 
e. g.^ by the broad surface of the expanded wing and 
the narrow edge as it speeds through the air. But this 
is not sufficient. A bird motionless with outspreading 
wings will fall slowly to the ground. The wings do 
more than balance the law of gravitation. They strike 
the air downwards with such violence that a reaction 
upwards results. Hence the law of the elasticity of the 
air and its reacting power against compression. 

§ 24. That the wings should strike the air so that 
reaction follows, the wing-muscles m.ust be strong, 
compact, of special form and not too heavy. Other- 
wise the weight of the bird would bring it quickly to 
the ground. Hence the strokes of the wings of most 
birds are too rapid to be counted. The compression 
of air in the stroke is achieved by the feathers, quills, 
and small amount of bone. Again, the conformation 
of the wing prevents the upward from naturalizing the 
downv/ard stroke. Hence we have the convex upper 
surface and the concave downward surface. The 

^ '® Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 279, sq. 



PROVIDENCE. 243 

difference in power between the two is illustrated in 
the umbrella. How much more difficult it is to pull an 
outstretched umbrella down than to push it upwards! 
Besides the feathers underlap so that in the downward 
stroke they present an air-tight surface; whereas in 
the upward stroke, they separate and permit the air 
to escape. 

§ 25. The problem of flight is not yet solved. Birds 
move in a forward direction. A study of this fact 
opens up another chapter in adaptative structure. 
The wing-feathers are set backwards, /. ^., in the direc- 
tion opposite to flight. At the base the feathers are 
strong and firmly fixed; at the end they are flexible. 
Thus the air compressed by the downward motion of 
the wing cannot escape upwards because the feathers 
underlap and are air-tight, nor can it escape forwards 
because the front edge of the wing is hard and rigid. 
Its easiest manner of escape, therefore, is backv/ards 
and in so doing it lifts the elastic ends of the feathers 
communicating, as it passes along the wing, a forward 
push to the body. Thus the same volume of air not 
only sustains the bird's weight against the force of 
gravity but imparts also a forward impulse. The bird 
is therefore sustained and propelled by the same 
stroke. '" 

§ 26. (b) A most interesting study in Natural History (b) means 
is that which deals with the weapons of offense and Cfg^iifl!''^^' 
defense employed by animals, either in securing food 
or in warding off hostile attacks. No living being, 
however small and insignificant, is left defenseless or 
unprovided. The Author of Nature has provided for 
all, has given to all the means of sustaining life. 
These means are varied. In illustration the attention 
of the reader is drawn to a phenomenon very curious 

'^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. III. 



244 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

indeed, but ver}^ interesting not only from a scientific 
point of view, but as an illustration of the workings of 
Divine Providence. Allusion is made to the phenomena 
of adapted color for the purpose of concealment. 
assimilated 8 2 7. The phenomena of assimilated color do not 

color. "^ ^ 

take place by accident. We find therein strong evi- 
dence of purpose and design. It is certain from careful 
observation that a natural law governs the process. 
The nature of that law, its scope and manner of work- 
ing, have not yet been put to scientific examination. 
Our present knowledge justifies the inference that the 
law goes into operation only upon the presence of 
certain conditions. The combination of these con- 
ditions are indicative of purpose. Thus we know that 
the law does not exist in animals which possess other 
means of avoiding danger and only in those animals 
which otherwise would be an easy prey to natural 
enemies. The law of concealment affects color or 
structure. Some animals, e. g.^ the grouse, ptarmigan, 
woodcock, exhibit a change in the color of their plum- 
age. In summer they can hardly be distinguished from 
the grass and the foliage of trees and shrubbery. In 
winter, however, their feathers are like the driven 
snow. That the change is due to organic causes is 
shown from the fact that it is gradual and natural, like, 
e. g., the phenom.ena of moulting, and varies with the 
seasons. Other animals show the phenomena of con- 
cealment in structure. The Mantidae, e. g., are very 
much like a vegetable growth. With utmost difficulty 
they can be distinguished from a leaf or vegetable 
matter. The special adaptation of structure as of color 
is designed for a special purpose. What stronger evi- 
dence of divine wisdom could be found ? 

§ 28. The traces of Divine Providence are therefore 
visible throughout the range of organic life. The 



PROVIDENCE. 245 

scope of the present work does not permit an exhaus- 
tive detail. Volumes could be written in support of 
the position maintained. Illustrations are to be found 
on every page of Natural History, of Comparative 
Anatomy, of Physiology, of Biology, of Botany, of 
Linguistics. The present aim is to establish certain 
principles. These are (a) the existence of laws in the 
organic kingdom; (b) the adaptation of manifold con- 
ditions convergmg to obtain definite results. The 
former shows the method of divine government which 
prevails in the organic world as a whole. The latter 
proves the existence of a Divine Providence over every 
living thing, from the smallest and most insignificant 
even to the highest form of organic Ufe.^" 

IV. 

Difficulties. 

§ 29, The line of reasoning is scientific and cogent. 
The data are drawn from the verified facts of science. 
The interpretation is in accord with scientific methods. 
Another aspect of the problem can now be considered. 
It is the logical sequence of what has preceded. Its 
force at first sight negative, in reality adds very much 
to the argument, by strengthening apparently weak 
places and by imparting solidity and thoroughness to 
the whole. 

§ 30. It might be objected that the conclusion drawn 
is more certain and universal than is warranted by a 
candid examination of the facts. Are there not, it is 
urged, evident signs of misgovernment in the universe? 
How then can we legitimately infer that an All-wise 
Providence guideth all things? 

'• McCosh, Method of Divine Government, pp. 11-26. 



246 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

stated'" § 31. Before an effort be made to face the difficulty, 

it is wise and even necessary to know the ground on 
which we stand. A calm and judicious estimate can 
then be made of the issue. Let us grant that there are 
evidences of disorder in the physical and in the organic 
world. At the same time the evidences for order and 
purpose are certain and cannot be denied. The former 
do not render the latter of no value. On the contrary, 
the indications of confusion are very few in compari- 
son with the facts of purpose and appear, therefore, as 
difficulties or exceptions to a well-grounded line of 
reasoning. Thus the more patent fact is order and 
purpose. This can only be explained by the existence 
of a creative and governing mind. For the tendency 
to order and adaptation is not something externally 
bestowed upon objects; it springs from and is founded 
in their intimate constitution. Only a mind that 
created and constituted the things could implant the 
order whose traces are so visible and marked. In face 
of this fact the difficulties adduced are few and of 
minor importance. The presumption for a governing 
mind is so strong that it cannot be shaken. Even 
before the contrary facts are subjected to a searching 
analysis, there is a strong antecedent probability that 
they can be explained in the light of the main argument. 
(c)pertur- § 32. (a) It is true that traces of disorder are found 
Stella? ITni- in the planetary system. The moons of Jupiter, the 
^^^^^' motion of Uranus, are well-known examples. But it 
would be poor logic to infer from these facts that the 
government of the stellar universe is imperfect. The 
harmony and order among the heavenly bodies is an 
evident fact of ordinary and scientific observation. 
The interpretation of this order in the form of a theory 
is something very different from the order itself. Our 
interpretations may be weak and imperfect. Every 



PROVIDENCE. 247 

day discoveries are made which constrain the mind to 
alter or throw aside scientific hypothesis. Science 
gains by the change and nature itself is presented in 
a simpler and more wonderful light. 

§ ^;^. So too in Astronomy. The signs of disorder (a) as- 
are viewed in the light of the nebular theory proposed 
by La Place. Now this theory is not well established; 
it is unable to account for all the facts. Hence we 
find a disposition among scientific men to propose a 
new explanation. Prof. Faye has made the attempt." 
Thus the objection fades away in the light of more 
recent research. The difficulties are due to a con- 
tracted view of nature. They enter as harmonious 
facts into a larger and truer generalization. 

8 ZA. The pleasure seeker in our northern woods is(b) meteor- 

ology. 

often puzzled by the changes of weather. He sets 
forth in the morning with a clear and bright sky. The 
waters of the mountain lake are calm and placid. 
Suddenly the heavens are overcast, the wind strikes the 
water, the waves pitch and seethe as in a tempest. 
The storm is of short duration and all is quiet and 
bright again. In the Alpine regions, where the 
mountain peaks tower on every side, these storms 
clothe the scenery with an aspect of grandeur. In the 
soft warm sunlight which follows, the glories of the 
Jungfrau shine resplendent. The storms that sweep 
our eastern coast, the blizzards that devastate the 
Western prairies, the hurricanes of the ocean are 
similar phenomena on a grander scale. 

§ 35. In the wide range of Nature there is nothing 
more indicative of confusion and disorder. Language 
fails to picture our impressions of the scene. We 
speak of the elements let loose in a wild and senseless 
rage. In illustration we instance man so filled with 

'^ L'Origine du Monde, ch. X. 



248 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

passion as to be no longer under the guidance of reason. 
But strange to say there is order and law in the storm. 
In every large city throughout the land there are 
weather-bureaus which note the conditions of the 
atmosphere and indicate the changes soon to happen. 
Facts are gathered, compared and classified. The laws 
which guide their play come out every day more plainly 
and are subject to verification. As yet Meteorology 
is in its infancy, nevertheless the broad groundwork of 
a science is there detected and constant investigation 
points to the near future when another department of 
nature will be intelligible to men. Modern science, 
therefore, can in the words of the Hebrew Psalmist, point 
to One " who rides the whirlwind and rules the storm." 
^^liifcKine- § 3^' (^^) ^^^ objections against our argument 
dom. drawn from the organic kingdom seem very formida- 

ble. Upon examination we shall find this to be due to 
exaggeration and to a partial view of the facts. A dis- 
torted truth is an error of the most dangerous kind. 
A common and radical fault with some minds is the 
inability to study facts impartially. They seem bent 
on swerving to extremes. One explanation seems 
plausible and is presented without regard to others 
which are equally or more so. This is the chief diffi- 
culty in the present problem. If we grasp this we shall 
be prepared for a candid examination of the facts. 

^?ih^°of' § 27 • (^) ^^^ ^^^ ^°^^ ^^^^ there are many instances 
Bature. where intention has been frustrated. In proof atten- 
tion is called to the prodigality of Nature in the pro- 
duction of seeds. On all sides we behold a lavish 
waste. In the flowers of the garden, shrubbery, grain, 
trees, we see the same foolish expenditure. 

Finding that of fifty seeds 

She often brings but one to bear.*' 

'^ In Memoriam, LV. 



PROVIDENCE. 249 

§ 38. In putting the objection to the test of criticism, criticism, 
it is necessary to separate the fact from the inference. . . ^, 
The fact is that a few seeds comparatively bear fruit„ nature very 

'• _ -^ compu- 

The inference drawn is that there is a frustration of cated. 
purpose. Facts well authenticated cannot be disputed. 
We are at liberty, however, to question an inference 
and a conscientious regard for truth demands that we 
do so when just grounds are had. So in the present 
case. The order of nature is very complicated and 
very partially understood. ^^ 

8 30. To make a bold assertion in real ignorance of (2) acts 

1 . . . , ,1 . r r have more 

the question is to advance beyond the region of fact than one 

_, . . purpose. 

into that of pure conjecture. To insist upon one 
explanation to the disregard of others is the sign of a 
biased and illogical mind. As in the solar system the 
exceptions indicated by the hypothesis of La Place fit 
in most harmoniously with the theory of Faye.^* In 
view of the fact that purpose is universal in Nature, 
why may not the results which appear as exceptions to 
one purpose, be rather the fulfillments of another? " 
There is no ground whatsoever for holding that an act 
has one purpose or intention only. The analogy of a 
wide experience declares the contrary and is constantly 
strengthened by the results of scientific investigation. 
I^ ^- g-j give an alms with the two-fold intention of 
pleasing God and of relieving a worthy indigent. The 
seeds of grain so abundant on the stalk have not one 
purpose only, viz., reproduction; they minister to our 
wants and form an important article of food. The 
luxuriant vegetation of the Carboniferous age, at first 
sight a magnificent waste, enters into our coal-beds, 
and supplies us with fuel and warmth. How unfortu- 

'2 Butler's Analogy, ch. IV. 

^ L'Origine du Monde, 

'* Prof. Jevons, Principles of Science, vol. II, p. 468. 



250 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nate that we live so close to our surroundings ! Objects 
run together and intermingle. Only the superficial 
and narrow relations of particular things impress the 
mind. If we could withdraw a little distance, the 
harmony and majesty of Nature's plan would come 
out in clear light, the relations of particular objects to 
the great whole could then be grasped, and in the 
perception all small differences would sink away.^" 
ceiveifreia § 4°" '^^^^ ^^ perceivc a relation does not imply that 
tionisnot all Contained in the relation is also known. The many 

to perceive _ •' 

all con- particular elements and their intimate connection, are 

tamed m ^ ' 

the relation, disclosed Only after long and serious study. In like 
manner we may perceive intention and yet fail to see 
all that is intended. Nature presents a concatenation 
of causes and effects. Everything has an influence of 
some kind on its environment and is modified in turn. 
Not only are natural things viewed as causes and 
effects; they likewise are means and ends. The 
imperfect state of scientific knowledge may often lead 
us to consider as ends what in reality are means. To 
rest in the knowledge of a proximate purpose and to 
forget or neglect the existence of a more remote, is 
to fail at grasping the scientific truth that a natural 
object has varied relations and may serve various 
ends." 

(3)inani- S 41. Another difficulty is drawn from animal life. 

mallife. ^ ^ . ^ 

Comparative Anatomy reveals structures without any 
e. g. useless apparent purpose. The phenomena of rudimentary 

organs. . -. , . . , , ^ 

organs is a standing objection to the prevalence of 
purpose. How then, we are asked, can these facts be 
reconciled with the existence of an all-wise Providence? 
cnticism. g ^2. An answer to this objection can be found in the 
very source from which it has been taken. Comparative 

^''W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, pp. 208-213. 
5^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. IV. 



PROVIDENCE. 251 

Anatomy tells of rudimentary organs but does not posi- ^ J^g_'*^° 
lively assert that they are without purpose. The latter Jj."^^^^'^ 
is an inference based on narrow and partial views. ^^ ence. 

§ 43. Rudimentary organs are not without place or (2) can be 
relation in organic life. They reveal the existence 
of a great plan. Homology of structure is a fact 
of science. The science of Biology is yet in its 
infancy. The phenomena of life-development have 
not yet been thoroughly investigated. Our knowledge 
is therefore limited. Enough is known, however, to 
justify us in viewing these organs in a wider relation, 
i. e., to the general type. On this ground we can con- 
sider them in reference to the past or to the future. 
They indicate either what has been or what is yet to 
be It is true that particular parts of the organism 
are of no apparent use to the particular animals. But 
when viewed in relation to the general type, we find 
that no one part is useless to all. Throughout animal 
life the vertebrate type prevails. At the same time 
there is a marvelous adaptability of this type to 
the variety of animal life. The fact simply is stated. 
No effort is at present made to assign reasons or 
theories. Rudimentary organs should be viewed in 
their relations to the general plan of organic life. If 
so, can we say that they are of no value? Does science 
affirm that they are altogether useless? May we not 
view them as factors in a larger plan and a wider pur- 
pose? Science does not gainsay; on the contrary, 
urges us to do so.^^ 

'^^ " Huxley shows that it is almost impossible to prove that 
any structure however rudimentary is useless, and answers 
Haeckel with the dilemma: either these rudiments are of no use 
and they ought to have disappeared, or they are of some use 
and are no arguments against teleology." Dr. Gildea, Is There 
Evidence of Design in Nature, in Proceedings of Aristotelian 
Society, 1889-90, p. 51. 

^^ Janet, Final Causes, p. 149, sq. 



252 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(3)sou«:eof g ^^^ The difficulty, therefore, fades away in the 
ties not in brighter lisfht of Scientific progrcss. As before in the 

nature but *= ** r fe 

our inter- material and plant kingdoms, it has its source not in 

pretations * . 

of nature, nature, but in our own interpretations of Nature. 
Larger knowledge and deeper research are the true 
solvents of Nature's mysteries. Not that the mind 
can hope to grasp all; something will yet remain diffi- 
cult to understand; nevertheless past experience and 
the consciousness of doubts removed will caution us 
not to be precipitate and impose our own short-sighted 
conclusions as the result of careful and exact investi- 
gation. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PRAYER. 

§ I. Man is the highest and noblest creature in the 
visible universe. Endowed with intelligence and free- 
will he possesses the characteristic privilege of rational 
intercourse with his fellows. In his spiritual nature, 
made to the image and likeness of God, his soul 
instinctively turns to his Maker in aspirations of 
worship, of hope and of intercession. The relation 
between God and man is far different from that which 
exists betweeen God and the lower creation. The 
element of intelligence is there found. This reveals a 
special aspect of Divine Providence. A question is 
thus presented of peculiar interest in itself and of vital 
importance at the present time. Its solution is neces- 
sary to obtain a true notion of God; and by certain 
leaders of scientific thought it has been made an issue 
in the conflict between religion and unbelief, 

8 2. The question is two-fold; it concerns God and The 

^ /-111- problem. 

man. Can man pray to God and m answer to prayer, 
does God exercise a special providence over man? In 
reality it is resolved into a discussion on the physical 
effects of prayer. Christian Philosophy answers in the 
affirmative and points to divine interference in the 
form of special providences and miracles. 

§ 3, Prayer is not treated in its full theological bear- viz. physi- 
ings. Only one aspect is considered, viz., its relation of prayen 
to physical science. The purpose is to investigate the 
statement whether science has shown the utter 
absurdity of any interference on the part of God in 
answer to our prayers. 

[253] 



254 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 4. God and man are two great facts. The relation 
of the soul to its maker is religion. This was the pur- 
pose of Christ's coming, of His life and death. He 
tells of God and also of man. He gathered and 
expressed in simple words our natural duties and to 
these added the truths He found in the bosom of the 
Father.^ Man is to know, love and to serve God. 
But he must do this in Christ Jesus. The expression 
of this knowledge, love and service is called worship. 
The soul of v/orship is prayer. 

I. 

The Fact. 

what is g 5. Prayer springs from the knowledge of God and 

the needs of our souls. It is the elevation of the mind 
to God. So universal and so natural is the act of 
prayer that it seems an instinct and part of our being.^ 
As we open the eyes of the body to the light, so do we 
raise the soul to God. Between God and the soul 
there is a constant intercourse. God acts on the soul; 
this IS called His grace. The soul receives God's 
grace, co-operates with it and looks up to Him; this is 
prayer. In prayer the soul raises itself to the pres- 
ence-chamber of God and speaks to Him in direct and 
familiar converse as if there were no other creature in 
the wide world. 

its place in §6, Hencc uo uoblcr exercise of the soul; none 

a christian ^ 

^e. giving more honor to God or drawing down greater 

blessings. In prayer we look up on high to our Father, 
the source and beginning of our being, the hope of an 
endless blessedness. We thus lead a life which we 
hope to continue after death in company of angels and 
saints who live in the vision and contemplation of God. 

' John. T-18. 

2 Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 448. 



PRAYER. 255 

We are not alone in the world. Life is made up of 
friendships, of the mutual exchange of kindness, love 
and devotion. Now in prayer we hold converse with 
God. We exercise towards Him the virtues of faith, 
hope, love, sorrow, gratitude, child-Uke devotion. 
Again, friendship with the great and good puts at our 
command their wealth and influence. But prayer is 
the privilege of God's friends, and as the Holy Fathers 
tell us, is the key which unlocks the treasures of heaven. 
Nay, more, in dealing with men, God chooses to act 
after the manner of men. Hence prayer is the 
appointed means in His providence by which men are 
called to win eternal crowns. It is called the channel 
of God's grace to the soul. In prayer we lay open to 
Him our needs, tell Him of our trials, dangers, tempta- 
tions; and through prayer, light, strength, hope and 
comfort come. A life without prayer is dwarfed and 
imperfect; and is so through our own fault. 

8 7. In the Holv Bible the necessity, power and con- prayer in 

,. . . ' ^ , . -^ ^ _, The Bible. 

ditions of prayer are set forth in many ways. The 
prayers of Abraham,^ of Moses,* of Anna,^ of Job are 
very beautiful. Every shade and feeling of the soul is 
expressed in the Psalms. But we go to Jesus for our 
prayer. His was a life of continual prayer and converse 
with the Father. He was not ahvays occupied in teach- 
ing or in working miracles or in deeds of mercy, but He 
was always praying. 

II. 

Theory of Modern Science. 

§ 8. Modern scientists of a certain school recognize Modern 
the universal fact of prayer. The impulse to pray is attack 
too deeply imbedded in the human soul, finds expres- p'"^^^'"' 

* Gen. 18-23. 

* Exod. 32-10. 
^ I Kings 1-12. 



256 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(i) Mr. 

Tyndall's 

position. 



(a) neces- 
sary char- 
acter of 
natural 
laws. 



sion in too persistent a manner and enters too inti- 
mately into the life of the race, to be erased by a mere 
stroke of the pen. Educated in an atmosphere of 
scepticism, openly antagonistic or at least indifferent 
to the claims of religious belief, their general turn of 
mind and tone of thought leads them to invent and to 
exaggerate the objections against the Theistic position. 
Apparently frank and ingenuous in word and in method 
of treatment they would convey the impression of a 
sincere and impartial mind. That they are conscien- 
tious is not the subject of discussion. The purpose 
only is expressed to treat them as such, and to employ 
in discussing their words the same spirit of candor and 
impartiality which they habitually claim as their glory 
and justification. 

§ 9. (i) Mr. Tyndall views the subject of prayer 
from the standpoint of physical science. The strong 
and secure basis of his inference is " the necessary 
character of natural laws." To him the undeviating 
uniformity of sequence between consequent and ante- 
cedent makes the association of both inseparable in 
thought. In a question of fact experience is the best 
and sole guide. The strict adherence of this method 
has raised modern science to its present preeminence 
and given to its conclusions a strength and cogency 
which can in vain be assailed. Now a divine interfer- 
ence with the course of nature in answer to prayer is 
rendered unbelievable by scientific experience.' If 
God should answer our prayer for physical benefits or 
to ward off physical calamities, the interposition would 
assume the form of a physical fact and as such fall 



« As the Duke of Argyll says: " In prayer the question is 
whether the reign of law does not preclude the possibility of 
Will affecting the successive phenomena either of matter or of 
mind. Reign of Law, p. 63. 



PRAYER. 257 

under the tests of experience. Bat the explicit testi- 
mony of experience is in favor of the necessity and 
inviolability of natural law. Hence to admit that 
prayer has a physical effect upon the natural sequence (b) prayer 
of phenomena would force the mind to admit a contra- denial of 

. . . . . , , this. 

diction. A common testimony, viz., experience, would 
bear witness to the truth of two opposite and irrecon- 
cilable facts. 

§10, The inference drawn is against the efScacy of (c) hence 
prayer. To him a rejection of the inviolable uni- rejected, 
formity of natural lav/ is a contention too inconceivable 
for thought. The evidence in its favor is too strong; 
its relation to modern scientific progress too funda- 
mental to be questioned. The only alternative is to 
reject the contrary hypothesis. " Only where," he 
writes, " the antecedents of a calamity are vague or 
distant is it that men think of resorting to prayer to 
advert it." Thus prayer has its source in ignorance, 
and is never employed where our knowledge of the 
facts is complete. Then scientific means are resorted 
to and we look to science, not to God, for help and 
assistance.'' 

§11. (2) It does not follow that prayer is of no value (2) true 
whatsoever. Modern science has only restricted its priyen^ 
efficacy within certain limits. It is absurd, we are 
told, to pray for physical benefits, nevertheless prayer 
is not without beneficial effect. It is an element in the 
development of moral life. Just as I, e. g., by going 
through a course of physical culture will develop the 
muscles and become strong. The only advantage 

'' Frag, of Scien. Reflec. on Prayer and Natural Law. Justin 
Martyr says that the Sophists of his time " seek to convince us 
that the Divinity extends his care to the great whole and to the 
-several kinds, but not to you or to me, not to men as indi- 
viduals. Hence it is useless to pray to Him; for everything 
occurs according to the unchangeable law of an endless series." 
Neander, vol. I, p, 9. 

17 



258 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

which results is the effect of the activity upon the 
bodily constitution. In like manner prayer gives a 
special tone and strength to character. It is an 
important factor in the culture of the moral life. The 
man who prays, even though the prayer may never 
have obtained a physical effect, yet carries about with 
him the fruit of prayer. It is seen in the deepening of 
spiritual life, in the elevated tone of thought, in the 
strength and nobility of high endeavor, in the atmos- 
phere of sweetness and light which ever seems to 
accompany him.^ 

§ 12. This theory is not confined to men of science. 
It has invaded the pulpit and is preached as the true 
doctrine of Christianity.' Mr. Tyndall thinks it *' a 
wholesome sign for England that she numbers among 
her clergy men who are wise enough to understand all 
this and courageous enough to act up to their knowl- 
edge." ^° In their hands it is proposed as an aspect in 
the Gospel of modern culture. ^^ 
criticism. | 13. (i) In the following section, where the 
(i) in gene- problem of Special Providence is investigated, a de- 
tailed examination of this theory will be found. At 
present it suffices to indicate the general line of 
criticism. ^^ 
(2)neces- § 1 4. (2) The necessity and inviolability of physical 
physical law are ambiguous tcrms. They require explanation." 

^ " Prayer is no more a begging for favors or an act of inter- 
cession. Supplication for outward benefits has given place to 
petition for spiritual gifts and this to pure aspiration, the desire 
for excellence." Recollect, and Impress., O. B. Frothingham, 
p, 296. 

^ Drobisch and Herbart teach that while God is Father by 
reason of creation in the beginning, He now leaves mankind in 
the deepest silence as if he no longer had any part in them. 
Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 226. 

^^ Fragments of Science, 1, c. 

" Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 466. 

^2 Fisher, Faith and Rationalism, p. 128, sq. 

^^ " If it be true that laws are invariable, it is not less true that 



PRAYER. 259 

To base a theory upon ambiguous phrases is illogical; 
but to take advantage of the ambiguity, at least uncon- 
sciously, with a view to exaggerate and give iron-bound 
strength to a favored position is a reflection both on 
the reasoning powers of the advocate and on the intel- 
lectual capacity of the reader. Furthermore the 
uniformity of nature is no obstacle to free-will in 
working out its purposes; on the contrary, it is 
the condition absolutely necessary that the will may 
carry out its purposes and lend the energies of nature 
to its sway. 
^ 15- (3) Again, the conservation of energy is no(3)conser- 

t> ^ V X o ^ vation of 

difficulty in the problem of prayer. Scientific experi- energy, 
ment has shown that it does not prevent the interfer- 
ence of free-will either on the movements of the body 
or on the forces of nature. Therefore we can reason 
a pari to divine interference. 

§16. (4) The view of Mr. Tyndall is partial and (4) theory is 
exclusi'\^e. To him the world is a physical aggregate. 
Now there is both 2^ physical 2.ndi a moral order. The 
former is made up of physical forces and the principle 
which prevails is that of necessity. The latter embraces 
a system of 7?ioral laws and the great principle is that of 
liberty. The consideration of the physical order gives 
rise to the mechanical theory; from the study of the 
moral order the teleological theory is formed. Just as 
the teleological view prevails over and rules the 
mechanical, so the moral order prevails over and guides 
the physical. Hence the universal sway of mind and 
will which Mr. Tyndall himself recognized at the 
close of his Hfe." 

they are subject to endless variation." J. Dimon, The The- 
istic Argument, p. 112. 

''* Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 464; Dr. Momerie, 
Origin of Evil, p. 239. 

'^ Janet, Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 846. 



26o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



provi- 
dences, 



III. 

Miracles. 
Prayer R 17. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that in 

answered « ' . . 

by miracles ans\¥er to Draver God at times interferes with the 

and special 

ordinary course of physical phenomena. As a result 
particular events happen otherwise than they should, 
and are designated by the special title of miracles. 
The word " miracle " comes from the Latin 77iirari^ 
and signifies an event which excites wonder and 
admiration. This is so for two reasons, viz., the 
cause is hidden, and the event is contrary to that we 
should expect." 

i^. Notion. 



miracle. 



(i) un- 
known 
cause : 



(a) parti- 
ally. 



§ i8. To have a clear conception of a miracle it is 
necessary to explain what is meant by a hidden or 
unknown cause. The cause of an event may be 
unknown in two ways; (a) either partially, /. <?., to a 
certain number only. Thus, e. g., an uneducated man 
sees wonderful things in every branch of science; he 
knows not how they happen and he is unable to explain 
or to trace them to a natural cause. In every sphere 
of physical science he pauses in wonder before hidden 
and unknown agencies. Not so, however, with the 
learned specialist. He has after laborious study pene- 
trated the secrets of natural phenomena. An eclipse 
is predicted and described in detail by the astronomer. 
The wonders of electricty are explained by the student 
of physics. Some modern writers, taking this meaning 
of unknown, apply it to the present question. They 
assert that miracles are the effects of natural unknown 
causes, that these causes daily come to our knowledge 



'^ Aristotle, Metaph. I, ch. 2. 



PRAYER. 261 

with the result that the sphere of the miraculous is 
slowly but surely narrowing. They look to the time 
when natural science shall have driven the miracle out 
of court and regard it only as a relic of a by-gone 
ignorant age 

§ 19. (b) The cause may be hidden, however, in(b)un- 
another manner. This happens when the effect is of jzv«//«/^r. 
such a character that either in substance or in the 
manner of occurrence it goes against scientific facts 
or simply surpasses the known powers of nature. 
Thus, e. g.^ raising the dead to life, or the instantane- 
ous recovery of a mortally sick man are beyond scien- 
tific explanation. In this case the cause is hidden not 
to the uneducated only.^^ Science itself stands silent 
and dumbfounded. It is powerless to give an explana- 
tion. Science had nothing whatever to do with the 
events. They were wrought by other means, far out 
of proportion to what was accomplished. This, there- 
fore, is the meaning in which the term " hidden " or 
" unknown " is employed. No effort is made to take 
advantage of an ambiguity; rather a definite and 
restricted meaning places the problem in clear light, 
removes all doubt and opens the way to a decisive 
solution.*® 

'' Modus quo corporibus adhaeret spiritus comprehendi ab 
hominibus non potest; et hoc tamen homo est." Augustine, de 
Civ. Dei, 1. 21, ch. 10. 

^^ Quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interum est cognita 
et a quibusdam incognita, inde contigit, quod videntium simul 
aliquem effectum aliqui non mirantar; astrologus enim non 
miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam, ignarus 
autem hujus scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. 
Sic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quantum 
ad ilium, Illud ergo simpliciter occultum; et hoc sonat nomen 
miraculi, ut scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum non quoad 
hunc vel quoad ilium tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta 
omni homini est Deus. Ejus essentiam nuUus homo in statu 
hujus vitae intellectu capere potest." St. Thomas, Sum. 
TheoL, 1. q. 105, a. 7. 



262 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Its true § 20. The mind is now enabled to Sfrasp the true 

nature " or 

conception of a miracle. By a miracle is understood a 
physical event which either substantially or in the 
manner of its occurrence exceeds the order and power 

even?"^^^"^ ^^ Created nature, (a) It is di physical QYQnt, i. e.^ an 
event which appeals to the senses and is known by the 
senses. 

(b) extra- g 21. (b) It is an event which is above and beyond 

ordinary. c \ / j 

the power or mere natural causes. This is the distinc- 
tive character of a miracle. It is an extraordinary 
occurrence. Not only is wonder aroused at the sight, 
but the cause completely baffles investigation. It is 
often urged, especially by men of science, that we do 
not know all the laws of nature; therefore, in a particu- 
lar case we are unable to decide that an event does not 
take place by the sole operation of these laws.^^ The 
that we do objection is more specious than well founded. It is 
an the°irws undoubtedly true that natural events have been termed 
miracles on hasty and insufficient evidence. Mistakes 
happen not only in ordinary daily life but even with 
men of learning. Our position is not in the least 
weakened. How comes it that there is a deep-seated 
conviction in the minds of men as to the possibility and 
actual occurrence of true miraculous facts? This con- 
viction is universal in time and in place. It springs 
from and is a complement to the belief in God.'^" Mis- 
takes do not destroy the belief. Facts well authenti- 

answer. ■' 

cated strengthen and confirm it. To these appeal is 
made. Our knowledge of natural laws is not exhaustive. 
Though limited, the knowledge is nevertheless true. 

^^ The Duke of Argyll praises Locke for holding that we can 
never know what is above nature unless we know all that is 
within nature. Cf. Reign of Law, p. 25, and tells us the bound- 
aries of the natural are not known. P. 18. 

^° Demus aliquid posse, quod nos fateamur investigare non 
posse. In talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis." 
Aug. ep. 137, n. 8. 



PRAYER. 263 

We know in particular instances their range and effi- 
ciency. Their properties and sphere of action are not 
altogether an enigma. Thus, e. g., fire burns, natural 
laws cannot restore sight to the born blind, nor life 
to the dead. When, therefore, in a particular case an 
event of the like nature comes to our knowledge, we 
are justified in inferring that the cause is above nature 
and that a miracle has taken place. It is not necessary 
to know all the laws of nature. What is required is a 
knowledge of the laws having a bearing upon the event 
in question. ■-'■' 

§22. (c) The event is extraordinary in two ways ; (c) either 
either it substantially surpasses the power of natural laws stance or in 
or simply in the ma7iner of its occurrence. Thus, e. g.^ 
the glorification of the human body, the restoration of 
life to the dead, of sight to the born blind are events 
which are entirely beyond the efficiency of natural 
forces. Hence we say that the fact itself is a 
miracle, that the event itself is utterly beyond natural 
efficiency. 

§ 23. Again, an event may be miraculous not so 
much in what has happened as in the manner of its 
occurrence. Thus, e. g.^ a man may be seriously ill 
with fever and immediately regain health; or a storm 
may take place instantly in a clear, cloudless sky. 
These events might occur in the natural course of 
things. Nature restores the sick, and condensation 
of the atmosphere causes rain to fall. The miracle, 
however, is in the manner of the happening. This is 
so sudden, so startling that the ordinary course of 
nature is interrupted and a power above physical law 
is judged to interfere. The manner in which they take 
place is entirely different from the natural. Therefore 

" W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, 112. 



264 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

we are justified in concluding that another and differ- 
ent agency is at work." 

2°. Errors. 

§ 24. The problem of miracles is one of the leading 
questions of the time. Intimately connected with the 
notion of God, it enters into and forms an important 
chapter in any discussion of Theism. Its opponents 
have held a leading position in literature and science." 
The productions in the defense have been no less bril- 
liant and learned. The purpose of the latter is to show 
that God has a real interest in His creation, and in 
divers ways throughout history has given to men a 
pledge of His fatherly love. Taking issue with men 
of different prepossessions and of various schools of 
thought, their arguments assume a peculiar form and 
tone. Sometimes it has happened that in the honest 
desire to conciliate an adversary they have taken a line 
of reasoning which is a virtual surrender of their own 
position.'^* A brief classification of erroneous teach- 

2^ Excedit aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter: uno modo 
quantum ad sabstantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint 
simul vel quod sol retrocedat, velquod corpus glorificetur, quod 
nullo modo natura facere potest; et ista tenent summum 
gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem 
naturae non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo 
fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum et illuminatio caecorum et 
similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, 
et potest praestare visum, sed non in caeco; et haec tenent 
secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid 
facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi. 
Sicut cum aliquis siibiio per virtutem divinam a febri curatur, 
absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus; aut 
cum status aeris divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque 
naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae; 
at hujusmodi tenent infirmum locum in miraculis." St. 
Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1. q. 105, a. 8. 

^^W. Macintosh, DD., The Natural History of the Christian 
Religion; Arthur K. Rogers, The Life and Teaching of Jesus; 
Otto Pfleiderer, Gifford Lectures; Strauss, Life of Jesus; Renan, 
Life of Jesus. 

^^ Duke of Argyll, in Reign of Law, ch. I. 



PRAYER. 265 

ing, therefore, is of greatest importance to obtain a 
true knowledge of the question under discussion. 

§25. (a) Pantheists of every school unite in reject- (a) Pan- 
ing the possibility of a miracle. This is the logical 
and consistent development of their fundamental 
belief. To them God is everything and everything is 
God. The divine is the only reality. We are a part 
of its substance, or its passing shadows. The real- 
istic Pantheism of Spinoza teaches that only one sub- Spinoza, 
stance exists which manifests itself in the phenomena 
of matter and of thought. This view obtains to a 
great extent in modern science. Its most recent 
exponent, Mr. Spencer, teaches that this substance is spencer. 
the unknowable, that its physical activities alone can 
be grasped by the mind, and to the evolution and 
interplay of these forces the phenomena of the entire 
universe in all the grades of being and of life can be 
reduced. Thus every event is the natural outcome of 
definite antecedents. In appearance the doctrine is 
Pantheism; in reality it is Materialism. 

§ 26. Another form of Pantheism is the Idealism of Hegel. 
Hegel. To him there is only one being which evolves 
into the world of nature and of man. This being is 
the idea^ the tq fieri. The highest stage of the evolu- 
tion is reached in human consciousness, where it 
becomes conscious of itself; in reality the human mind 
is but a phase of the divine; at the basis there is no 
distinction; we have the consciousness of the divine, 
inasmuch as the divine reaches consciousness in us. 

§ 27. The identity of human and divine conscious- Neo- 
ness is proposed by the school of Neo-Hegelians. At 
present they form an important factor in philosophic 
thought. Earnest in soul they accept Hegel's teach- 
ing as the highest exposition of philosophy, and strive 
to reconcile it with Christian belief. But if all exist- 



266 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ing things are only a manifestation of the idea in its 
constant evolution, if the human consciousness be 
fundamentally one with the divine, where shall miracle 
have place? Every occurrence is miraculous in so far 
as it is the direct manifestation of divine agency. The 
idea alone is real; all things else are the phases of that 
reality. The divine consciousness is one with our 
own and unfolds its energy in every thought and 
action. 
(b) Physical § 28. (b) Another modern school of thousfht attacks 

scientists. / . ** 

the doctrine of miracles from a far different point of 
view. Allusion is made to a certain class of physical 
scientists. Impressed by the reign of law and the uni- 
formity of natural events, they assum.e that the con- 
stancy of this order precludes all possibility of divine 
interference. To them a miracle is a violation of the 
laws of nature." Their basis, therefore, is physical 
science. To admit a miracle, they tell us, would be 
equivalent to the destruction of science. '^^ 
criticism. g 29. A criticism of this position is not at all diffi- 
cult. The theory rests upon an ambiguity and an 
Ci)ordr -c ^^^.ggeration. The phrase "the order of nature is 
nature is constant " is ambiguous. The word ** constant," /. e.. 

constant. ° . ' ' 

uniform, expresses either a fact or a necessary truth. 
With the former meaning no fault can be found. In 
the latter sense the phrase is not correct. The uni- 
formity of nature is a truth of experience. It is not 
self-evident and is attained only after a long and patient 
research. The great majority of mankind have ever 
looked upon this world as liable to interference on the 
part of higher agencies. Finally, Mr. Mill has shown 
that the conviction in uniformity of nature prevails 

^= Dr. Macintosh, in Natural History of Christian Relig. ; A. 
Lang, The Making of Religion, p. 18, cites Hume as its first 
promoter. 

^^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 17. 



PRAYER. 267 

only among the educated and civilized few." The 
belief, therefore, has not the character of a self-evi- 
dent, necessary and universal principle. To exaggerate 
an induction from experience into a necessary truth is 
a fallacy. Nevertheless how often are we reminded 
that nature's laws are inviolate! This course of rea- 
soning fails in the object. 

S 30. Now a miracle can be in perfect accord with (2) miracle 
nature s uniformity. For the laws of nature remain stroy order 

mi ,- ,- • 1 1 1 of nature. 

mtact. The fact of a miracle does not cause them to 
disappear. A miracle has nothing to do with laws as 
such. It concerns only a particular event. When a 
miracle takes place, the laws of nature are not abro- 
gated. Only in a particular case their effect is sus- 
pended. Hence the result is other than would happen. 
Fire did not cease to burn when the three children 
were protected from its ravages in the furnace; nor 
did the law of gravitation cease to have force when 
Jesus walked upon the waves of the sea of Galilee. 
The law remains intact; the particular event only is 
influenced. 

§ 31. A good illustration can be found in our own lUustra- 
voluntary activity. I can, by interposing, vary the 
particular events of physical forces. Thus I dash 
water to my face every morning in opposition to the 
law of gravitation, or I lift a heavy weight or drag a 
sled up hill, or row against a strong current. These 
are ordinary and familiar facts. My will interferes 
with one course of events by bringing a stronger force 
to counteract the efficiency of the former. A miracle 
is somewhat analogous. God interferes with an ordi- 
nary occurrence. His will is powerful to suspend a 
law in a particular case. The uniformity of nature is 
not disturbed. They who reason to the contrary are 

^' Logic, B. III. ch. 21. 



268 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

guilty of the fallacy " ignorantia elenchi," /. e.^ miss- 
ing the point. The difficulty is the creation of their 
imagination, 
(c) miracles S 32. (c) Finally, some writers, e. s:,, Hume, Kuenen, 

are possi- o^\/ j ■> i o -> 

bie, but TyndalL and Huxley, deny the actual existence of 

never actu- 
ally took miracles. °® They view the question as a matter of fact. 

place. 

The mere possibility is granted or dismissed from con- 
Huxiey. sidcration as irrelevant. " Denying the possibility of 
miracles," writes Mr. Huxley, " seems to me quite as 
Tyndaii. Unjustifiable as speculative atheism."" Mr. Tyndall 
admits " The theory that the system of nature is under 
the control of a Being who changes phenomena in com- 
pliance with the affairs of men, is, in my opinion, a 
perfectly legitimate one." ^° Yet he continues: " But 
without verification, a theoretic conception is a m.ere 
figment of the intellect, and I am sorry to find us part- 
ing company at this point." ^^ They, however, reject 
miracles from lack of evidence. No human testimony 
to them can ever produce credence in events opposed 
Their rea- to kuown natural laws. The tendencies of nature more 

son (a) from 

nature. than Overbalance whatever men may say to the contrary. 

Furthermore they attack the testimony itself. The 

<b)deny persous and circumstances are closely examined with 

historical . .11. r ^ 

testimony, a view to show that the witnesses of the event were 
not able to have trustworthy evidence, that the fact 
itself was a simple natural phenomena. Thus Renan 

^^ Macintosh, in Natural History of the Christian Religion; 
Huxley's Hume, p. 133; Present Day Tracts, n. 28, The Origin 
of the Hebrew Religion, E. R. Conder. 

^^ Spectator, Feb. loth, 1886; Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, 
p. 89. 

^° Fragments of Science, p. 468. 

^^ P. 469. J. S. Mill assures us that " science contains nothing 
repugnant to the supposition that every event which takes place 
results from a specific volition of the presiding power, provided 
that this power adheres in iis particular volitions to general 
laws laid down by itself." Cf. Prof. Wilson, Foundations of 
Religious Belief, p. 339. 



PRAYER. 269 

tells us that Jesus walked not upon the sea but by the 
seashore. Strauss explains the gospel miracles as 
myths. Huxley takes a real or fancied miracle and 
assails the evidence leaving the impression; I told you 
so; all are of the like nature. The ^//-/^r/ objection 
that human testimony is worthless in face of nature's 
uniformity is a strange exaggeration. We have seen criticism. 
that the uniformity of nature is an induction from 
experience and has not the character of an absolute 
truth. Furthermore the occurrence of a miracle by no 
means interferes with the orderly course and system of 
nature. If human activity can interfere with the ordi- 
nary course of one or more laws by interposing a con- 
trary tendency without destroying the constancy of the 
laws or the uniformity of nature, surely the divine can 
do the same. Only a particular effect is suspended; 
the law remains intact. 

§ 34. The effort to invalidate human testimony may 
succeed in particular cases. Exaggeration may take 
place. However, the truth of our thesis does not rest 
upon a fallacy or an exaggeration. We are the first to 
reject and repudiate such a method. Strong and free 
in the full and harmonious accord of reason and revela- 
tion, the Christian mind is active and eager to study 
the truth in all its bearings. The separation of dross 
from the pure ore is a lasting and genuine gain. He 
works for the years in building and ornamenting the 
temple of truth. The spirit is all the more eager 
because it has the truth as its possession and inherit- 
ance; all the more free to reject what is unsound 
because of the abundant material. That miracles 
have been established as well-authenticated facts can- 
not be questioned. We do not go to the past. Our 
own time has witnessed them. Reference is made to 
the miracles admitted at Rome in the process of the 



270 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

canonization of saints. The tests are most scientific; 
the witnesses are of undoubted intelligence and probity. 
An examination of the facts will convince the most 
sceptical mind. 

IV. 

Special Providences. 

§ 35. The providence of God over men is shown to a 

striking degree by the miracles wrought in their behalf. 

They are extraordinary proofs of His justice and loving 

kindness. Nevertheless when we kneel to pray morn- 

we do not ing and evening we do not beg God to work miracles or 

always 

pray for that our livcs shall be constant prodigies of His power. 

miracles. 

The consciousness of our own littleness in His presence, 
the sense of His holiness, greatness and majesty bend 
the strong will, bring low the soaring hopes and impart 
an humble and reverential spirit to our prayer. Even 
when our petitions are most earnest and ardent, the 
spirit of trust in God's infinite knowledge and all-em- 
bracing love breathes throughout. We speak to God, 
of our needs and longings, confident that He will 
ansv/er in His own good way. Hence the place and 
scope of Special Providences. 
Special R ^6. Bv Special Providences are understood events 

Provi- " ^ J r 

dences. which happen in the course of Nature through the 
instrumentality of natural laws. We cannot discern 
either in the event itself or in the manner of its hap- 
pening any deviation from the known physical course. 
What we know, however, is that events shape them- 
selves in response to our prayer. The laws of nature 
are invariable; they always and of necessity produce 
the same effects. One important factor, nevertherless, 
must not be forgotten. That the laws of nature pro- 
duce an effect, the same conditions must be present. 
If the conditions vary, the effects also vary. By alter- 



PRAYER. 271 

ing the conditions other tendencies of nature are made i"fl"ence of 

_ ^ human will 

predominant, and the law which would otherwise work on forces of 

^ ' nature. 

out its effects yields to other and stronger laws.^^ In 
this way our wills interfere with the workings of nature. 

§37. The progress of science shows not only new illustrated, 
laws but also reveals the manner and means by which 
we may subject these laws to our aim and service. 
The vast field covered by the practical sciences are a 
striking illustration. We do what nature herself could 
never do; we make nature a servant to carry out our 
plans. Rivers are bridged, railways constructed, the (a) from 
telegraph and telephone carry messages over seas and mechanics. 
across continents. The uniformity of natural laws, far 
from preventing our efforts, is the fundamental and 
necessary condition which render them possible. ^^ We 
do not create new forces, we only set force working 
against force. 

§ 38. The contention that the uniformity of physical (b)from 
laws renders impossible their subordination to a higher ^ ^ ^ ^' 
will is opposed to ordinary and scientific experience. 
Every move of my body, every notion of the soul 
effectually proves this assertion groundless. Thoughts 
and feelings, buried deep in my mind and heart, cause 
the eye to sparkle, bring the color to the cheek, 
accelerate the movements of the limbs, and give anima- 
tion to the whole bodily frame. In writing to you, 
kind reader, does not my will move my arm and set 
the pen at work? The law of inertia does not prevent 
my writing, nor is the law abrogated because I write. 
Or I may rise from the desk and walk out into the air; 
or I play at tennis, or bathe in the clear water. Is the 
law of gravitation rendered null and void? Every 

2^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 96; Noah Porter, Ele-- 
ments of Moral Science, p. 564. 
^^ Reign of Law, p. 98. 



2/2 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

movement of my waking life is an illustration of the 
thesis. 
sciincS^^^ §39- Science also comes with its examples. Water is 
decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen gases by simply 
passing through it a current of voltaic electricity. 
Mechanical and chemical combinations in the labora- 
tory show how one force neutralizes another. The 
science of mechanics and of medicine especially render 
the truth obvious. Or we pass from physical to livmg 
elements. Chemical forces serve the vegetable world, 
and this is under the sway of the animal kingdom 
Vv'hich in turn obeys man. Or the elements may be 
living men. Here we have the science of government. 
The influence of a superior will over an inferior will is 
illustrated in daily life, in politics, in civil society, at 
home, with friends. I may carry out my aim by influ- 
encing and controlling the desires of others. They 
work with me and for me. If I am ambitious, I seek 
the favor of those in power; if I am unable to perform 
an act, I seek a powerful friend to influence others 
where I should fail. 

§ 40. Now if such power rests with man, if he can 
do so much with the forces of nature and his fellow 
beings, can God do less? Can we not believe that at 
our prayer God may cause the conditions of natural 
phenomena to so combine that through his special 
agency we obtain our hearts' desire, and yet so that 
to the ordinary observer the event happens in its ordi- 
nary place and time. To the devout soul, however, 
all is different. He recognizes God's mercy and is 
devoutedly thankful for the Fatherly care. He knows 
that God has managed the event in some way. The 
hidden power and love displayed is the response to the 
prayer. When, therefore, we pray for rain, or to avert 
a calamity, or to prevent the ravages of plague we beg 



PRAYER. 273 

not so much for miracles or prodigies of omnipotence. 
We ask that He who holds the heavens in His hands, 
and who searches the abyss will listen to our petition 
and in His own good way bring about the answer we 
need. 



Conclusion. 

§ 41, How easy, therefore, it is for God to answer 
our prayer! We do the same for friends every day. 
The sphere of our influence is limited, but we can to 
some extent bend energies and wills to a good and 
holy cause. Is God less powerful than we? If nature's 
laws remain constant, notwithstanding our interfer- 
ence, does God's will destroy the uniformity? 

§ 42. But it is said that our prayers are not always 
answered. In reply to this we may say that the 
objection does not affect our position in the least. If 
a prayer be answered but once, the thesis holds good. 
In order that natural laws should v^^ork a result, certain 
conditions are necessary. So, too, with prayer. That 
prayer be what it ought, subjective conditions are 
required. Our Lord speaks thus, and the Apostles 
enumerate them. St. Augustine proposes the query 
why prayers are not always answered and gives a solu- 
tion. This question may go beyond our knowledge. 
We cannot penetrate the mind of God and explain why 
He does so or otherwise. We may rest content that 
He who reads our hearts knows what we want and what 
is best for us. However, that God cannot answer 
prayers for physical benefits because of nature's uni- 
formity, is a problem within the scope of reason. We 
can solve it and the answer is too strong and clear to 
be shaken. 

18 



2/4 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 43. There is a providence over all things and over 
the lives of men.^* He cares for all, even the lowliest. 
In man, His government shows itself not only in the 
powers of the body and of mind, but in special and 
extraordinary ways. In answer to our prayer, God 
worked miracles and causes nature's laws to group 
according to our wishes. 

2* Plato, Laws, B. X. ch. ii; Aristotle, Metaphys. XI, ch. 6; 
" O tu, bone omnipotens," exclaims St. Augustine, " qui sic 
curas unumquemque nostrum tamquam solum cures; et sic 
omnes, tamquam singulos.'' Confess., 1. Ill, ch. II; de Gen. 
ad. Lit. 1. 5, ch. 21. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

PESSIMISM. 

§ I. The phenomena of existence and of life affect 
the human mind in various ways. By a necessity of 
nature we fashion views of the world from the contents 
of individual experience. The extent and nature of 
our environment, the peculiar disposition and power of 
the soul find unconscious expression. What we think 
and feel gives form and color to our lives. We breathe 
a peculiar atmosphere, and its influence is felt by our 
associates or, embodied in the written word, exerts an 
uplifting or depressing force on future ages. 

§2. The evils of life have at all times strongly Problem oi 
impressed the minds of men. The earliest records of 
human speculation show the attempts made at a solu- 
tion. In the Vedic writings the problem appears and 
elicits a cry of despair. It is crystallized into a system 
with the Parsees and the later Manichaeans. Its 
mournful tones are heard in Greek poetry. It has 
occupied the great minds of Christian philosophy, and 
has drawn forth the deepest thoughts of an Augustine 
and a Thomas Aquinas. 

§ 3. At present we are concerned with one answer Pessimism, 
only. Pessimism is an error which is contemporane- 
ous with philosophic thought. Its traces appear in 
every stage of history. Its influence upon the minds of 
the passing generation has been widespread and pro- 
found. The miseries of existence have so impressed 
the minds of some as to furnish data whereon is built 
a philosophy of life which sees no good in the world, 

[275] 



276 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



recognizes no beneficent purpose over man, excludes 
all joy and goodness, and teaches that sorrow and pain 
and evil alone reign in undisputed sway. 



Hindu 
mind meta- 
physical. 



origins of 
Buddhism. 



Upan- 
ishads. 



I. 

Buddhism. 

§ 4. The problem of life early took possession of the 
Indian mind. The longing to pierce the veil of mystery 
which envelops his being called forth the highest 
efforts. Beautiful are some passages of the Sacred 
Books. The human soul answers in mournful tones to 
the touch of life's realities. The cry may vary in 
strength, in its human echoes, but it is ever the same. 
Again and again it is heard in the Hindoo Scriptures. 
The voice is the voice of humanity, and the answer is 
what humanity alone can give. 

1°. Origin. 

§ 5. Before the rise of Buddhism, India already pos- 
sessed a voluminous literature. Its growth can be 
determined from difference in language and develop- 
ment of thought. The principal periods are the Vedic, 
the early Brahmanic, the Upanishads, and the later 
Brahmanic. No sharp line of demarkation can be 
drawn between them. They run into each other and 
overlap. Viewed in relation to the subject-matter 
the Upanishads are by far the most important. They 
are the earliest remains of Indian Metaphysics. 

§ 6. The sole problem of the Upanishads is release 
from the miseries of life. The solution proposed is a 
transmigration which holds sway from the lowest forms 
of existence to the highest intelligence. The character 
of life in the present state shapes the following. Evil- 
doing leads to lower forms of life, while the good rise 
in the scale of existences. The highest stage, how- 



PESSIMISM. 277 

ever, is not permanent. Gods and men are parts of 
the world system. The purest intelligences and most 
blessed spirits must descend sooner or later to run 
again the course. There are stages, no final resting 
place, for the soul on its journey. Once the merit has 
been exhausted, the soul falls to a lower sphere to doctrine of 
begin its dark and painful ascent. Misery only and mfgration. 
vanity are found in life. No afterhope to cast a beam 
of comfort on the chill and gloomy present. Not the 
fear of death palls the Indian mind, but the dread of 
birth. Death brings no surcease to sorrow and suffer- 
ing. As plants spring from seed, and seed falls from 
the ripened fruit, so birth and death, death and birth 
follow each other with the inexorable rigor of a phy- 
sical law.^ 

That — once and whereso'er and whence begun - 
Life runs its rounds of living, climbing up 
From mote, and gnat, and worm, reptile and fish, 
Bird and shagged beast, man, demon, deva, God, 
To clod and mote again. ^ 

§ 7. Great is the sorrow of the rich at the loss of pessimistic, 
their riches, says the Atma-Purana, of the prince at 
the approach of death, of those in paradise at the 
expiring of their merits; there is pain in the perform- 
ance of the rites, there is pain in the fruition of the 
reward, at the thought of its loss, there is pain on the 
fresh birth in the world. ^ No peace, no rest, no end. 
Activity was considered as the root of evil. Even good 
acts at the most prolong the flow of life. 

§ 8. Buddhism is the logical and natural sequence of Buddhism 
the principles set forth in the Upanishads.* The same dIvcIoI?^ 

ment. 
'Brih. Up. Ill, 9, 28. 
'^Arnold, Light of Asia, p. 96. 

^Chand. Up. II, 10, 7; Brih. Up, VI, 2, 16; 9, 3; Manavad- 
harmasastra XII, 54, sq. 

^Miiller, S. B. E., vol. XV, Introd., p. xxvii. 



278 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Gotama 
however 
abolished 
distinc- 
tions. 



Buddhism 
a common 
not a speci- 
fic term. 



pessimistic theory of life throws its gloomy shadows 
over the one system as over the other. ^ The same 
dread of birth is the nightmare to be freed from. 
Gotama, however, made a change in the means 
employed to avoid a rebirth. In the Upanishads the 
student is drilled in lower wisdow, e. g., rites and sacri- 
fices, as a preparation for the higher, e. g., abstraction 
and meditation. Gotama abolished the distinction 
and opened the higher path to all. The highest pur- 
pose of the soul is to return to original nothingness 
and final extinction. All things have sprung therefrom ; 
all things have this destination.^ In the words of the 
Sankya-Karita, " so through the study of principles, 
the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge 
is attained, that neither I am, nor aught is mine, nor 
do I exist." ' 

2°. Teaching. 

§ 9. Buddhism is a common name designating the 
.popular faith in many lands. Not only is it applied 
to existing creeds; it has a history reaching back over 
two thousand years. The study of its development 
and present condition reveals not Buddhism but 
Buddhisms. It varies in every land just as it has 
varied in the course of time. The reason is that 
Buddhism in its origin was not a religion. Its founder 
simply propounded a philosophy of life. In propagat- 
ing his doctrines the early missionaries did not compel 
the inhabitants of other countries to give up their 
native beliefs. They adapted Buddhism to the con- 
dition of those to whom they preached. Hence many 
varieties sprang up, crystallized and flourished. The 
Buddhism of China, e. g., is not the Buddhism of 

^ Miiller, Chips from a German Workshop, vol. I, p. 223 sq. 

^ Chand. Up. 

' Pfleiderer, The Phil, of Religion, vol. IV, p. 8. 



PESSIMISM. 279 

Ceylon.® Just as these forms are not identical with True Bud- 

,....,' a A J. ^ J dhism is the 

the primitive teaching.* At present we are concerned teaching of 
only with the teaching of Gotama as far as this can be ° ^"^^* 
learned from the results of modern critical and his- 
torical research. 

§ 10. Buddhism can be considered as a system ofnotareiig-- 
thought and as a philosophy of life. It has, therefore, phiiosopV. 
a metaphysical and an ethical aspect. Lacking in the 
constitutive elements which go to make up a religion, 
it has no true or just claim to the title. The question 
is now of primitive Buddhism, not of the later excres- 
cences which pass under that name. The meta- 
physical basis of the system only demands our present 
attention. 

§ II. While seated under the Bo-tree of Benares in The Four 
deep meditation upon the Chain of Causation, /. ^., Truths. 
the unending cycle of birth and death, of death and 
birth, Gotama, in a flash, or by an inner illumination 
as his disciples are wont to say, perceived a solution 
for the dark sodden veil of mystery and misery which 
envelops life. This solution is embodied in the famous 
Four Noble Truths which form the kernel of his system. 
Around and from these his moral teaching is developed, 
and by them is adequatelv understood and explained.'^W Sorrow 

■^ is universal. 

§ 12. In the first sermon by which the triumphant 
chariot-wheel of his doctrine is set in motion the Four 
Truths are emphatically expressed." They are: 
I. That sorrow is universal: " This, mendicants, is 
the noble truth of sorrow; birth is sorrow, old age is 
sorrow, sickness is sorrow, death is sorrow, the pres- 
ence of the unloved is sorrow, the absence of the loved 
is sorrow, all that one wishes for and does not get, is 

* Biel, Copleston, Bigandet. 

^ Rhys Davids, Kellogg. 
'•^ Copleston's Buddhism, p. in. 
** Buddha's Dhammapada, V. igo-192. 



28o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(2) desire is 
the cause 
of sorrow. 



sorrow: Briefly the five elements by which beings 
hold to existence are sorrow." '* 

§ 13. In so far as Gotama states the fact of sorrow, 
the words are true. But they only express a partial 
view of life. Happiness is a fact also. The joy of 
hard won achievement, of motherhood, of child-like 
innocence, of well-doing, the joy which springs from 
the right exercise of the higher emotions cannot be 
ignored. To insist upon the sorrows of life to the utter 
exclusion of the joys is a travesty of truth. To pro- 
claim that sorrow is the primal, fundamental and uni- 
versal fact of conscious existence is an unwarranted 
assumption or rather a perversion of the testimony of 
consciousness. Christian Philosophy admits the coex- 
istence of happiness and of sorrow, but teaches, as 
shall be shown, that the former is the primary and 
fundamental fact, and explains their true ethical mean- 
ing and import, 

§ 14. (2) That the cause of sorrow is desire. " This, 
mendicants," says Gotama, " is the noble truth of the 
cause of sorrow. Desire that leads from birth to birth, 
and is accompanied by pleasure and pain, seeking to 
gratification here and there, namely, desire of sensual 
pleasure, desire of existence, desire of wealth." 

§ 15. The three-fold division of desire can be reduced 
to the desire of existence. That sensual gratification 
leads to sorrow is a truth illustrated on every page of 
history. In giving statement to this, Gotama simply 
laid stress upon a fact; but again and again assures 
his hearers that the desire of existence is the main and 
real cause of sorrow. If all existence is sorrow, as we 
learn from the first Truth, then desire of existence is 
the true source of sorrow. This desire perpetuates 
Karma and leads from birth to birth in unvarying 

" Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 48. 



PESSIMISM. 281 

round. With Gotama there is no soul. Individual life 
is made up of a combination of the five groups of ele- 
ments or Skandhas. Desire is the reason of their 
combination into the Karma and causes the Karma to 
be perpetuated in other forms. It thus becomes the 
constitutive of personal existence." 

§ 16. (3) That the cessation of sorrow is brought (3) sorrow 
about by the eradication of desire, " When this fierce destroying- 

i-\ riir- • T ' desire. 

thirst {i. e.^ desire) overcomes, fall of poison, in this 
world, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana 
grass. This salutary word I tell you, as many as are 
here come together: Dig up the root of thirst, as he 
who wants the sweet-scented Usira root must dig up 
the Birana grass." ^* 

§ 17. The Third Truth follows from the Second. It criticism. 
is true that the diminutions of desire cuts off many 
occasions of disappointment and sorrow. At the same 
time it deprives us of the purest and noblest joys. 
Life is effort, and is shown forth in activity. A great 
and noble soul is filled with desires of good. Do not 
these desires furnish the sweetest joys? It is of 
Catholic faith that God rewards the longings of the soul 
for good, even though we lack the strength or oppor- 
tunity to put them into execution. In the silence of my 
room I may kneel in prayer that God may be glorified 
by all His creatures, that He may rule in the hearts of 
all men, that He may give me light and strength to do 
His holy will. My desire becomes a swelling hymn of 
praise. In acting thus, how can I do wrong? He bids 
me fill my mind and enlarge my heart with such as these. 

§ 18. Again, the very possession of desire reacts 
upon temperament and character. It gives elevation 

'2 Kellogg, The Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p. 
210 sq. ; Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures of 1881, Rise and Growth 
of Religion. 

'*Baddha's Dhammapada, ch. XXIV, V, 335-337 sq. 



282 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of mind, it broadens my horizon, it imparts firmness 
and resource amid the varying happenings of life. Or 
suppose I strive to put my hopes into execution. There 
is energy and joy in the effort, but what exultation 
of spirit in the achievement! True, reverses come to 
the wisest and the best. But there can be no failure 
in the effort to be good and true. By a v\ford or act I 
give sympathy or help to the struggling or downcast. 
I add to the happiness of others, I cause the sun to 
break through the gloomy cloud, I become greater and 
better in its light and warmth. Happiness is found in 
action and the cessation of activity cramps the heart 
and makes life friendless and cheerless. 
(4) This § 19. (4) The Fourth Truth teaches that the one 

nobfe eight- way to accompiish this end, /. e., the extinction of 
pat . (jgg^j.g^ J5 l-]^g noble eight-fold way. " This, O mendi- 
cants, is the noble truth of the way of living which 
leads to the extinction of sorrow; it is the noble eight- 
fold way; right faith, right resolve, right speech, right 
action, right living, right effort, right recollection, 
right meditation." ^^ 

8 20. At first siafht these precepts appear beautiful 

criticism. '-> * jr f i-r 

and excellent. We are apt to interpret them after our 
own manner of thinking and in the light of Christian 
philosophy. This is to fail utterly in grasping their 
true meaning. The term " right " has not the same 
sense in Buddhism as in Christian ethics. The " right" 
views of life, e. g., are those set forth in the Four 
Noble Truths. They are right only on the admission 
that Atheism is true and Pessimism is the only gospel 
of m.ankind.^^ Ignorance of these truths is the imme- 
diate cause of existence in so far as it perpetuates 

^5 Davids, Buddhism, p. 44 sq. ; Buddha's Dhammapada, ch. 
XX, V, 273-276; Copleston's Buddhism, p. 130 sq. 

IS Kellogg, The Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p. 
302. 



PESSIMISM. 283 

Karma and involves the individual in the eternal chain 
of causation." 

§ 21. Thus the doctrine of Pessimism is the dominant Pessimism 
note of Buddhism. That all existence is evil, was the Buddhism. 
spectre ever before the mind. The supreme effort of 
life was to cease to live. Nirvana, /. ^., extinction of 
lust, was the goal leading to Parinirvana, /. e., the 
extinction of being. ^® 

II. 

SCHOPPENHAUER. 

§ 22. This Philosophy of life, so dismal and shorn of Buddhism 
hope, was the gospel to countless struggling human scloppen- 
souls in India over two thousand 3; ears ago. In our ^^^^^* 
own time it has been proposed to European minds as 
the panacea for all our woes. About one hundred 
years have passed since Sir William Jones brought to 
English readers the treasures of ancient Hindoo litera- 
ture. His extravagant praises of its worth attracted 
the attention of scholars. The number of students 
interested in this department of Knowledge constantly 
increased. It was reserved, however, for the master- 
mind of Schoppenhauer to appropriate its philosophy, 
and to set it forth in a scientific form, becoming thuS 
the founder of modern Pessimism. 

§ 23. In Schoppenhauer two currents of philosophic sources 
thought converge to form a new system. By nature teaching. 
and early education a German, he came under the 
influence of Kant and his immediate successors, Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel. In after-life a devoted admirer 
and disciple of Buddhism, he drew therefrom the 
inspiration and substance of his teaching. Yet the 
elem,ents of both can be clearly traced. 

"J. Wordsworth, M,. A., The One Religion; appendix I, 
by Prof Frankfurter, pp. 371-372. 

*^ Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 321. 



284 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

funda- § 24. His fuQdamental doctrine is the distinction 

doctrine, between the phenomenal and the real world. Thus he 
accepts Kant's initial principle of the phenomenon and 
the noumenon, as also the Maya of Buddhism. The 
phenomenal world is what is known in sense-experience ; 
it exists only to the percipient mind; its real nature is 
pure mental representation (Vorstellung). With 
Fichte he holds that the phenomenal is a world of 
appearance which depends on the activity of the mind 
and ceases to exist with the percipient mind. Not so 
the real. Sclielling conceives this as absolute thought; 
Hegel, as the idca^ which transcends and enfolds all 
wuithe that is known as subject and object. To Schoppen- 
one ''^^ i^y- ha,uer will is the one universal substance and essence 
of every individual thing. It is manifested in the blind 
courses of nature, as well ^s in the deliberate acts 
of man.^^ 
The world § 25. Hence his definiton of Will as that which con- 
tains the various manifestations of impulse and feeling. 
Kant taught that the principle of causality held sway 
only in the world of phenomena, /. <?., Vo?^stellung. 
Therefore will, in as far as it is the absolute and real, 
is not the cause of the world, but its essence and real 
being. In every individual phenomenon we may dis- 
tinguish two elements; the will, /. e., the constant 
principle of being, and a variable phenomenal cause. 
In its ceaseless striving, the will is free from all 
determination. In its essential nature unconscious, 
motives have no influence over its actions. The signs 
of purpose everywhere visible in nature ^^ are true of 
phenomena only, not of the real or absolute will; in it 
there is no prevision or design. In preserving the dis- 
tinction between the real and the phenomenal, in 



essence. 



^^ Sully, Pessimism, p. 84. 

20 The World as Will, Vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 375. 



PESSIMISM. 285 

ascribing purpose to the latter and denying it to the 
former, Schoppenhauer frequently contradicts himself. 

§ 26. The phenomenal world is the objectivation of pheno- 
the will. This objectivation takes place through the wo?id is 
medium of ideas. They are the intermedium between uolfS^m. 
the real and the phenomenal. In animals and in man 
the manifestation is recognized as the will to live. 
Every creature strives for life. Life is the aim and the 
end of existence. The way is thus presented for a 
problem, the solution of which casts a peculiar aspect 
over his whole system of philosophy. What, he asks, The value 
is the real value of life? Does the end for which we°^^^^^' 
strive justify the toil and anxiety employed in the 
striving, does its possession yield real satisfaction? 
The answer he gives is an emphatic negative. The 
striving to live arises not from choice but from a blind 
instinct. If life were happy it might have value. But 
the preponderance of pain over pleasure shows that 
happiness is only an illusive dream. To live is to (i) a priori 
strive. Now striving has its source in want or discon- 
tent. We are not satisfied with what we have, or we toVtrffe^and 
need something we have not; therefore we strive f or ^^^^°"^^"^* 
what lies beyond. This of necessity involves suffering. 

§ 27. As the nature of the will is a continuous striv- (b) real 
ing we can readily understand that lasting satisfaction fj^P^ggJ^^e 
is impossible. The satisfaction we do at times obtain 
is only temporary, and marks the starting-point of a 
new effort. Schoppenhauer compares the nature of 
the will to an insatiable thirst, or a craving hunger. 
Happiness is like the sweet food, having the power to 
please in the mouth, losing it when swallowed. As 
the poet expresses it: 

Pleasures are like poppies spread 

You seize the flower, the bloom is shed. 

Or like snow flakes on the river, 

A moment white, then gone forever. 



286 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(c) happi- §28. Happiness is something negative, /. e., the 

ness is 

something Satisfaction of a need, the stilling of a pain." But tlie 

negative. ^ . . ^ . ,. . ^ . . 

permanent or real element m our lives is a striving. 
Satisfaction is instantaneous and fleeting only, and 
gives way to the strong current of desire which consti- 

(d) pain is tutes our nature. Hence, new striving, suffering and 

pain. The fact of suffering is essential and universal." 
It is of the essence of things, in as far as it is insepara- 
ble from striving. Man, however, suffers more than 
lower creation; and the more intelligent, the more 
intense is the suffering. 

(2) a post- § 29. Schoppenhauer concludes to the evil of exist- 

ence from a consideration of man's essential nature. 
He reasons also from the data of experience. The 
(a) progress intellectual development of the individual brings with 
Ssodaif it a larger knowledge and a wider mental range. 
larger Dcsircs multiply and are intensified. Thus wants arise 
and greater ^nd wauts bring Suffering. So also with society and 
^^^^^- nations. Progress of necessity increases suffering. 
The progress we are wont to herald is not a sign of 
bettermjent, but a sure indication that the world is 
growing worse. Hence to live is to suffer, not through 
an accident of circumstance, but from a necessity of 
nature. To earnestly desire life is folly. The con- 
scious affirmation of will is the source of misery. To 
this source can be traced the belief in imm^ortality. 

(3) means § 3°- The Only means of escape from the suffering 
of escape. ^^^ ^^^^ q£ existence is the denial of the will to live. 

Here is found the basis of wise and virtuous conduct, 
since this denial is founded in our recognition of the 
true nature of life. What is real is the absolute Will; 
all else are merely seemings. The veil of Maya over- 
spreads the real, and is the reason why we apply par- 

" Kant, Anthropology, No. LIX. 

" Metman, Le Pessimisme moderne, pp. 81-93. 



PESSIMISM. 287 

ticular names to individual objects. It is the principle 
of individualization. But these individual objects are 
not real; they constitute the phenomenal world only. 
By holding this truth firm in mind we penetrate the veil 
of Maya, we see that individual things are only seem- 
ings, and grasp the essential oneness of all. The intel- 
lectual vision of the one underlying reality quiets the 
Will. It no longer affirms itself as an individual dis- 
tinct from other Wills. Hence arises true self-denial, 
/. <?., denial of the Self, which culminates in a denial to 
live.'*^ This state of quiescence is the highest attain- 
able happiness. We are passive spectators of the pass- 
ing vanities and miseries of life; and are at peace in 
the worst of all possible worlds. 

§ 31. The philosophy of Schoppenhauer is an Ideal- Criticism, 
ism. The initial error lies in the full acceptance of 
Kant's theory of knowledge. If the noumenon, SuTtheory 
i. e., the real, cannot be grasped by the perceiving edg^e"^"^^" 
mind, and if the phenomenon, /. ^., the ideal appear- 
ances, can only become the object of cognition, the 
source of the system can be seen at a glance. He 
inferred the unity of the real from the unity of crea- 
tion. Unlike Hegel he did not look upon the real 3.?, 
idea, but as will. With Fichte he considers the objects 
around to be of the stuff that dreams are made, or, as 
the Buddhist would say, illusions caused by Maya 
overshadowing the real. Now Kant's theory rests on 
the confusion of sense-perception and intellectual 
knowledge, on the failure to grasp the true nature and 
powers of the mind/^* - A system, therefore, which 
rests upon a false basis cannot be true. 

§32. Schoppenhauer maintains as a fundamental (2) funda- 
principle that activity is evil. This is not true. Let principle is 

false. 

^' Sully, Pessimism, p. loi. 

'* Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 37 sq. 



288 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

US appeal to our conscious experience. Is there not a 
joy in labor, in putting forth our powers of body or of 
mind, in the recognition of what we have done as well 
as in the reasoned hope of what we can do? Grant 
that our nature craves for what we have not; the crav- 
ing is not an abnormal thirst; there is what we may 
call a healthy desire. The pleasures of sense are to 
the generality of men more than a fleeting gratification 
of crying needs. Diseased minds are sometimes found, 
but of these we do not speak. There is in the depths 
of our nature a well-spring of activity which finds vent 
in a thousand ways. The high resolve, the courageous 
endeavor, the fire of enthusiasm, the flush of anger, 
have spurred great souls to live and to live so as to 
make mankind, nobler, purer, better. The cities in 
which we live, the comforts we enjoy, the books we 
read, are not the product of men who passed their lives 
in constant misery. If the highest good w^ere quies- 
cence and apathy, how miserable would be our lot! 
Human nature rebels against such a creed. To live is 
an inalienable possession of our nature. Man will not 
crush out existence. In this is seen the superiority of 
Christianity. Unlike Buddhism it recognizes the funda- 
mental desires of human nature, and far from crushing, 
strives only to uplift and direct them. Christ came to 
those " who dwelt in the shadow of the valley of 
death." He came that "they might have life and 
have it more abundantly." To point out the real 
dignity and value of life, to offer to mankind the means 
and aids which purify, ennoble, and make life a priceless 
blessing has ever been the aim and purpose of our 
Christian religion. 

§ 33. The disciples of Schoppenhauer, Bahnsen, 
Frauenstadt and Taubert modify to some extent the 
teaching of their master either in its metaphysical or 



PESSIMISM. 289 

ethical aspect. The most important, however, is 
Hartman, who presents a system based on the main 
lines of Schoppenhauer with important additions from 
Schelling and Hegel. 

III. 

Hartman. 

§ 34. In 1864 Hartman published the Philosophy of doctrine, 
the Unconscious, which contains the substance of his 
philosophy. He recognizes one ultimate reality; 
hence his theory is, as with Schoppenhauer, a kind of 
Monism." The individual objects around us are activi- 
ties or manifestations of the one reality. In this, true 
to his German antecedents and environment, he pre- 
sents a form of Pantheism. The world is due to a (j) genesis, 
combination of will and idea; the will in itself is an 
empty form; a definite aim or purpose, /. e., content, 
must come from another source; this is found alone 
in a mental representation. Hartman claims to agree 
with Spinoza, who holds one ultimate substance having 
two attributes. The student, however, readily per- 
ceives that he has ingrafted the idea of Hegel upon the 
will oi Schoppenhauer, and beyond underlying both he 
postulates the absolute of Schelling, which he names 
the unco?iscious.'^^ 

§35. Thus to Hartman the Unconscious includes (2) The Un- 
the will and the idea. He teaches that the manifesta- ^^"^'^i^^s- 
tion of unconscious will and intelligence can be recog- 
nized: (a) Throughout the organic world as, <?. g.^ in (a) in or 
the functions of the spinal column, and cerebral Ifodd. 
ganglia, in voluntary and reflex movements, in instinct, 
in the formation, growth, and the recuperative pro- 
cesses of the organism, (b) In the human mind, e. g., (b)in man. 

^^ Royce. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 259-263. 
^^ Sully, Pessimism, p. 131. 

19 



290 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(3) Matter 
and mind 
resolved 
into the 
uncon- 
scious. 



(4) Hedon- 
ism in 

Ethics, 
value of 
life. 



(a) a priori 
life is suf- 
fering-. 



sexual love, feeliag, character, morality, aesthetic judg- 
ment, artistic creations, mysticism, etc.^^ From these 
data he infers an all-pervading reality which he terms 
the Unconscious. 

§ -^6. Matter is made up of innumerable atomic 
forces. Their activities are merely acts of volition. 
Hence the theory of atomic wills and the resolution of 
matter into will. The distinction between matter and 
mind is thus blotted out. In reality they are identical. 
Organic life is the will acting with the purpose or aim 
of producing higher . and still higher forms. The 
organic evolution, therefore, is not merely mechanical; 
it is guided and upheld by the direct action of an 
unconscious will. Individual variation, natural selec- 
tion and inheritance play only subordinate parts in the 
development. Sensation and thought are explained 
as due to a collision or conflict of v/ills after the same 
manner as matter comes into existence by the inter- 
action of atomic wills. In this we perceive the influence 
which the monads of Leibnitz and the plurality of Her- 
bart left upon his mind, and how he has tried to recon- 
cile the plurality with the Monism of Spinoza, Schelling, 
Hegel and S:hoppenhauer. 

§ 37. Hartman follows Schoppenhauer in viewing life 
from the Hedonist standpoint. Its value is measured 
by the balance of pleasure over pain. Now by the 
very nature of our existence pain always is in excess of 
pleasure. The reason of existence is the blind impulse 
to will. But to will or to strive implies defect and 
need. Thus the will by its nature is never satisfied. 
Life is never complete, and existence is the result of 
folly. Not to be is better than to be. The very rea- 
son of existence, therefore, becomes the source of pain 
and sorrow. 



2' Sully, ib., p. 119. 



PESSIMISM. 291 

§ s8. Hartman is not content in showing the failure (b) a 
of life as the logical result of his phisosophy. He ^°'''"°"- 
appeals to experience. By a large and wide induction 
he attempts to make secure the conclusion reached 
from /?/;Y^r/ reasoning. His exposition of the wretched- more 
ness of life is much more complete and searching than Sfjfsihop- 
that of Schoppenhauer. With ruthless hand he shatters p^"^^"^''- 
the ideals man has venerated, exposes the shams which 
enter into our conscious existence, and holds up to 
contempt and scorn the very objects which are 
enshrined in the sacred memories of childhood and are 
the source and mainspring of high resolves and noble 
deeds in after Hfe. To him, woman is a degraded 
thing. ^ Only a mind besotted, only a soul steeped in 
the mire of degradation, only a heart dead to the 
slightest affection for what is true, beautiful and good, 
could inspire the pages inscribed with his name. 

§ 39. The work of Hartman is a storehouse to those (sv design in 
who seek proofs for design in the universe. To him^ersetthe 
the world has a rational aim. The rational element, un?on?5 '^' 
/. e., Hegel's idea, which gives content to the pure""'"'- 
potency of will, is the fundamental reason of the world- 
order. He disagrees, however, with Hegel in affirming 
that consciousness is the proximate, not the final end 
in the evolution of the universe. Hartman holds that 
the final end is had in appeasing the cravings and striv- 
ings of the will. This is accomplished by divorcing (b),„aiai,„ 
the will from the mental representation and thus j'o?dSir«' 
reducing it to its primal state of pure potency. The ^^""^^li^^e!'''^ 
conscious denial of will is the means to be employed. 
Thus an antagonism is engendered and the will is 
reduced to a pure potency.^^ 

§40. (i) The system of Hartman is more complete Criticism, 
and systematic than that proposed by his master. In " ''''"^ 

"Sully, Pessimism, p. 140. 



292 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



it are found traces of a synthesis and attempt at recon- 
ciliation of antecedent German Philosophic thought. 
(i)Pan- Nevertheless it is purely pantheistic and labors with 

theistic. ^ -^ ^ 

the defects indigenous to every system of Pantheism. 
The initial postulate is the fundamental identity of all 
existing things. Now consciousness conclusively shows 
this to be false. We are distinct one from another; 
my conscious life is my own possession. I am not of 
the same nature as the stone, or the tree, or the brute. 
(2) Same §41. (2) The conclusion of Hartman's system is 

wfth'schop- the same as Schoppenhauer's. The addition of the 
pen aue.. j.^^jqj^^| element only supplies a defect; it does not 
alter the nature of the evolution. Therefore the same 
criticism which so effectually exposed the conclusions 
of one, tells with the same effect against the other. 
Life is not a blunder or a folly; existence is not a 
fundamental mistake. Such words as enthusiasm, 
virtue, heroism, goodness, truth, beauty, find place in 
the lowest lives and leave an indelible imprint upon 
the page of history. 

§ 42. (3) The standard of Hedonism which both fol- 
low is not the true test of the value of life. The very 
consequences to which it leads are a telling argument 
against its truth. Principles which logically result in 
despair do not make the world better and give no ray 
of comfort to struggling human nature. In the follow- 
ing chapter this standard will be closely examined. Its 
real worth will be shown to be illusive and inimical to 
what is our highest aim and prize. 



(3) false 
theory of 
Ethics. 



Influence 
on Litera- 
ture, e. g., 
Leopardi. 



IV. 

Influence. 

§ 43. The influence of Pessimism upon modern 

thought has been deep and widespread. To Schoppen- 

hauer and Hartman it is a well-developed system of 



PESSIMISM. 293 

philosophy. Leopardi consecrated his poetic genius 
to express in stirring verse the tale of life's wretched- 
ness.^® He is thus the real poet of Pessimism.^" 
Diffused by them, its teaching has permeated every 
rank of society and every sphere of life. We find its 
traces in conversation, in the papers, on the stage, and 
throughout contemporaneous literature. ^^ It is seen in 
" Queen Mab," in *' Misery and Mutability " of Shel- SheUey,^^ 
ley, in Tennyson's "In Memoriam," and Goethe's Goethe, 
"Faust," in the grim Carlyle exposing the shams of Byron. ' 
life, in the fine Byronic despair. 

Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen, 
Count o'er the days from anguish free. 
And know whatever thou hast been, 
Tis something better not to be. 

Musset complains that he has come too late in a world Mussett. 
too old.^^ Lamartine hears in nature the voice of one Lamartine. 
long sigh, and wonders what crime he committed that 
he should be born.^^ The tone of disappointment, of 
the eternal unfitness of things is dominant in the writ- 
ings of the naturalistic school, in the works of Loti, 
Bourget, George Eliot, and Hall Caine.'* The excla-gojJ|f- 
mation of Euripides: " Swift-fated and conscious, how g^*?,'>, . 

^ ' Hall Came. 

brief is life's pleasureless portion! " ^Ms repeated bygmar 
the admiring readers of Omar Khayyam and of Heine, Heine. 
the sweet singer of the world pain. 

" His L'amour et la mort. 

3° "Sombre amant de la mort, pauvre Leopardi." writes 
Musset. 

^' Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 117. 

^^ " Je suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux." 

^^ Le Desespoir, 

^^" L'homme en se civilisant, n a-t-il fait vraiment que com- 
pliquer sa barbarie et raffiner sa miserie." P. Bourget, Essais 
de Psychol, contemp., p. 322; R. H, Hutton, Modern Guides 
of English Thought in Matter of Faith, ch. V, George Eliot. 

^^ Lewes, History of Philosophy. 



294 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Literature § 44. It is false, howcver, to hold that literature is 

not wholly , . , . . . ^ ^ . . , 

pessimistic, whoily pessimistic. More than one poet, from the 
analysis of his own inner consciousness, has sung 

" Sweet are the uses of adversity," 

and more than one toiler along life's highway has 
learned that sweet rest comes after labor, and sweet 

Keats. joy after pain. Keats forms a contrast to Byron, 
Hellenbach has drawn a kind of Optimism from the 

Words- philosophy of Schoppenhauer, and Wordsworth, the 

worth. . ^ . . . - , 

poet of nature, from communion with her various 
moods, has learned that 

Wilderness and wood 
Blank ocean and mere sky, supports that mood, 
Which with the lofty, sanctifies the low, 

and warns us too apt at times to look upon the gloomy- 
side, that 

If life were slumber on a bed of down. 
Toil unimposed, vicissitude unknown, 
Sad were our lot. 

Sir John Lubbock has written the beautiful work on 
the Pleasures of Life; the scientific Meliorism of 
George Eliot and of Sully have been submitted to 
exhaustive criticism, and OUa La Prune has presented 
the Christian standpoint in the philosophic essay " La 
Prix de la Vie." A healthier tone is visible in the 
decline of the Positivistic school and in the revival of 
Romanicism. 

V. 
Causes, 

in general § 45' ^ discussion of Pcssimism would not be com- 
plete without advertence to its causes. A thorough 
analysis is difficult and would embrace elements too 
minute and varying for place in the present dissertation. 



Olla La 
Prune. 



PESSIMISM. 295 

Peculiarity of temperament, manifold circumstances of 
life, fill the soul with sad thoughts and gloomy fore- 
bodings. Three principle sources, however, can be 
indicated. 

§ 46. (a) Philosophical : To this head are reduced the spedai: 
systems of Buddhism, of Schoppenhauer and of Hart- osophkai. 
man. The Pessimism which they teach is the logical 
result of the attempt to explain the system of the uni- 
verse. The principles are false; they spring from a 
false theory of knowledge, and lead to a kind of Pan- 
theistic Nihilism. 

§47. (b) Ethical: A false theory of life leaves an Ethical, 
imprint in the form of Pessimism. This is especially 
true of Hedonism^ the recent aspect of ancient Epi- 
cureanism.- Kant taught that happiness conceived as 
enjoyment can never be reached. ^^ History is replete 
with proofs of this statement. Individual experience 
tells that pleasure is an empty mirage which leaves 
the toil-stained seeker sad and disconsolate. A higher 
motive should rule our acts. There is a moral order 
and a moral law universal and imperative to which the 
individual must conform, very frequently at the loss of 
pleasure or enjoyment. If we sought pleasure only, 
why struggle against temptation, why row against a 
strong contrary current? Only thus is life's prize won, 
is character formed and men stirred to high and heroic 
deeds. Pleasure enervates and softens manhood, 
lowers the standard of action, kills earnest endeavor 
and leaves the devotee a prey to scepticism, weariness 
and disgust." 

§48. (c) Religious: Finally, Pessimism may be Religious. 
traced to a denial of a good and just God. Around 
this truth are clustered the religious and philosophic 

^^ Sully, Pessimism, p. 67. 

'■^ Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. I, ch. V. 



296 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

beliefs which alone give to life a reason and a moral 
worth, and explain the facts of suffering or of death. 
Hope rests upon faith. Remove this and all the 
progress of modern science in vain can comfort the 
sad and unhappy soul. Life becomes an enigma, with 
only its human and sorrowful side apparent. The only 
recourse is had in a scientific Meliorism which is a 
vain dream or the shadow of Pessimism. ^^ 

§ 49. Christian faith alone transforms life and sheds 
over the lowest and most sad the soft, warm sunlight 
of its teaching. Virtue can reign in the lowliest 
hamlet, vice may run riot upon a throne. The goods 
and ills of life are powerless to alter our worth and 
dignity ; they only serve to render it more conspicuous.'* 

2^ Metman, Le Pessimisme Moderne, pp. 319, 358. 
^^ Mgr. Gay, Christian Life and Virtues. 



CHAPTER XV. 

EVIL. 

§ I. The existence of evil is a startling fact in indi- fact of evil, 
vidual experience. When in moments of silent medita- 
tion we look into our souls, we trace there scars of 
repented sins or festering sores of evil habits. The in- 
justice and malice of men, however much we may battle 
against the conviction, takes deep root in the mind, 
fills the imagination and hangs over our waking lives 
like a dark and heavy pall. The actions of others are 
carefully examined, or their biographies are read, and 
the same tale of physical or mental suffering is told. 
The history of man confirms our judgment and exhibits 
sorrow, suffering and misery. Our own convictions 
are read in the physical and animal world. Evil every- 
where exists; life itself is conditioned by pain. In 
face of these facts how can man admit the existence 
of a good and merciful God? 

I. 

The Problem. 

§ 2. The existence of evil, we are told, is widespread. 
It is found in inanimate and animate creation, in ani- 
mals as also in man. It assumes different aspects, nor 
is it always of the same force. To be thoroughly 
treated, the problem should be made definite. 

§ 3. Evil is the antithesis of good. To understand what is the 
its nature we must first obtain a clear notion of what^°° ' 
is meant by good. The idea of goodness is funda- 
mental. It enters into the thought of every conscious 
mind; it is applied to a great variety of objects, and 

[297] 



298 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

finds expression in some of the most beautiful passages 
in literature. Nevertheless the notion is not easy to 
define. The important part it plays in our rational 
life, its intimate relation with the ideas of the true and 
beautiful, its moral influence on what is highest and 
noblest, as well as on what is lowest and base, its con- 
nection with the generous, the selfish and the aesthetic 
emotions, are apt to suggest a superficial or partial 
and erroneous conception. The atmosphere in which 
we live, the manner of viewing persons and events, 
the value of life itself are in danger of perversion. 
They hinge on what we hold to be good. Human 
nature in the past has sought the good and will seek 
it in the future. 
implies a ft 4^ Goodness is an abstract noun formed from the 

relation " ^ 

based on adjective ** good." In its primary and concrete signifi- 
facts. cation, therefore, it denotes a quality or attribute of 

things. Further analysis shows that the attribute or 
quality which inclines us to call an object good, is not 
conceived as something absolute. The idea of good, 
as well as of truth and of beauty, implies a relation. 
In the good, the object appeals to the will; in the true, 
to the mind; in the beautiful, to the aesthetic sense. 
The relation is, however, not purely logical; it has a 
real objective basis in external objects. 
a subjective § 5. Thus the couccpt of the good contains a sub- 

and obiec- . . . 1 • , • 1 ^ rr-.! 1 • • 1 

tiveeie- jcctive and an objective element, ine objective ele- 
ment in the . , T .- . 1 . , , . 

notion of mcnt IS the quality or attribute inherent m the object; 

goo ness. ^^^ subjective element is the peculiar relation to the 
will or desire. The objective elem.ent is conceived as 
fundamental; the subjective as constitutive; both 
combined form the complete and correct notion. This 
enables us to understand how it is that writers present 
conflicting views in the analysis of the good. Some 
laying stress on the objective element alone, identify 



EVIL. 



299 



goodness with perfection. It is true, perfection is con- 
tained in the concept of goodness. Hence what is 
perfect is good. Thus, e. g., God, the most perfect 
being, is the highest good. Nevertheless over and 
above the element of perfection, the notion of good- 
ness exhibits a relation to the will which is its char- 
acteristic mark. Thus Aristotle,' St. Thomas,' and 
Cicero,^ describe the good as that which is desired or 
sought by all. Others viewing the subjective to the 
exclusion of the objective element have been led to 
treat of the good as a sentiment, beautiful in itself, 
but possessing no reality save as the projection of our 
hopes and tastes. To the consistent followers of Kant 
the good is purely subjective. What is objective is 
beyond the reach of the mind. The supremacy of the 
will, upon which Kane so strongly insists in his Critic 
of Judgment, is nothing more than the dictum of the 
individual. The logical outcome of his teaching finds 
historic illustration in the sentimentalism of Jacobi and 
Schleiermacher, in the aesthetic idealism of Fichte and 
the Neo-Kantians. 

§ 6. Finally, some recognize the subjective and the g[l°/J^^^^' 
objective elements, but, forgetful that the will forP^^^sure. 
divers reasons seeks an object apprehended as good, 
confound goodness with utility or pleasure. Thus we 
have the school of Utilitarianism proposed by Bentley 
and both Mills, and the ancient theory of the Epi- 
cureans reappearing under the modern form of 
Hedonism. 

^ Ethics, 1. I, c. I. 

^ C. Gent. 1. I, ch. 37; S. Theol. p. i, q. 5, a. 1. 3, 5, 6; q. 48, 
a. i; q. 60, a. i, 21, 
^ De Finibus, 1. I. 



300 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



II. 



In the Material World. 



principal of 
finality. 



in nature. 



§ 7. In a preceding chapter the problem of the Final 
Cause was fully discussed. The conclusion established 
beyond question was that ends and purposes exist in 
creation. An examination into our inner life shows 
that every waking moment is filled with an object in 
view which guides and controls our thoughts, affec- 
tions and actions. The explanation is found in the 
constitution of our nature. The two great faculties of 
the soul are mind and will. A rational act springs 
from their harmonious union. The mind points out 
the way and funishes the motives of action. The will 
imparts the moving power by which the act is put into 
execution. To act with a motive is a sign and proof 
of rational life. Now motive is the reason why our 
acts combine in a special line for a fixed object; nay, 
more, it is the reason why we act at all. In this way 
our actions are clothed with a purpose and the princi- 
ple of finality rules over our conscious existence. 

§ 8. The same conclusion is forced upon the mind 
from the consideration of external nature. Ends are 
everywhere found, and ends suppose and demand pur- 
poses. The knowledge of the laws which hold sway in 
the external world is obtained from the study of the 
physical sciences. Pick up whatever branch of science 
)''ou will, there is always found something in the 
language or tone of thought which reveals the universal 
sway of purpose. As in a concerted and well -developed 
course of human action the individual acts conspire 
and combine under intelligent guidance to form one 
harmonious and efficient whole, so in the world with- 
out. The individual objects have a special position in 



EVIL. 301 

the scheme of things and a definite function to per- 
form. They bear definite relations to one another, act 
and interact according to determined and determinable 
laws, thus constituting a closely joined, compact and 
connected whole. Thus we speak of the system of 
nature, distinguish grades of existences in creation, and 
call the universe a divine fabrication." 

8 Q. Some modern writers strongly maintain that mechanical 

" '^ . theory not 

the physical view of nature is in direct opposition to contra- 

^ •' ^^ dictoryto 

the religious. By the former they understand thefinaUty. 
mechanical view; by the latter the teleological. In a 
former chapter the question has been discussed, and 
shown to be not in accord with truth. The error is 
due to a confusion of terms occasioned by a narrow 
frame of mind. The confusion disappears as soon as 
the meaning and sphere of both are defined. The 
mechanical view represents the world as resulting from 
the interaction of physical agencies; the teleological 
as controlled by purposes, whether great or small. B}^ 
insisting exclusively upon either we are led into error 
and become one-sided and exaggerated. The truth 
lies in the harmonious union of both.^ 

§ 10. Two theories conflict only when they give 
different explanations of the same thing viewed under 
the same aspect. There is no conflict when they strive 
to account for different things or are concerned with 
different aspects of the same thing. Thus, e.g.^ Physi- 
ology and Anatomy treat of the human body. They 

^ " There are harmonies in the works of God beyond painter's 
pencil and poet's pen, falling upon the soul with a more melodi- 
ous rhythm and a sweeter cadence than the most exquisite 
music." McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 135. 

^ This chapter may present some considerations in answer to 
the difficulties felt and expressed by Prof. Royce in The 
Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I. The line of 
thought is a development of the Design-Argument which is thus 
shown not to be " a halting half-Theism." lb., p. 279. 



302 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

are different sciences, yet do not run counter to each 
other. Physiology treats of the functions of the living 
body; Anatomy of the structure of the inanimate 
frame. In like manner Psychology discusses the 
nature and activity of the human soul, yet does not 
deny that the process of digestion is carried on accord- 
ing to chemical lav/s. 
mechanical 8 II. The present difficulty is solved in an analogous 

theory con- , . , . , , . . 

cernsthe manner. The mechanical view ot the universe is con- 
finaiity the ccrncd Only with the means or laws of the world-order; 
purpose, the teleological with the purpose of these laws or with 
the order itself. That I have a purpose to accomplish 
supposes the existence of means through which only 
it can be worked out. The means vary according to 
the nature of the end desired. Thus I make use of my 
own words, actions and conduct, or employ the influ- 
ence of friends to secure employment for myself or for 
others. Again, in building a house I use stone, brick, 
cement, wood, according to the principles set forth in 
the science of Architecture. Take, e. g.^ the depart- 
ment of Mechanics. In the steam engine, in hydraulics 
I combine known laws of nature to work out my own 
purposes. Every day man's dominion over the phy- 
sical forces is widening. Are these wonderful machines 
and devices less the proof of definite purposes simply 
because natural forces and material are the means 
employed? The mind of man controls and guides phy- 
sical elements to carry out his own designs. In the 
daily life of the humblest artisan or mechanic we find 
abundant illustration of the manner in which the 
mechanical and teleological views of the world work in 
harmonious accord. Traces of mind working behind 
and through phenomena, prevail throughout the uni- 
verse. The very existence of the marvelous world- 
order is a striking proof. The purposes of the divine 



EVIL. 303 

mind are carried out througrh mechanical and physical modern 

° r ^ science in 

a^^encies. In the divine government both views Record with 

'^ _ f^* Scholastic 

coalesce into a grand harmonious unity. The fact that teaching. 
throughout nature ends and purposes are everywhere 
visible is not only a truth of modern science, it is a 
fundamental principle of Scholastic Philosophy. Both 
are in full accord and this unity of teaching prepares 
the way for a deeper insight into a truth involved in 
the fact and springing from it. 

§ 12. The existence of ends supposes the existence ends 

. suppose 

of tendencies. Thus we speak of an object tending to tendencies. 
an end. The tendency is a quality or property inherent 
in the object by which it passes from a state of rest 
into activity or varies its form of activity in the pur- 
suit of the thing sought. A tendency, therefore, is a 
power of activity which an object possesses. To speak 
of an object without a tendency of some kind is to go 
contrary to all known experience. For tendency is of 
the nature of a thing, and to affirm that a thing is 
without a tendency is equivalent to say that it has no 
concrete existence. 

8 i-^. Tendencies sprinor from the nature of a thing, source and 

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ nature of 

Therefore things of a different nature possess different tendencies. 
tendencies. A superficial knowledge even of the vari- 
ous sciences brings this home to our minds. The forces 
of nature, energy of whatsoever kind, human activity, 
are classed under the common name of tendencies. 
For our present purpose we may distinguish two divi- 
sions only: natural and rational. Natural tendencies 
embrace the forces which prevail throughout inanimate 
creation. The knowledge is found in the physical 
sciences. Their nature and modes of operation become 
the subject of study and experiment. Thus we formu- physical 
late the laws of their interaction, e. g., of attraction, tendencies. 
in virtue of which the myriad bodies of the universe 



304 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

hold their appointed round and a harmonious unison 
prevails. Or we express chemical affinities and pro- 
portions according to which molecules show special 
inclinations to one another so as to form special com- 
pounds, e. g., H2O shows how strong is the affinity of 
oxygen to combine with two parts of hydrogen, thus 
forming the natural element of water. The study of 
physical nature is a concerted effort to investigate the 
properties of bodies and to express them in a scientific 
formula. With every discovery or advance in science, 
the knowledge of the qualities or properties of things 
acquires a corresponding increase. But the properties 
of bodies are nothing more or less than their tendencies 
or inclinations. By reason of these properties bodies 
have definite forms of activity and definite inclinations 
to the objects which make up the environment. 
rational S 14. Rational tendencies are the activities of human 

tendencies. ^ 

nature. The soul of man has two great potencies or 
powers; intelligence and will. The will is the source 
and controlling power of human action. The intelli- 
gence ministers to our activity in so far as it shows the 
will what to do and furnishes motives of action. The 
rational will is characteristic of human nature and 
makes it distinct from lower creation. Beings in the 
scale of existence below man act by a necessity of 
nature; in given circumstances they cannot help act- 
ing, and we are enabled with mathematical precision 
to calculate the direction and intensity of the act. 
Man alone acts from free-choice, and in acting he is 
guided by the intellect which supplies motives either 
for acting or for abstaining from action, or for doing 
the opposite. The will seeks what the intellect appre- 
hends as good. This good excites the desire, which in 
turn arouses our activity and thus takes on the char- 
acter of a final cause. The nature of the rational 



EVIL. 305 

tendency will be analyzed further on; at present the 
problem concerns natural activities and inclinations.' 

S iq. A study of the natural tendencies reveals the mutual in- 

r r 1 1 -1 11, teraction 

existence of ends everywhere in the world about us. for mutual 

,-,..,.. , ,-^, perlection. 

Objects have definite inclinations to one another. The 
near presence of an object arouses another to act. 
Thus we explain the marvelous combination of activi- 
ties in inanimate as well as in animate nature; e., g.^ 
the phenomena of growth. The mutual interaction 
everywhere visible is for the mutual perfecting of the 
objects concerned. The object sought perfects the 
object seeking, just as this in turn is perfected by 
the possession of that to which it tends. 

§ 16. What impresses the student of nature is the subordina- 
defiaite subordination of activities. One object leads tendencies, 
to another, which in turn ministers to another in 
the various spheres of physical science. Natural 
tendencies are the means by which one object acts 
upon and perfects another, just as this object is con- 
ceived as the source or cause arousing the activity or 
tendency. If this object were not present there would 
be no motion or tendency; only a potency to action 
or an inclination to act which would lie dormant owing 
to the absence of a movine: cause. Thus is opened , . ^ 

*^ ^ explained 

up to the mind the notion and function of the final by the 

^ Final 

cause, as an object which arouses the dormant energy cause. 
or potency of another and becomes the end cf the 
other's activity. 

§ 17. We are thus led on to a further consideration. 
Objects do not act upon one another at haphazard. 
There are definite tendencies to definite ends. The 
marvelous order in the universe and the harmony 

^This enables the student to understand the raeani-irj '^f 
** appetitus naturalis, sensitivus^ rationalis''' so frequent in 
Scholastic Philosophy. 
20 



306 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

which reigns throughout can only thus be explained. 

There are determined relations and tendencies. The 

reason must be sought in the nature of the things 

themselves/ 

revear"^^ § 1 8. Tendencies suppose a natural fitness or agree- 

fitnesse ^^^^ between things. An object seeks another in so 

far as it perfects the other in some way. Thus the 

analysis of inclinations reveals the fitness or agreement 

of things. But fitness and agreement shows the idea and 

existence of goodness. We have seen that the notion 

notkfnof of goodness implies a perfection or quality in an object 

goodness, ^j^j^.]-^ arouscs the activity of the agent, fits into its 

natural constitution and perfects it either in being or 

in activity. Whatever, therefore, possesses a fitness for 

the agent in the sense that it excites to action and 

perfects the agent in any way is said to be good.® Now 

this is the object of every natural tendency. From 

this it follows that good is coexistent with tendencies; 

it is their reason and explanation. But tendencies are 

universal throughout nature; therefore goodness holds 

universal sway. 

universal^ § 1 9. The cxistencc of goodness as a fundamental, 

andfunda- universal element in nature is the necessary conse- 

mental •' 

element in quencc of the arg-ument from desisrn.® The universe 

nature. 7 ... 

is a vast system of beings different in nature joined 
one to another and forming a harmonious whole. 
One object ministers to another so as to constitute 
a compact well-connected unity. The tendencies 
or natural inclinations are the means employed 
by the Divine Architect to connect being to being. 
These inclinations are potencies possessed by every 

' Urraburu, Ontolog. Disp. 7, c. 3, a. 2. 

*"Bonum habet raiionem causae finalis." St. Thomas, 
1. q. 5, a. 2, ad. i; " verum est in anima sed bonum in rebus," 
1. q. 16, a. I. 

^ Card. Satolli, de Deo, q. 5, a. 4. 



EVIL. 307 

object; they only become activities through some 
external and exciting or moving cause. The reason 
why an object moves or arouses another from a state 
of potency to action is because it possesses a quality 
which perfects and is fitting to the nature of the agent. 
Now the possession by a being of a quality which 
draws another being to it as to an end and perfects that 
being is what constitutes the notion of goodness. 
Thus an intimate analysis of the world-order shows 
that goodness is the basal element; it is a part of its 
very constitution and its reign is universal and supreme. 

III. 
In Human Life. 

§ 20. The existence of evil in human life is a problem evil in 
much more interesting and difficult. Its closeness tomore^"^'^^ 
our daily lives, its apparent contradiction to the '^'^^*'"^^" 
fundamental desire of happiness, make it a part of our 
conscious selves. It enters into every philosophical 
treatise which proposes to explain the mysteries of 
our being. Many theories have been advanced differ- 
ing in point of view and in the strength of reasoning. 
The true solution is found in the profound study of 
man's nature. Thus Kant and Fichte viewed the 
problem from an ethical standpoint.'" The aim is true 
but the exposition is vitiated by an erroneous phil- 
osophy. 

§ 21. The purpose is not to trace the development the ques- 
of the question in the past. That pertains to the His- '^°"''^'^'^- 
tory of Philosophy. Its present phases are of more 
vital importance. They naturally spring from the 

'®So also Brown in Phil, of Human Mind, Lect. 93; cf. Mc- 
Cosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 32; Sully, Pessimism 

p. 68. 



3o8 



Hedonism. 



(i) subjec- 
tive. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ethical theories of life. What concerns us at present, 
therefore, is to investigate the standard and value of 
human life. 

1°. Hedonist Theory. 

§ 22. Hedonism is the theory of those who teach that 
pleasure is the end of conduct and the criterion of 
morality. Set forth in persuasive language by Epi- 
curus, it deeply influenced ancient Greek and Roman 
civilization." Proposed in our own times by men of 
great authority it has reappeared under a new name 
as a philosophy of moral conduct." Its various phases 
permit a wide scope of human activity. Thus there 
are intellectual, aesthetic and sensuous pleasures. The 
consistent Hedonist, therefore, may be an apostle of 
intellectual culture," a lover of the beautiful, or a 
seeker of sensuous gratification. These forms do not 
appear separated by a rigid line of demarkation. His- 
tory shows that they inevitably run one into the other. 
The influences of a Christian environment, the natural 
promptings of a noble soul may preserve the individual 
from contamination. But there is nothing in the 
theory itself which restricts to one class of pleasures 
only, which forbids the disciple from seeking pleasure 
in the full realization of all his desires. Its legitimate 
consequences are seen in a pessimistic tone of thought," 
in the drama and novel of modern sensualism. ^^ 

§ 23. (i) The theory of Hedonism is subjective. 
As such it is variable. What pleases one does not 
always please another. Hence there is no stable 

1' Cicero, de Fin, I, 9; II, 3; Tuscul. Ill, 18. 

12 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. I, p. i; 
Hodgson, Theory of Practice, vol. TI, ch. 2. 

^^ E. g., Marius the Epicurean, cf. James Seth, Ethical Prin- 
ciples. 

^'^ Royce, The Religious Aspect -^f Philosophy, B. I, ch. V. 

»^ W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 65. 



EVIL. 309 

foundation for human conduct. But this is contrary 
to the testimony of consciousness and is contradicted 
by the universal practice of human legislation. An 
examination of our inner life shows that conduct is 
not governed by mere subjective desire. There is a 
constraining power over our acts which cannot be 
explained by the subjective constitution of the indi- 
vidual alone. Else whence the remorse and sorrow 
which follow evil deeds, the approbation and peace in 
the soul of the righteous? Conscience, the guide, wit- 
ness and judge of oar life, is the voice of a law outside 
and beyond us. Everywhere legislation is controlled 
by a principle which supposes an objective moral 
order. The existence, therefore, of an objective rule 
and guide of morality is a complete refutation of the 
theory of pleasure.^'' 

§ 24. (2) It is wrong to maintain t\\2it pleasiu^e is t'liQ {■£) pleasure 
true and only meaning of good. The good is the object meaning of 
of our desire inasmuch as its possession perfects our'^'^'' ' 
nature. ^^ But in seeking our own perfection we often 
undergo suffering. Thus, e. g.^2. physician gives bitter 
medicine, or performs a painful operation in order that 
health be restored or life saved. Again, I undertake 
excruciating mental labor, or face trials and death on 
the battlefield. My efforts are by no means the dic- 
tates of pleasure; they are accompanied by pain, dis- 
appointment and bodily suffering. Yet they are a good. 
Thus all through life I seek the good^ in seeking 
it I acquire virtue, and I acquire virtue at the dic- 
tates of duty. Where, then, are these words in 
the vocabulary of the Hedonist and what is their 

»6 W. S. Lilly, Right and Wrong, ch. Ill; J. Ming, S. J., Data 
of Modern Elhics, ch. IV; H. Meyer, S. J., Institutiones Juris 
Naturalis, ch. II. 

"Walter Hill, S. J., Ethics, p. 17. 



3IO 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(3) conse- 
quences. 



(a) selfish- 
ness and 
disgnst. 



(b) Utili- 
tarianism, 



meaning? Whether it pleases or not heroism is a 
noble thing! " 

§ 25. (3) That Hedonism is not the true theory of 
moral life is shown by its consequences. These are 
two-fold: (a) It has fostered what is base and ignoble 
in our nature. The consistent seeker of pleasure is 
not a great and good man. The higher springs of 
action are closed to him. He is his own end and the 
acquisition of pleasure is the aim of existence. Hence 
the development of a supreme selfishness.^^ (b) The 
weakness of Hedonism gave rise to another school of 
morals. This, in the hands of Mill, is called by the 
term Utilitarianism. It is an attempt at an improve- 
ment by the introduction of the element, Altruism. 
A critical 
attention.^" 



examination, therefore, demands our 



Utiiitaria 



nism. 



itsprinci- § 26. John Stuart Mill, a disciple of Bentham, 

pie: The • i ^^ 1 r ' • , f 

greatest recoguizcd tnc weakness of nis master s position and 
SiTgreatest attempted to strengthen it by supplying the defect. 
numoer. ^^ j^.^ .^ .^ ^^^ ^^^ individual good which is the 

standard of conduct, but the greatest possible good 
for the greatest number. He is thus the parent of 
the altruistic spirit which pervades modern ethical 
literature. ^^ In teaching that pleasure should be esti- 
mated by quality as well as quantity he departs from 
Bentham. He admits that pleasure is not a principle 



'^ Janet, Theory of Morals, pp. 11, 122. 

^^ Tennyson, The Palace of Art. A good negative criticism is 
given by Prof. Royce, in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 
B. I, ch. VII. 

'° Plato, Philetus and Republic, B. IX; Lecky, European 
Morals, vol. I, ch. I; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. 
II; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, B. I., c. 4; IV, c. I; Muir- 
head, The Elements of Ethics, B. Ill, ch. I. 

"John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism; J. Martineau, Types of 
Ethical Theories, B. II, Br. I. 



EVIL. 311 

sufficient in itself, but that it is necessary to make 
a choice between pleasures. Hence the principle of 
utility." 

§27. In setting forth the basis of Utilitarianism, two ^^^ 
/. ^., the passage from individual to general pleasure, ^^^Pj^"/^^!^. 
which gives rise to the fundamental principle, e. g./^ona-i 
the greatest good for the greatest number, its advocates 
separate into two schools, viz., Empirical and Intui- 
tional. The former, with Mill " and Bain," seek an 
empirical criterion for the quality of pleasure either in 
legislation with Hobbes or in the general estimate of 
mankind." Hence the theory of Empirical Ethics. 
The latter, with Sidgwick,'^^ teaches that we have an 
immediate faculty of rational intuition which informs 
us that the good of others is as desirable an end of 
conduct as our own happiness. Thus we have the 
theory of Intuitional Ethics." 

S 28. Mr. Spencer in the Data of Ethics attempts a Spencer 

.... r 1 t 1 11- 1 • 1 , attempts a 

reconciliation of both schools by introducing the ele- reconciiia- 

. . , . , . tion in his 

ment of evolution. According to this doctrine the Evoiution- 

1 -11 , .,..,,. ary Ethics. 

experience laboriously acquired by the individual is 
transmitted to succeeding generations,^^ In the course 
of time the store of accumulated wisdom increases and 
becomes the precious heritage of the past. Thus what 
is empirical with the race becomes intuitional with the 
individual; " the true basis for a reconciliation between 
Egoism and Altruism is found, and rational laws hold 

^^ Janet, Theory of Morals, p. 13. 

*^ Utilitarianism, 

^*Bain, Moral Science, p. 27; Emotions and Will, p. 203. 

'^^Th. Meyer, S. J., Institutiones Juris Naturalis, ch. Ill; 
Royce, The Relig-ious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 164, 165, 166. 

'® Methods of Ethics, p. 379. 

^"^ ]. Dewey, Outlines of Ethics, p. 46 sq. 

2^ In Germany Ernest Laas teaches the same doctrine. 
Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, p. 177. 

29 Ribot, English Psychology; Leslie Stephens; Science of 
Ethics. 



312 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sway instead of mere empirical calculations and rules. 
Hence the theory of Evolutionary Ethics which is a 
synthesis of the best elements in Hedonism, in Empiri- 
cal and Intuitional Utilitarianism. Under the title of 
Scientific Meliorism, this theory finds able exponents 
in George Eliot and Mr. Sully. 

Criticism. § 29. (i) Mr. Spencer's theory of Evolution is 
only a specious effort at reconciliation. In reality 

cer'stheory it Icavcs the difficultv uusolvcd. The teaching of 

is false : ' . . . , 

(a) assump- moral growth by evolution is a pure assumption and 
is contradicted by facts. It is not true that primitive 
man Vi^as a savage, as the doctrine must assume. Com- 

(b) refuted parativc philology and historical investigation show 

by facts. , . , , . , . , ^ . , - 

that in the earliest known times man had ideas of 
religious and moral truth and expressed these ideas in 
language and institutions which show a high grade of 
intelligence. Again, how in this theory account for 
deteriorating nations and civilizations? Yet every- 
where history points to facts of degeneration. That 
knowledge acquired by parents is transmitted by 
organic evolution is a statement advanced without 
proof. Genius is never thus evolved. The ethical 
value of our present civilization is not due to the law 
of evolution, but to the influence of Christian teaching.^" 
(2)Sidg- g 30. (2) Mr. Sidgwick teaches that the results of 

wick's S o \ J b, 

theory the act are the only tests of its righteousness.^^ Moral 

IS false: -^ ° 

moral good orQod or cvil, therefore, depends on the consequences 

and evil do *=* ' ' x- ~i 

not depend of the act. If the consequences be good, the act is 

on results ^ 

of the act. good ; if the consequences be bad, the act is bad. But 
what then becomes of the distinction everywhere 
recognized between the acts of man and human acts? 
The former are acts performed by man when asleep or 

30 W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, 170, sq.; J. Ming, S. J., The 
Data of Modern Ethics, ch. HI. 

31 Methods of Ethics, B. I, c. IV; B. IV, c. I. 



EVIL. 313 

without consciousness; the latter are those which 
spring from mind and free-will. According to Mr. 
Sidgwick there is no moral distinction. Nevertheless 
there is a distinction and a very great one. It is found 
in motive and free-will which belong to the latter class 
only. Hence not consequences but motives and free- 
choice which antedate the act give to it a moral value. 
Only thus can we account for the moral laws of right 
and wrong. Finally, to make consequences the test 
of morality is to teach an impossible criterion. How 
can any one calculate the possible results of his acts? " 

§31- (3) Just as Utilitarianism defeats Hedonism, (3) Hedon- 
so does Hedonism overthrow Utilitarianism. The utiiftarian- 
basis of Mr Mill's teaching is utility. But utility is ea^h other. 
not a principle. The useful is what serves a purpose; 
hence a means to an end.^^ Now to Utilitarianism, 
this end can only be pleasure. Yet it has been shown 
that pleasure cannot be an end. 

§ 32. (4) Above pleasure and above utility there is (4) law of 
the law of duty. Our inner consciousness bears wit-both.^ °^^ 
ness to the fact. The dictates of this law must be 
obeyed. We know what is right and what is wrong. 
Wq are constrained to do the one and avoid the other, 
even at the sacrifice of earthly honors and posses- 
sions.^* True, we can refuse to obey, but the refusal 
does not destroy the dictate of conscience; it ever 
abides, like Banquo's ghost, the avenger even of a 
secret wrong. ^^ 

32 T. R. Birks, First Principles of Moral Science, ch. III. 

33 Mr. Wallace contends that there is in nature a sense of 
right and wrong antecedent to and independent of utilit^v. Cf. 
Natural Selection, p. 353; cf. also Forum, April, 1891 " Will 
Morality Surviv^e Faith." 

34 Mallock, Is Life Worth Living, p. 47. 

3* Sophocles, Shakspere, Goethe, as Mr. Mallock justly 
observes, depict man struggling or failing to struggle after 
right. In Macbeth the impression left is not that Duncan shall 
sleep forever, but that Macbeth shall sleep no more; not the 



314 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

3°. The Theory of Christian Philosophy. 
evil in i5 -1%. Christian Philosophy teaches that man is a 

animal life. ^.^, . , ^ ^ '' .,,^ ,, 

rational animal. In common with the brute he has a 
perfect animal nature. But over and above he possesses 
the characteristic endowment of intelligence and free- 
will. In discussing the nature and value of evil, it is 
necessary to clearly understand what part pain plays in 
animal life. 

the Animal g 34. Scientists speak of an animal Kingdom. The 
term is based upon and expresses the existence of 
order in the anim^al world. This order is constituted 
by the unity and harmony of tendencies. The animal 

tendenaes. has faculties of scnsc, e. g., sight, hearing, etc., which 
arouse tendencies of various kinds. In the exercise 
of these tendencies it seeks and acquires that which 
perfects its being. Animal tendencies can be reduced 

lre1)Ttwo to two main classes; v^^hat conduces to the preservation 

fiaTses. of the individual and of the species. Besides the 
organs of sense, the animal possesses instinct. Instinct 
is a positive element and accompanies the operations 
of the senses. The study of instinct and of animal 

sanction of activitv rcvcals another element in animal life, viz., 

pleasure ■> ' ' 

and of pain, the Sanction of pleasure and of pain. The sensitive 
life of animals is the source and principle of their 
action. But in acting they have no reason to guide 
them. They have, however, the lav/ of pleasure and of 
pain. Physical evil is the pain which results from the 
lesion of an organ. Physical good is the pleasure which 
follows the true satisfaction of animal tendencies. 
Thus animal pleasure is an instrument to preserve, 
just as animal pain is a natural means to restore the 

extinction of a dynasty, but the ruin of a character. In Measure 
for Measure and Faust, the strugfgle is centered in female 
chastity; this makes Isabella heroic, Margarite unfortunate. 
In Antigone the purpose is to live up to the enduring laws of 
God. Is Life Worth Living, p. 136. 



EVIL. 3,-5 

proper order.^® The animal seeks pleasure and flies ^^ the con- 

* * ^ stitutive 

from pain. In so doinof it conduces to the maintenance element of 

^ ° the order. 

of order. The sensation of pain makes the sufferer 
seek to put an end to the pain. The cessation of pain 
is the cessation of organic disorder. To destro}^ pain 
is equivalent to the destruction of sensitive life, t. e., 
the animal itself. Is not this fact the indication of 
wisdom? Cruelty does not consist in inflicting pain, meaning of 
bat in taking pleasure in causing suffering. There is 
no proof that God is cruel in the pains of animals. 
They alone do not make up animal existence. The 
pleasure derived from the exercise of tendencies form 
the main feature. Pain only enters in as a small part place of 
of animal life, and even then its function is to restore ^nlmiuife. 
the animal organism, to direct animal tendencies, so 
that pleasure may again prevail. ^^ 
8 34^. Furthermore, in the observation of animal pain animal not 

^ -^^ ' . ^ like human 

we are prone to exaggeration. We estimate the suffer- pain. 
ing by the standard of human sensibility. This is a 

T ' -m- • • •<. r cc • • J . (i) element 

radical error. The intensity of oar suffering is due to of inteiu- 
memory of the past, to provision of the future, toiackSg. 
association with others.^® But animals have no intelli- 
gence. The past and future do not accentuate their 
pain. Their suffering is confined to the present only. 
Finally, in limiting pain to the present, we do not 
take into account the difference of temperament. This 
difference has an important bearing on human pain, 
how much more so with the brute? Its nervous encJhT'^" 
organization is not so delicate and sensitive as ours. Janlmion^." 
That very fact lessens the keenness of their suffering. 

^* Mr. Mill admits this in Essays on Religion, pp. 190, 
igi. 

s'Bonniot. S. J., Le Probleme du mal, b. Ill, ch. II; b. IV, 
ch. 5; Chadbourne, Natural Theology, p. 119. 

38 R. F. Clark, S. J., The Existence of God, ch. III. 



3i6 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



good means 
not only 
pleasure^ 
utility. 



suvtmui 
homitn. 



The moral 
order. 



conscience 
a witness 
to it. 



Natural sympathy leads us, therefore, into a vital 
error. ^^ 

§ 35- We have seen that the good admits of more 
than one meaning. It may ^\%x{\iY pleasure^ and on this 
meaning is based the theory of Hedonism. Or it m.ay 
signify utility^ whence arises the theory of Utilitarian- 
ism. The defect in these theories was shown to lie in 
the claim to be the supreme and sole guide of human 
conduct. But ^(?^^ has another meaning, viz., that, the 
possession of which, enobles and perfects our nature 
in the highest and best possible manner.*" This leads 
to the conception of the highest good., the summum 
bonujn, " the discussion of which forms so important a 
place in the philosophy of Plato and of the Christian 
Fathers, especially St. Augustine." 

§ 2,^. Just as a physical order prevails in the material 
world, and an animal kingdom in animal nature, so 
there is a moral order in the world of man. With this 
difference, however, that man alone has the govern- 
ment and guidance of his own acts. Material bodies 
exert tendencies by a physical necessity; animals act in 
an analogous necessity governed by the feelings of 
pleasure and of pain; man alone possesses intelligence 
and free-will, by these he guides and becomes the 
responsible agent of his actions. 

§ 37. But man is not independent in the sense that 
he is a law to himself. In the soul of every rational 
creature there is a hidden monitor which proclaims 
the ineradicable distinction between good and evil. 
Its dictates are part and parcel of our conscious selves. 

2^ J, R, IlHngworth, in Lux Mundi, The Problem of Pain; 
Prof. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 232. 

^" Franzelin. De Des Uno, p. 227. 

^' Hence the distinction in Philosophical manuals of bonum 
delectabile, bo7iu?n utile, boniini honestum. 

^'^St. Augustine, de Beata Vita; De Mor. Eccles., 1. i, c. 3; 
1. 2, c. I. 



EVIL. 317 

Its voice is ever heard in the deep silence of the soul, 
telling what we should do or what we should avoid, 
rewarding with the tone of approval or censuring with 
the pangs of remorse, The voice of conscience is the 
witness of a higher law which has its basis in God. 
Thus we have the conception of a moral order. 

8 ^8. By obedience to the dictates of this law man God is the 

" ^ •' basis of the 

seeks the sfood. The possession of this s^ood perfects moraiiaw; 

^, . . 1 •■, , , . ^ , theultimate 

his nature. Christian philosophy teaches that God end of 

. . human 

IS not only the basis of the moral law, but He is also conduct, 
the supreme and ultimate end of human conduct." 
The life of Christ is an illustration of this truth. He 
everywhere proclaims that we must seek God above all 
things, that He alone is our true and ultimate good, 
and in possession of Him we shall be truly happy.** 
As a means to obtain this end, our highest good, He 
enforces the natural precepts of the moral law; sets 
tfi'em forth more clearly, and adds thereto the rules of 
Christian conduct. Thus revelation throws a flood of 
light upon our end and the means to obtain it. We 
see more plainly the nature and extent of our duties, 
what we should seek and what we should avoid. 

§ 39. We are now enabled to investigate the nature nature of 
of evil. In works of art, evil is a defect of aptitude, 
a defect in the application of the aptitude, a defect in 
the union of the aptitude with the destination. The 
destination determines the value of the work." In 
works of nature and in the acts of man likewise, the 
destination determines the value. Evil, therefore, is 
whatever destroys the destination." It is seated 

*^St. Augustine, De Mor. Eccles. I, 13; de Civ. Dei, XIX, 4; 
Hill, Moral Phil., p. i, ch. i. 

**"Secutio igitur Dei, beadtatis appetitus est; consecutio 
autem, ipsa beatitas." Aug. de Mor. Eccl. 1. r, n. 18. 

^^ Bonniot, S. J., Le Probleme du mal, 1. II, c. 3; St. Thomas, 
C. Gent, 1. II, c. 4: 1. IV, c. 7. 

^^ This meets the contendon of Prof. Knight that the 



3l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

principally in the will, for by the possession of free 
determination man can seek or refuse to obtain his 
destiny. Evil, therefore, is a defect; it is the priva- 
tion of a good demanded by the destination of a being. 
It supposes a positive subject. Of itself it is nothing, 
for all that exists is good in virtue of its reality. All 
that exists, however, is not perfect, /. e., it has not all 
a thing the reality it should have. The absence of that reality 

good by . , ^ , , . , . n . . r 

whatithas, IS the rcason why a being that is good m virtue of 

is evil by , . . . , , ., , r i • i 

what it has v/hat it has, is rendered evil by reason of what it has 
should not, but should have. Now a being can be evil either 
in its constitution, or in its operations, or in its destina- 
tion. Thus defects in the animal constitution of man 
render him an imperfect animal. They are not of 
hesu- necessity evils for 77tan. The refusal of the will to 
obey the dictates of the moral law is the supreme evil. 
wiiitoobV^^^ moral order is thus destroyed. This evil is an 
imperfection of operation and results in the failure to 
reach his proper destination. Other evils in life may 
help the attainment of our last end; they are, there- 
fore, evils only in a relative sense. 

§ 40. Let us turn now to a study of man's nature. 

He is called a rational animal. Possessing a perfect 

animal nature, he has also the distinctive properties of 

intellect and free-will. The life of man is essentially 

j^ a development. In early years he appears only an 

hood law of animal; the sisfns of reason appear later on. As an 

Pleasure ^ . , ^ * . , , 

a;idpain animal the young: child is g-overned by the animal law 

rules. J J=> o ..... J. 

of pleasure and of pain. The cry of the infant indi- 
cates an organic need or disorder; it is thus a natural 
instrument for the preservation of life. With the dawn 

with dawn . , . , , . , . , , , t 

of reason of rcason he IS under the sway of a higher law. JNever- 

knov^ied^e thcless all through life he retains his two-fold nature. 

moraUaw. As an animal he is subject to the inclination after 

argument from Design constrains us to admit a designer of evil. 
Aspects of Theism, p. 73. 



preme evil 
is in the 
refusal of 
will to ob€ 
moral law 



EVIL. 319 

sensitive goods, as a rational being he is under obedi- 
ence of a moral law which inclines to higher goods. 
The needs of food and clothing which when unsatisfied 
cause pain, are at the basis of all industrial progress."^ 

_,, . , . . . . J r • conflict of 

The inclination to sensitive goods otten comes in con- the two 

st3.nd3,rcis 

flict with the dictates of the moral law. This conflict 
is called temptation. Thus, e. g,, fear in presence of 
danger is a law of animal life. But if the moral law 
imposes an obligation to brave danger, e. g.^ in the 
discharge of duty, fear becomes a temptation. We 
should struggle against it and do what we ought to do. 
Thus temptation is the attraction of pleasure and the 
shunning of pain; and is due to the instinctive and 
passionate promptings of our animal nature. These 
movements are good in themselves, e. g., in the animal; 
they only become an evil in as far as they conflict with 
a higher law, e. g,, the moral order. Hence good 
things may become an evil, just as evil things, /. ^., 
pains, may become a good in as far as they are instru- 
ments for the preservation of order. physical 

pain and 

§ 41. The distinction can now be made between phys- n^o^ai eviL 
ical pain and moral evil. The one is not the other; 
they should not be confounded. Even in man physical 
pain is not of necessity an evil; it may be a natural 
instrument for the preservation of order. "^ Man still 
retains his animal nature. Ill deeds entail not only 
suffering of mind, e. g., remorse, shame, etc.; they 
also give rise to bodily pain. The mental suffering and inst'rument 
bodily pain thus become natural signs of disorder or vadon^^*^' 
excess, and natural instruments for the restoration of orden ' 
the right order and harmony which should rule our 



*' Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 77. 

**"Ut, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti 
sumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur." Aug. De Vera 
Rel. XV. 



320 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

lives. Again, the anticipation of pain is often a pre- 
ventative of evil acts and a stimulation to good. The 
knowledge that we shall suffer, if we do evil, is a strong 
motive to good. The factor of pain thus stretches 
out to the future as well as holds connection with 
painan t^he past."^ Finally, pain helps in a higher manner. It 
for virtue, prescnts occasions for actions which are the crown and 
glory of Christian manhood. The virtues of self-con- 
trol, of self-sacrifice, of fortitude, of patience which 
enter into the formation of perfect character, blossom 
only in presence of suffering. Without these human 
action would lose its value, and virtue would degener- 
pain shows ate into selfishness."* Suffering shows the value of life. 

the true . - , . ^ . , 

value of it calls US to a consciousness of our destiny. It reminds 

life 

us that we have not here an abiding dwelling-place. 
The thought of an immortal blessedness hallows and 
transforms our grief, just as the warm sun breaking 
through the rain clouds diffuses its soft v/arm light 
over nature, and makes the drops on flower and leaf 
sparkle like jewels." 
conclusion. g 42. A brief summ_ary of the line of thought can 
now be made. Everywhere throughout nature tenden- 
cies are found. Tendencies are a proof of the final 
cause. The essence of the final cause is the good. 
Of necessity material and animal nature seek what is 
good. Thus the reign of goodness is universal and 
supreme. Man, however, is free in the guidance of 
his acts. He also seeks the good. But the truly good 
in human life is not found in pleasure nor in utility." 

49 J. J. Ming, S. J., lib. cit., ch. VII; J. R. Illingworth, The 
Problem of Pain, in Lux Mundi. 

^° Lecky, European Morals, vol. I, p. 136; Seneca, de Prov.; 
de Beata Vita XV; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 
94; St. Aug., De Vera Relig. XV; Adv. Marc, 1. II, ch. 14; De 
Mor. Eccles., 1. I, ch. VI. 

" St. Paul, To the Corinthians, II, ch. IV. 

'* Mill's objection to God's goodness rests on ambiguity and 



EVIL. 321 

It is had in obedience to moral law enlightened by- 
Christian faith. Thus moral order is preserved. If 
evil enters into human life, it is owing to the viola- 
tion of order by free-will." Pains are not an evil as 
such. They are natural instruments whereby sensitive 
beings are constrained to maintain order. As such 
they become subservient to good. In no way, there- 
fore, can the existence of evil be ascribed to God. 
Creation viewed as His work proclaims His wisdom and 
goodness." 

§ 43. The doctrine is the teaching of Optimism. 
By this we do not mean to say that the present world 
is the best possible world. Leibnitz thought so 
because he felt the position necessary for the defense 
of the Christian concept of God. Such a theory, how- 
ever, is not at all required and is in patent contradic- 
tion to daily experience. The optimism here set forth 
is not absolute, it is only relative. We do not teach 
that the world is made up of the best possible things 
and natures. God could have made us angels, instead 
of frail mortal human nature. We only proclaim the 
rule of order and harmony. Each individual, while 
not the best possible, is nevertheless best adapted by 
nature to minister to the wants and perfection of 
others. Throughout there is an adaptation of means 
to ends; all converging to declare and make manifest 
the glory of the Creator, to show forth His eternal 
wisdom, goodness and power." 

false meaning of the word " happiness." Cf, Essay on Relig., 
p. IQ4; Nature, p. 65. 

^^ " Catholica fides est: omne quod dicitur malum, aut 
peccatum, aut poenam peccati." St. Aug., Lib. Imp. de Gen., 
ch. I. 

^^Thus St. Thomas sees in goodness the reason of creation. 
" Divina bonitas est ratio cur Deus velit alia a se," C. Gent., 
I, 86; and this is made the authoritative teaching of Catholic 
philosophy. Cf. Concilium Vaticanum, sess. Ill, cap. 2; St. 
Aug. Confess., 1 XIII, ch. I. 

" Rom. I, 20; St. Augustine, De Vera Relig., n. 76. 

21 



CHAPTER XVI. 

NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 
The § I. A philosophy of Theism would not be complete 

problem . , , ,. . . . ^ 

Without the discussion of a problem involved therein., 
on whose clear conception the scope and nature of the 
treatise depends. The meaning and sphere of the 
Natural and the Supernatural is a fundamental issue in 
any treatise on Natural or Revealed Religion. These 
words stand for something more or less definite in the 
mind of every thinking man. The ideas which they 
convey are as ancient and as widespread as the exist- 
ence of religion itself. In our own times the great 
advance in knowledge and the use of modern methods 
in history and the physical sciences have inspired the 
effort to purge out the old leaven of error and super- 
stition from the common heritage of man's highest 
convictions and behefs. In this conflict the question 
of the Natural and the Supernatural has been one of 
the outposts most bitterly attacked and most ten- 
aciously defended. It is wise, therefore, before enter- 
ing upon the discussion, to carefully examine the 
ground, to weigh the resources at our command and 
to know the strength of the position. 

I. 

Theory of Positivism. 

The § 2. Positivism as a system of philososphy arose in 

^^gnostic pj-^j^^g under Auguste Comte about fifty years ago. Its 

influence upon modern thought has been wide and 

profound. Starting with a system of definite ideas, it 

gradually assimilated itself to a peculiar mental atmos- 

[322] 



. r'ositivism. 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 323 

phere of the places whither it was carried until at 
present it is distinguished rather as a tone of thought 
or a certain aspect of things than as a clear and 
systematic body of doctrine. Thus it is often con- 
founded with Agnosticism and its adherents have been 
classed Agnostics. More frequently it has been 
claimed as the exclusive property of modern science, 
and, by a certain class of thinkers its subtle meta- 
physics has been spread broadcast as the well-ascer- 
tained conclusions of scientific research and experiment. 
For this reason the view of Positivism is often called 
the Agnostic or the scientific view.^ 

§3. Positivism teaches that direct observation of teaching of 
and experimentation on facts is the only method of 
knowledge. By facts is understood the phenomena 
which are grasped by the senses. Thus the only order 
of existence is the material. Beyond the material 
there is nothing. What is termed absolute and supra- 
sensible is merely the product of the fancy. Comte 
assures us that there is a striking resemblance between 
the childhood of the individual and of the race. Then 
the imagination holds complete sway; fable, not cold 
historic truth is attractive and the world is peopled with 
creations of childish wonder. This he calls the theo- 
logical or imaginative stage and is illustrated in Fetich- 
ism, Polytheism, Monotheism. In reality there is no 
God, no angel, no soul. The man of science whose 
mind has been trained to investigate the positive facts 
of nature and of mankind looks back with a feeling of 
pleasure tinged with regret that he cannot believe as 
he did when a child, but must accept the cold, stern 
realities of life. He considers that these beings of 
fancy are good for children, but should have no place 
with full-grown men. 

'Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. IV. 



324 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 



The super- 
natural. 



Idea of 
humanity. 



§ 4. The supernatural, therefore, is a fiction of the 
mind, a sweet delusion,^ a chimera, or a product of dis- 
ordered reasoning.^ The natural alone exists; it alone 
is the object of knowledge and by natural is under- 
stood physical nature. Physical science thus becomes 
the only aim of an intellectual man. To know^ nature 
is the sole and highest ambition. Not that this knowl- 
edge can lead to anything higher. Physical science 
shows man his true place in the world and furnishes 
what conduces to his real perfection as an individual 
and as a member of society. Thus the physical 
sciences lead up to Sociology, Comte's last and greatest 
effort. Man's well-being is to be obtained by physical 
means. He is purely an animal; Physiology is not 
different in nature from Psychology; and all human 
phenomena can be explained by the action of the 
environment upon the organism." 

§ 5. Comte felt that the idea of God could not be 
wholly eradicated from the human mind by his princi- 
ples. He invented a substitute which, much to the 

'"The rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the 
supernatural, whether in natural or revealed religion, is that of 
scepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand and 
from atheism on the other." J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion, 
p. 242. With the result " that the whole domain of the super- 
natural is removed from the reign of Belief into that of simple 
Hope," lb., p. 244. 

2 In many scientific treatises and in magazine articles we find 
the word supernatural used to designate what is at variance 
with or in violation of natural law." Duke of Argyll, Reign of 
Law, p. 5; Miiller, Natural Religion, p. 119. 

"* The influence of this teaching upon English thought is very 
great. Thus the Duke of Argyll writes " The truth is that 
there is no such distinction between what we find in nature and 
what we are called upon to believe in Religion as that which 
men pretend to draw between the Natural and the Super- 
natural." Reign of Law, p. 50. And " Christianity does not 
call on us to believe in any exception to the universal prev- 
alence and power of law." P. 51. Yet we find him teaching 
" The superhuman and in this sense the supernatural element, 
i> e., the ideal conformity and unity of conception, e. g., the 
vertebrate plan." P. 31, 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 325 

discredit of his vaunted scientific metliod, is nothing 
more than a fiction of the mind. No such being as 
God exists, nevertheless he invented a God for his pur- 
pose. Man is the apex of the animal series, the highest 
product of nature. Now science shows and helps on 
the progress of mankind. This idea of human progress 
and development is uppermost in every mind and uni- 
fies by a common purpose the divine elements of 
struggling humanity. The idea of humanity thus 
becomes a center of unity for the followers of the new 
philosophy and is held up as an object of worship. 
The highest aim is the perfection of the race. Man 
should strive for this, should keep it ever in his 
thoughts, should hold it in reverence and homage. But 
the perfection of the race is accomplished by means o^ 
the physical sciences. Therefore the Natural is our 
only knowledge and our only possession. The Super- 
natural does not exist. 

§ 6. (i) The fundamental error of this theory is the criticism, 
false doctrine concerning the scope and limits of human 
knowledge. The senses do not constitute the only theory^of 
channel through which we acquire truth. We ^re '''^'^^'^^'^^^' 
moral and intelligent beings. The existence of Ethics, 
of Metaphysics, of Theodicy as sciences show that the 
mind can grasp what is above and beyond sense. The 
possession of a spiritual nature, of higher faculties 
mark man out as distinguished from the brute. Intel- 
lect can never be degraded to the level of sense. It is 
the crown and the characteristic of human nature. 
A philosophy that ignores this is false to man's true 
dignity and must inevitably fail. 

§ 7. (2) It is false to teach that the early history of (2) false 
nations can be compared to infancy in the sense that^^^'^' 
the contents of our beliefs are the mere creations of 
fancy, and possess no objective validity and give way 



326 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

to the matarer reflections of sober years. Historic 
research has shown that pure and noble truths were in 
the possession of mankind far back at the very dawn 
of time. Darkness of the understanding and weakness 
of the will may have obscured these truths for a time. 
They shine forth again with renewed splendor and are 
confirmed by the most laborious and exact scientific 
reasoning.^ 

II. 

Theory of Pantheism. 

§ 8. By the natural, the Positivistic theory under- 
stands the physical world only. This lies within the 
scope of sense-experience, our only source of knowledge. 
What is beyond the range of sense does not exist. The 
supernatural, therefore, has no meaning and conveys 
no story any other than the product of childish or 
irrational fancy. 

doctrine. §9. To this the present theory presents a Strange con- 

trast. The Pantheist holds that there is no distinction 
between nature and God. The world about us is the 
emanation from or a manifestation of one divine sub- 
stance. Whether the one reality be termed substance 
with Spinoza, or the ego with Fichte, or the absolute 
with Schelling, or the idea with Hegel, is of little 
practical moment. These are only different forms of 
presenting the same teaching. 

influence. § lo. The influence of this school is not confined to 
writings strictly philosophical. It is found in poetry 
and in literature. Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Words- 
worth, Shelley in England, Emerson, Alcott and the 
Concord school in America disseminate its teachings. 
Modified somewhat by philosophic and scientific dis- 
cussion, it is known to-day as the Neo-Kantian or Neo- 

^ Christian Philosophy, p. loi sq. 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 32/ 

Hegelian system. The leading thinkers in England 
and America welcome it as a last recourse from a 
rampant materialistic scepticism. Nothing can happen 
in nature that contradicts or transcends its laws; noth- 
ing above nature, or contrary to nature, for the power 
of nature, is as infinite and unlimited as the power of 
God. There are no real miracles or supernatural natural and 
occurrences, and the notion of miracle is only of natural, 
subjective importance. The idea of miracle is based 
on ignorance of natural causes. For all God's opera- 
tions follow necessarily from His nature as the pro- 
perties of a triangle from its nature. Thus to Herder Herder, 
revelation is not supernatural in its contents. Jacobi jacobi. 
says God's existence is more evident and certain than 
our own and therefore requires no proof; our spiritual 
consciousness is for us directly transformed into a 
consciousness of God.^ 

§ II. Emerson teaches that the one eternal im ma- Emerson, 
nent being is the soul. It is the universal background 
of our own particular existence. He writes that " the 
currents of this Being circulates through me and I am 
part and parcel of God." Visible objects are merely 
projections of God, the web or clothing of the Soul.^ 
It is everywhere manifest and everywhere the same.® 
To Mr. Green there is one eternal divine substance. Green. 
This is the universal self-consciousness. He teaches 
that consciousness has a double character, unity and 
manifold. As a unity it is an end realizing itself in 
and through the manifold; as a manifold it is subject 

* Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. I, pp. 218, 229. 
The same teaching runs through the Idea of God, by J. Fiske, 
p. 109. 

''To Goethe also the world is the woven and flowing garment 
which at once hid and manifested God's essence. Cf. Fair- 
bairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 196. He 
taught that Spinoza was a Christian Thei:^t. lb. 

^Nature; Over-Soul; The Transcendentalist; Wood-Notes. 



328 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



to change, a means to an end. The consciousness of 
the individual is a manifestation of the one universal 
divine self-consciousness.^ In our own country Dr. 

Royce. Royce is an ardent advocate of Pantheistic Idealism. 
To him the whole universe is nothing more or less 
than a system of ideas. All minds are in essence 
one, and the whole world of ideas constitute essen- 
tially one world with which each individual is 
identified. '° 

The logical § 12. The teaching of Pantheism on the problem of 

inference is 

that the the Natural and the Supernatural is thus easily grasped. 



natural or 
the super- 
natural 
alone 
exists. 



Pantheism assumes logically a Theistic or an Antithe- 
istic form. In the latter there is no place for the 
Supernatural; the Natural alone exists. In the former 
there is no place for the Natural. If I am part and 
parcel of God, if my intelligence is a portion of the 
universal divine self-consciousness," the word Natural 
is devoid of meaning. ^'^ 

§ 13. Some modern writers on Theism accept this 
philosophy as a ground work. They speak of an intui- 
tion of the divine, of the divine idea in the conscious- 
ness, and draw therefrom a proof for the existence of 
God. The aim is to reconcile Hegel's philosophy with 
Christian belief. They forget, however, that the two 
are fundamentally opposed and to combine both is to 
sacrifice truth in the interests of an unnatural harmony. 
God is not the world, and the world is not God. 



^T. H. Green, Proleg. to Ethics, p. 182; W, Fairbrother, The 
Philosophy of T. H. Green, p. 157; Pres. Schurman, Belief in 
God, p. 227, 

Inspirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI. 

^^ Spencer, First Principles, § 34. 

^■^ The Monistic development of this theory is seen in Pfieiderer 
and Lipsius. I'o them the natural and the supernatural are 
different sides of the same process. That which on the divine 
side is viewed as Revelation, is, on the human side, simply the 
development of man's moral and religious consciousness. Cf. 
Pfieiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. IV, pp. 46, 94. 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 329 

Human reason is a participation of the divine light,*' 
nevertheless a created thing. From the consideration 
of our mental life we may reason to God, but we do 
not see God in the mind, nor is our reason the posses- 
sion of God in the sense that human and divine con- 
sciousness are in essence one and the same. We can 
understand how it is that men of devout religious 
nature should attempt a reconciliation. The criticism 
is that the peculiar frame-work of the philosophic 
system renders a reconciliation impossible. Their 
minds are prepared to accept truth and eagerly seek 
the truth. Through no conscious fault, however, they 
possess error and falsehood. 

IV. 

Theory of Dr. Bushnell. 

§ 14. Some forty years ago the Rev. Dr. Bushnell history, 
attempted a solution of the present problem in a work 
entitled ** Nature and the Supernatural." The volume 
is interesting both for the novelty of the doctrine set 
forth and for the broad scope and apparently unbiased 
tone of thought. He recognizes that Natural and 
Supernatural are two different words in the English 
language, which have different meanings and admit of 
different application. Far from hedging or explaining 
away the difficulty, he boldly faces the task and broaches 
an explanation which was eagerly taken up by the 
religious world. Succeeding writers on the Theistic 
controversy accepted the theory as the simplest 
solution of an anxious problem. We find it per- 
meating contemporaneous thought and broached by 
writers like Prof. Knight," Dr. S. Harris/' Prof. 

»3 St. Thomas, i, _q. 84, a. 5. 

** Aspects of Theism. 

" Philosophic Basis of Theism. 



330 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



doctrine. 



human 
agency 
is super- 
natural. 



not entirely 
however. 



Bascom,'" Coleridge/^ Noah Porter/^ and Prof. 
Fraser." 

§ 15. To Dr. Bushnell the Natural is what is under 
the law of cause and effect. " Nature is that world 
of substance, whose laws are laws of cause and effect, 
and whose events transpire in orderly succession under 
those laws."" The supernatural is what is outside 
the range of cause and effect. It is " that range of 
substance, if any such there be, that acts upon the 
chain of cause and effect in nature from without the 
chain, producing, thus, results that by mere nature 
could not come to pass." 

§ 16. So much for the definitions. He then proceeds 
to illustrate and make clear his meaning. We, as 
powers of activity, are not in the line of cause and 
effect; we are free in our own choice of actions or of 
objects. The idea of our personality is therefore 
supernatural. The whole range of human agency over 
the powers of nature is supernatural.^' Acts which 
spring from human liberty, e. g,^ lifting a weight, 
criminal or artificial acts are supernatural." Man 
stands out clear and sovereign as a being supernatural 
and his definition is that he is an original power acting 
not in the line of causality but from himself." 

§ 17. Nevertheless, he continues, it is erroneous to 
think that man is wholly supernatural. In certain 
parts or departments of the soul, e. g., memory, 
appetite, passion, attention, imagination, association, 
disposition, the will-power is held in contact with con- 

'^^ The New World, June, 1895, art. The Philosophical Basis 
of the Supernatural. 
" Aids to Reflection, 
^^ Science and Sentiment, p. 285. 
^® Philosophy of Theism, pp. 249, 255, 269. 
^^ Nature and the Supernatural, p. 43. 
^' P. 45. 
'' P. 44. 
23 P. 51. 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 33 I 

ditions and qualities that are partly dominated by laws 
of cause and effect. As far as they are concerned, man 
is pure nature. He is only a power superior to cause 
and effect at the particular point of volition where his 
liberty culminates, and where the ministration he is to 
maintain over his whole nature centers.'^* Hence all win is 
the functions of the soul, will alone excepted, are natural, 
nature." Whatever is will, or is the effect of free 
agency is above nature. Thus true manly heroism is 
supernatural,'^® and character is supernatural." All free 
agencies, the created and the uncreated, are, as being 
free, essentially supernatural in their agency.'^® 

§ 18. (i) The advantages of the theory are at criticism, 
first sight obvious. For this reason it has com- 
mended itself to many minds perplexed at difficulties bil and^^' 
which seemed to defy solution. By fixing the scope Jeous.^" 
of the supernatural so as to include free action, whether 
created or uncreated, the truth of its existence was 
established beyond question. If my free choice, or 
the influence which I exert over the forces of nature 
are supernatural, then I am directly and immediately 
conscious that the supernatural is a reality. The 
sphere of miracles is likewise extended and I cannot 
gainsay their possibility. For, in this theory, miracles 
would not be specifically different from human action. 
Hence the truth of the miracle could be proved by 
showing the power of the will over inanimate nature." 

^4 lb. 
"lb. 
5« P. 56. 

'^ P. 85. So also with John Stuart Mill. Nature means " not 
everything which happens, but only what takes place without 
the agency or without the voluntary and intentional agency of 
man." General Result, pp. q, 64, on Nature. Dr. Momerie 
inclines to the same view. Basis of Belief, p. 14, 

^^ This criticism is made by Mr. Lecky relative to the Duke 
•of Argyll. Cf. Reign of Law, ch. I. 



332 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(2) not of § 19. (2) The benefits obtained by the sacrifice of 
truth are only apparent. They are never lasting or of 
real value. The extension of the supernatural beyond 
just limits, the restriction of the scope of the natural, 
do not advance us a step nearer the solution. The 

(3)errone- distinction is confusing, and under severe analysis 
stands without warrant. According to Dr. Bushnell 
the natural embraces physical and animal nature. But 
why exempt man? Is he not within the limits of 
nature? And is not the will a natural endowment? In 
the exercise of voluntary action man is not transcend- 
ing the sphere of his own nature. 

IV. 

Theory of Christian Philosophy. 

its import- § 20. The distinction between the Natural and the 
Chrisdan Supernatural is a cardinal one in Christian Theology, 
philosophy. ^^.^,^ ^^^ Incarnation of the Son of God and the fruits 
of the Redemption, the superabundant " riches of 
grace " and of " glory " were made manifest to men. 
In developing the teaching the Fathers of the Church 
made use of v/ords and phrases best fitted to express 
with fullness and precision the meaning of these great 
truths. Thus in course of time certain words became 
crystallized in Catholic teaching, having borne through 
the fire of criticism the precious heritage of divine 
truth, 
fiaturai. § 21. " Natural " is that which belongs to nature. 

Supernatural is what is above nature. The whole dis- 
cussion, therefore, centers on the meaning and scope 
of the word nature, 
mature. § 22. The word Nature is employed in more than 

(i) cause of one scnsc. In poetic language and in Pantheistic 
''^^'^^^' teaching Nature is spoken of as the producing cause or 



NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 333 

governor of the universe. Again, we are wont to ask 
what is the nature of such and such a fact or phenome- 
non. In this sense the word nature is used for essence (2) essence 
and the answer we expect is supposed to indicate how° 
the fact or phenomenon is constituted. Yet in strict 
philosophical language nature means more than 
essence. It signifies the essence of an object viewed (3) essence 

^ •' viewed as a 

as the principle or source of the activities which the principle of 

•^ '^ action. 

object exercises. 

82^. Viewing^ the term Nature in this latter sense, hence its 

^ ^ ^ scope and 

we can clearly perceive that Nature means (a) what- meaning. 
ever pertains to the essence of a thing inasmuch as it 
is a constitutive part; (b) whatever is required for the 
specific perfection of a natural object; (c) whatever is 
within the scope and limits of an object acting accord- 
ing to the laws of its own intimate constitution. If we 
employ the term nature, not in an individual, but in a 
collective sense, then the Natural means whatever 
does not exceed the activities and exigency of the 
beings which go to make up our visible universe.^" 

§ 24. With this firm in mind we can say that the application. 
Natural means (a) the material universe with its forces, 
as set forth in the Physical Sciences; (b) the organic 
world, the properties and activities of living bodies, as 
explained in Biology, Physiology, Anatomy, Zoology, 
etc. ; (c) everything that pertains to the constitution 
of human nature, /. ^., not only bodily organism and 
life, but the higher powers of mind and of will as 
exposed in Psychology, the course of man's history on 
the earth, e.g., Anthropology, the duties and relations 
to fellow-men in society, e. g., Ethics, Sociology, Poli- 
tics, etc. The powers of mind and of will, therefore, 
are natural. The knowledge we acquire by the use of 
our mental faculties, the power we exercise over our 

^* Schrader, de Triplici Ordine. 



aatural. 



334 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fellow men, the creative products of genius, are within 
the scope and sphere of the natural. ^^ Language 
justifies our exposition. We speak not only oi physical 
nature or of organic nature with Dr. Bushnell, but we 
discourse about Jmman nature. Thus the word natu7-e 
in its collective sense, /. e., the natural order, embraces 
the beings and activities of not one or two, but of 
the three great spheres of natural objects, 
super- § 25. The definition of Supernatural now is made 

very simple. It means whatever is beyond and above 
the scope and exigencies of nature. The word is 
employed to designate whatever belongs to the 
economy of divine grace. Thus revelation, sanctifica- 
tion, the light and strength we obtain in prayer through 
the merits of Christ are supernatural. Created nature 
by itself is unable to elicit supernatural acts; they are 
over and above its power; they depend on free gifts 
bestowed by God for our justification. Above nature, 
they nevertheless perfect nature by raising the soul to 
a participation of the uncreated life of God. 

^' " What man has ascertained by the unaided exercise of his 
own powers is termed natural." J. Dimon, The Theistic Argu- 
ment, p. 22. 



CONCLUSION. 335 



CONCLUSION. 

Thus the principles of sound philosophy show that 
our belief in God has a basis in fact. The data were 
drawn from our own nature and from the world with- 
out. They are the well-established results of the 
modern sciences. In reasoning from these facts, we 
pursue a course that cannot be questioned. The 
principles of reasoning employed are at the very 
foundation of thought. Falsely stated at times their 
truth comes out upon closer analysis.^ 

It is often urged that our conceptions of God repre- 
sent Him as a human being. The difficulty is more 
specious than real. The explanation is found in the 
examination of our mental life. Composed of body 
and soul we are so constituted that sense impressions 
arouse thought, and that the mind in action expresses 
its thoughts by sense images. Thought and sensa- 
tion are different, yet go together in our conscious 
lives. Thus abstract and immaterial concepts are 
expressed from the data of sense-experience. So we 
must express God from the content of our own knowl- 
edge. In representing Him we choose the highest 
symbols of our conscious experience. In the visible 
world man is the highest and noblest creature. God 
is therefore expressed after the analogy of man.'' At 

* It is not true, therefore, to hold that *' theism is the funda- 
mental postulate of our total life. It cannot be demonstrated 
without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking 
all our interests . . . Strictly proved by nothing . 
implicit in everything." Prof. Bowne, in Philosophy of 
Theism, p, iv. This savors of Kant, ib., p. 32. In the same 
breath Prof. Knight calls God " the great postulate " and " the 
universal essence of all things." Aspects of Theism, p. 28. 

'St. Aug. De Gen. Contra Manich., 1. I, n. 27; Quaest, in 
Levit. 93; De Gen. ad Lit., 1. VT, n. 20; Mr. Fiske admits this. 
Idea of God, p. 135. 



336 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the same time we are conscious that the expression is 
imperfect and insufficient. We confess that the limi- 
tations of our minds do not enable us to represent God 
as He really is and as we conceive Him to be.' Pure 
thought passes beyond the bounds of sense, yet in 
expression must make use of the data derived from 
sense. Thus viewed anthropomorphism presents no 
difficulty. We do not make God like ourselves.* We 
employ the highest figures we know and admit that 
they fall far short of the reality.' 

The various proofs alleged in the preceding pages 
should not be viewed as separate and distinct. They 
coalesce into a unity. The various sciences represent 
each only a part of created nature. The universe in 
its entirety cannot be known from one alone. We do 
not confine our reasoning to one grade of existences 
nor to one kind of proof. All things come from God 
and all reveal the hand of their maker. But they do 
not reveal Him in the same manner." The world of 
thought points to a foundation Truth; conscience and 
the moral order tell that He is just and righteous. 
The unity in the ever-changing multiplicit)'' of external 
things show that one Being of intelligence and will is 
the cause of the wonderful adaptions we see about us, 
the reason of their conditioned dependent existence, 
and the sufficient cause for their movement.' The order 

3 St. Aug. De Mor. EccL, n. 17; De Vera Relig., n. 99; 
Confess., 1. I, ch. IV; 1. VII, ch. I; 1. VI, ch III. Yet Mr. 

Fiske tells us that the knell of anthropomorphic or Augustinian 
theism has already sounded. Idea of God, p .134. 

^ Fiske, Idea 0/ God, ch. VIII, develops this view; criticised 
by Prof. Knight, Aspects of Theism, pp. 129, 211. 

5 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolychum, I, cap, IV. 

®" Quod et reriim creatarum sit effector (Deus), et lumen 
cognoscendarum, et bonum agendarum; quod ab lUo nobis sit 
et principium naturae et Veritas doctrinae et felicitas vitae." 
St. Aug. De Civ. Dei, 1. VIII, ch. 9. 

' Janet, Traite Elementaire, p. 848 



CONCLUSION. 337 

prevalent in the material, organic and human world 
reveals a Providence which guides all to their appointed 
end, and exerts a special care over man. The notion 
of goodness is obtained from the analysis of finality 
and is made more evident in the study of human life. 
Thus from a close study of nature we rise to the knowl- 
edge of a great and good God.^ Christian revelation 
takes these fundamental aspects and throws greater 
light upon them. God reveals Himself in His own 
divine Son." 

The purpose of this volume is to collect the scattered 
rays of light which flash in upon the mind from created 
nature and to show that they converge behind the 
world of sense in what the agnostic falsely calls the 
Great Unknown. God is and can be known. The soul 
instinctively rises to Him in prayer. The acquisition 
of modern knowledge does not lead us to throw aside 
the belief of childlike piety. A closer study of nature 
and of life grounds still deeper in the mind the truth 
learned when a child. In the sublime song of the 
Psalmist we may say "The heavens show forth the 
glory of God," or with St. Augustine, **Donot seek 
without; enter into thy own self; in the inner man 
dwelleth the truth."" 

• Mr. Muller's criticism that the three famous arguments, 
Cosmological, Ontological and Teleological, have collapsed 
before the tribunal of Formal Logic, is by no means sound. 
Physical Religion, p. 240. 

^ St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb., 1. I, n. 5. 
'0 De Vera Relig. 27 



INDEX. 



Abiog-enesis, 1O2. 

Absolute, 19. 

Abstract unity, 217. 

Acoustics, 238. 

Act, pure, 228 ; and potency, 113 

Ages, intellectual, 5; middle, 5 20- 

scientific, 12. 
Agnosticism, 5, 6, 9, n, 58 ; influence 
of, 6, 22 ; ongm of, 7, 12 ; doctrine, 
7, 16, 166, 322 ; causes, 8, 14 to • 
principle of, 19; remedy for m • 
true form, 21. 
Anatomy, 241. 
Ancestor worship, 50. 
Anthropology, no; theory of, 41. 
Anthropomorphism, 335. 
Apologetics, 12, 60. 
Appearances, 10. 

A Priori argument, 64; forms, 65- 
history, 89. ' o - 

Aristotle, 6, 20, 145, 177. 
Art and nature, 159. 
Aryan, 35. 

Association school, 10, 19, 57. 
Astronomy, 77, 103, 237, 247. 
Attraction, 135, 139. 
Avesta, 33. 

Bam, 10. 

Bampton Lectures, 12. 
Bentham, 10. 
Berkeley, 9, 81. 
Bible, 24, 38. 
Biogenesis, 107. 
Biology, 24, 106, 240. 
Brahman, 193, 195. 
Buddhism, 275. 
Bushnell, Dr., 329. 



Conscience, 83; its office, 87, ^i6- 
argument from, 88. " ^ . 

Consciousness, 72 ; divine and human. 
57, 69 ; and idea of God, 63. 

Contradiction, principle of, ^6.' 

Contingency, argument from, 95, 

Cousm, 184. 

Creation, 179, 202, 207. 

Criticism, The Higher, 24. 



Came, Hall, 24. 

Galvanism, 15. 

Carlyle, 16. 

Categories, 9. 

Causality, n, 117, 237; nature of, ng • 

termed, 121 ; with Hume, 122 • with 

Mill, 125; final, 149, 151; efficient, 

151 ; argument from, 126. 
Chance, 157, 170, 173. 
Chang-e, fact of, 96. 
Chemistry, 97; elements limited, gS • 

basis, loi. ^ ' 

Color, assimilation of, 244 
Collective unity, 211. 



Darwinism, 168 ; and finality, 170. 
Deism, 22. 
Democritus, 14. 
DesCartes, 8, 46, 81. 
Desires, fundamental, 83, 91, 
Dieii-Progres, 82. 
Dualistic Theory, 200, 206. 
Dynamic Theory, 137. 

E. 

Earth, formation of, 106. 

Eleatic school, 179. 

Eliot, George, 6, 14, 24. 

Emanation Theory, 180, 204 

Empiricism, 8. ' 

Energy, conservation of, loi, 106 2<;q • 

potential and kinetic, 136. 
Erigena, 179, 183. 
Essence, 9, 72 ; composition, existence 

and, 225. 
Ethics 13, 84, 154; evolutionary, 311. 
Ethical, culture, 220 ; Dualism, 201 
Evil, problem of, 275, 297 ; in human 

life, 307 ; in animal life, 314 ; nature 

of, 317 ; and pain, 319 
Evolution, . ; and belief in God 41 
^ 49, 53 ; with Hegel, 68 ; theory of, 165' 
Excluded Middle, principle of, 76 
Existing and possible, 72. 
Extraordinary, 263. 

F. 

Fact and inference, 251 

Faith and Existence of God, 59 ; mor- 
al, 79. 

Fatalism of Spinoza, 189. 

Fathers, 60. ^ 

Feeling, theory of, 59, 80. 

retichism, 39. 

Fichte and ontological proof. 68 • re- 
ligion with, 221. . . c 



[339] 



340 



INDEX. 



Finality, principle of, 149, 164, 305 ; 
proof of* 158 ; method of, 175 ; inter- 
nal and external, 177 ; not a sign of 
imperfection, 178 ; complicated, 24.9 ; 
with Hartman, 291 ; in material 
world, 300. 

Finite, 11. 

First Principles, 17, ; of thought, 75. 

Fiske, 3, 22, 161. 

Flight, phenomenon of, 241. 

Forces not alike 162. 

Four Noble Truths, 279. 

Fundamental Desires, 83. gi. 



O. 

Gathas, 33. 

Generation, spontaneous, 107. 

Geology, 105. 

Ghost-worship, 50. 

Gnostic, 182. 

God, problem of, i; existence of, 71; 
message about, i; idea of, pp. 3, 60, 
63, 70, 231; not only an object of 
faith, 12, 17; unknowable, 15; know- 
able, 21, 337; in Calvinism, 15; belief 
in God a psychological fact, 13, 26; 
universal in place, 27; in time, 29; 
expression of the belief, 28, 43; not a 
philosophical unity, 31; names for, 
32; a self-existent unity, 36; origin 
of belief, 45, 95; existence of God not 
a postulate, 59, 79; two-fold knowl- 
edge of, r i; belief in God a psycho- 
logical necessity, 69; not in any cate- 
gory, 227; a pure act, 228; not a soul, 
228; proofs for God coalesce, 336. 

Good, love of, 92; nature of, 297, 306; 
and pleasure, 309; and utility, 311, 
316; and evil, 318. 

Gotama, 278. 

Grote, 18. 

H. 

Hamilton, 11, 20, 

Happiness, longing for, 92. 

Harmony in physical and mental 
worlds, 77. 

Harrison, 14, 22. 

Hartley, 10. 

Hartman, 200, 289. 

Hedonism, 290, 292, 308, 313. 

Hegel, 13, 57, 79 division of his fol- 
lowers, 67; and ontological argu- 
ment, 68 ; doctrine, 215. 

Hindus, Sacred Books of, 30; Panthe- 
ism of, 179. 

History, Philosophy of, 2, 5; of thought, 
5; of Religion, 29, 62. 

Humanity, Religion of, 80, 218, 324. 

Hume, 9, 50. 

Huxley, 6, 12, 16, 163. 



I. 

Ideal appearances, 10. 
Idealism, 9, 17; phenomenal, 19; true, 
82. 



Ideas, innate, 8, 47; belief in God, 45 
with Plato, 46; with DesCartes, 46 
with Leibnitz, 47 ; with Hegel, 68 
universal, 31; singular and particu 
lar, 72; with Royce, 81. 

Identity, personal, 70. 

Idolatry, 32, 39. 

Ignorance, fact of, 80. 

Immanence of God, 229. 

Individual, the measure of things, 18. 

Individuality in Buddhism, 195. 

Infinite, 12; known by special faculty, 
58 ; inconceivable, 59 ; number, 112 ; 
series, 114 ; in space and time, 115 ; 
motion, 143 ; with Fichte, 199. 

Inscrutable, 15. 

Instinct, 153, 173. 

Intellect, 59 ; and sense, 20 ; and truths 
73- 

Intelligible, 74. 

Intuition, forms of, 9; of God, 57, 58, 



JCant, 9, II, 17, 20, 79. 

Kinetic energy, 136. 

Knowledge, theory of, 8, 59, 60, 287 ; 
forms of, 9 ; materials of, 9 ; with 
Tyndall, 14 ; object of, 17 ; relativity 
of, 17, 82 ; simple and comprehen- 
sive, 21 ; of God twofold, 61 ; of 
visible world, 97. 

li. 

Law, of inertia, 19, 135, 138 ; of con- 
servation of matter, 105 ; of conser- 
vation of energy, loi, 136; of 
dissipation of energy, 102 ; meaning 
of, 234 ; reign of, 236 ; natural, 256, 
262. 

Life, explanation of, 14 ; desire of, 92 ; 
beginning of, 106, no; preservation 
of, 243 ; value of, 285, 290. 

Linguistics, 42, 71. 

Literature, 6, 26. 

Logic, 6, 13, 18, 20, 75 ; of Mill, 10 ; 
logical principles, 76 ; composition, 
227. 

M. 

Man, achievements of, s ; study of, 26 ; 

primitive condition of, 54 ; acts for a 

purpose, 84. 
Manifestation theory, 189, 205. 
Mansel, 12, 19. 
Materialism, 113. 
Mathematics, 77, m. 
Matter, nature of, 206. 
Maya, 195. 
Mechanical. 271 ; combination, 74 ; 

theory, 135, 161, 167, 301. 
Mental Life, 64, 70, 79, 83. 
Metaphysics, 13, 24, 78 ; principles 

of, 75- 
Metaphysical society, 7 ; compound, 

224. 
t Meteorology, 247. 



INDEX. 



341 



Method employed, 2, 30, 63, 232. 

Mill, J. S., 10, 16, 18, 20, 50 ; and caus- 
ality, 125 ; James, 10. 

Mind, powers of, 8 ; in universe, 82, 
174. 

Miracles, 260, 266 ; possible not actual, 
268. 

Modern thought, 3. 

Monism, 69, 165. 

Monotheism, primitive, 30, 40. 

Moral, man, 83, 85 ; law, 83 ; sanction, 
86, 318 ; order, 84, 316. 

Morality and God, 83 ; with Kant, 89 ; 
effects of, 90 ; independent, 222. 

Motives, 155. 

Movement, fact of, 96, 129 ; nature of, 
130; definition of, 130; with Hegel, 
132 ; kinds of, 133 ; argument from, 
134, 144 ; due to external cause, 140 ; 
infinite series of, 143 ; circular, 143 ; 
and attraction, 135. 

Mutation, 140. 

N. 

Nature, meaning of, 332 ; unity of 
physical, 84 ; of man religious, 93 ; 
uniformity of, 125 ; and art, 159 ; 
prodigality of, 248 ; order of, 249 ; 
laws of, 262 ; and supernatural, 
322 ; in Christian Philosophy, 332. 

Nebula theory, 104. 

Neo-Hegelians and belief in God, 69 ; 
and miracles, 265. 

Neo-Kantians, 22, 24, 80. 

Neo-Platonism, 183. 

Noble Eight-Fold Path, 282. 

Nomenalism, 20, 71. 

Nothing and creation; 203. 

Noumenon, 10, 17. 



Objects, external, 9. 

Ontological argument, 65 ; with Neo- 
Hegelians, 69. 

Ontologism, 56, 57. 

Ontology, 75. 

Order, argument from, 147 ; and final 
cause, 148 ; is intrinsic, 176 ; and 
providence, 233 ; of nature constant, 
266 ; of nature and miracles, 267. 

Organic Kingdom, purpose in, 248. 

Organs, bodily, 152 ; useless, 250. 



P. 

Pain, problem of, 286 ; and pleasure, 
314, 318 ; and evil, 319. 

Pantheism, 16, 46, 212 ; ethical, 382, 176 ; 
Cosmic 4, 22 ; Idealistic, 69 ; and de- 
sign, 172 ; forms of, 172, 179, 214 ; and 
the supernatural, 326. 

Parker, Theodore, 16. 

Pasteur, 109. 

Pessimism, 93, 275, 292. 

Phenomenalism, 10, 194. 



Phenomena, 9, 14, 17 ; and final cause, 
150 ; worship of natural, 31. 

Philology, 30 ; and primitive man, 42 ; 
and Christian doctrine of God, 62. 

Philosophy, Christian, 3, 347 ; of His- 
tory, 2, 5 ; problem of, 8 ; English, 
10 ; of the Conditioned, n ; synthetic, 
16 ; modern, 17, 20 ; of Mind, 21, 25, 
71 ; false, 10 ; scholastic, 71. 

Physics, 99, 239 ; physical compounds, 
226 ; effects of prayer, 253 ; laws, 258 ; 
scientists and miracles, 266. 

Physiology, 152, 241. 

Plato, 46, 64, 71, 145. 

Polytheism, 36. 

Positivism, 13, 19, 23, 323. 

Possible things, 72. 

Potential energy, 136 ; unity, 213. 

Prayer. 253 ; and modern scientists, 
255 ; value of. 257. 

Priestley, 10. 

Principles First, 17, 22. 

Protestantism, 15. 

Providence, 231 ; in material world, 
235 ; special, 270 ; Psychology, 14, 
153. 

M. 

Realism, 71. 

Reason, practical and theoretical, 60, 
79 ; operations of, 76. 

Reid, II. 

Relativity of Knowledge, 82. 

Religion, 2, 63; natural, 16; and science, 
17 ; philosophy of, 23 ; history of, 29, 
63 ; nature, 30 ; Vedic, 32 ; of hu- 
manity, 80 ; man's nature religious, 
93- 

Revelation ; ver. philosophy and his- 
tory, 23 ; feeling, a channel of, 60 ; a 
source for knowledge of God, 61. 

Ritschel, 22, 24. 

Royce, 89, 91. 

S. 

Scepticism, 9, 16, 46, 58, 81 ; and this 

age, 2 ; and XVIII Century, n. 
Schelling, 79, 200. 
Scholastic philosophy, 71 ; and modern 

science, 303. 
Schoolmen, 60, 65, 
Schoppenhauer, 200, 283. 
Schurman, 6. 
Science, 6 ; physical, 12, 24, 272 ; value, 

13 ; methods, 14, 15 ; and religion, 17. 
Scotch School, 4. 
Self, the, 191, 194. 
Sense, 8 ; and intellect, 20 ; and the 

infinite, 59. 
Series, infinite, 114 ; of causes and 

effects, 127. 
Sex, 153. 

Socrates, 5, 7 ; his work, 6, 9, 20. 
Sophists, 6, i8. 
Sorrow, in Buddhism, 279. 
Soul, II ; made in image of God, 61 ; 

not identical with God, 70; longings 

of, 83 ; in Buddhism, 194 ; its nature, 

326 : and spirit, 229. 



342 



INDEX. 



Spencer, 6; lo, 14, 22. 49 ; and idea of 
God, 50 ; and finality, 163, 167. 

Spinoza, 22, 188 ; and fatalism, 189. 

Spontaneous generation, 107. 

St. Augustine, 3, 64, 78. 

St. Thomas, 3, 5, 20, 23. 

Stoics, 179, 187, 

Structure, 134. 

Substance, 9, 11. 

System, solar, 104 ; perturbations in, 
246 ; human, 152. 



Tendency, 154 ; rational, 304 ; subor- 
dination of, 305. 

Tennyson, 24. 

Theistic, 3, 4 ; argument, 11 ; philoso- 
phy, II, 57. 

Theodicy, 23. 

Theosop'hy and idea of God, 55 ; pan- 
theistic, 55 ; and special faculty, 58. 

Thermo-Dynamics, 100. 

Thought, 8, 86 ; history of, 5 ; modern, 
10 ; religious, 15 ; Gospel of modern, 
24 ; problem of modern, 25 ; God a 
postulate of, 58 . 

Transcendentalism, in New England, 
58 ; German, 198 ; theory of, 190. 

Transmigration, 277. 

Truth, rehgious, 15 : false presenta- 
tions of, 15 ; its nature, 18 ; objective, 



59, 74, 79; reign of, 77; knowledgre 
of, 80 ; aspiration for, 91. 
Tyndall, 6, 14, 49. 

U. 

Unbelief, 15. 

Unconscious, the, 289. 

Unitarians, 16. 

Unity, at basis of things, 77 ; of phys- 
ical nature, 84 ; of moral life, 85 ; of 
God, 209 ; simple, 211, 223 ; collective, 
211 ; potential, 213 ; abstract, 217. 

Unknowable, 11, 14, 19 ; can be known, 
22. 

Unknown cause, 260. 

Upanishads, 31, 181, 187 ; sage of the, 
196 ; problem of the, 276. 

Utilitariarism, i6, 299, 310. 



Varuna, 34. 
Vedanta, 191. 
Vedas, 30. 

i W. 

"Ward, Mrs. Humphrey, 7, n. 
\ Will, with Shoppenhauer, 284. 

World, not self-created, 14 ; physical, 
76 ; visible, 97 ; stellar, 104 ; had a 
beginning, 115 ; limited, 116 ; de- 
pendent, 202 ; government of, 239 ; 
organic, 240 ; phenomenal, 285. 



SD 18 ^ 



'•^^. 







°o 



« o 



-v A *^te!i^«^ '^ aT" ^^' 



9*0 















*^ • ^ C^ ^ * ^ >. **^*C Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.] 

%j^ *■«•*• < V ^ "^i^ ' Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide I 

• »•'*♦ ^b -4.^ «*fc^*«^ "^^ Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 



•^ ^c^^j^*^ ^jp Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 9^ 

'^bv^ f'^^^^" ^^ PreservationTechnologies 

Q^ > 'i^'^^^^^* H A VifORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION , . t: 

^ <j^ * *^^^^!^'* >► 1 11 Thomson Park Drive 1 %' 

I ti* **r^^«'* "^ Cranberry Township, PA 16066 * 

^^ ^5* a {724)779-2111 *' 






.^''^ '^^ **?^* .,o'^ 




.^^ .._ "^^. *--*\^^ 







. >.., .^^\';«k:. -^ 












'°.-,-.-.v'^>...,\:'^>' \-.-.„ 




■/ ^^ "^^ 







/ ^^' "•Ji 



















.* ^^^ *^„ 











«>^^ 



^°-^^, V 






D0B8SBR0S. , %1* '** • ^ " A ^ 

t..»^RY B.ND.NO , t / , ^ ^ ^'^^ „ O « O ^ *i> 

ST. AUGUSTINE ^ ' 



32084 








